McNeil Receives WHA Award

The next item on the agenda is a real pleasure for me. Since I first read *The Rise of the West*, shortly after publication in 1963, the name of William H. McNeill has been synonymous with world history for me, as it has been for most of us.

We sometimes joke about the difficulties of tracing the history of something as simple and familiar as the World History Association. There is the official Air Force account of our origins and the Cameroonian revisionist interpretation. No one, however, would have any difficulty in explaining the rise of world history as a movement and as a field of study. It is due to William H. McNeill.

In *The Rise of the West*, and then over and over again in...
McNeil continued from page 1

effects of human interaction, to name only a few.

Before William H. McNeil, it was possible to say that world history could not be taught, that the subject was too large or ill conceived. After *The Rise of the West* such comments can only be made from ignorance. *The Rise of the West, Plagues and Peoples, The Pursuit of Power*, and over two dozen other volumes show anyone willing to learn that world history can be not only conceptually and heuristically respectable, but also fascinating, richly informative, and enormously valuable.

But I don't have to tell any of you in the World History Association that. Bill McNeil has been our founding father and friend. As he retires this year, not only from what he called in his dedication in 1963 "the community of scholars constituting the University of Chicago," but also from the original executive council of the World History Association, we say thank you—and keep in touch.

To ensure the latter, the executive council has voted to make you a lifetime member of the Association, a recipient of all the rights and bulletins assigned thereto. If we might borrow a sensible Japanese idea, we would like you to consider yourself a sort of genro, welcome to visit or advise anytime.

To say thank you, we would like you to receive this plaque. It says:

William H. McNeil  
Doyen of World History  
Our teacher and inspiration  
Founding father and friend.

In appreciation  
The World History Association  
December 28, 1986

A PLEA continued from page 1

tion, even though they do not understand each others' languages, cultures, or politics. It is therefore a world of rising violence which may well lead to the nuclear winter. And more, in that wide open and treacherous world nobody possesses an adequate overview.

Even the most learned people persist in thinking and working within limited perspectives. Among the run of people we even observe a defensive shrinkage of awareness, back to roots, back to the old certainties which, under present conditions, produce even more tension and insecurity. Nobody can handle all the information now swirling around the world. Who can keep up even with the scholarly literature in their own field of specialization? The world has grown over everybody's head, of individuals as well as of governments. We live in a global Tower of Babel.

As teachers we are well aware of the disorderly, not to say disoriented, state of mind among our students. The old liberal arts canon of meaning, intellectual discipline, and integrated knowledge focused on the European or Western experience, has disappeared for good. Our students' awareness—like that of our public generally—is that of the newscasts into which are channeled the latest events, undigested and unexamined, from all over the world, mostly the non-European world. In addition, our students, like the run of our contemporaries, are overwhelmed by the rapidly proliferating specialized knowledge in all fields of human endeavor (history included), as well as by avalanches of trivia or plain intellectual and spiritual dirt. When you confront that audience with history as presented in the monographs and scholarly articles, you can hear it grunt: so what? And rightly so. Given the conditions of the world in which we live, most of the work turned out by the academic history industry is of the "So What?" variety. How under these conditions can we teach and write meaningful history?

Meaningful history in the anarchic community of our interdependent world must offer suitable perspectives intelligible to all humanity and at the same time dissolve the prevailing mutual incomprehension and hostility. Like national history in its heyday, global history must develop transcendent and unifying viewpoints. At its core stands the search for tension-reducing, awareness-raising overall perspectives. Meaningful history may be concerned with relatively minor events, even with local history, provided that its topics are viewed in the global perspective. All events around the world have long been shaped by a global constellation of conditioning factors. If in the case of any historical phenomenon in the past several hundred years we ask "why?", we have to take into account the global matrix, or else our understanding remains incomplete or even aggressive. We have no choice but to rise to an all-inclusive worldwide perspective.

If we accept the necessity of global perspectives we will

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World History
 PATTERNS OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
 Peter N. Stearns, Carnegie-Mellon University

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have to admit that all intermediary perspectives are superseded; they have lost their usefulness. Or more pointedly in our context: all the perspectives, all the criteria by which history has thus far been organized—and is still organized—are outdated and meaningless. What we produce is either "So What?" history without reference to civic concerns in our interdependent world, or immoral, nation-centered history contributing to the escalating global tensions. By our lack of insight into the dynamics of social and political change into which even the smallest events have long been set, we share the responsibility for the inhumanities which we deplore as we read the news.

Clearly then, our historic perspectives must be framed not by our nation-based past but by all-inclusive contemporary experience, by an understanding of global interdependence. It is not true that "knowledge of the past is relevant to our understanding of the present and to exercise freedom of the mind" (as Diane Ravitch has recently argued). On the contrary, it is knowledge of the present which shapes--or should shape--our understanding of the past. All those who want to produce meaningful history and achieve a liberating sense of control over human destiny, should therefore first thoroughly familiarize themselves with the world in which they live. In our reasonably secure and self-contained settings of the past we could take the context of meaning for granted. Under present circumstances we have to create those contexts consciously and deliberately before we can proceed with meaningful historical work.

It is no longer entirely true, then, as Santayana remarked, that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Now, at a major transition in the human condition, we should rather say: those who cannot interpret the past responsibly are bound to repeat it. Or, to paraphrase Kierkegaard, "life must be lived forward, but it can only be remembered backwards" as seen from the present, in the light of present and foreseeable future need; history must be taught and written forward. Responsible interpretation grows out of putting the events studied into the global context, into perspectives that help remove all cause for further inhumanity resulting from in comprehensibility. The historical remembering currently so fashionable—especially in the case of the holo caust—surely leads to further holocausts; all the furies of this century, carefully packaged into well-researched histories, are thereby conveyed into the future. We need therefore to adjust the inscription on the Yaf Vashem monument in Jerusalem: Salvation lies in responsible remembering, in understanding the causes of inhumanity for the sake of removing those causes—which in this age can only be done from an overarching global perspective.

In attempting to rise to a global overview, however, we encounter major problems. Our capacity to understand the dynamics of global events is severely limited. We live in a world tightly packed with mutually incompatible languages, cultures, and political systems. How much can we, people of one culture, understand the people in other cultures on whom our well-being and survival depend? Here we stand to gain from a radical cultural relativism as a realistic starting point in the search for valid global perspectives. In support of this contention let me quote the testimony of a cultural anthropologist, E.T. Hall: "No matter how hard man tries, it is impossible for him to divest himself of his own culture, for it has penetrated the roots of his nervous system and determines how he perceives the world." Put differently: when dealing with other cultures, we—and everybody else around the world—practice "cognitive imperialism." There exist no cultural universals providing a common language for trans-cultural understanding. We therefore have no choice but to interpret the others by our own lights, never able to see the others as they see themselves, never fathoming their motives and all-too-often dangerously misinterpreting them. We do this even when we try our best to escape from ethnocentrism. Given the inescapability of "cognitive imperialism," we always have to ask in all questions of cross-cultural understanding: who understands whom on whose terms? In the last analysis, cross-cultural understanding is a matter of raw power: who has the power to make his own understanding prevail? Brute power is the only global universal recognized by all.

Similarly in all cross-cultural comparison—a phenomenon of the utmost political importance at a time when modern communications have made worldwide invidious comparison a daily habit—the question is: who compares himself with whom on whose terms? Again, the question is answered in terms of raw power: who has the capacity to impose their own terms? Naturally, in all American historical studies of non-American peoples and cultures are inescapably comparative studies (a fact not commonly recognized) we only see an Americanized world, a world interpreted according to the limited perspectives of American political and cultural evolution as embodied in our language, attitudes, and institutions. Admittedly, we observe different intensities of cognitive imperialism, from American conservatives at one end of the spectrum to the more sophisticated among ethnographers and anthropologists. But even the latter seem naive in fathoming the power aspects in cross-cultural understanding.

The soundest attitude in this respect may therefore be relentless caution. We really do not understand and, for that reason, should proceed in historical studies, as in politics generally, with the utmost restraint. In all questions of fact—and even more of moral judgment—we should constantly remind ourselves that we really don’t know. And more, we should be aware that we cannot offer convincing proof that, if we have lived under the same conditions as those other peoples, we would have acted according to our presumably superior moral ideals.

There crops up a further problem in dealing with a world tightly compacted of many different cultures: we do not understand the nature of the cultural envelopes into which all human actions are set. The visible and documentable surfaces with which historians and social scientists deal are but a part—the lesser part—of the totality of factors at work. Underneath the visible evidence lies a hidden matrix of factors and motive that is still largely unexplored, even though it makes our concepts and ways of thinking operate in the manner expected. It is that hidden dimension which, for instance, keeps
our freedom from deteriorating into anarchy, or makes our rationality reasonable, or our technology socially constructive. All events—and surely also all historical events—should be viewed in that elusive submerged cultural context which has shaped them. As long as we do our historical work within our own cultures, we can take the invisible contexts for granted. But even here, once we compare our history with that of others (as we generally do without even noticing it), we should be holistic, viewing as much as possible the aspects selected for comparison within the total matrix of causation. Comparison of items considered in isolation and torn from their contexts is not intellectually respectable. Nor is employing terms like "freedom," "human rights," or "common sense." In inter-cultural comparison they yield no insight; they rather contribute to misunderstanding.

In short, in trying to develop an adequate global perspective for our historical studies we run into profound cognitive obstacles. We do not really understand. And if we try to understand with the help of a greatly enlarged sense of causation, we find ourselves burdened with enormously expanded dimensions of knowledge; we are caught in a new determinism. As Tolstoy remarked at the end of War and Peace, the greater the distance from which we observe human affairs and the greater our knowledge, the more the area of freedom shrinks and the area of necessity expands. We can liberate ourselves from that determinism only by maximizing our knowledge of determining factors, by probing into the hidden dimensions of cultural conditioning. This obviously requires us to draw on all fields of human knowledge. Global history has to be a thoroughly interdisciplinary endeavor, exploring all facts of human existence, venturing far beyond the surface evidence contained in historical sources.

Global history—it will have become clear—is an enormously difficult undertaking, though no more difficult than living responsibly in our interdependent world (it is difficult enough to be a responsible citizen in a modern nation). The first task of such history would seem to be sorting out, in the manner here suggested, its basic parameters. What are the cognitive problems? What simplifications in concepts and generalizations have to be achieved, what abstractions, what myths, introduced? And more: how much time and energy can we afford to give to the past when the present and foreseeable future needs are so urgent? The human carrying capacity is limited. How much of the past can we, who inevitably have to live forward, carry with us? Human progress is enhanced as much by forgetting the old as by learning the new. Global history means forgetting the traits and convictions that have divided people in the past. What then should we remember, what forget?

Concerned with questions like these, global history must be, at its initial stages at least, "theoretical history." We first have to sort out, in our minds, the conceptual framework, the coordinates of guiding criteria. We have somehow to cover, in our personal lives as well as in our studies, the enormous distance between our ground floor existence and our involvement in global affairs. We have to widen our own awareness and that of our public to the outermost sphere of human interdependence. "Theoretical history" means reordering existing knowledge rather than probing for more historical details. New perspectives create new facts. Let us establish the new perspectives first and then let these perspectives determine what constitutes relevant facts and relevant targets for research.

Obviously such resetting of perspectives entails unprecedented risks. There exists no consensus on this subject. Our endeavors remain experimental. They also run counter to the current contraction of sociopolitical perspectives; they are likely, in the eyes of traditionalists, to be considered politically or professionally subversive. Yet they are the only course of action open to intellectuals who do not want to be accused of le trahison des clercs. Let all scholars examine their own consciences regarding this issue. We live in an extraordinary, unprecedented age. And intellectuals, historians included, who do not think in scale with that age, are not worth their salt.

Thinking in scale with the age of intense global interdependence obviously means at this stage conducting intellectual experiments in our writing and, more directly, in our teaching. The professional heroes these days, one might perhaps say, are not the renowned academic celebrities, but the anonymous teachers who try to put together a world history course for the benefit of students whose future depends on their grasp of contemporary reality.
pectively.

*The Human Venture* has a number of strengths, both in terms of its intellectual approach and its suitability as a textbook. The work is truly global in perspective. In general, Esler provides a well-balanced view of developments throughout the world. *The Human Venture* is not a revised Western civilization textbook that contains a few short, obligatory chapters on the rest of the world. Esler provides adequate coverage of Sub-Saharan Africa, pre-Columbian America, and the Americas after the wars of independence. Although Esler's focus is on civilization, he also discusses people such as pastoralists and agriculturalists who lived apart from civilization. He describes their lifestyles, notes their achievements, and in general avoids the usual unflattering stereotypes when referring to them.

Another strength of the textbook is that its chapters on particular civilizations display considerable breadth. In addition to examining the political and religious systems, Esler provides subsections on each civilization's intellectual and aesthetic achievements in areas such as literature and the visual arts. Volume II even contains two excellent chapters that explore the development and the growth of a truly global culture during the twentieth century. Esler also gives a balanced overview of each civilization's social structure. For instance, he discusses the position of women, not only noting the achievements of major historical figures, but also mentioning the diverse roles played by women during a certain period of time. Moreover, Esler tries to describe the daily lives of the non-elite.

In general, *The Human Venture* has much to recommend it as a college textbook. In addition to its perspective and breadth, the work is well-organized and clearly written. Esler's style is frequently lively and crisp, especially when he describes the physical setting of a particular civilization and the lifestyle of its inhabitants. The work contains numerous maps, some of which are excellent, and also includes a wide variety of photographs which help provide a sense of the particular civilization. Esler is also good at discussing multiple explanations for a particular development, whether it be the industrial revolution, the overseas expansion of Europe, or the outbreak of World War I. Students also like the summary at the end of each chapter. During the past seven years DePaul University has used six different textbooks in its world civilization program. Both students and faculty seem to prefer Esler over the others.

In spite of these many strengths *The Human Venture* does contain certain weaknesses. Although Esler's perspective is global, he largely ignores developments in Southeast Asia. He provides a brief description of classical Southeast Asia, but makes almost no mention of European imperialism and the rise of nationalism in the region. Even the war in Vietnam receives scant attention. Esler also could have expanded his comments on popular Hinduism and the bhakti cults, and he says little about the responses in Asia to the West during the nineteenth century. There are also occasional problems with Esler's organization. In general he begins each chapter with a discussion of a civilization's political history and men-
tions its religion later. At times it would seem more logical to reverse this order since religion was frequently an important factor in giving rise to political history. This seems especially true in the chapters on Mesopotamia, ancient India, and Islam, where Esler's organization at times results in confusion. For instance, in his chapter on Islam he mentions the Shi'ites in the section on political history, but only explains later who they are and why the Sunni-Shi'ite split occurred. In terms of organization his least successful chapters appear in Volume I where he discusses Sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas together. It would have been less confusing for the students if he had devoted one separate chapter to each area.

On occasion students have also complained that Esler is too brief and does not provide adequate explanations. To cite two examples, in his chapter on Mesopotamia he states that the political structure was feudal, but does not define the term. Moreover, he never explains why he classifies the pueblo Amerindians as pre-urban. Although students like the summaries at the end of the chapters, professors are less enthusiastic, suspecting that the summaries actually discourage students from reading the chapters in their entirety.

Depending on his or her perspective and field of specialization, any professor who teaches world civilization can come up with a list of factual errors and questionable interpretations after reading even a good textbook. For instance, Esler's acceptance of the idea of three distinct races is disturbing, as is his use of the term Mongoloid to describe peoples as diverse as the Chinese and the Cambodians. He has confused the concepts of caste and varna in his section on India and he has incorrectly translated the Arab term *hegira* as flight rather than migration. His comments on the relationship between Taoism as a philosophy and a religion are incorrect and he fails to mention the printing press as an important factor in the Reformation. This is only a sample. However, the number of factual errors and points on interpretation is not unusually high. Overall, in terms of perspective, coverage, and suitability, *The Human Venture* appears to be one of the best, if not the best, world civilization textbook on the market.

Bruce L. Fenner
DePaul University

**Twentieth Century World**


*Twentieth Century World* offers students a viable survey of the major developments of this century. In clear, straightforward language, in chapters of manageable lengths, Carter Vaughn Findley and John Alexander Murray Rothney present their version of a multinational history of the contemporary world.
In Chapter I they present a description of the forces that they believe have shaped change and caused conflict in the twentieth century, such as: "global interrelatedness," "the rise of the mass society" and the "triumph of technology" over nature. Terms and phrases come from many disciplines, and each is carefully defined. Any hint of jargon is dispelled in an effort to avoid weighted meanings. This approach and these efforts to generalize about human experience in the twentieth century are the great strengths of the text. The last chapter follows the same pattern, again presenting students with concepts, in this case areas of concern for the future such as population growth, scarcity of resources and nuclear weapons. These chapters and two comparative essays on cities from different parts of the world set the history in a global, thematic framework.

In contrast, the four parts of the central text give the history chronologically according to traditional Euro-centered units that will be more familiar to students. Discussion in each time period begins with Europe and the United States. For example, it is "The End of the European Empires" after World War II, not "The Emergence of New Nations in Africa and Asia." Two parts are devoted to the other regions of the world: with a chapter in each section on Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Each chapter begins with a masterful summary of ideological, political, and economic changes in that region. Then specific countries are described in more depth; for example: Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba; Nigeria and South Africa; India, Turkey, Iran, China, and Japan.

The weakness of the text is that despite the best efforts of the authors, the orientation remains implicitly favorable to the Western model of change and Western values—especially the United States and its way of life. This occurs because the authors have divided the world into two kinds of cultures, the one "believing in change for its own sake," the other, committed to "inherited, sacrosanct pattern." The distinctions are presented as a descriptive device but have the effect of establishing a comparison that leads inevitably to statements like "Western civilization is the most advanced of all" (p. 228). To take such a position is understandable especially in a text written for United States students, but could be more explicitly acknowledged by the authors as their view.

Overall this is a sound, clearly written text. The organization follows a pattern compatible with traditional Western civilization courses. Supplemental readings could fill out the picture of Latin America, Africa, and Asia and highlight what has been unique, indigenous, and effective in their political doctrines, their choices about government, and their strategies for economic and social change. Those using the text may also want to add materials on women and the United Nations. Both are mentioned only briefly. The premises, themes, and conclusions offer challenging topics for discussion.

Judith P. Zinsser
United Nations International School

Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900

Alfred W. Crosby is well known to teachers of world history for his pathbreaking book, *The Columbian Exchange: The Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (1972), a thought-provoking study of the transatlantic migration of diseases, plants and animals during, mainly, the century or so following the Columbian voyages. My students have been intrigued with Crosby's discussion of smallpox and syphilis, maize and dandelions, horses, and pigs. The book succeeds admirably in introducing undergraduates to two important topics: biohistory and Europe's domination of the Atlantic world in early modern times.

Crosby's new volume is a further contribution to our understanding of the history of the biota and the rise of the West, all the more so for being conceived on a temporal and spatial scale grander than that of *The Columbian Exchange*. Indeed, the book begins 180 million years ago (!) with the breakup of the supercontinent known to geologists as Pangaea and the subsequent formation of the principal floral and faunal regions of the world. But Crosby's main subject is the emergence of "Neo-Europes" around the globe beginning in the tenth century, i.e., societies in regions far from Europe which nevertheless have populations that are mainly European in origin. As Crosby sees it, the prototypes from these settlements of Europeans, following the collapse of the Norse colonies in Greenland and Vinland as well as the demise of the Crusader states in the Holy Land, were the islands of the eastern Atlantic—the Azores, the Madeiras, and the Canaries—all of which were thoroughly Europeanized during the fifteenth century. The major portion of the book focuses on the making of the most important Neo-Europes: North America (north of Mexico), southern South America (present-day Argentina, Uruguay, and southern Brazil), Australia, and New Zealand, the latter country serving as the subject of the longest chapter.

Crosby's central argument will be familiar to readers of *The Columbian Exchange*. The successful geographical expansion of Europeans was not so much the product of a superior military technology as it was due to the way in which the European biota—a distinctive package of plants, animals, and, above all else, pathogens—overwhelmed the isolated and less diverse life forms native to other temperate lands. On the one hand, the inability of the Norse in Greenland and Vinland and the Crusaders in the Holy Land to found permanent European settlements serve as negative confirmation of Crosby's thesis: Greenland was too cold for European grains, and the Vinland Norse (fortunately) did not bring with them the epidemic diseases necessary to decimate the Amerindians; the Crusaders failed in the Near East because they caught malaria and died in droves. On the other hand, the emergence of permanent Neo-
Europe off the coast of Iberia and Morocco and in the Americas and Australasia was, in essence, the triumph of European grains, weeds, horses, cattle, pigs, rabbits, honeybees, and diseases over the biota indigenous to these regions.

This book should be a valuable resource for teachers of world history. I found the chapters on the Atlantic islands, on the European discovery of the oceanic winds and currents, and on the coming of the British to New Zealand to be especially illuminating. The writing is strong, occasionally witty and full of well-turned phrases. The book abounds in interesting tidbits of information. While much of Crosby's overall thesis necessarily relies on inference and conjecture--as he freely acknowledges--the argument is plausible and, equally important to this reader, suggestive and stimulating. Crosby now has to his credit another significant contribution to our understanding of how the world got to be the way it is. Does he have more in store for us?

Stephen S. Gosch
University of Wisconsin Eau Claire

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A Modest Proposal
Frank Huyette
Auburn Union School District
Auburn, California

This proposal is called the "Modified European Scope and Sequence" (MESS) Plan. It is presented as a means of opening a dialogue on improving ways to prepare this nation's students for a complex world.

The existing scope and sequence for history/social studies in most of our schools follows an overlapping of both due to the "expanding horizons" in the elementary grades (kindergarten-six) and then a series of nonrelated courses at the secondary level (seven-twelve). This lack of a truly unifying structure is a major weakness of our current history/social studies program. The MESS plan combines the existing American and European scope and sequences in an attempt to bring order to the problem. This proposal takes into consideration the current pedagogical and existing teacher's concerns.

Grades kindergarten through four would keep the expanding horizons; kindergarten--Self and others, first--Home and school, second--Individuals and group relations, third--Communities, fourth--State (past and present). The mental maturity of the students and the available materials makes this series appropriate.

The major shift from the existing scope and sequence occurs in grades five through eight with a change from "place" to "time." This shift would be a more effective approach to the understanding of the historical forces at work on the world of today. Grade five would cover the time period of earliest man to the sixth century A.D. The central focus would be on the beginnings of civilizations throughout the world. The areas of social studies, science, myths and biography can be formed into a core program.

The sixth grade would continue with the time period of A.D. 500 to 1600. This would allow for a study of traditional societies from the early Middle Ages through the Reformation and European worldwide expansion. This time period would also allow a continued study of geography and early history of the Americas.

The seventh grade would cover the period of 1600 to c.1900 with its central focus the growth of the United States in world setting. This focus would allow an in-depth study of geography of the United States.

The eighth grade would be centered on the twentieth century and the United States as a world power. This division into a two-year course has two advantages. First, the twentieth century is usually not taught in depth in a one year course, the two-year course can correct this. The second advantage is that political literacy can be included as an integrated part of study.

The high school would retain the world history/geography and U.S. history and other courses. With the MESS Plan the students can have more time to study the political and economic world. The mental maturity will allow the more abstract concepts and vocabulary to be better understood.

The MESS Plan has many advantages over the existing scope and sequence. For example:
1. The emphasis in grades four-eight on social history will place academic history on a level of understanding to most students and forms a direct link from primary grades.
2. The use of the sequence of years will aid in the understanding of chronology.
3. The change in emphasis from social to political history will mean that the U.S. or world history courses would not be "reuses" but "new" history each year.
4. Teachers would be able to use their existing skills and preferences, e.g., sixth grade still has Latin America.
5. The plan will make students recognize the need to maintain their knowledge of content and skills from year to year.
6. The need for a new series of textbooks would allow the inclusion of recent research of history and social sciences.

I believe that it is the role of schools to have our students be able to use their knowledge of history and the historical methods to recognize realistic options in order to make rational decisions in the present and the future. The MESS Plan offers a better way of doing this than the current scope and sequence that we find in our nation's schools.

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Joint-Session Of World History Association And International Society For The Comparative Study Of Civilizations
H. Loring White
Panama Canal College (Emeritus)

"Periodization in World History" was the topic of the first joint-session of the World History Association and the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations on
May 30, 1986. The WHA-ISCS joint-session occurred at the ISCS Fifteenth Annual Meeting held at the College of Santa Fe, Santa Fe, New Mexico. The session was chaired and organized by H. Loring White (Panama Canal College); and the presenters were Loyd S. Swenson (University of Houston), Robert E. Roeper (University of Denver), and H. Loring White. This session was well attended, filling every available seat.

Such a broad topic resulted in approaches that were complementary rather than closely related, and the three presentations ranged from a comparison survey to a comparative analysis of selected thinkers to a specific proposal. Loyd Swenson opened with "A Taxonomy of Timelines," in which he surveyed and compared a number of periodization schemes. Illustrating with charts and books, he explored what he termed the "systematics of chronologies." His exhibits ran a gamut from the creationist and compendious Illustrated Chart of History (Sebastian C. Adams, 1871, 1984) to the highly systematic and culturally analytical scheme of Darcy Ribeiro (1968). He also considered the interesting Histotmaps of John B. Sparks (1931, 1975), Bernard Grun's exhaustive (and perhaps exhausting) The Timetables of History (1964, 1975), R.H. Carling's The World History Chart (1985), and The Times Atlas of World History (ed., Geoffrey Barracough, 1978). Characterizing the creators of such schemes as "chronographers," Swenson conveyed a very full sense of their variety. He was followed by Robert Roeper, whose "The Mega-Historians and the Periodization of World History" offered both a comparison and a commentary on the periodization schemes of Marx, Toynbee, and William H. McNeill, plus a brief look at recent periodizations by Anthony Esler and himself. Roeper's critique of Marx's "stages of society" scheme (precivilized, slave, feudal, capitalist, communist) demonstrated that this periodization does not fit non-Western civilizations; that class struggle and technological change do not account for all historical change; and that Marx's technological determinism is an unexplained deus ex machina.

In the case of Toynbee, Roeper pointed out that here again a paradigm of stages (genesis, growth, breakdown, disintegration) seems descriptive of only the societies of western Eurasia, and because "civilizations have been non-synchronous in the timing of their evolution," applying the Toynbeean stages to all societies leads to results that are confusing in their complexity. On the other hand he found the greatest value in Toynbee's system to be in the "explanations of how and why civilizations moved from one phase to another," because such "explanations are essentially psychological in character and provide valuable, if not final, clues to the character and grounds of the human behavior that gave rise to historical changes... "

Next Roeper indicated that William McNeill's periodization avoids the "stages of society" and instead presents a "scenario" of major "acts" (dominance of Near East, Eurasian equilibrium, rise and dominance of West), subdivided into episodes. Roeper argued for McNeill's "dramatic" model because it comprehends all civilizations and other cultures, and because it enriches and strengthens macrohistorical study with two perspectives unique to the craft of history: (1) that of "conscious purposive action," an approach not used in social science, which focuses on men and groups in a narrative sequence; and (2) that of the "contingency of events" which reveals elements in historical change that elude the "systematic dynamics" of the internalized models of civilizations which are based upon stages of development. Thus the dramatic model of McNeill gives significant attention to external peoples, the civilizational outsiders whose interventions have regularly altered the courses of civilizations. However, Roeper faulted McNeill's scenario because of its tendencies to oversimplify the internal development of civilization, and to downplay the themes that counterpoint the Rise of the West. He concluded with brief looks at the periodization of Anthony Esler (in the recent textbook, The Human Venture) and at an "eclitic" one of his own; both, like McNeill's, are scenarios of history, but both, in being more comparative, deal more with the problems of particular civilizations.

The session concluded with Loring White's "A Technological Model of Global History." The paper's premise is an expanded definition of technology which comprehends mental as well as physical means of accomplishing tasks; thus, there are technologies of politics, society, aesthetics, and even knowledge. This paper pursues the idea that innovations in the totality of technology comprise the major cultural events that set humanity off on new courses of development. These technological changes appear to have manifested themselves in the change from gathering to food production, the emergence of cities, the development of rationalized knowledge, the coming of a hemispheric ecumene, the creation of modern science, and the recent growth of science and its effects upon culture. From these epochal changes, White hypothesizes eight major periods in human history:

- Protocivilization (6000-3000B.C.)
- Urban I (3000-1800 B.C.)
- Urban II (1800-500 B.C.)
- Protoscientific (500 B.C.- A.D. 500)
- Ecumenical (500-1600)
- Scientific I (1600-1800)
- Scientific II (1800-1950)
- Recent (since 1950)

Each period's uniquenesses and differences are characterized by "clusters of technology," e.g., food production, complex social system, rational knowledge system, governmental systems, mass communication systems; "main movements" in history and culture, e.g., the development of cosmopolitan society in the ancient Middle East, the coming of the Eurasian ecumene, the development of science and scientific method, the industrialization of material processes; "cultural lags and conflicts," e.g., the early reduction of common humanity to subsistence and servility, the prolonged cultural archaism of Urban II, the decay of non-Western traditions in modern times, the recent increase in the capacity of government to regulate human life; and an interregional and multiculturial focus on the "creative cultural areas" dominant and innovative during each period.
Thus this world-historical model attempts to counter ethnocentric bias (a fundamental impossibility) by bestowing to each culture with a share of attention based upon its creative contributions and role in history's main movements. Further, it is similar to a model recently suggested by William McNeill which would trace the development of human power over the millennia, surveying both good and bad effects and revealing the incremental quality inherent in this master trend ("The History Teacher," August 1985). In conclusion, White pointed out that this teaching model is characterized by a simple structure, consisting of a small number of components repeated in parallel and appropriate in length for a course of study; and that it stresses developmental trends, highlights cultures during periods of creativity, reaches for a tragic dimension by considering conflicts along with progressive changes, and last, in the shift of focus from one region to another and in the avoidance of anatomizations of particular cultures, it deregionalizes history. *

**Winner Of First Annual World History Essay Contest, 1986**

*Thuy Pham, A Junior at Cody High School in Cody, Wyoming*

**VIETNAM CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE**

*Introduction*

The Vietnamese Conflict sometimes called the Vietnamese war, started in 1945 and continued until now, 1986. First, the Vietnamese were fighting the French in the French War from 1945 to 1954; then their own civil war started in 1954 to about 1964. The war was between North Vietnam, the Communist, and South Vietnam, the Noncommunist. The United States did not want to see Vietnam fall to communism so they aided South Vietnam, while Russia and Communist China aided North Vietnam. American aid and troops lasted from about 1964 to 1973, and the South fell two years later. After the defeat of South Vietnam on April 29, 1975, many Vietnamese fled to other countries to find peace from communism. My family and I are Vietnamese now living happily in Cody, Wyoming. We were once some of the boat people who fled from South Vietnam six years ago.

**The Essay**

The French Indochina war between Vietnam and France lasted for eight years from about 1946 to 1954. The French wanted to regain their control of Indochina after World War II but Indochina wanted to be an independent state. War broke out, and during it my grandfather fought against the French with the Viet Minh. Indochina got their independence on May 7, 1954 after they defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, their last battle.

At the Geneva Conference after the fall, the representatives from France, South Vietnam, Viet Minh Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States talked over the terms of the French war on May 8, 1954. The two most important terms that they agreed upon were the demarcation line which separated North and South Vietnam at exactly the 17th parallel, and the 300 days of free movement across the line the Vietnamese were given. My father's family were living in Hanoi and decided to move to South Vietnam. (1)

North Vietnam, ruled by Ho Chi Minh, wanted to unite Vietnam under one Communist government, but South Vietnam did not wish to live under communism. The United States wanted to help South Vietnam to defeat North Vietnam by sending, at first, supplies and later American advisors over to train the South Vietnamese army. Later, after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and resolution, in 1964, President Johnson began to send American troops in large numbers. Johnson gradually increased the American troops in Vietnam, and at the end of his term there were approximately 541,000 American troops in Vietnam. (2)

From 1965 to 1973 the fighting in Vietnam got really brutal during the American intervention. My father, a captain, at this time served in the South Vietnamese army. American bombing in North Vietnam increased up to 300 bombs dropped a day! North Vietnam launched the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam on January 30, 1968, which destroyed much of the cities and military bases. And worst of all were the massacred villagers in South Vietnam; one of the unluckiest villages was My Lai. (3)

Meanwhile in the United States the war grew unpopular as the casualties increased. Under pressure, President Nixon tried to negotiate peace with North Vietnam at Paris. North Vietnam said they would agree to stop fighting if the bombing in North Vietnam were stopped and American troops withdrawn. The United States kept their word, they stopped the bombing and withdrew the American troops in 1973. But North Vietnam didn't keep their promise and the war continued from 1974 to 1975 without American troops. Even though America withdrew they did not stop sending supplies over to South Vietnam, but after 1974 they began to restrict them somewhat.

After American troops left Vietnam, the South Vietnamese lost all confidence in winning the war. North Vietnam started pushing harder as years progressed in 1973 to 1975. Thieu, South Vietnamese president, started pulling back some military bases in 1975, letting the Communists take them over in hopes that America would see that they might lose and send more supplies or come back, but unfortunately America did not. This scared the South Vietnamese because they did not
know what President Thieu was up to or what areas were being given up. So they panicked and began to withdraw from the northern part of South Vietnam.

My Dad at Nha Trang was told by his superior to go home to his family for there wasn't anything he could do. My father sent our family to Saigon for safety and went back to his base to guard it. The panic got worse and on April 29, 1975, Saigon fell and many Vietnamese fled the country to find peace elsewhere. (4)

My family tried eleven times to get out and finally on our eleventh time we made it. We went through the same process that many Vietnamese tried. First we planned it months ahead, not telling anyone except the people who were involved. Second, the trip was very complex and must go without suspicion. We left our home, and went into hiding in the countryside. From there we joined with the others in a small boat which took us out to a bigger boat. Here is where most of the Vietnamese refugees are caught by the Communists who are on alert every minute of the day watching for them. If they catch the refugees they will put them into jail, adults and children. We were very lucky to make it out to the big boat, but there were still many dangers we had to face before we reached our destination. At sea on our second day we encountered a Russian ship and amazingly they were very nice. They helped us fix our boat, gave us food and water, and they did not turn us in to the Viet Cong. On our tenth day we reached Malaysia but they wouldn’t let us come in until two days later.

At Malaysia everyone had an opportunity to choose where they wanted to go; my family chose the United States. We stayed in Malaysia for ten months waiting for a sponsor to take us in. Then one day the news came saying a church, Trinity Lutheran, had sponsored us with Mr. and Mrs. Krevo of Cody, Wyoming. On August 20, 1979, we set our feet in America to live in Cody, Wyoming, and that was the happiest day of my life!

**End Notes**


(4) Pham Thanh. Interview on April 19, 1985, Cody, Wyoming.

*Thuy Pham's entire essay is printed, although the bibliography has been deleted. (Ed.)*

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**Periodization And Chronological Coverage In A World History Survey**

**Ross E. Dunn**

**San Diego State University**

The textbook I read in undergraduate Western Civilization, as I remember, had a paragraph or two devoted to Genghis Khan and the Mongols. The instructor may even have mentioned the subject in one of his lectures. The Mongols, I learned, appeared suddenly in Poland and Hungary in 1240, wreaked murder and mayhem, scared Western Europe half to death, then just as suddenly disappeared again. The textbook had little to say about who the Mongols were, where they had come from, or where they went when they evacuated the European plains. Later in college I took a course in the history of the Middle East. Once again, some where between the fall of the Abbasid Empire and the rise of the Ottomans, the Mongols appeared on the scene. This time they were even meaner and more destructive, and they stayed around longer, ruling Persia and Iraq for a time. But then they vanished, northwesterly somewhere into the murky steppe that lay beyond the scope of the course. Early in graduate school I acquired a passing acquaintance with the history of China. There were Genghis Khan and his hordes yet again, knocking down the gates in the Great Wall and swarming over the land.

By this time my curiosity was aroused. Mongols were turning up everywhere, yet they appeared to have no history of their own. I became aware of their profound and enduring effect on the history of Russia, the Middle East, China, and in a counter-factual way on Western Europe. Yet the rise and fall of the Mongol Empire as a world-historical event had eluded me. Only after having read McNeill's *The Rise of the West* and other books that introduced Central Asia itself as a fit subject of historical inquiry was I able to get a broad enough view of the Eurasian landscape to perceive the Mongol phenomenon, both the calamitous predations and the Pax Mongolica that followed, as a historical pattern of great importance in its own right. By the time I started to teach world history, I was convinced that in hemispheric terms the period from approximately 1200 to 1350 could very justifiably be labeled the "Mongol Age," and that to teach that portion of the "Middle Ages" civilization-by-civilization and region-by-region would deprive my students of any clear understanding of the most important event of all.

My point in summarizing certain recondite aspects of my own university education is that if we are going to offer introductory courses to undergraduates that we call world history, we should do so in a way that makes such hemisphere-shaking events as the Mongol conquests subjects of primary

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inquiry rather than as fragmented pieces of information fitted into the histories of particular civilizations. I do not wish to review all the standard arguments in favor of some kind of "global" history at the introductory level. Rather, I would like to contribute some thoughts to the continuing debate over the problem of conceptualizing and structuring a world history course more effectively.

So far, it seems to me, the content of world history courses, as well as both secondary and college textbooks, has been excessively governed by the notion that countries, civilizations, and conventionally defined regions are the only probable and workable categories for organizing a description of human history over the long term. To be sure, the history of a civiliza- tion, cultural tradition, or nation is a valid subject for undergraduate investigation. But it also seems clear that, as so much recent research in social, economic, ecological history has shown us, the most important long-term historical processes that have made the world what it is today have taken place within a geographic or demographic context greater than any civilization or polity. Moreover, if most undergraduates take introductory history for only one year, or even less, I would suggest that we ought to be teaching them about such processes.2 Eric Wolf in the first paragraph of his book, Europe and the People without History, points out the dangers of failing to do so:

...the world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of inter-connected processes, and inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality. Concepts like "nation," "society," and "culture" name bits and threaten to turn names into things. Only by understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding.3

I would offer two reasons why we should strive to teach more effectively about transregional or global processes. The first is that, as almost all social science educators seem to agree, college students ought to be learning something about the problems and complexities of the international contemporary world. Yet we have largely organized history education in this country in such a way as to suggest to students that the social, economic, political, cultural, and demographic trends that gave rise to global interdependencies began to occur only in very recent times. The deep histories of such processes—for example, the Eastern Hemispheric network of market exchanges that blossomed after A.D. 1000 and that widened into the worldwide commercial system of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—have been largely ignored in favor of purely national or civilizational history or even presentist-minded area studies. If teachers believe that global problems of the postwar age are essential subjects of social science education, then I ask how far back in history we have to go to reach a point where such processes, and I do not mean simply interesting "connections" between civilizations, are not worthy of serious attention?

A second reason for de-regionalizing history is that we have consistently striven to do so in teaching and writing text- books about the history of both United States and Western civilization. That is, within the context of those two cultural entities we have tried to identify the most general historical patterns and problems. I know of no colleagues who organize their U.S. survey courses around fifty lecture units, each devoted to the history of a single state. Nor do I know any Western civilization teachers who trace out individually the histories of Great Britain, France, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, Serbia, and Montenegro, one country after the other. Likewise at the world-historical level, the profession should aim to identify those trends and developments that transcend purely political or ethno-cultural boundaries.

The challenge of teaching introductory world history necessarily involves questions of periodization. In addressing the problem of organizing historical time, I am leaving aside the interesting issues connected with the "social studies" approach (introducing history as purely background information for the study of contemporary problems), the rigorously topical method (tracing specific subject areas over a long period of time), or such innovative schemes as teaching history backwards. I am assuming, rather, that most teachers organize their courses, whether in world, European, or U.S. history, according to at least a rough chronological plan, taking the subject matter of the more distant past first and contemporary times last. Therefore, we are obliged to divide the past into periods. We do it for a number of reasons. One is simply to identify and isolate manageable chunks of time to study one by one, since we cannot study everything all at once. A second is to distinguish one bundle of interrelated historical events from another in order to perceive patterns. A third is to identify important shifts in those patterns in terms of terminal dates for periods or, in other words, turning points. A fourth is to signal a configuration of events that appears to the historian dominant or particularly important during a specific span of time.

Any ordering of historical facts must take place in the mind of the individual historian. Therefore, the periodization scheme that seems illuminating to one historian appears hopelessly wrong to another. The devising of periods is a form of historical generalizing, and so any arrangement is less than perfectly valid. Terminal dates that work for one group of interrelated developments do not work for another, so that period labels (other than those simply designating pieces of time such as "The Eighteenth Century") are invariably restrictive and misleading in one way or another. Terminal dates that refer to long-term historical processes rather than Big Events are always arguable. A label meant to characterize an entire nation or civilization may in fact only characterize certain groups of people within it. Traditional labels designating dynastic regions, art styles, or wars may seem unconvincing to historians who explore patterns of everyday social life, prices, or migratory movement. In short, all periodization schemes are biased, arbitrary, delusive, and absolutely essential to making sense of the past. This is especially so when the subject matter encompasses millennia.

Sometimes, when the issue of periodization is introduced in connection with global history, we presume that a metahistorian, perhaps a crackpot metahistorian, is lurking about. I
am not, however, concerned here with the philosophical dimensions of historical time, that is, with the discovery of cosmic, biological, or sociological laws by which we may figure out what changes in human society are to be expected next. Undergraduates would do well to learn something about the idea of law-like periodization by discovering Spengler and Toynbee and certainly Marx. But the issue here is periodization as a pedagogical and heuristic tool.

In other words, periodization in world history must address the practical realities of the introductory course. This means that the length of defined spans of time must be roughly conformable to unit divisions of the teaching year. The designating of very, very long-term periods, to paraphrase Eric Jones, is only useful in teaching certain concepts in world history. I am thinking here of the division of Western history into ancient, medieval, and modern periods, a scheme that has been debated since the seventeenth century and is still of some value. I am also thinking of the broad division of world history into, for example, Old Stone, Neolithic, Agrarian, and Modern Ages. These period labels, or similar ones, are useful in so far as they draw the attention of students to the most fundamental shifts in the ways humankind has learned (or failed) to control or manipulate his natural or social environment. Any world history or Western civilization introductory course should lead students to understand that the productive capabilities, attitudes, and values of modernity have been largely absent over the long run of human history.

Probably all world history and Western civilization textbooks on the market (and therefore most courses) recognize sweeping, universalist historical divisions by one labeling scheme or another. But the organization of most texts is also region-based, which means that more time-specific schemes of periodization are formulated within the context of countries, civilizations, or regions. As long as trans-regional or world-historical processes as such are not studied to much extent, no need arises for periodization names and terminal dates within which to frame them. But if the primary focus of a text or course shifts to such processes, then innovative ways of "slicing" the past have to be thought through.

I do not mean to suggest of course that a single periodization scheme can be devised that encompasses all of humanity for all of history. Such an effort would immediately throw us into a realm of geo-time so broad as to embarrass even the editor of "Annales." But we can look for world- or hemispheric-scale processes in mind.

Philip Curtin has recently proposed that a "historical problem" as well as a civilization is, in Toynbee's phrase, an "intelligible field of historical study." Curtin suggests that the historian can aim to identify "relevant aggregates" of human relationships that define the space-time boundaries of a historical problem. This involves the historian's willingness to let his study of the problem carry him wherever it will over the geopolitical or ethno-cultural landscape. He must allow the time-space range of his inquiry to be determined by his problem rather than the other way around. He must be willing to consider any geographical or social space in which the relevant process took place as a primary object of investigation, whether it is the Mediterranean basin, the land rimming the Red Sea, the land mass of Eurasia and Africa combined, or indeed the globe as a whole. That space then becomes the relevant unit for identifying valid configurations of time.

Moreover, the sorts of problems and processes that lend themselves to world-historical periodization will fall largely in the general categories of social, cultural, economic, demographic, technological, and epidemiological history. Perhaps this goes without saying, though the emphasis of such subject matter necessarily involves choices that will result in many conventional themes in political, institutional, or military history being subordinated to other issues. In any case, no teachable course in either world history or Western civilization can attempt to cover all significant subject matter. Nor should historians ever be expected to agree on a fixed body of knowledge to which all students must be introduced.

I am not prepared to present here a detailed scheme of world-historical periods for the whole span of time from Neanderthal man to Nixon. Moreover, I realize that the farther one goes back in history the harder it becomes to identify relatively short-period processes that have significance beyond the limits of particular civilizations. Yet we do not have to limit ourselves to the twentieth century or even to modern times to discover important historical problems of trans-regional dimensions. To support and illustrate the generalizations I have made so far in this paper I would like to lay out in a very sketchy way an outline of time divisions for the period A.D. 1000 to 1600.

My primary field of inquiry up to about 1450 will be the Afro-Eurasian region taken as a whole. My premise is that the populations inhabiting that region, or at least the greater part of it, constituted a "relevant aggregate" for the study of a number of problems of profound significance to the history of the human community. For the 150 years after 1450 my field becomes the Eastern and Western Hemispheres combined, though some societies, Australian aborigines for example, probably continued for a time to exist largely unconnected to world-scale patterns of change.

I am drawing heavily here on the concept developed by Marshall Hodgson and William McNeill of the Afro-Eurasian Ecumene, the zone of social intercommunication that came to be articulated in the first millennium B.C. and that extended across the central agrarian lands of the Eastern Hemisphere from the Mediterranean basin to the Pacific. This world region came to exhibit cultural patterns of its own: the rise of an interconnected network of cities, the development of a trans-regional commercial system, and cycles of confrontation between urban-agrarian societies and pastoral peoples of the chain of steppes and deserts that ran diagonally to and cut across the intercommunicating zone. The Ecumene, moreover, tended to "grow" as peoples of the periphery (West Africans, Japanese, Siberian Eskimos, Welsh highlanders) became incorporated into its web of interrelations.

Hodgson states that if we take the Afro-Eurasian zone of intercommunication as a developing complex of historical processes in its own right, we can begin to conceive of those
"unconsciously interregional developments" which "converge in their effects to alter the general disposition of the Hemisphere." I would like to offer an outline of primary periods centered on those historical problems that appear to have "altered the general disposition of the Hemisphere." Each of these named periods might correspond to a major teaching unit.

The scheme sketched out here is not meant to suggest that developments within or the achievements of particular civilizations are to be ignored. Rather, such developments would be presented within and subsidiary to the broader hemispheric or global themes. By analogy, all of the standard Western civilization textbooks lay out the general civilizational patterns of change first, then relate those to events within particular countries.

The years I have chosen to divide one period from another are meant in every case to be approximations, since the terminal dates of none of the historical processes that I would stress can be persuasively targeted to fixed points in time. If I could isolate "Fourths of July" in my search for turning points, I would probably use them. I would also reiterate the truism that all period labels are restrictive, misleading, or incomplete in one way or another.

1. 1000-1200: THE FIRST AGE OF HEMISPHERIC EXCHANGE

At about the beginning of the second millennium A.D. there came into existence a system of transport, market exchange, and financial organization that extended from the Mediterranean basin to China. This development was linked closely to three other processes: (1) the phenomenal commercial, industrial, and urban expansion of Sung China (A.D. 960-1279); (2) the rise of a Muslim mercantile class in the middle sector of the Afro-Eurasian region that was, by the standards of earlier times, unusually mobile and cosmopolitan; (3) the emergence of a commercial economy centered on the northern shore of the Mediterranean and increasingly involving the peoples of Europe north of the Alps. Any world-scale investigation of the eleventh and twelfth centuries should, I think, begin with the fact that a trans-hemispheric network of market relations was becoming permanently established. Moreover, the place to look for the genesis of this process is not in Europe but in China. McNeill wrote in The Pursuit of Power:

What was new in the eleventh century... was not the principle of market articulation of human effort across long distances, but the scale on which this kind of behavior began to affect human lives. China's belated arrival at a market articulation of its economy acted like a great bellows, fanning smoldering coals into flame. New wealth arising among a hundred million Chinese began to flow out across the seas (and significantly along caravan routes as well) and added new vigor and scope to market-related activity.

Within this framework of hemispheric interrelations, the rise of towns and trade in Europe is to be seen primarily in relation to economic developments in the rest of Eurasia, rather than in juxtaposition to earlier periods in its own history.

Other important trans-regional developments, subordinated to the main theme, can be fitted with some justification into the 1000-1200 time frame. These would include the armed migrations of Turkish-speaking peoples into the Middle East, India, and the Byzantine lands, carrying with them Islam and both Persian and Turkic culture northward, eastward, and southward, including the Spanish and Holy Land Crusades; the expansion of Islamic faith and civilization among peoples rimming the Arabian Sea as far south as Mozambique; and the growing linkages between states of the western Sudan and the Mediterranean world of commercial and cultural interchange.

2. 1200-1350: THE MONGOL AGE

Truly hemispheric in scope were the conquests of Genghis Khan and the creation of the Mongol World Empire. The beginning of the age might even be pinpointed at 1206, when Genghis was chosen leader of "all who live in tents of felt" at the famous assembly of Mongol notables. In hemispheric terms (as well as comparative ones) the two most important historical problems associated with the Mongol Age are [1] the relative short and long-term effects of Tatar destructiveness on the major agrarian regions, that is, China, India, the Middle East, and Europe; and [2] the trans-regional consequences of the Pax Mongolica in terms of commercial, cultural, technological, and epidemiological interchange from one end of Afro-Eurasia to the other. The Mongol phenomenon, therefore, determines the shape of the age. That process would then be the basis from which developments within particular civilized traditions or subregions of the hemisphere could be described. One of these would be the continuing expansion of Islamic civilization in Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Bay of Bengal, and Southeast Asia. Another would be the articulation of a Christian high culture in Europe, a development resulting in part from the region's success at keeping the "devil's horsemen" at bay. (The happy fate of Western Europe in the thirteenth century contrasted to that of Transoceanic Persia would be a comparatively ideal eminently worth exploring.)


The great plague of the mid-fourteenth century is usually presented in undergraduate history as a European calamity, when it was of course a hemispheric one. The recent work of Michael Dols, William McNeill, and a few other historians has brought the wider geographical dimensions of the plague into focus, though so far not much is known about either its immediate or its long-term effects in places like China or India. Nevertheless, the Black Death seems to me to be an era-making event, especially in light of the pattern of plague recurrences that continued well into the fifteenth century. The demographic, social, economic, and cultural consequences of the plague were so great throughout the Afro-Eurasian intercommunicating zone that this event provides a readily justifiable pedagogical device for introducing other important themes of that century and a half.
4. 1450-1600: THE AGE OF THE GREAT WORLD CONVERGENCE

I began to think about what has conventionally been called the Age of Exploration and Discovery in an entirely new way after reading Alfred Crosby's *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* several years ago. The achievement of the Genoese mariner in linking the peoples of the Eastern and Western Hemispheres for the first time in thirteen or fourteen thousand years activated processes of social change that can only be described as revolutionary for the human community taken as a whole. Indeed, I find it astonishing that we continue to teach students about the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the only college history course they will probably ever take without even mentioning the enduring, world-scale epidemiological, demographic, racial, cultural, and economic effects of the "Columbian exchange." After 1492 only the world as a whole can serve as the "relevant aggregate" for the study of any or several historical problems of eminent relevance to the twentieth century.

Europeans were the agents of the world convergence of those two centuries, which involved not only the joining of the hemispheres but the creation of a "global intercommunicating zone," that is, a complex inter-lacing of all major regions with one another: Mexico with East Asia, India with West Africa, Siberia with the Middle East, and of course everybody with Europe. This process began well before 1492 with the fifteenth century strengthening of trans-hemispheric links through the seaborne mercantile activities of the Muslims, the Portuguese, and, abortively, the Ming Chinese. It continued into the sixteenth century with the evolution of a worldwide communication and market system that involved not only the intercontinental exchange of wares and commodities but also of plant cultigens, parasitic microorganisms, and very large numbers of people. In the traditional introductory course, however, these processes and the vast social and cultural changes that attended them have been largely ignored in favor of only one process: the overseas maritime activities of Europeans and the relationship of foreign conquest, trade, and settlement to developments within Europe itself.

Within the period defined by the global link-up, a number of subsidiary themes concerning its effects would be studied without imposing any national or civilizational limits on the study of the processes themselves (e.g., the demographic collapse of the Native American peoples, or the evolving of an "Atlantic world" of population, commercial, and cultural exchange). It must also be recognized, however, that developments occurring in Europe itself were so important to the ensuing arrival of modernity that such events as the consolidation of strong nation-states, the Reformation and Counterreformation, and the philosophical and attitudinal dimensions of the Renaissance can hardly be relegated to footnotes in a world history text. Nor can the military and political encounters between Europeans and Asian or African societies. Still another set of related problems of that century and a half that cannot be neglected is the resurgence of Islamic power from the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean to India (the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughul empires), as well as the continuing expansion of Islam in Africa and Asia.

The periodization scheme I have outlined here invites the introductory student to acquire a conceptual vision, however rudimentary, of human history on a world scale. He or she is asked to think about the larger fields of interrelated social change first and the smaller ones second. Such an approach should also give the teacher or textbook writer plenty of opportunity to raise analytically comparative questions about institutions, values, and ways of life. Examples might include feudalism in Europe compared to politico-military institutions in the Turkish-ruled Middle East, or the place of merchants in thirteenth-century European, Chinese, and Muslim society. When, on the other hand, civilizations are studied for a millenial period or so one after another, they tend to become conceptually boxed off from one another, thereby inhibiting comparative analysis and perhaps encouraging the false notion that each period in a civilization's history simply "grew" out of the previous one.

FOOTNOTES


SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Ross Dunn argued in favor of world history survey courses where world-scale change processes are taught. In order to achieve this end he said it is necessary to bypass the regional and temporal boundaries established in most textbooks. Students need an awareness of trans-cultural developments as well as specific cultures. Dunn stated that teachers and textbook writers can better serve their students by avoiding rigid boundaries between regions in their organization of time and space. Instructors should try to teach students an understanding of different cultures and that people in any age act according to their own culture.

In response to the comment that his approach seemed to take the dangerous route of diminishing the role of the individual in history, Dunn stated that he chose to talk about broad social change in his courses. Individuals play a second or third-rate role, but he does discuss individuals as social types. Dunn focuses on three major issues in his world history survey: the state system and social order, the religious tradition and how it interacted with the political order, and the identification of contact areas as a means of teaching ideas.

Although he favors the world history survey, Dunn does not want to cease the teaching of Western civilization. The development of Western civilization must be a fundamental part of a world history course; we can understand Western civilization better in context of world civilization.

Some Observations: Our Future And Our Close Intellectual Kin

H. Loring White
Panama Canal College (Emeritus)

Four years ago, when our concerned group of teachers and historians ventured, with modest hope and tentative optimism, to form the World History Association, we probably felt ourselves to be a solitary group. Our "movement" had been triggered by a conference on world history undertaken by the Air Force Academy at which the conference–agreeably surprised by a turnout that tripled expectations, and encouraged by the enthusiasm generated realized that a constituency had materialized. But beyond our less than "wild surmise" and the subsequent gathering of our committed little congregation (a successful "Genesis" now behind us), we face the questions of propagation and growth. It is time for new initiatives, directed not only at increased interest and membership, but also toward a wider scope in the encouragement of creative activity. The work of the annual AHA sessions must be supplemented and augmented in order to step up momentum.

This writer wishes to report that in informal conversations at recent conferences these concerns surfaced and suggestions were made. Starting our own journal was one offered possibility, and it is quite probable that other members are pondering this notion. Recently "The History Teacher" has generously allocated more space to world history, but this can only guarantee limited commitment. It will never be adequate to our creative potential, and it will never embody our mission either intellectually or graphically. There are arguably too many journals, and this idea could be "ahead of its time," but two considerations have cropped up on our agenda: (1) there is no print medium to promote regularly the growth and creativity of the "world history movement," (2) there is a felt need to look into the possibility of such a journal.

Another suggestion was to hold regional conferences. These would multiply participation and attract potential as well as current members, particularly high school teachers who do not belong to the AHA. Happily the Colorado membership provides a successful model for emulation. Both the Rocky Mountain Regional World History Association (RMRWA) and the Air Force Academy have sponsored recent conferences that were creative and well attended. Last year the RMRWA (jointly with the WHA) presented a conference on "Technology in World History" (Aspen, June 1985). Its topics ranged from ancient to modern, considered science and communications along with technology, and drew on such scholars as Leften Stavrianos, William McNeill, and Nathan Sivin. This year the Air Force Academy (jointly with the RMRWA) hosted "Africa in World History" (Colorado Springs, April 1986), which featured Philip Curtin, Jan Vansina, A.J.R. Russel-Wood, George E. Brooks, and Joseph C. Miller. Clearly the duplication of these efforts is both possible and necessary. A journal might be premature, but the activity in Colorado indicates that we may be late on this one.

And it turns out that when the WHA debuted, it wasn't the only association concerned with matters global, interregional, and civilizational. Since 1971 the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSC) has met annually in this country. From its European origins (Salzburg, 1960), the ISCSC (among its founders were Arnold Toynbee and P.A. Sorokin) has developed into a broad spectrum organization that encompasses and attracts many disciplines: anthropology, political science, geography, sociology, economics, social psychology, art history--and, of course, history. Noting its representation, it is difficult to generalize about the ISCSC. Many styles themselves "civilizationalist" (some do not), a label which lies outside their usual disciplinary contexts; rather civilization is the ad hoc umbrella under which gather the shares of common interests which are usually extradisciplinary. We find anthropologists and sociologists debating when and why state systems dissolve into empires; We find sessions devoted to civilizational theories, "Psychological Issues in Comparative Studies," cultural identity in Latin America, "Economic Processes in Civilizational Perspective," civilizational world-view, and "Politics and Violence" (to indicate some recent topics). This association is eclectic, variegated, nondoctrinaire, and open to any one who has something to say about civilization or related topics.

But if civilization here denotes the broadest possible
range of topics, the ISCSC is the direct descendant of civilizational theorists whose ideas continue to claim a significant share of the annual meetings. Titles of sessions and papers contain such words as "genesis," "breakdown," "encounter," "worldwide," "transformations," "Universal Empire," "termination," and "civilization" in its many forms. Marx, Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin, Alfred Kroeber, Rushton Coultorn (another founder), Caroll Quigley, Fernand Braudel, and William McNeill are among the historians present. These figures constitute a mixed group, and while some may be viewed as outside the bound of what may be regarded as orthodox history, all are historical thinkers. Thus, if we encircle each of the associations, the circles will significantly overlap. Or we can identify two complementary, though sometimes discordant, tendencies, a systematic approach more characteristic of the social sciences and an event-trends approach more characteristic of historians, one focusing more on similarities and regularities, the other chiefly concerned with differences and particulars.

Where they overlap, however, this dichotomy fades, and we encounter an interdisciplinary area where mutual interests converge. Both associations are concerned with the longue durée, the things in history that change slowly over time, and both are concerned with cultural encounters, courses of civilizations, cultural style, comparative studies, and developmental trends. This realm of common interests lacks a common designation, but depending on the approach—whether it is called world history, global history, trans-regional history, macrohistory, civilizational studies—it requires an interdisciplinary effort, and history will never be its sole proprietor.

Thus each association has something to offer the other, because, as the study of world development moves out of its incipient stage, all disciplinary insights are both valuable and necessary. The lack of a name reveals that the integration of these macro studies into an organized discipline lies farther ahead along the timeline. Getting there will require disciplinary cross-ferilization, plus the willing cooperation of generalists and specialists. This imperatively calls for a special relationship between the two associations. Recently at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the ISCSC (Santa Fe, 1986), a joint-session with the WHA (summarized in the accompanying article) took the first step. As with regional meetings, a pattern for future action has materialized. The WHA has accomplished its Genesis and discovered a constituency; it must now achieve its Growth through creative Encounters.

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WOMEN IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD
A Regional Conference of the World History Association (WHA)
May 1 and May 2, 1987 at Colorado State University
For information on registration, travel, lodging, and on receiving course crit, write or phone David McComb, Program Chair, Department of History, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO80523.

Phone: (303) 491-6124 or 6334. Registration is possible until 24 April
The Program:
Friday, May 1, 1987
1:00-2:00. Registration and Reception.
2:00-3:00. Introductory Comments.
3:00-3:30. Coffee break.
3:30-5:00. Add Women and Stir. Panel: Carol Cantrell, Colorado State University, chair; James Long, Colorado State University (Western Civilization); Jan Worrell, University of Northern Colorado (Latin American History); James Jankowski, University of Colorado (Middle Eastern History); Pat Limerick, University of Colorado (U.S. History).
Saturday, May 2, 1987
7:00. Continental breakfast seminar with Kevin Reilly, President of WHA.
10:00-10:30. Coffee break and book displays.
10:30-12:00. World History on Film. Marilyn Hitchens, Wheat Ridge High School continued.

Continued on page 19
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10:30-12:00. A Regional Service Center for Teachers of World History. Robert Roeder, University of Denver.

12:00-1:30. Lunch: Matriarchal Societies. Carol Mitchell, Colorado State University.

1:30-3:00. Women on the Battlefields: National Foundation and National Salvation. Olga of Kiev (d. 969), Lynda Shaffer, Tufts University; Joan of Arc (1412-1431). Anne Barstow, State University of New York at Old Westbury; The Rani of Jhansi (d. 1857). Joyce Lebra, University of Colorado.


3:00-3:30. Coffee break.

3:30-4:00. Summation and final words.

4:00. Business meeting of the Regional World History Association.

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### Two Invitations

- The *World History Bulletin* invites book publishers to submit books of interest to world historians for possible review. Books should be sent to the book review editor, Professor Joe Gowaskie, Department of History, Rider College, Lawrenceville, NJ 08648.

- The *Bulletin* invites advertisements for publication. For information on rates, contact the Editor, *World History Bulletin*, Department of History & Politics, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

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Future issues of the *World History Bulletin* will be sent only to members of the World History Association. Yearly dues (January through December): $10.00 (for students, unemployed, disabled, and senior citizens: $2.00).

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Name
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I have enclosed $ for the dues of the *World History Bulletin*.

Mail to: PROFESSOR ERNEST MENZER, ACTING TREASURER, World History Association, Iona College, New Rochelle, NY 10801

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**Editor's Note**

The Fall/Winter 1986-1987 number of the *Bulletin* should have been the Spring/Summer 1986 issue. This delay was necessary for two reasons: (1) the financing of the *Bulletin* was changed, and (2) the entire production process was reorganized. We apologize for any confusion. To make up for the "lost" number, we shall have a Spring as well as a Summer *Bulletin* in 1987, then get back on track with our usual Fall/Winter one.

In this entire change, several inexcusable errors resulted. Gilbert Allardyce from the University of New Brunswick had his name misspelled at the end of his article, "Two Cheers for World History." The same was true of the name of our Vice President, Arnold Schrier from the University of Cincinnati. Addedly and also regretfully, L.S. Stavrianos' review of *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* was somewhat "garbled" as Joe Gowaskie, one of our Book Review Editors, was to call it and quickly point it out. Our apologies to all three of these scholarly gentlemen.

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**Archives**

**World History Association**

In an effort to better serve its membership, as well as to preserve its own records and resources, the Council of the World History Association has established an Archive. Its first goal will be to obtain a copy, or failing that, an abstract, of all panel papers or addresses delivered at World History Association sponsored meeting or conferences. These materials will aid in the cataloging of these presentations for possible inclusion in a future Guide to the Programs of the World History Association. If you have such materials, please send them to: Professor Marc Gilbert, Social Science Department, North Georgia College, Dahlonega, Georgia 30597.

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Joe Dixon, Exec. Director
World History Assoc.
808 Fillmore Street
Papillion, NE 68128
In Memoriam

It is with deep sadness that we announce the untimely passing of Professor Michael F. Zaremski of Iona College, the Treasurer of the World History Association. A native of Brooklyn and a graduate of Power Memorial High School as well as Iona College, Professor Zaremski received his graduate education at Columbia and Fordham Universities. Michael was taken from family and friends and from students and colleagues at Iona College and the World History Association in the forty-fourth year of his life and in the twentieth year of his service to higher education.

His life was devoted completely to the task of making this world a better and more peaceful domicile for human kind. He devoted all of his energies to teaching his students about their world and the world beyond the West. A dedicated student of politics, a profound historian of civilization, a matchless stylist and articulate communicator, Michael was concerned particularly with the state and the fate of Latin American civilization. His deep commitment to Iona's Peace and Justice Movement reflected his personal agony over the problems besetting our neighbors to the South and over the human condition in general.

Michael was a loving and much beloved man. We offer to his mother, to all of his family and friends, our sincere condolences.

SHARE THE BULLETIN

Members interested in added copies of the Fall/Winter 1986-1987 Bulletin for distribution to prospective members may send their requests to the Editor. Through the generosity of the Office of the Dean of Bronx Community College, we have these additional copies--200!

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