In This Issue

Time Demands Bring Dixon Resignation 1
Rosen Appointed Executive Director 2
For a Unified History of the World in the Twentieth Century 2
Give World History the Time it Deserves 14
Book Reviews 16
Minutes of WHA Council Meeting, December 28, 1988 22
In Search of a World History Textbook 24
Writing World Histories, Conference in Copenhagen 25
History and Textbooks, a New Dutch Example 25
ANNOUNCING A CALL FOR PAPERS

Library History Seminar VIII
"READING & LIBRARIES"

to be held

9-11 May 1990
Bloomington, Indiana

The conference will focus on its theme but generally explore the role and significance of collections of recorded knowledge in society. Without limitation of chronological period, geographical region, type of library or institution or type of medium – topics may include, but are not limited to, the following:

Biographical Studies; Institutional Development;
Collecting Efforts; Cultural and Socio-Economic Environments;
Literacy and Libraries; History of the Profession;
Philosophy of Librarianship; Research Methods; and
Teaching Methods.

A prospectus of no more than 500 words and a vita should be sent before July 1, 1989 to:
Dr. Donald G. Davis, Jr.
LHS VIII Coordinator
Graduate School of Library & Information Sciences
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX 78712-1276

Papers selected for presentation at the Seminar will be published by the University of Texas Press.

Sponsored by
Library History Round Table
American Library Association

Libraries & Culture
Graduate School of Library & Information Science
University of Texas at Austin

School of Library & Information Science
Indiana University
Time Demands Bring Dixon Resignation

808 Fillmore Street
Papillion, NE 68128
20 December, 1988

To: Officers and Members of the WHA Council

It is with the deepest regret that I am compelled to submit my resignation as Executive Director of the World History Association. This decision in no way reflects diminished enthusiasm for world history or for the World History Association. I am simply unable to devote the time necessary to fulfill my responsibilities as I would wish to do.

As Chief of the Policy and Doctrine Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, I find more and more of my time consumed by Air Force obligations. These demands will only increase in the future.

I am proud to have been a part of the WHA from its inception, and flattered to have been able to serve as Executive Director. Our organization has grown and prospered in its first half-decade to a point where we can consider a more permanent headquarters and paid staff support. This seems to be an ideal time for me to bow out.

Thank you for your support and understanding over the past several years.

Sincerely,

Joe C. Dixon

Rosen Appointed Executive Director

At its meeting on December 28, 1988, the Executive Council of the World History Association approved the appointment of Dr. Richard L. Rosen as Executive Director of the WHA. Rosen succeeds Joe Dixon, the first Executive Director, who resigned (see article in opposite column).

An Associate Professor of History at Drexel University, Dick Rosen holds a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from Drexel, and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in the history of science and technology from Case Western Reserve University. Currently he teaches courses in the history of science, 20th Century world history, and Modern Europe. He is also the director of a new program in Appropriate Technology, a field which combines engineering with international studies including world history, development, and anthropology.

Rosen acted as interim editor of the Bulletin (1984-1985) and has been its publications director for the past four years. His first job was to convert the membership list to a format compatible with Drexel’s computer system. With the completion of this first project, a systematic keeping of records and the collection of dues should become a less difficult task.

WHA

DUES INCREASE

Beginning January, 1990, World History Association dues will increase to $25 per year. Included in these dues will be a subscription to the new Journal of World History as well as the World History Bulletin. A decision regarding the increase in dues for student, retired, and disabled members is pending.
For a Unified History of the World in the Twentieth Century*

Charles Bright
University of Michigan
and Michael Geyer
University of Chicago

Historians no longer need to invent the world in order to study world history. The world exists as a material fact and everyday practice in the global organization of production and destruction. It is this fact of global integration at the end of the twentieth century that makes the current crisis of world history so serious. The venerable Western tradition of world history, embedded in the grand themes of German idealism and the naturalistic metaphors of growth and development, ceased to produce explanations precisely at the moment when advanced means of communication, production, and coercion began to integrate the world technically and materially. The tradition survives in the recurrent attempts to explain the "rise of the West" and to account for that unique combination of factors that enabled the North Atlantic region to encapsulate the world. But eighty years into the twentieth century, it is clear that these formulations are no longer sufficient for the problems of contemporary history. It becomes less and less useful to rethink the origins of Western expansion unless we can also begin to think systematically about the nature of the world that has been created as a consequence of Western expansion and the processes of global integration it established. The problem is to understand the embattled efforts to establish order on a globe that has become one, yet is also becoming more self-consciously diverse. The central themes of this world history cohere around the ever more radical disjuncture between global integration and local autonomy.

In this context, the problem of world history appears in a new light. At its core is no longer the evolution and devolution of world systems, but the tense, ongoing interaction of forces promoting global integration and forces recreating local autonomy. This is not a struggle for or against global integration itself, but rather a struggle over the terms of that integration. The struggle is by no means finished, and its path is no longer foreordained by the dynamics of Western expansion that initiated global integration. The world has moved apart even as it has been pulled together, as efforts to convert domination into order have engendered evasion, resistance, and struggles to regain autonomy. This struggle for autonomy — the assertion of local and particular claims over global and general ones — does not involve opting out of the world or resorting to autarky. It is rather an effort to establish the terms for self-determining and self-controlled participation in the processes of global integration and the struggle for planetary order.

At the center of this study is the question of who, or what, controls and defines the identity of individuals, social groups, nations, and cultures. This is as much a political as an intellectual formulation, for it involves a critical reassessment of the practice of globalism. Is the path of integration to be defined by the systems of control and the increasingly elaborate efforts to manage people in the service of production? Or is the oneness of the world to be defined as the common human struggle for freedom, expressed in terms of cultural diversity and autonomous integration of production, power, and social organization? Posed in this way, the study of world history reaffirms, from the vantage point of the late twentieth century, the old agenda of enlightened thinking about the progress of humankind toward freedom.

This same struggle between integration and autonomy has engendered much of the endemic violence that has characterized twentieth-century history. Old ethnocentric views, born in relative isolation as images of Self and Other, have been transformed into direct, often vicious, confrontation: the quest for global order has taken shape around containment and control, the deployment of coercive power. Under these conditions, the creation of difference can only be seen as a threat to the unity of the world. The place for a truly global agenda of civil

* Reprinted with permission from the authors and Radical History Review 39 (Fall 1987).
rights, then, lies not just in redressing inequalities, but in affirming the creation of difference in the context of understanding the common destiny of human beings.

The Politics of Global Development

The explosive expansion of the European-North Atlantic region during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries bound the world together in dense networks of economic and power relations. This expansion of Western power proceeded according to the logic of competition. This competition was essentially the outgrowth of European capitalism and the rivalry of European nation-states. Material integration was accompanied and underwritten by a hegemonic extension of Western culture, glorifying and scientifically sanctifying competition as the foundation of human progress. This competitive extension of Western control, although it was a powerful universalizing force, was highly unstable and prone to violence. At one end, the logic of competition generated intense lateral struggles among industrial powers; at the opposite pole the competitive extension of Western power entailed a selective but intense penetration of specific regions around the world, creating complex patterns of evasion, resistance, and renewal.

The struggle for local autonomy proceeded according to a distinct logic of its own: the logic of community building. This logic included the creation of coherent meanings, cultural identities and solidarities — or organizing the relations of gender, class, and ethnicity. That is, we must be careful not to assume that the forces of integration were, themselves, the driving forces of twentieth-century global development. This would not only reduce world history to the history of Western domination, where, in fact, power and production must be organized again and again, locally and socially, in the social relations that control labor and render it productive and in the modes of social organization that accommodate and reproduce subordination.

"Global systems of control did penetrate and break up regional concentration of production, power, and social organization."

The key point here is that global integration and local autonomy were not alternative trajectories or possibilities, but parallel and mutually interactive processes. In the interaction of “the West and the rest,” people who had long been shaping their history continued to shape it in new ways. Global systems of control did penetrate and break up regional concentration of production, power, and social organization. Yet the more societies became part of the processes of global integration, the more powerful became the possibilities of reinventing or reasserting social and cultural difference. This is most apparent in the imperial context, where the consolidation of the colonial state and economy promoted both collaboration and new patterns of resistance, leading ultimately to decolonization. But these were worldwide dynamics in the twentieth century. Twentieth-century history, then, points in exactly the opposite direction of what even the most sophisticated advocates of world systems would argue. The hallmarks of “development” in this century are the creation of difference and the defense of separate, autonomous paths in the wake of worldwide social and economic transformation.

Hence, a unified world history of the twentieth century must establish the interactions between the logic of competition and the logic of community building in the social organization of production and power; it must also try to grasp the interplay between these opposites which, together, establish the course of global development.

The Regional Origins of Global Integration

As long as we assume that the world is moving toward a single, homogeneous and “modernist” civilization in which “traditional” societies are left behind in favor of a new, global civilization, discrete regional histories remain mere “prehistorics,” so much skin to be shed, with more or less pain, in the process of “entering the third world.” Once we give up the cherished knowledge of the trajectories and outcomes of world history, however, the autonomous histories of diverse regions and cultures become immediately relevant to the study of global development. For prior to the explosive surge of Western power in the late nineteenth century, global development rested on a series of overlapping, interacting, yet essentially autonomous regions, each engaged in distinct processes of self-organization, the characteristic feature of which was the regional integration of power, production, and social organization. Any interpretation of world history in the twentieth century ought to begin with a decisive emphasis on regionalism in global politics.

There are considerable difficulties in elaborating and examining the inner workings of a world of autonomous regions. In studying the nineteenth century, however, we can reconstruct the organization of production and the trade links within and between regions, the regional configurations of military and administrative power — especially those relatively few power centers around which regional processes of production and exchange cohered — and the patterns of cultural identity that allowed people of one region to distinguish themselves from others. From this, we can delineate the distinct, though not necessarily territorial, boundaries between regions of the world and establish the analytic bases for studying global development. What emerges from this perspective are parallel paths of regional development, driven by quite similar forces — expanding population, intensified agricultural production, denser patterns of exchange, and the
struggle to maintain extractive relationships between producers and their overlords. Linkages between regions always existed and the density and intensity of interaction tended to increase as they became linked by European, mainly British, industrial commerce and a growing Western demand for tropical "drug foods" and commodities. But until the mid-nineteenth century, the major regional centers of the world remained distinct, engaged in increasingly competitive processes of self-improvement.

From the mid-nineteenth century, these patterns of competitive self-improvement underwent a substantial shift in nature and direction, marked by a global crisis in the organization of the social relations of power and production. What was important at this juncture was not that Europe took over, but that all regions of the world were engaged in sustained and parallel struggles over self-improvement in the face of global competition, and that distinct regional crises occurred together at mid-century. Regional histories were lifted to a new plane of global interaction whose central dialectic — from the very beginning — involved the struggle to preserve or enhance autonomy and difference.

Ultimately, the most striking feature of the Western industrial world in the 1860's and '70's was neither its wealth nor its superiority of technical means, but its extreme instability — its failure to control competition and conflict among various micro-centers of power within the region and, concurrently, the inability to stabilize relations of production and reproduction within the confines of these national power configurations. Europe was unable to regenerate itself from within, since none of its "national" fragments could reproduce itself on its own and, yet, they together were incapable of cohering, except in the myth of "Western civilization" and in the practice of establishing supremacy over the "rest."

The resulting threats of war and revolution set the region as a whole on a highly volatile, competitive course of expansion in which the problems of organizing social relations of production and power were resolved by a quite unprecedented projection of power and production outward and overseas. This external solution to regional crisis was made possible by a global revolution of power and an unprecedented intensification of production which, from the 1860's on, decisively tilted the balance of power among regions in favor of the North Atlantic-European region. The rapid, increasingly ruthless extension of Western rivalries to the world as a whole broke up regional systems elsewhere, redirecting autonomous trajectories of development and forcing regional centers and their subordinate systems to reorganize the social relations of production and power under the pressure of the rapid formation of global politics.

Great Britain championed an accelerated process of global integration, hinging on the spread of industrialization and the intensification of production and exchange within the context of an increasingly global division of labor between manufacturing and primary commodity producing areas. Increased global integration also involved a tier of newly industrializing countries that benefited from Britain's penchant for exporting its industrial revolution; this tier initially included the United States, Germany, and Japan, rapidly industrializing powers that soon challenged British domination directly. Also included were a diverse group of societies around the world that engaged in a process of self-transformation leading toward full incorporation within the emerging British-led imperial division of labor. The reorientation of Latin American agrarian and extractive economies, especially in Argentina and Chile, is perhaps the best known example, but the phenomenal rise of peasant-based agricultural production in West Africa in the wake of the collapse of slave trading, and the expansion of rice production in Burma and Thailand in response to the restructuring of the Indian Ocean economy, were equally significant. Much of eastern and southern Europe also followed this trajectory. In each of these cases, though in quite different and specific ways, state power turned into an instrument of, or a conduit for, producers who were increasingly engaged in world-market exchanges. As a result, these societies retained only residual powers to resist encroachment on their autonomy. While few were formally subordinated to colonial power, they functioned as dependent elements, constituting highly developed regional enclave economies serving the industrial producers according to the rules of free trade.

This global organization of production and exchange rested to a significant degree on the capacity of primary producing countries to export their goods to industrial countries on fairly equal terms of trade. Although European colonial possessions certainly participated in this exchange, they were only a small part of a much larger expansion of production and trade worldwide. This has led some authors to dismiss the importance of colonies in the organization of the imperial world order. Yet is was not by chance that Great Britain, the foremost champion of world economic integration, also became the most aggressive and successful colonial power at the end of the nineteenth century. For the organization of accumulation on a worldwide scale and the reproduction of multilateral exchanges depended on colonial societies and most specifically on India, which remained the centerpiece of a large East Asian network of production and exchange. As the only great land-based power, India stood at the heart of Britain's imperial order. It was Asia's leading trading and manufacturing power, earning trade surpluses with every country in the world except Great Britain well into the twentieth century. Under colonial domination, however, India never converted these earnings into national savings of domestic consumption. Rather, the
surpluses were transferred, in a variety of forms, to Great Britain. This not only provided the British with large capital reserves, but it enabled them to translate their paramount position as a colonial power into a central role as the world’s banker, supplying liquidity for world trade and investment and for managing the global system of settlements based on the gold standard.15

This link between empire-building and economic integration — between economic expansion, extra-economic forms of surplus extractions, and financial hegemony over the exchange of goods — made imperial world order cohere. Britain could organize exchange globally in an international division of labor that left production largely to indigenous producers around the world (as long as they threw open their regional markets to British goods). The reproduction of this system of exchange and accumulation on a world scale depended on the expansion of state power through empire building and on the capacity of the colonial state to extract and transfer surpluses.

**The link between empire-building and economic integration ... made imperial world order cohere.**

The path of global integration championed by the British was profoundly conditioned from the outset by its opposite — the quest for autonomy. Within the industrial and industrializing world, this took the form of national consolidations of productive power, which attempted, in very different ways, to break clear of subordinate integration and to carve out independent, national paths of development. Despite all the obvious differences, newly industrializing countries like Germany, Japan, the United States, and Russia had one thing in common: they all eschewed the British path and turned in upon themselves, mobilizing national societies and organizing productive power in an essentially Listian project of self-improvement and self-exploitation designed to overtake the industrial lead of Great Britain or at least to escape subordinate integration in a British-dominated world-order.16 In the case of both the United States and Russia, this effort involved the effective segregation of large, state-protected national markets which, in that wake of social and political renovation (the American Civil War, the Russian emancipation of the serfs) promoted a rapid expansion into the territorial hinterland and a large increase in agricultural surpluses as a foundation for indigenous industrialization. In the case of Germany and Japan, with much smaller domestic bases, the effort involved the national consolidation of state power, grounded in universal military service and the cultural homogenization of state education and nationalistic ideology, which subordinated social order to an institutionally organized and increasingly planned drive toward efficiency and economies of scale — all aimed at breaking into the process of global integration and challenging British control over the terms of integration.

In each case, efforts to mobilize national societies in institutionally controlled processes of self-transformation had serious domestic consequences, producing heightened struggles over class relations and social values which at times threatened to undermine, even paralyze, the institutional drive for industrial development. Where the effort succeeded, it took the form of corporate reorganization of society that attempted to solve the problems of mass participation in the context of a rapid concentration of industrial and coercive power.17 The strain of this effort and the explosive social tensions it generated made it a most problematic path.

In the United States, where a large domestic market gave capital room to maneuver and a highly developed democracy absorbed and deflected mass dissent, corporate consolidation occurred very rapidly, and an intense period of industrial development allowed corporations, by the 1920's, to begin extending control outward along the backward and forward linkages of the national economy toward the organization of resources and markets — and eventually production itself — on a global scale. In the case of Russia, where capitalist development was far less robust and the bureaucracy too rigid to solve the problems of mass mobilization and participation, the concentrated drive toward state-centered industrial transformation ended in revolution. In the case of Germany and Japan, where the absence of a large internal market reduced the freedom to maneuver and forced industries into highly competitive export drives, the enormous strain of the domestic reorganization of the nation and the struggle for mass participation tended to get displaced into a fervent nationalism that culminated in military activism. For Japan, this took the form of a direct challenge against France and Great Britain — abd for the place in the imperial sun — which ended in world war.

The rise of the new corporate powers at the end of the nineteenth century intensified the lateral competition among industrial nations over control of the means of production, and this competition, in turn, shaped the nature of imperial order. Faced with the challenge of industrial competitors, the British and French rapidly shed their earlier preoccupation with markets and access overseas in favor of a more systematic effort to organize production, to maximize state power in the extraction of colonial resources, and to harness the colonies to the cause of “national efficiency” and the creation of global positions of strength. In effect, imperialism ceased to be mere expansionism and became, as it were, conscious of itself as a world ordering concept. The self-conscious ordering of the imperial estate gave the imperial order its final and distinct form in the consolidation of the colonial promotional state overseas — and also proved its ultimate undoing.18 The more colonial state power bore down upon subject societies to insure the surplus extraction necessary to maintain place in the lateral competition of industrial nations, the more it had to
contend with the resistance, evasion, or counter-mobilization of subject peoples — all of which tended to raise significantly the costs of colonial control.

These countercurrents were of two essential kinds. On the one hand, the old land-based empires of Asia and some Latin American states showed much tenacity in preserving their political and even economic autonomy in the face of the tightening forces of global integration. The continuing struggle for renewal that took place in China and the Ottoman Empire — culminating in the Young Turk revolt of 1908 and the Chinese revolution of 1911 — testified to an ongoing campaign to maintain the integrity of these regional centers of power by adapting Western techniques to the autonomous processes of social organization. The reconstruction of Brazil in the wake of slave emancipation and, in different forms, the Mexican revolution, moved at least partially against the tendency, widespread elsewhere in Latin America, toward dependent integration in the imperial world economy. While only partially successful, these efforts at self-renewal preserved separate centers of power. Their successes — significant in the light of the Indian experience — consisted in limiting the extension of European, state-lead forms of surplus extraction and, hence, the process of universalizing the imperial mode of accumulation on a global scale.19

There were, in the second place, equally important subterranean processes of social self-organization throughout the colonial world. The subordination of production to colonial state power had the effect of pushing autonomous development into the seemingly depoliticized and ahistorical spheres of “native” and “nativist” culture where the struggle to reegrate production, power, and social relation and to establish internally generated forms of domination and subordination continued. These took the form of evasion, “laziness,” open sabotage, and “nativist” practices, but increasingly, with the imposed reorganization of economic and political relations, these struggles cohered in new social mobilizations around subordinate, but indigenous concentrations of production and coercion.20 This process had only begun to unfold in the years before 1914, and, initially, colonial state power was able, wherever applied, to destroy or deflect autonomy drives. Yet, in the longer run, colonial peoples mounted an escalating challenge to the consolidation of state power, which, it should be noted, was not resolved by decolonization, when independence movements seized state power, but continued in the subsequent crises of post-colonial states during the 1960’s and ‘70’s.

**Benchmarks of Global Development**

In the decades before 1914, two axes of conflict coalesced which were, between them, to shape the course of global development down into our own time. Both expressed the tense dialectic between integration and autonomy.

On the one hand, there was an axis of lateral competition that took shape around the bid to forge global integration on the basis of imperial power and the counter-bids to establish autonomous bases of national development on the basis of self-exploitation. Competition along this axis led directly to the First World War. In the long interwar crisis of imperial order, it increasingly took the form of a straight-up rivalry between imperial and corporate forms of organizing production and power. World depression and another world war ended with the American attempt to reconstruct world order on the basis of corporate and nuclear power. The triumph of corporatism under American hegemony in the great postwar boom yielded to basic elements of a supranational organization of production on a global scale.

“The First World War set off a long transitional crisis that led ultimately to a basic restructuring of global order.”

Yet this struggle to control the terms of global integration has continually had to contend with, on the other hand, an axis of struggle against subordination. This struggle for self-improvement included strenuous worldwide debates between efforts to evade or escape subordination through selective adaptations and efforts to evade or escape subordination through selective adaptations and efforts at self-improvement through dependent integration, between appeals for the defense of reinvention of “traditional” values, and pleas to plunge ahead with the economic and social transformation set off by processes of global integration. Along this axis congregated, as well, the various populist, revivalist, and right- or left-wing radical movements of the industrial and industrializing world.21 Conflict along this axis intensified during the interwar period, as the inconclusive conflict between imperial and corporate forms of world order opened avenues for alternative visions. The Second World War and the Cold War effectively eliminated, or contained, contention within industrial societies, but these global conflicts also finally destroyed imperial power, thus releasing forces of political independence and economic development. From this post-colonial crisis emerged the basic elements for a defense of autonomy in the recreation of a world of disparate entities and distinct cultural identities.

**The Transition Toward a Global Organization of Production**

The First World War set off a long transitional crisis that led ultimately to a basic restructuring of global order. This enduring crisis between 1910 and 1950 can be interpreted not simply in terms of a long depression and yet another furious world war, but as an intense struggle over the possible ways and means of shaping global integration. Three developments profoundly affected the general course of global development in these years. In the first place,
world-ordering capabilities shifted from imperial systems, which had been dominant and apparently permanent in 1910, to corporate forms, which undertook a global organization of production on the back of American military and industrial power during the 1950's. This shift was gradual, intermittent, and, during most of the transitional period, inconclusive. On the one hand, imperial power found it difficult to reinstate to global division of labor between manufacturing and primary commodity producers. In the process of trying, however, they transformed colonial regimes into full-fledged promotional states, which now entered and reshaped directly the relations of production—a development that allowed imperial powers to weather the world economic crisis and only culminated during and just after the Second World War.

On the other hand, American corporate power, riding the crest of an enormous domestic boom, made its first bid to supplant Great Britain as the world's source of liquidity and linchpin of global order. During the 1920's, the United States began a process of extending control overseas, running along the backward linkages of raw material suppliers in Latin America and the Pacific basin and the forward organization of production and markets in Europe. Yet this corporate extension failed to establish a cyclical system of exchange relations and payments that would guarantee the reproduction of this new order, and it failed eventually to sustain the domestic expansion of production that underwrote the entire endeavor. With the economic collapse of the 1930's, the United States effectively withdrew from the world economy, and the transition attempted in the 1920's was abandoned. There was thus no linear continuity between the decline of imperial and the rise of corporate order; rather, the transition was wrenched out of a global depression and forged in a worldwide struggle with new forces that arose in the 1930's to challenge both corporate and imperial power.22

This inconclusive conjuncture created the opening for the explosive rise of two militant challengers, Germany and Japan. Both countries had followed a very extreme course of rapid self-transformation in order to participate in the lateral competition over the terms of global integration before 1914, and both had faced massive domestic resistance ever since the 1880's. This opposition first turned into open revolt in the decade beginning in 1910, was temporarily suppressed by the corporate-led recovery of the 1920's, and then burst again to the surface in the 1930's, when corporate industrial and state power could no longer guarantee economic reproduction within national boundaries, and political elites in Germany and Japan were no longer able to stomach or impose a further intensification of self-exploitation to salvage the social relations of production and power. Both countries turned toward neo-imperial solutions, attempting to create by conquest self-contained regional concentrations of power and production and to set free participatory drives through the racist subordination of other societies. The challenge of Germany and Japan revealed with lethal precision the changing trajectory of global development, for this neo-imperialism was a struggle against all forms of global integration, imperial and corporate. It linked the struggle for mass-participation—at its core a challenge to corporate rule within each country—to supremacist dreams of social reconstruction in an imperial counterworld, based on racist domination and the destruction of all possibilities for autonomous development on the part of subordinated societies. It thus reconciled large-scale organization with social mobilization.23

The crisis of imperial order and the depression that followed the collapse of a corporate alternative provided the context for a second development. It deepened the worldwide struggles for autonomy. The world crisis destroyed the integrated process of global accumulation and, in effect, devolved surplus extraction onto regional and local levels where it came increasingly to depend on the control of state power. The strengthening of the colonial state, as an instrument for the promotion of development within empires, encouraged the formation of anti-colonial independence movements. Paralleling this elsewhere was the emergence of authoritarian, nationalist regimes engaged in programs of indigenous development, often with populist overtones. These currents were most pronounced in areas that had followed a path of subordinate integration or had remained marginal to the imperial world order before 1914, but then found themselves hard pressed in the 1920's and '30's to escape the effects of that order's collapse.

In either case, efforts to establish or defend autonomy in the organization of production and power were profoundly affected by the brutal effects of the world economic crisis. Everywhere the general collapse of commodity prices led to a massive impoverishment of raw material and agricultural producers, driving apart industry and agriculture, city and countryside, and subordinating the latter to the imperatives of reviving and maintaining production in the former. Although this global process of starving the countryside eased up because of the war-induced raw material boom of the 1940's, it was not fundamentally changed by it, and it was reinforced again by the precipitate decline of commodity prices after 1953.24 Thus the deepest and most persistent cleavage that resulted from the interwar years was between industrial centers—including the manufacturing and urban enclaves of the nonindustrial world that profited from the collapse of an integrated global system of accumulation—and impoverished agricultural zones that carried the burden of maintaining a highly fragmented, yet intensified process of accumulation.

Outside the colonial systems, the drive for autonomy found its clearest expression in a dozen or so state-centered, military, or authoritarian regimes that appeared across Eastern and southern Europe, the Near
East (Turkey, Iran), Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico) and as far as Guomindong China. Though often conservative and repressive, these regimes were committed to programs of national development and self-strengthening, and they shared a reliance on a strong state as the means for staving off the negative effects of global integration and establishing autonomous bases of social cohesion. While these regimes experimented with various forms of indigenous industrialization, based mainly on import substitution, they were also engaged in a latent or open civil war against their own countryside, and most of them were successful in subordinating either the agricultural sector as a whole or, at least, peasant production and landless labor. Despite significant advances in industrialization, internal civil and class conflict ultimately weakened the quest of these regimes for autonomy. Some made common cause with the neo-imperial challengers of the 1930’s and, after the Second World War, fell easy prey to subordination within a corporate world order, once the process of integrating global accumulation was renewed under American supervision.

Within colonial empires, there was less room to organize shelters for autonomous development. Colonial societies were far less buffered against the ravages of depression. Development policies in the 1920’s had strengthened state control over the organization of labor and extraction and deepened the integration of colonial producers into world market and pricing structures. In the 1930’s imperial powers were generally able to pass off the costs of their recovery strategies onto their colonial subjects. At the same time, however, this strengthening of colonial control made the colonial state an object of nationalist agitation. On the one hand, radical nationalists aimed to seize state power and use it to destroy dependency and recreate autonomy; on the other hand, the strengthening of the colonial state’s extractive capacities and the devastating impact of the depression upon agriculture set off vicious communal, ethnic, and class conflicts that threatened to ruin the movements for national independence and destroy the nationalist dream of inheriting the colonial state and grounding it in a mass popular base.

“Within colonial empires, there was less room to organize shelters for autonomous development.”

Thus the final drive toward independence was shaped by two parallel forces: mass political mobilizations aimed at closing the deep cleavages that had been opened up within colonial societies, while nationalist elites scrambled to control state power as the only effective means of organizing society and managing the economy. The key question in the context of decolonization was whether the techniques of mass action or of state formation would prove most effective in holding societies together and defending independence. Ultimately, it was the path of state strengthening, pioneered in the 1930’s by colonial powers and by autonomy movements outside the colonial empires, that prevailed. The postwar order was built not on the basis of mass mobilizations and mass participation, but on the devolution of power to independent state apparatuses, which sponsored a subordinate integration into the corporate order of Pax Americana. Thus in the end, expanding state power led not to autonomy, but to new forms of subordination. This in turn prompted a general crisis of the post-colonial state throughout the Third World in the 1960’s and ’70’s. It was this crisis of the state after independence reopened multiple possibilities for establishing autonomy on the basis of new forms of social and cultural mobilization.

These struggles to establish the bases of autonomy in the long transitional period are best understood in the context of a third development: the appearance and successful defense of a revolutionary organization of social relations as the foundations of autonomy. The essential prerequisite of this autonomous path was social revolution, something that most anti-colonial movements and developmental statebuilders were unable or unwilling to attempt. Yet the revolutions in Russia and China, which mark the beginning and the end point of this period of transition and form its most enduring legacy, demonstrated against extraordinary odds that autonomous paths of development were possible, albeit at a very high, and some say, crippling, cost. The Bolshevik victory in 1917 united very briefly the fragmented elements of resistance against both corporate and imperial order, calling upon the colonial and peasant masses to join the industrial working class in overthrowing a common oppression. However, through much of the interwar period, the Soviet Union was more a witness than a factor in the crisis of imperial order and the onset of world depression. Cauterized and contained, the Soviet regime turned to a program of autonomous industrial development — socialism in one country — and emerged by the end of the 1930’s as a major industrial power outside the capitalist world.

In pursuing this course of state-led industrialization, based on the terroristic transformation of the Russian countryside, the Soviet Union sharply distinguished itself from the other, nationalist attempts to establish defensive autonomy by its revolutionary willingness and growing ability to rework social relations in favor of industrial growth. At the same time, in pursuing this grim course, the Soviet Union moved along a trajectory quite distinct from the revolutionary movement in China, which in battling the nationalist regime of the Guomindong expressed more clearly the impoverishment of primary commodity producers and explored more fully the possibilities of mass insurgency as a basis of social reconstruction and autonomy. The seminal decisions of China and the Soviet Union in 1927-28 — when Stalin launched his first Five Year Plan and Mao Zedong successfully
inaugurated the course of peasant revolution — captured the tantalizing possibilities of pursuing revolutionary autonomy from entirely opposite poles.²⁸

Both the Soviet Union and China became rallying points, as examples of revolutionary autonomy, for anti-colonial nationalists and their subsequent struggles for social reconstruction. Despite all their differences, these two revolutionary powers remained the lone survivors of the much broader transitional struggle for autonomy that had challenged and undermined imperial world order from below and continued to seek strategies for resisting both the allure and the threat of new corporate order. They thus expressed the extreme difficulties, the internal strains and contradictions, of an autonomous road, and in grappling with the problems of revolutionary self-transformation, they continued to oscillate between the equally massive efforts of breaking into, or breaking out of, the process of global integration.

The Consolidation and Crisis of Corporate World Order

The Second World War brought the transitional struggles to an end. The gigantic American domestic economy, fully restored by war production and generating an enormous surplus of goods and capital, was ideally positioned to attempt a global organization of production and exchange. The Cold War, while instrumental in the consolidation of American control over the processes of global integration, did not fundamentally condition developments after 1950, because most of the world was on the American side of the Cold War divide and subject to its terms of world ordering.²⁹ The United States, in blunting the appeal of a Soviet or Chinese alternative, managed for a brief time to solve three key problems that had thwarted world order in the transitional period. It contained internal opposition to corporate rule from both the Left and the Right; it contained lateral international competition among industrial nations over the terms of global integration; and it deflected global challenges to subordination. In the latter instance, the United States fostered a rapid process of decolonization and deployed developmentalist strategies to shore up the post-colonial state in the wake of the dismantled empires. The two decades of the American epoch thus brought a brief moment of synchronization.

"The American-led corporate order, in contrast, organized production globally ...."

The corporate world order established under American auspices was based on quite different premises from the preceding imperial order. Domestic compromises blunted resistance to large-scale institutional rule: productive pacts calmed trade unionists, while Cold War mobilizations around private property, the family, and the state effectively integrated nationalist opponents to corporate rule. Growth-oriented trilateral compromises fostered regional recovery in Europe and (more slowly) in the Pacific, and curbed lateral competition among industrial nations. The Cold War alliance systems effectively combined the strongest national institutions — large-scale enterprise and the military — into a transnational elite network which, especially in Germany and Japan, turned the staunchest supporters of national power into the foremost proponents of a new world order under American leadership. The reproduction of this system was ensured through a mixture of productivity increases, inflation, and unequal terms of trade. Above all, it was ensured by the opening of the American market, which facilitated a mutually beneficial circulation of goods and capital and fostered an increasing specialization in the division of labor among industrial and industrializing nations. This promoted a much higher level of global integration than had been possible before 1914, but it also produced a profound transformation in the bases of world order. The imperial world order had organized exchange relations globally, leaving production to indigenous producers, and had insured both production and social reproduction through the expansion of state power. The American-led corporate order, in contrast, organized production globally, while fostering regional exchange networks within the industrial world and creating monopsonistic exchange relations between industrial and nonindustrial nations.³⁰

In the industrial world, stabilization depended on the effective suppression of insurgencies against subordination. The Soviet Union contested this corporate dispensation, but managed to ensure the survival of an autonomous socialist alternative only through a rigorous suppression of autonomy drives in Eastern Europe and (less successfully) China, and through a sullen, economically debilitating acquiescence in its own containment within a militarized regional block. The Americans were thus able to brand all popular oppositionist or autonomy movements on their side of the Cold War divide as communist-inspired. Consequences of this ideological consensus spread to the colonial world, where the balance tipped against mass insurgencies in the movement for independence.³¹

Decolonization in the corporate world order, instead, involved the devolution of state power to local and regional actors who used it to attract investment and expand production within a transnationally coordinated economic system of surplus extraction. Developmental policies led to a remarkable expansion of primary commodity production, achieved largely through investments in economies of scale. At the same time, a general cheapening of products resulted from tradeoffs between indigenous elites of poor countries (who benefitted from transnational investments) and corporate elites whose principal motive in investment was to control and cheapen the costs of raw materials.
Thus industrial and primary producers were bound together in an integrated global system of accumulation. It is in this context, as a specific feature of the formation of a corporate world order, that the notion of the development of underdevelopment makes sense, and explains both the crisis of the post-colonial state from the late 1960's and the continuing viability of popular insurgencies. It is hardly surprising, in the light of these developments, that the stabilization of corporate order came increasingly to depend on exertions of military force. A general militarization of the world, a global integration of coercion under American supervision, was a concomitant to the control of autonomy. Not only did the containments of the Soviet Union come to depend on weapons of enormous sophistication and destructive power, but the dissemination of these technologies of destruction to state elites and clients throughout the Third World contributed to both the fiscal crises of post-colonial states and to the rising levels of repressive violence that were necessary in the reproduction of internal order. The U.S.-centered corporator order thus proved highly unstable. Signs of impending trouble became evident in the early 1960's, and in the 1970's the system entered general crisis. A third transitional phase has opened which is bringing to a close the century of Western control over the processes of global integration.

The tremendous expansion of the world economy since the 1950's has produced a climactic advance in the processes of global integration. The internationalization of production since the late 1950's, followed by the proliferation of global banking operations in the late 1960's, fostered both the rapid expansion of manufacturing sectors in selected Third World countries and a dramatic decentralization of production worldwide. The increasingly tight integration of global systems of finance, production, and exchange gave corporate forms of control enormous leverage and maneuverability. This in turn produced increasing crises of adjustment for local and regional economies seeking to participate in world development. Western industrial nations, every bit as much as the newly industrializing nations of the southern tier, had to accommodate national economic policies to the logic of competition within a fully integrated world economy. This brought both austerity programs and export drives among industrial nations seeking markets, and engendered further impoverishment and indebtedness among poorer nations seeking to participate in what was, still, an era of global growth. The logic of global competition thus came to overshadow the integrity of national politics.

Control over the global organization of production is no longer centered in the United States. Rather, it is spread out among industrial powers and increasingly crosses the North-South divide. With this development, the process that has characterized the last century — that of a simultaneous expansion of industry worldwide and a concentration of control in the North Atlantic world — may be coming to an end. But the newly emerging competition over global order, in which Asians, Latin Americans, and Near Easterners actively participate, has not led to a more egalitarian world. Instead, the renewal and spread of lateral competition for control is slicing up whole regions and countries anew, establishing new focal points of production and power. This process is commonly called a new international division of labor: an apt enough description as long as we recall that this division of labor is based no longer on exchange between independent producers but on the global and competitive management of production. This process incorporates newcomers, yet pushes others to the margins.

No one escapes the impact of a global organization of production. The victims are not only in an impoverished "fourth world" of the regions of endemic violence and protracted civil war, but in the United States itself. The process of global integration produced a general crisis of American hegemony in the 1970's. The internationalization of capital and productive capabilities had the long-term effect of draining investment and running down domestic plants and equipment, reducing productivity and increasing inflationary pressures. The crisis of American power was passed off on others in the form of exported inflation, capital shortages, an intensified debt crisis, and deepening militarization. The United States sought to defend global stability with projections of military strength. Its embattled clients, who had depended on the American promise of development, resorted to military solutions in the face of the general crisis of state power. These patterns bear all the marks of a transitional crisis. If the first period of transition, in the mid-nineteenth century, was characterized by a projection of productive and coercive power from one region onto the rest of the world; and if the second period of transition, between the wars, was characterized by national struggles over the global organization of production and power; then this third transitional period is marked by a truly global competition over the terms of integration itself.

"No one escapes the impact of a global organization of production."

In this passage, the North Atlantic world clings to the social organization of production and power that has given it the edge in global competition for so long, while other regions of the world launch crisis-prone efforts to carve out new modes of social organization to preserve some semblance of coherence and identity. The strains are enormous and the failures are numerous. Thus the shift to high productivity factories in parts of the Third World has rendered obsolete the generalized mobilization of labor power typical of the imperial era. In the process, one of the more important twentieth-century footholds of contention has dissolved. Instead, mobilization of labor power takes place more
and more on the initiative of impoverished people themselves and at their own expense: Mexicans, Africans, Turks, and others migrate across continents in search of jobs. Moreover, whole areas and whole peoples have been pushed out of the processes of global integration. Bangladesh and much of Africa are rendered irrelevant to global development, so marginal that their only real resource is to call upon the pity of the world by threatening to die in mass starvation on television.

Globally organized capitalism nevertheless maintains its allure. It may destroy social cohesion and it may give rise to terroristic regimes, but it also holds out the promise of plenty and a better life. The emergence of a universalizing, global culture is apparent, not only in the corporate boardrooms of the transnationals, but in the worldwide appeal of such artifacts of American consumerism as Dallas. In response, regional moves for autonomy entail the elaboration of new cultural forms. That is, culture cannot be taken at face value, as some "authentic" expression waiting to be ruined by missionaries, Coca-Cola, and Donald Duck. At the end of the twentieth century, cultural representations (arising as expressions of the relations of gender, class, and ethnicity) have become a contested terrain in which the use of symbols and of goods is at stake. One of the crucial contests over global control has shifted from the general mobilization of labor power to the generalized reworking of social relations and their cultural representations.

The open-ended nature of this struggle is evident. Against the impoverishment of African culture, which is an extension of the general spoliation of Africa, we can set the attempts of China or India to reorient production, power, and social cohesion. In China, these efforts have revived old issues: how to maintain central power and social cohesion while fostering economic development; how to maintain a moral, non-economic order of society and a separate Chinese identity while establishing closer ties with world systems of production and exchange. In India such efforts have led to a new surge of religious and sectarian extremism and to widespread communal violence, threatening to break up the unity of the subcontinent at precisely the moment when a distinctly national, technocratically modern middle class is taking shape. One may note the tendency of more overtly militant societies, like Iran, to open some distance between global technique and indigenous culture, to attempt "arms-length" appropriations of technique that reorient society and establish defensible cultural coherence against a global power structure. And one may observe West Africans trying to cope with the balkanization of their region and the collapse of the post-colonial state: creating "informal" economies and social networks, new modes of social organization, and new centers of power.

The current crisis of transition is thus characterized by the inability of political systems to control global production and global integration, and also by the inability of regional social formations to assert fully distinct processes of social and cultural reproduction. World order fails, while disparate entities cannot yet organize autonomous histories: this is the current configuration of the century-old struggles between global integration and the local organization of society. In this tense and tenuous combination of material integration and cultural fragmentation, we mark the end of the era of purely Western domination and the reappearance, in dramatically altered forms, of a world of disparate entities and autonomous regional centers. Women in veils work at computer terminals, dispatching oil tankers to distant markets or military supplies to troops engaged in holy war. This is not Spengler's decline of the West, but the beginning of a global reordering in which the West seeks its place in a world order it must now share with radically different societies. It is the beginning of a truly global politics.

A World of Autonomous Regions
The Crisis of Transition —
1840's - 1880's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Improvement via</th>
<th>Self-Improvement via</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriation of</td>
<td>Domination &amp; Enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technique</td>
<td>Social Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance vs.</td>
<td>Imperialism (colonial domination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>vs. Corporatism (self-exploitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evasion vs. Subordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Soviet Union         | China |
| revolutionary        | revolutionary |
| autonomy             | autonomy |

| Corporatism under    | Political Independence/Economic |
| American hegemony    | Development |
| Supranational        | Autonomy on the Basis of |
| Organization         | Cultural Identity |
| Global Production    |                     |

The Crisis of Transition — 1970 -
A Materially Integrated World Consisting of Distinct Social-Cultural Entities


3. Geoffrey Barraclough was one of the first to argue this case in *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, 1st ed. (New York, 1965).

4. Our interpretation -- as most others which deal with global development -- is deeply indebted to Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York, 1944), though we disagree with him at virtually every point.


9. While this transition crisis may be studied in its regional manifestations — an excellent example being Key-Hiuk, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882* (Berkeley, 1980) -- there are very few recent attempts to conceptualize the crisis as part of a global process of transformation. The growth of the global, i.e. Western-controlled economy is traced in its general outlines by A.G. Kennwood and A. L. Loucheug, *The Growth of the International Economy, 1820 - 1980* (London, 1983).


13. This is a matter of intense debate; see Paul Bairoch, *The Economic Development of the Third World since 1900* (Berkeley, 1975); Alfred Maizel, *Industrial Growth and World Trade* (Cambridge, 1963); John R. Hanson, *Trade in Transition: Exports from the Third World, 1840 - 1900* (New York, 1980).


17. The literature on corporatism is reviewed in Alan Cawson, *Corporatism and Political Theory* (London, 1986).


19. Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, 2 vols. (New York, 1974), underestimates these limits by using a dichotomy of development and underdevelopment. If, as we argue, the organization of control over the process of global integration in unstable and changes over time, it is of utmost importance to differentiate between the various means of maintaining and reproducing control: unequal exchange, control of the organization of production either by the state or (inter)national capital, and surplus extraction (either on the basis of state extraction or through unequal exchange). This whole matter requires further systematic analysis. For the time being, it suffices to stress the changing nature of accumulation on a world scale which reflects the limits of exploitation. See Fred Cooper, "Africa in the World Economy," *African Studies Review*, 213 (1981): 1-86.


21. Most studies on populism are limited by their lack of proper contextualization. A valid exception is Gavin Kitching, *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective: Populism, Nationalism, and Industrialization* (New York, 1982).


24. Dietmar Rothermund, ed., *Die Peripherie in der
Century (Berkeley, 1985), provides a most succinct interpretation.


33. The most sophisticated analyses of this kind exist for Latin America (conveniently summarized in Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Flisch, eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America [rev. ed., New York, 1986]), but these cannot be easily transferred to Africa with its gatekeeper states [Ruth B. Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changin Forms of Supremacy, 1945-1975 (Berkeley, 1982); and Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven, 1976)], or for that matter to South and Northeast Asia (see the forthcoming volume of Edwin Winckler, ed., World-System and Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Theory: The Case of Taiwan).

34. Clearly expressed in the "trilateralist" debate of the mid-1970's; see Brian Crozier, et al., eds., The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York, 1975), and the current debates over protection and reindustrialization. In any case, the challenge to global "liberalism" (i.e. corporate control) cannot simply be subsumed under the political struggle for a New International Economic Order by "Third World" nations (as is assumed in Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism [Berkeley, 1985]). Rather, it should be seen in the context of a new global struggle over control of the process of global integration. So far this process of a "Braziliization" of the struggle for control has only received journalistic treatment.

35. The combination of terrorist industrialization and militarization of hegemony is most clearly expressed in Latin America and Southeast Asia in the 1970's. See Miles Wolpin, Militarism and Social Revolution in the Third World (Totowa, N.J., 1982). The intellectual propagandists of this development can be found among the second generation of developmentalists; see Leonard Binder, et al., eds., Crises and Sequences in Political

THE MARTIN YANUCK MEMORIAL SCHOLARSHIP

Spelman College announces the formation of the Martin Yanuck Memorial Scholarship. Because of Dr. Yanuck's own commitments to internationalizing Spelman's curriculum by increasing the global perspective of Spelman women through the world civilization course, the visiting diplomats program, study abroad, and other extra funding will be possible through this scholarship. The funds collected will be used to help bring international students to Spelman and to help students with financial need to study overseas.

Contributions can be sent either to the History Department, Box 1447, Spelman College, Atlanta, GA 30314; or to Mrs. Tanya Moore, Director of Development and Annual Giving at Spelman College, Atlanta, GA 30314.
GIVE WORLD HISTORY THE TIME IT DESERVES

by the Staff of the Bradley Commission on History in Schools

In some ways, history is like a rearview mirror: it gives us a view of what we can no longer see and thereby helps us drive forward. The “rear view” of world history, however, is like that from a wide-angle, twelve-lane mirror.

In each case the views that appear in the mirror are somewhat the same and the purpose also carries through. It is the framework of the view that is different. Looking in the “mirror” of world history shows all the images of the U.S. or Western Civilization “mirrors,” but within a bigger picture. It is essential that American students have had a good look at that “wide-angle” rearview mirror before they leave high school, says the Bradley Commission on History in Schools.

The Bradley Commission, formed in 1987, and composed of noted historians and master classroom teachers including William H. McNeill and Gordon Craig, spent a year looking at the history curriculum in American schools K-12. In September, 1988, the Commission issued a call for improving the quantity and quality of history taught in U.S. schools. Their report, Building a History Curriculum; Guidelines for Teaching History in Schools, takes pains to point up the importance of world history in providing an adequate basic education for all citizens.

“History,” says the Bradley Commission, “provides the only avenue we have to reach an understanding of ourselves and of our society, in relation to the human condition over time.” For that reason all history courses, regardless of their scope or content, should bring students to a better understanding of the six Vital Themes that shape - and have shaped - human life:

* Civilization, cultural diffusion, and innovation;
* Human interaction with the environment;
* Conflict and cooperation;
* Comparative history of major developments; and
* Patterns of social and political interaction.

Within world history these themes are viewed in their widest frame, a global perspective.

Understanding the six Vital Themes in the global context requires expanded curricular time. Therefore the Bradley Commission recommended that school social studies be made history-enriched in the primary grades and history-centered in the elementary grades, with much of that emphasis on the literature, biography, geography, and mythology of the long-ago and far-away. In the secondary grades (7-12) the Commission recommended at least four years of formal study of history, with two of those years being devoted to world history because of its enormous scope and the difficulty of teaching it. World history is inadequate when it consists only of European history plus imperialism. Furthermore the Commission went to some pains to point out that all children in a democracy, not just the gifted or the college-bound, need the knowledge and understanding that world history imparts. It should be part of each student’s background, not just an elective for the college-prep track.

To help teachers fashion world history courses that develop intelligent global perspectives in their students, the Bradley Commission offers twelve topics that should be pursued with an eye toward the relationship of each to the appropriate Vital Themes:

1. The evolution and distinctive characteristics of major Asian, African, and American pre-Columbian societies and cultures.
2. The connections among civilizations from earliest times, and the gradual growth of global interaction among the world’s peoples, speeded and altered by changing means of transport and communication.
3. Major landmarks in the human use of the environment from Paleolithic hunters to the latest technologies. The agricultural transformation at the beginning and the industrial transformation in recent centuries.
4. The origins, central ideas, and influence of major religious and philosophical traditions, such as Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, Christianity; and of major ideologies and revolutions such as the American, French, Russian, and Chinese.
5. Close study of one or two selected non-European societies, to achieve the interest and power of the good story that narrative provides.
6. Study of at least one society that can no longer be simply defined as “Western” or “non-Western,” such as in South and Central America.
7. Comparative history of selected themes, to demonstrate commonalities and differences not only between European and other societies, but among non-European societies themselves.
8. Comparative study of the art, literature, and thought of representative cultures and of the world’s major civilizations.
9. Varying patterns of resistance to, or acceptance and adaptation of, industrialization and its accompanying effects, in
representative European and non-European societies.
10. The adaptation of both indigenous and foreign political ideas, and practices, in various societies.
11. The interplay of geography and local culture in the responses of major societies to outside forces of all kinds;
12. Selected instances of historical success and failure, of amelioration and exploitation, of peace and violence, of wisdom and error, of freedom and tyranny. In sum, a global perspective on a shared humanity and the common human condition.

A two-year course in world history focused on the preceding dozen topics, using a variety of narrative instances and with an eye toward helping students develop an understanding of the six Vital Themes of history within a global context, can form the cornerstone of a curriculum that supports the new movement toward global and international studies. By viewing history in the global framework, students better learn to use the historian's "Habits of Mind" to think about patterns and events. For instance, when students look for patterns and significant developments on a global scale they will better understand "the relationship between geography and history as a matrix of time and place, and as a context for events." Before describing a movement or significant pattern as identified with a particular culture or society, students will widen their viewpoint in both time and space. They will look to see if something similar may have been going on somewhere else in the world rather than just within a region; they will look at other eras to see if something similar happened in another time period.

There are other techniques of analysis, habitually used by historians, that the suggested world history course would help students develop. In order to understand history in a global framework students must learn to:

* distinguish between the important and the inconsequential, to develop the "discriminating memory" needed for a discerning judgment in public and personal life.
* perceive past events and issues as they were experienced by people at the time, to develop historical empathy as opposed to present-mindedness.
* acquire at one and the same time a comprehension of diverse cultures and of shared humanity.
* comprehend the interplay of change and continuity, and avoid assuming that either is somehow more natural or more to be expected than the other.
* grasp the complexity of historical causation, respect particularity, and avoid excessively abstract generalizations.
* appreciate the often tentative nature of judgments about the past, and thereby avoid the temptation to seize upon particular "lessons" of history as cues for present ills.
* read widely and critically in order to recognize the difference between fact and conjecture, between evidence and assertion, and thereby to frame useful questions.

In many ways, world history can be thought of as the culmination of a citizen's study of history. Not only does it provide the frame for national and cultural history, it also hones the skills of the historian that are most useful to the citizen in making prudent decisions in his or her own private and public life.

The Bradley Commission is clear on the point that world history is central to an adequate school history curriculum. A discussion of the Vital Themes, the Topics for Study, and the historian's Habits of Mind is included in the Commission's 32-page booklet, Building a History Curriculum. Copies are available from The Bradley Commission Office, 26915 Westwood Road, Suite A-2, Westlake, OH 44145 for $3/copy, postpaid. Also be on the lookout for The Future of the Past, the Commission's book of essays by various authors on topics raised in the booklet. Among the essays will be one on "Central Themes in World History" by Ross E. Dunn of San Diego State University and past president of the World History Association. The book will be published by Macmillan Publishing Company and is expected to be available by the fall of 1989.

Just as we appreciate having the wide-angle rearview mirror when driving a car, we can also see the value of having the "wide-angle" view of the past that only world history provides as we "drive" through our personal and public lives. In the case of world history, however, it takes two years between grades 7 and 12 to install that "mirror." We should make sure we take the time to install it.

The professional heroes these days, one might perhaps say, are not the renowned academic celebrities, but the anonymous teachers who try to put together a world history course for the benefit of students whose future depends on their grasp of contemporary reality. ---

Theodore H. Von Laue
Clark University
BOOK REVIEWS

World Politics in the Twentieth Century
Paper, $20.25.

The World Since 1945: Politics, War and Revolution in the Nuclear Age
Hardbound, $35.00; paper, $22.50.

Teachers of world history are likely to find The World Since 1945, the work of two historians at Towson State University, of much greater utility in the classroom than the occasionally brilliant but often baffling book of Peter R. Beckman, a political scientist at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. The first is a well-organized, lucidly written narrative reinforced by modest but penetrating analytical insights. The second seemed to this reviewer to be a well-intentioned but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to illuminate narrative by some of those modes of theoretical discourse that strike political scientists as very meaningful but often leave historians cold.

In seventeen chapters stretching from the end of World War II to the 1980's, the Towson co-authors focus on political and diplomatic history, venturing into economic history when its explanatory value becomes essential, as in analyzing the politics of the Third World. Their treatment of it, and of the Soviet bloc, is full and thoroughly informed. For some reason they have chosen to omit the domestic history both of Western Europe and of the United States during the period. Many teachers will not regret the latter omission, feeling that their students will have had a surfeit of U.S. history elsewhere. Yet I regret that authors as willing as these are to offer frank interpretations did not take the opportunity to set their readers' own society within a world-historical context.

The results would have been interesting, for this is a work that does not shrink from judgments. Not for McWilliams and Pitrowski the all-too-common textbook blandness. Blame for the Cold War is apportioned evenhandedly, for example, though the authors do not go as far as some revisionists. Facts found here that some texts would omit include, among many others, the legal connections of the Dulles brothers to the United Fruit Company prior to the U.S. intervention in Guatemala, and the activities of Menachem Begin in 1948.

Even in an effective collaborative work like this one, the reader can sometimes surmise where one author leaves off and the other begins. The chapters on the Third World struck me as a bit more given to undiscriminating accumulation of detail: need students really be told that what was once Nyasaland is now Malawi? The excesses of colonialism, moreover, evoke a tone of moral condemnation absent from the chapters on superpower rivalry. Nonetheless these chapters make effective use of statistics to show how the "roots" of Third World revolutions are to be found in "maldistribution of wealth and lack of social justice," a fact that Washington systematically ignores. In such a sympathetic chapter, the suggestion on p. 234 that the Ivory Coast enjoys its relative prosperity because of the continuing presence of 60,000 Frenchmen is shockingly discordant.

As they approach the 1980's, the authors choose to focus on some critical issues of our decade: Third World debt, Islamic militancy, Polish Solidarity, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the nuclear arms race. Skillful as the treatment of these topics is, one wonders why they chose this selective approach to the present.

These are minor criticisms. Overall, this is a text I would unhesitatingly adopt. I detected few errors, however: e.g. Jean Monnet was never France's
Foreign Minister (p. 74). Clearly conceived, written with with verve and moral commitment, it should be welcomed by student readers.

Beckman’s book may not prove so welcome. Its essential premise is that “history is not enough” to understand contemporary world politics. Beckman’s remedy is to divide the century into decades and devote a hybridized chapter to each. Every chapter has two parts: a dense narrative is followed by a theoretical essay that attempts to apply one of four principal “scientific” modes of analysis to some event falling within the chapter’s span. Along the way Beckman repeatedly attempts to quantify the distribution of power in the world at various epochs, correlating such accessible variables as steel production with more imponderable ones like political “stability.” This sometimes leads to odd results. Is it because McKinley was shot that he finds the U.S. less “stable” than Imperial Germany 1890-1900? Why does the political stability of the USSR under Stalin rate only at 0.7?

Realizing, perhaps, that young readers might find all this puzzling, the author attempts to maintain a mood of intimacy with them by frequently addressing them as “you,” and sometimes by facetiousness, as in generalizing about mustachioed dictators (p. 166). Many graphics are used in an attempt to help readers envision the theoretical relationships the text is trying to elucidate: one diagram, for example, depicts the power structure of the classroom, with the professor represented by a big circle and the students by little ones.

Historians attuned to the uniqueness of past events are likely, whatever their tendency to generalize, to have little sympathy with this sort of effort to make the study of world politics into a predictive science. They will not be surprised by the author’s admission, in his closing pages, that “the practice of world politics may be at variance with the logic of the power distribution because of the intrusion of environmental characters” — like the influence of individuals or even change. Professor Beckman deserves real credit for his effort to make some of the arcane — and to my mind unprofitable — concepts of the political science journals accessible to undergraduates. But a history teacher who assigned this book would probably spend much class time trying to interpret its narrative detail and its opaque and circularly reasoned generalizations to a mystified class.

John Rothney
Ohio State University

Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties

Paul Johnson’s examination of our century is reviewed at this relatively late date in order to assess its suitability as reading for students and/or teachers of world history. For students, at least as a primary text, no; for teachers, yes.

Johnson displays one characteristic that should gratify student readers, who are often troubled by complexity, alternative explanations, and the like: he writes with an assurance approaching Macaulay’s. But his admirably forceful writing is directed to relatively sophisticated readers, who are assumed to know Tristan Tzara, Karl Popper, and untranslated bits of French and Italian. The few Britishisms (Wilson a “don,” a civil rights bill “tabled” in the British sense) are less of an obstacle.

For teachers, Johnson’s book invites a reassessment of assumptions. The glowing appreciation of Harding and Coolidge may seem a reaching for novelty, but the work has its agenda: the defense of Western Culture against Communism, and more particularly against liberalism and relativism, which have consigned the world to misery by undermining the West’s self-confidence.

Johnson has been bashed as Eurocentric by Burjor Jal Avari and George Ghevargese Joseph (History Workshop Journal, 23, Spring 1987), but he does devote many withering pages to the viciousness — compounded by hypocrisy — of Third World leaders. He is more outraged by those who professed high
principles, such as Mao and Nehru, than by straightforward thugs such as Idi Amin, but he provides a vigorous summary of the monstrosities and failures of post-colonial regimes in general.

Atrocities of colonial regimes are shown to be provoked by ruthless nationalists, as especially in Algeria, or to be trivial in comparison to those of their native successors. Johnson contends that the massacre at Amritsar in 1919 — a smaller affair than the butchery by the Indian government in the same city in 1981 — was unfortunate chiefly because afterward “security officials, both British and Indian, now hesitated to deal promptly with riotous assemblies.”

Characteristic of the imperial failure of will was the Indian official Edwin Montagu, a “Jew with oriental longings,” e.g., “the longing to be loved. He suffered from that corrosive vice of the civilized during the twentieth century, which we shall meet in many forms: guilt.”

It is not just misguided officials who let the world disintegrate, however; Johnson subscribes to a trickle-down theory of causation that puts the intellectuals in control. The British Empire let go, ultimately, by the “Bloomsberries,” and Sartre was responsible for the massacres in Kampuchea. The ancient Egyptians were better off than the unhappy citizens of the twentieth century, as the Egyptians possessed a cosmology untroubled by the doubt and relativism let loose by Einstein. Johnson’s assertion of the centrality of intellectual history is perhaps more unfashionable than such occasional curious judgments on particulars as his declaration that Mussolini “always disliked large-scale violence, especially violence for its own sake.” His intellectuals are capable of effective treason; their backstabbing of civilization has been fatal.

Johnson holds up no hope of reassembling the Humpty Dumpty of the golden age before the First World War through some triumph of the imperial will. He argues vigorously that the state is better suited for doing harm than good (though American repressions in the 1950’s ought to have been more thorough, and France’s problems grow chiefly from the lack of a proper government).

For all its liveliness, this is therefore a discouraging book, bristling with unpleasant details and arranged around a pessimist thesis. Modern Times was published in England as A History of the Modern World: From 1917 to the 1980’s. Yet another title might have been still more appropriate, had not William L. Shirer pre-empted it: The Nightmare Years. Johnson’s gloomy and assertive book is useful for freshening the lecturer’s store of information and for reasserting the primacy of the history of ideas.

Martin Berger
Youngstown State University

The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940

Daniel R. Headrick has written another splendid book on the technology of European imperialism. Readers of The Tools of Empire (1981) will recall Headrick’s masterful discussion of how a handful of key inventions—iron-hulled steamships, the machine gun, quinine and the telegraph—contributed mightily to the European conquest and control of much of the tropical world in the nineteenth century. Lucidly written and carefully argued, The Tools of Empire remains a major contribution to our understanding of the technological dimensions of European empire-building and a valuable classroom resource as well.

In The Tentacles of Progress Headrick shifts his focus from the ways in which Europeans used technology to facilitate their conquests to the process by which technology was transferred to the colonies. The result is an interesting and nuanced contribution to the historiography of the “development of underdevelopment.” The book begins with a useful distinction between, on the one hand, the geographical relocation of technology, i.e. the means by which the colonial powers exported the equipment, methods, and technical personnel to the colonies; and, on the other, the cultural diffusion of technology, that is the (infrequent) spread of the requisite technical knowledge and skills from Europe to the colonial peoples.

Headrick’s thesis is that during the height of European colonial power, 1850-1940, European self-interest ensured that the dominant mode of technology transfer would be geographical relocation rather than cultural diffusion. Thus when the British decided to build railways in India, they used British-manufactured materials and British technical personnel. As a result, India experienced economic growth under British rule, but in the absence of “backward linkages,” there was not the kind of generalized economic development that had occurred earlier in Britain during its railway boom. In circumstances that were typical of much of the colonial world, India entered the twentieth century as neither a traditional society nor a modern industrial society; rather, the subcontinent was well advanced along the road to modern underdevelopment.

This overall argument is development in eleven crisply written chapters based on evidence pertaining to India (about half of the examples), Africa, and Southeast Asia. Most of the chapters deal with the substantial geographical relocation of the technology of ships and shipping, railways, the telegraph and the wireless, urban sanitation, irrigation works, and agriculture from metropole to colony. Two concluding chapters tell the much briefer story of technical
education and native enterprises in the colonies. The Tentacles of Progress will be rewarding reading for everyone who teaches world history. Headrick has read widely in British and French archives and made good use of what he found. One of the strengths of the book is the way the author demonstrates how political considerations shaped the process of technological transfer; there is no hint of technological determinism here. I also found the account of economic developments in India to be particularly illuminating. My only reservation about this book is that, unlike The Tools of Empire, it is probably too complex for the typical freshman in my world history course.

Stephen S. Gosch
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire


For most of us, "civilization" is a term encountered or used casually and with little reflection. If questioned, we might respond that it characterizes a society with "a relatively high level of cultural and technological development" (Webster). We might add that such a society is more complex in its institutions and activities than a simpler, preliterate society. But other than to append a list of such civilized attributes as trade, cities, and social classes, we soon run out of things to say. The explanation for this sudden poverty of knowledge and understanding is that civilization, like cosmology, is a theoretical subject; unlike nations or localities, it is not manifested in monuments or documents. Civilization is an abstraction: It can be affirmed, refuted, defined, classified, subjected to theorizing and speculation, or treated in any other philosophic or scientific manner. Further, if we affirm the civilizational concept, and if civilization is viewed as experiencing processes of change, then it possesses a history. If we make these leaps, as world historians we will have to deal with it.

In The Boundaries of Civilizations in Space and Time, fifty-six theorists contribute their views and ideas about the definition, classification, origins, economic bases, terminations, and global extent of civilization. The contributors include historians (seventeen), social scientists (twenty-two), classicists (three), philosophers (five), and various others (nine, representing philology, comparative literature, linguistics, religion, education, and a couple each of librarians and physical scientists). Their contributions were assembled in a series of symposia carried on by the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (ISCSB) over an eight-year period, 1978-1986. Taking off from earlier theorists (Spengler, Toynbee, Kroeber, and others) and also from founders of the association (Toynbee again, Coulborn, Quigley, and Sorokin), the "civilizationists" of the ISCSB (which fosters particularist studies as well as the generalist kind underlying these symposia) pursue five main approaches:

1. Civilization as a concept
2. Developmental processes
3. Comparative analysis
4. Holistic studies
5. A global or ecumenical perspective

These symposia manifest a quality of work-in-progress rather than final formulation. They are characterized by an atmosphere of openness, a rejection of dogmatizing, and no compulsion toward consensus. These qualities are shown in the symposium on the differences between primitive and civilized cultures. Stepping around the pejorative connotations in primitive and barbaric, the session inquires into processes of origin whereby preliterate cultures mix (Quigley) or conglomorate (Coulborn) to form civilizations. Rather than consensus, new meanings and ideas are sought, and Melko concludes carefully that Coulborn's generalization — that the greater magnitude of civilization in size and complexity generates a flow of history — has not been refuted, but that a civilized society experiences more rapid changes because of the instability that results from greater size and complexity.

More often, even such a tentative consensus is not reached, although the participants never fail to value any idea of worth. The problems they encounter are those of the generalist. At one point (p. 231), Melko notes that no two scholars dealing with the same problem ever come up with exactly the same sources. At another (p. 202), a specialist calls out a theorist who may be exceeding the facts. And there are many instances where presenters allude too quickly or carelessly to ideas or material that underlie or precede their work. Fortunately the editors have filled many of these lacunae by providing a glossary of arcana and a comprehensive bibliography.

A more serious intellectual shortcoming to which generalists are prone arises with Bowler's application of systems theory to civilizational processes. Although civilizations apparently consist of a congeries of subsystems (government, economy, society, etc.), the evidence for a supersystem seems intimated. This gets too close to the pathetic fallacy of Spengler who, rejecting a linear history, depicted his civilizations as possessing the cyclical qualities of biological organisms. To depict civilization as a physical-mechanical system conforming to systemic dynamics replicates the Spenglerian fallacy of mistaking metaphor for reality. Perhaps the hazy outline of the civilizational supersystem is hovering vaguely before us, but when apprehended more closely, it will be revealed as a uniquely complex human system, not a physical one like a steam engine or a computer.

The reader who persists through these dialogues will
find that most of the book’s opaquenesses become clarified through repetition. Thus Richardson’s successive applications of his ideas on world view (Weltanschauung) to each topic develop a cumulative sense of Weltanschauung’s role as a component of civilization. Again, this is true for Wilkerson’s singular theory that civilizations are defined by their intercivilizational contacts or transactions, and that, since the late Bronze Age, civilizations have been merging into a dominating entity that he calls “Central Civilization.” The gem of his succinct presentations is his elucidation of Terminations, à la Cummings. Another gem is Hewes’ magnificent summation of ethnocentrism, “The Concept of East and West in Eurasian Civilizational Thought,” which covers the ground from Herodotus to the modern ideology of Western culture (worth the price of the book).

Those who recognize that the world subdivides not into nations but into macro-entities made up of state systems, economic and trade networks, common religions, universal languages, superstyles, and Weltanschauungen will find this book useful and significant. These socio-cultural leviathans which have filled time and space, which have been curiously and uncertainly labeled civilizations, supersystems, ecumenes, and cultural regions, defy the specialist but invite the generalist-theorist. These attempts to throw their nets over such grand constructs; however, such nets may be too crude or lack strength. To mend or improve the net requires data from the specialist, who in turn may discover the significance of his work in the work of the generalist. It was Toynbee, founder-inspirer of the ISCSC and whose spirit is pervasive here, who called attention to this necessary symbiosis:

...if you analyze the work of the specialist, you will find some general background of ideas behind it, and this means that the two approaches are necessary to each other. Every generalist ought to be a bit of a specialist; every specialist ought to be a bit of a generalist.

H. Loring White
Panama Canal College (Emeritus)

Democracy’s Untold Story. What World History Textbooks Neglect

Paul Gagnon’s book, sponsored by the Education for Democracy project, is the first volume of a planned series on the teaching of democracy. It tackles vital issues in the teaching of history in American secondary education as well as in historical studies generally. Following the theme indicated in the subtitle, it examines five popular world history texts published between 1981 and 1984, concluding that they “leave the story of democracy largely untold” (p. 137). The omission is considered a serious flaw, because “democracy is the worthiest form of human government ever conceived” (p. 14). While advocating Western civilization against world history courses, the book lays out basic principles for teaching history in secondary education. It does so with a commendable understanding of the problems with which history teachers, the authors of history texts, and even the American public in general, must cope at the end of the twentieth century. These principles deserve careful and critical attention.

The opening chapter presents the guiding charter of the volume’s sponsors called Education for Democracy: A Statement of Principles. This statement contains valid advice. Students should “know how democratic ideas have been turned into institutions and practices,” “what conditions — economic, social, cultural, religious, military — have helped to shape democratic practice”; and also “what conditions have made it difficult — sometimes even impossible — for such [practices] to take root.” They moreover should be taught to understand “the current conditions of the world and how it got that way,” preparing them for the challenges to democracy. “For intelligent citizenship we need a thorough grasp of the daily workings of our own society, as well as the societies of our friends, of our adversaries, and of the Third World, where so many live amid poverty and violence with little freedom and little hope” (see p. 20 for the quotations in this paragraph).

That thorough grasp, the Principles plead, calls for more attention to world studies, especially to the realistic and unsentimental study of other nations — both democratic and non-democratic” (p. 23). For that purpose they recommend the comparative study of politics, ideology, economics, and culture and especially [of the efforts of citizens to improve their lot through protest and reform...” (p. 23).

In subsequent chapters Gagnon elaborates these guidelines, underlining the call for more world studies. “Nobody can quarrel,” he writes, “with those who insist that the study of Western civilizations by itself seriously insufficient, given the diversity of our own people and the precarious interdependence of the world community” (p. 38). He stresses the importance of geography among the factors shaping events, and also of morals, so essential in the practice of democracy. Pursued in this manner, “historical study offers the citizen the perspective, the sense of reality and proportion that is the first mark of political wisdom” (p. 28). “The object [of history teaching]”, Gagnon concludes, “is to place us in our own reality, the only ground from which we can hope to make sense of ourselves, of others, and of the world” (p. 39).

Gagnon also has sage advice for the writers of history texts, advocating a durable partnership between high school and university teachers, both working as equals on the vital question: what in the midst of the
profusion of facts and data is most worth teaching? In answer he suggests that they should develop many items and concentrate on critical and controversial issues. They will "be explicit about why to study the assigned material and how it relates to larger ideas and developments." Above all, "they will respond to their student-readers' most persistent and most reasonable questions: So what? What of it?" (p. 35). Reading these and similar passages, one feels like saying "Amen".

But there also runs a different and worrisome strain through these pages. We find a curious ambivalence about American attitudes toward their own institutions and toward the world around them. When outlining the topics for the Western civilization course Gagnon advocates, he contends that his choice of topics does not plead for Western ways. "The focus is on the West not because it is inherently better than other civilizations but because it has produced liberal democracy and many of the moral values that sustain it. This is not to say that no other civilization was capable of doing so, but it was in fact the West that did it, and we need to know how" (p. 39). How are we to reconcile the contradiction: the West produced liberal democracy, "the worthiest form of human government ever conceived," but it is not inherently better than other civilizations? What then is our reality from which we have to "make sense of ourselves, of others, and of the world"?

Our reality, by Gagnon's own definition, is "the diversity of our own people and the precarious interdependence of the world community," for which "the study of Western civilization by itself is seriously insufficient" (p. 38). That admission would seem to justify the global perspectives called for by the various educational agencies cited by Gagnon, as well as, most recently, by the U.S. Conference of State Governors. Following the logic of these recommendations, we must recognize that Americans, comprising less than five percent of the world's population, are caught in a novel dependence on alien, and often very alien, peoples. Making sense of ourselves in this setting so as to have an assurance over our destiny would seem to assign a high priority to a global overview brought into our citizens' minds early in their lives. Yet over this point Gagnon balks, sticking to his advocacy of the traditional Western civilization canon as the core of high school history.

Gagnon defends his position in part by insisting on the centrality of the democratic experience. But when pressed by the advocates of world history courses, he argues that, however desirable a global approach, there is simply no place in the overcrowded high school curriculum. On this ground he retreats from his half-hearted admission that the study of Western civilization by itself is insufficient. For him and his sponsors Western civilization is central, because it culminates in liberal democracy.

How then — and this is the central issue — can we teach what our students should know about the immense diversity of the rest of the world in which they must find their way? How can history teachers, or academic historians, or any thoughtful person for that matter, give detailed answers drawn merely from the course of Western civilization, when students ask: So what? What of it? What, for example, is the link between Socrates and the current war in the Persian Gulf? What does ancient Rome matter to students compelled to search for a career in contemporary society? What does Western civilization teach us about the Japanese, our most vigorous competitors in the global economy?

Under the impact of headlines from all corners of the earth can we still restrict our historical studies to Western civilization considered in isolation? Granted, we want our high school students to understand and appreciate our democratic system of government; we need knowledgeable and dedicated citizens. But we are also obligated to alert their minds to their own and their country's increasing dependence on the outside world and to provide them with the mental tools that create the political wisdom needed for controlling the course of events. These mental tools include an expanded capacity to relate constructively their democratic system of government to the diversity of human experience around the world.

In that world we need to look outward and forward, to the present and foreseeable future. The past assuredly offers essential guidelines. But let them be packaged lightly, knowledgeably abstracted from detail too burdensome to carry with us. Not only the time available, but also the human carrying capacity is limited; it surely is now overstrained by unnecessary historical baggage. We cannot possibly combine teaching a full course of Western civilization with building an informed awareness of the contemporary world. Which is more important to our youngsters, knowing the evolution of Western civilization or finding their way knowledgeably in the world in which they are destined to live? How then, with our limited time and energy, are we to proceed in our history classes, in high school and in college, too?

The alternatives are obvious — and terrifying. We can go the way suggested by Gagnon (and the National Endowment for Democracy) and opt for the canon of Western civilization as reinterpreted by American conservative ideologists. Yet in that manner we abet the defensive closing of the American mind to the non-American majority of humanity on whose activities Americans depend now more than ever. Admittedly, a return to cultural isolationism (like economic protectionism) carries a strong emotional appeal. Dealing with familiar historical landmarks leading to a flattering climax offers a source of psychological security in the dangerous openness of an uncomprehended world; it strengthens vested interests unwilling to change. Yet that phantom security leads to further insecurity. It builds barriers and promotes
reliance on physical power, on violence — on practices which in effect undermine the ideals of Western, and especially American, liberal democracy.

The opposite course is equally problematical. A globally oriented history survey fitted into the limited time available strikes out into “the precarious interdependence of the world community,” in which there exists no consensus, no common experience, no guarantee for peaceful cooperation.

How in the threatening openness can we find guidelines for a common interpretation that boils down the infinitude of data to constructive generalizations relating our form of government to the variety of human experience around the world? It is a challenge worthy of the best minds in America. By advancing, like pioneers, into that global insecurity, we boldly follow the highest ideals of Western civilization and American cultural experience.

History teachers and historians who dare face the contemporary world honestly and realistically will be confused by this volume. Why the attack on world history texts in the name of democracy? Is a historical perspective open to human diversity as evolved over time a threat to the “many-faceted educational needs of a democratic people?” Assessing the thrust of this volume, the reader is uncomfortably reminded of a rival political system ideologically insulated from the rest of the world, in which history education likewise endorses the current form of government as the culmination of human evolution.

Theodore H. Von Laue
Clark University

Minutes
WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION
Executive Council Meeting
Cincinnati, Ohio
December 28, 1988

President Arnold Schrier called the meeting to order at 12:10 pm. Present were Vice-President Marilynn Hitchins, Secretary Anne Barstow; and Executive Council members Jerry Bentley, Sam Ehrenpreis, Marc Gilbert, Sarah Hughes, Sam Jenike, Ray Lorantas, John Mears, Kevin Reilly, Robert Roeder, Heidi Roupp, and Lynda Shaffer. Also present were guests Margery Ganz, Dorothy Goodman, David McComb, Walter Nimocks, and Judith Zinsser.

Minutes of the June 18m 1988 Council meeting were approved unanimously.

President's Report
Arnie Schrier announced the newly elected Council members: Mary Evelyn Tucker (Iona College), Julia Clancy Smith (University of Virginia), and Sam Jenike (Walnut Hills High School, Cincinnati). He thanked retiring members Sam Ehrenpreis, Sara Hughes, and Robert Roeder for their service.

The Treasurer had flight delays and could not attend; therefore, there was no Treasurer's report. (Arnie did know the general status of the finances and did report that we were solvent despite a high legal fee for gaining non-profit status).

Arnie announced with regret the resignation of our Executive Director, Joe C. Dixon, and reported that, after consultation with the Executive Committee, he recommended for this post Richard L. Rosen of Drexel University. Rosen has worked on the Bulletin and his location at Drexel will help to centralize our work. Rosen's nomination was approved unanimously.

From Dixon's final report, Arnie noted that our paid-up membership is 526, 48 more than last year. Arnie then presented us with two pleas raised by Dixon in regard to our increasing dues to $25; not to raise
dues for the 161 persons who have paid up through 1989, 1990, or 1991 until their renewal date, and not to raise dues at all until the first issue of the *Journal* is in members' hands. After considerable discussion, it was voted unanimously:

- to raise dues on Jan. 1, 1990, with notification mailed in the Fall of 12989, including a table of contents of the *Journal*'s first issue. All memberships paid through 1990 or 1991 will not be raised at this time.

New dues scale for students, unemployed, disabled, and senior citizens was discussed: John Mears moved that we raise our current $2 dues to $10, to include the *Journal*. Tabled until we learn more about our present student membership.

*Sam Ehrenpreis moved that the Council of the WHA express its sincere appreciation to Lt. Col. Joe C. Dixon for the years of dedicated service he has rendered to the WHA.*

Be it further moved that the sense of this motion be conveyed to today's business meeting of the Association with the recommendation that they endorse the sentiments thus expressed; furthermore that the President of the WHA compose a suitable letter which he will send to Col. Dixon expressing our sincere thanks and appreciation.

Be it further moved that the Association extend to Col. Dixon a Life Membership in the WHA.

This motion was voted unanimously, with the recommendation that this statement be printed in the Bulletin. (The recommendation about Life Membership was made by Marilyn Hitchens.)

Part of our loss in Martin Yanuck's death lies in the work he was doing on three committees. Marc Gilbert of the Nominating Committee was requested to fill these and other vacancies, and to create a better geographical spread:

*Nominating Committee:* 3 vacancies (Marty's term runs through 1990, 2 are up as of now). Suggestions — Walter Nimocks, Jay Anglin, Mary Rossabi, Mary Evelyn Tucker.

China Conference Committee: Lynda Shaffer will take over Mary's work on grants. Suggested new members are Jim "Pete" Gillam, Jim Ryan, Dana Greene.

Program Committee: Suggestions — Judith Zinsser, Paul Adams, Al Crosby.

*The Bulletin:* Ray Lorantas reported that he has gotten the price of the last copy down to $1.66, including postage. This announcement was greeted with applause. Ray will expand the job opportunities section.

China Conference Committee: Lynda Shaffer pointed out that we need a selection committee to choose the papers. William McNeill was suggested as a member. The China Committee, coordinated by Lynda, will create this subcommittee.

*The Journal:* Jerry Bentley passed out a sample design.

In regard to the Board of Editors, Jerry announced several names added since our last meeting. Further suggestions were:
- Asia — Ainslie Embree
- Latin America — John Russell-Wood
- Europe and America — names from the North-West: Donald Treadgold, Peter Sugar, Jack Green, Arthur Tiedeman (Japan and US), David McComb.
- Pedagogy — (as a referee) Diane Ravitch
- Master Plan Committee: John Mears submitted a report (see attached).

Sam Ehrenpreis requested that this committee update the statement on our membership application.

Bob Roeder and John Mears commented that we need more MA's in World History, especially to train high school teachers. We will discuss this more fully at the June meeting.

David McComb argued that we should break away from the AHA and organize our own conference. March Gilbert and Arnie Schrier replied that many of us can get money from our universities to come to the AHA, and that we recruit new members here (32 paid up at this convention), so we should do both.

Membership: Heidi Roupp wants to do a mass mailing, renting the AHA list or using lists of colleges offering AH courses or lists from the big state university systems.

(Rocky Mountain Regional Conference, June 8-10, 1989, at Aspen): David McComb announced that the theme will be "World Revolutions" and that Philip Curtin had agreed to speak about liberal revolutions, and a Russian scholar about Marxist revolutions. For the third spot, contemporary revolutions, Peter Winn's name was suggested. Heidi Roupp will be in charge of arrangements. NOTE: THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL will meet concurrently with this conference.

Program Committee: For the 1989 AHA, Marilyn Hitchens reported that we will submit a panel on restructuring undergraduate history offerings, from a WH perspective — a curricular approach. The Africanist George Brooks was recommended for this. Sarah Hughes and Bob Roeder suggested that this become two panels, K-12 and undergraduate, advertised as related panels. Structure them around one paper and responses.

NCSS panel last November: led by Marilyn, Heidi, and Marc, to an audience of about 200 who "gobbled up" course outlines and bibliographies. We asked that an article on the teaching of world history be put in the NCSS journal; Heidi and Kevin will help.

There will be a Rocky Mountain Symposium in Denver on WH for the public and politicians.

Proposed Ohio Valley Regional WHA: Walter Nimocks is organizing this. We supported it by acclamation.

Marc Gilbert commented that we need a committee on regional organizations. John Mears and the Master Plan Committee will see about this.
Proposed "1992" conference around the Quincentennial: Judith Zinsser offered three possibilities: to work with another group, the AHA, LASA, or AAA; to work with an American Indian group; or to have our own conference, in October, 1992, in an Indian place — Denver, Albuquerque, etc. In any case, we should stress an indigenous viewpoint, rather than a “Columbus Jubilee.” This will be discussed at our June meeting.

Bob Roeder pointed out that the the impact of the Bradley Report will mean that we must train many more teachers in world history for the schools.

CAFLIS: Dorothy Goodman reported that there should be a better WH representation with this group. Kevin Reilly agreed to help. Marilyn Hitchens moved that we support CAFLIS and ask Goodman to represent us. Voted unanimously.

Respectfully submitted,

Anne L. Barstow, Secretary

IN SEARCH OF A WORLD HISTORY TEXTBOOK
Stephen J. Simon
Appalachian State University

In the fall we examined the textbooks which are available for adoption in our world civilization course here at Appalachian State University. Your editor thought that it might be of interest to those who teach world civilization to have a list of the works that we examined and to have a comment on the process which we used to make recommendations of texts to our department. Our experience might be of use to those departments which are about to choose a new textbook.

The following is a tabulation of the books which we reviewed for use in our course. The list does not pretend to include all possible volumes that are available. However, for those selecting a new text, it is a starting point.


Seven criteria by which to evaluate the various texts were developed and employed by the World Civilization Committee in our department. The notion of differentiation was considered first. This is the question of how well the book states what makes one civilization more advanced or better than another. The next criterion is integration. Is there a good blend of topics and are the major non-Western cultures treated equally with the Western cultures? Then, there is the issue of literacy. How readable is the volume for students? Under currency, one has to consider the proper balance of adequate, interesting, and relevant facts. Also, are the interpretations up to date and is there treatment of gender, social questions, and urban affairs? Next, one must determine whether the text is teachable. Can the work meet the different teaching styles and interests of the various faculty in the department? Are there workbooks, guides, slides, and transparencies? The instructor also must consider the format of the text. Does it have an attractive physical layout? Last, what is the quality of the book's ancillary items such as maps, charts, bibliography, indexes, and quotes from documents?

Since members of our department have differing points of view concerning the teaching of our world civilization course, our committee decided to recommend the adoption of two textbooks. These are the McKay, Hill, Buckler book for those who wish to use a more conventional volume which concentrates on world social and institutional issues, and the Esler text for our colleagues who want a shorter work with a greater global approach. Also, Esler takes more of a social and economic approach than a political one. In the opinion of our committee, both of these textbooks stood up very well to our criteria. For some of our faculty, the Reilly work is utilized as supplemental reading. Our committee also was impressed with the new Robert Strayer text, but, since it only deals with the world community since 1500, our committee could not make it one of its final selections.

Your author hopes that this information will be of help to the world civilization community.
WORLD HISTORIANS AT WORK IN EUROPE

WRITING WORLD HISTORIES
Report on a Recent Conference in Copenhagen
Michael Harbsmeier, University of Copenhagen

In his analysis of nineteenth-century historical consciousness, Hayden White raised the suspicion “that the historical consciousness on which Western man has prided himself since the beginning of the nineteenth century may be little more than a theoretical basis for the ideological position from which Western civilization views its relationship not only to cultures and civilizations preceding it but also to those contemporary with it in time and contiguous with it in space. In short, it is possible to view historical consciousness as a specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of modern, industrial society can be retroactively substantiated” (Metahistory: the Historical Imagination of the Nineteenth Century, p. 2). If such can be said about historical or rather historicist consciousness in general, it would apply much more emphatically to the kind of historical consciousness expressed in world histories. In fact, it has been argued that the very genre of world history itself imposes an inherently ethnocentric or Eurocentric set of constraints on any of its practitioners. If to such suspicion — mostly articulated by anthropologists, philosophers, and other metaphorists — we add the historian’s own reluctance and hesitation when having to deal with increasing amounts of information as well as increasing professional specialization, world histories would not seem to have much of a chance today.

The Center for Research in the Humanities, University of Copenhagen, organized a workshop in early December 1988 bringing together people actually engaged in writing various world histories and others indulging in critical reflections on how this has been and ought to be done. Contributors were asked to address some of the following questions: What are the consequences of cultural relativism and the critique of ethnocentrism or Eurocentrism for the writing of world histories? Are there any constraints inherent in the genre of world history itself? Can they be specified at a general level? How have various world histories dealt with the problems of relating global periodization to local historical processes? How have conventions concerning world histories changed through time? To what extent do world histories reflect their authors’ national or even continental backgrounds?

A wide range of examples was discussed during the two days of the conference: including the new UNESCO scientific and cultural history of mankind; a recent Scandinavian history of world literature, and a recent Scandinavian world history (both discussed by scholars actually involved in these projects), universal histories and histories of mankind from late eighteenth-century Germany, the almost forgotten genre of world prehistories; the Soviet history of world literature which has been under preparation for almost three decades; Paul Bairoch’s comparative study of urbanism; The Cambridge Modern History; and the contributions of comparative sociology and comparative political science to the study of world history.

It is of course impossible during a short conference to arrive at any conclusive answers to so many wide-ranging questions. Looking at the question of how to write a truly non-ethnocentric, international, intercontinental, dialogical, and multicultural history of the world on the basis of so many, though often negative examples, clearly contributed to a better understanding of the conditions for writing world histories.

The proceedings of the conference will be published in the spring of 1989 in a special issue of the newly founded journal Culture and History, published by the Center for Research in the Humanities at the University of Copenhagen. For further information, please write Professor Michael Harbsmeier, Center for Research in the Humanities, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 80, DK 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark.

HISTORY AND TEXTBOOKS: A NEW DUTCH EXAMPLE
Dr. John P.C.A. Hendricks
Catholic Tilburg High School for Teacher Training
Tilburg, The Netherlands

1. Preface

This short article is a rewritten version of a paper delivered at the European Academy in Berlin on December 7, 1988, during a seminar devoted to international relations in textbooks. In discussion with some of the American participants -- including Professor D. Jan L. Tucker, Director of the Global Awareness Program, Florida International University, I was asked to put the ideas on paper and introduce them in the United States.

In the Netherlands in due time a new type of secondary school will be introduced, after the just ended renewing of primary schools. The existing types of secondary school must be transformed to ones offering a three-year global education program which is the same for everyone. After these three years, when the students are fifteen years old, they can choose any school type they like. Accordingly, new textbooks will be needed. What they should contain has required much thought.

The following goals, themes, and their relations are given in a new textbook for Dutch history programs. The theoretical outlines are followed by the example of the Cold War — it is in no way intended to be the definitive analysis of the subscribed period.
2. Goals

About a year ago, I was asked by a publisher connected to the Catholic Tilburg High School for Teachers Training, where I worked as a historical-didactical trainer in the history department, to write a textbook for the first stage in secondary schools. It was meant for students who are twelve to fifteen years old. A few points were made:

1. The new method was meant for the so-called AVO schools — Algemeen Vormend Onderwijs, that is, globally-formed education.

2. It must canalize the pro-history feelings in the society, so that the pupils become motivated for this interesting but slowly decaying part of the school timetable. In 1965 there were four history-hours a week in secondary school. At this moment there are only two hours, and it is the feeling of some of us that somewhere in the nineties school history will get only one hour a week! Something must be done about that, and one of the best means we have is getting to realize what the meaning of history in society is. So the textbook has to be, first of all, motivating.

3. The textbook should not be a grasping of interesting items in different chapters, but one basic idea should be the major starting point. Many textbooks now available in the Netherlands are not only one-dimensional but also kaleidoscopical. They contain many aspects without any configuration other than just the element of time. It is time for a new paradigm. This basic idea was originated from modern anthropological history, closely connected to the French Annales-school of Febvre, Bloch, Duby, LeGoff and Bradel and also from the American New Archaeology of Binford, Clarke and Renfrew.

The new textbook will contain three parts: The first covers the time from beginning of mankind to the Renaissance; the second covers the period from the Renaissance to Versailles; the third part describes contemporary history from 1919 onward.

3. Themes

In the basic idea two questions are central: 1. How do people live together? In many textbooks there is very little about international problems. This must be changed. Social and political relations should have more attention. It is a sociological way of looking at history. 2. How do people survive together? The question of the quest for food (that is, economy) goes hand in hand with the problems of safety and housing. In this way religious feelings are primarily a safety problem. One should be certain of divine support in daily life. On the other hand, from religious persuasions parts of a sociological group proceed. The past, which may not be fractionalized in reality, is for our systematic approach partitioned in five different aspects:

* psychology (the individual aspect)
* culture (relation man-idea/conception)

The starting point is the idea that all men in all times in all parts of the world struggle with the same problems: problems of food; problems of safety; problems of housing; problems of living together; problems of inequality. In each time the answers to these kinds of problems were made according to ecological and political possibilities, technical knowledge and tradition — that is, the way people used to react to the problems. So it seems that answers to longue durée-questions are determined by the factors of time, space, knowledge, and history. Together they form the culture of the community. This culture can be materialized or made mystical. What we normally call “culture” (architecture, music, literature, etc.) are just material phenomena of the total ensemble of values and norms. The right term for it is not “culture” but “art.” It is no surprise then that I do not believe in a “cultural heritage” when it actually means “monumental heritage.”

4. Goals and Themes Related

The above stated questions of living together and surviving as individuals or as groups can be looked at from the previously-mentioned aspects. So we get a matrix along which the textbook will develop. In this way we avoid giving attention to unnecessary little items which are interesting as such, but not within this more theoretical view. The following general outline might provide some clarity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Living Together</th>
<th>Surviving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade,</td>
<td>Agriculture (in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colonialism,</td>
<td>north and south)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EEG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Social**      |          |
| organization    |          |
| Chieftoms,      | Kinships, |
| states,         | sodalities |
| international   | Religious |
| relations       | systems   |

| **Politics**    |          |
| Imperialist,    | Group    |
| East & West,    | solidarity|
| NATO            | How to feel safe? |

| **Psychology**  |          |
| Values of living|            |
| (human rights,  | Egocentrism of |
| peace)          | persons and   |
|                 | groups        |
|                 | (Sociocentrism) |

| **(Culture)**   |          |
| Symbols of      | A day in the life |
| group identity  |          |
As you see, international relations are part of the "how do people live together" group and not "how do people survive." This is very essential, because we sincerely do not believe that any regional or global conflict in modern times has anything to do with survival of a whole community. Other factors such as power, strength, political-economic systems, pride, personal feelings, religious pressure, military-industrial demands, and, above all, economic or presumed economic factors are in this vision the ways along which international relations developed. When you see "How to feel safe" in the columns of "surviving" and "politics" we stress the word "feel." This is the way in which the political structure of an entity, be it a regional group or a country, succeeds in telling their own members or inhabitants that their way of reacting against other groups or countries is sufficient enough to feel safe. It's a question of communication, not of rearmament. "Peace" is in this option the institutionalization of the awareness of people and the will of their governments to live together in one world, according to primary civil rights of freedom and liberty. This is the harmony model and is in contrast to the will of survival, which leads to war (the conflict model). The harmony model does not include that people resolve conflicts, it means that they can deal with conflicts within the framework of the will to live together. Even in a marriage there are conflicts, but still most marriages are subject to this will.

5. An Example: The Cold War

There have been many visions of the outbreak of the Cold War in the years immediately following World War II up to the East — policies of the American President, Richard Nixon — 1945 until 1971. We can recall the traditionalist view in which the USSR is the black sheep, the revisionist view where the United States is seen as a big sinner too, and the new-revisionist view in which both parties equally have contributed to the problem. We do not however present here a whole new vision on the cold war. In a nutshell I will tell you the background of the cold war in the way we believe our students should be told. The background of cold war lies in our view principally in two factors: the psychology-factor and the economy-factor. I will first turn to the psychology-factor.

The United States as well as the Soviet Union emerged from World War I as greater expanding powers. The two countries arose at the same time and each of them has, mainly because of their contradicting economic-political system supporters in all parts of the world. As a result of this not one of them could develop as the new world leader as was Holland in the seventeenth century and Great Britain in the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century. One of them should be the greater. Emerging countries in the same area of space are condemned to fight each other in order to make it possible to grow larger. In this way the Punic wars between Rome and Carthage in the second and third centuries BC, or the Dutch-English sea wars in the seventeenth century, are not really different from the issues of the cold war. A clash could be foreseen and is, in our opinion, a natural cause. A clash was to be expected, and a survival of the fittest is the normal historical outcome. A hot clash, however, came after cooperation during the war and after the appearance of the atomic bomb. The cold war was inevitably the outcome of these two developments.

In the economy factor, the two expanding states built up big economic systems, which only could survive when there were enough buyers (in the American way) or when there was enough product (in the Soviet way). Both systems needed markets. The Americans found their economic market in the allies and eventually also in their enemies from the war; the Soviets found their markets in Eastern Europe and in Maoist China. So the two powers became the principal dividers of the world. Each of them could now pursue the sole leadership, but in both systems conflicts made that impossible: In the American system it was the Vietnam War which cracked the Atlantic allies system and resulted within the Western-oriented countries in a new feeling that one "bad" system should not be replaced by another "bad" system. In the American world the backing was quickly reduced. The socialist world also had their problems. That world was quickly divided in two when China went its own way.

The two countries, emerging societies between 1920 and 1945, could naturally have been expected to fight for the top position of the world. Such a clash was expected before the Second World War. As a result of that war such a clash was no longer justifiable. Because of the schism in both worlds, the global power altered which affected the behavior of Europe and other parts of the world. The voyage of Nixon and the detente are the outcome of this whole process, not the starting point.

As you have noticed in this vision there is no enemy, because we sincerely believe the Cold War was fought against an imaginary enemy, not a real one.

Why is there no cold war now? Not because of Nixon, Reagan, or Gorbachev, but because the Soviet Union is no longer a challenge to the growth of the United States. In economic and psychological ways the United States is far ahead of the Soviet Union. The fight between the two megapowers is, at least at the moment, won by the West. What Gorbachev is dealing with is a new start to be competitive again with the United States. His aim is to bring back at least a balance of (economic and psychological) power in the world.

A year ago a book was published called The New Romans. The United States was compared to ancient Rome. The development of the two powers have a remarkable likeness. In this view the Soviet Union is no more than a twentieth century Carthage (if you are pessimistic), or a twentieth century league of Celts (if you are optimistic).
URBAN HISTORY ASSOCIATION
ANNOUNCEMENT

The Urban History Association has been established to stimulate interest in the history of the city in all periods and geographical areas. To develop a broad membership, the Association welcomes scholars who pursue research or teaching involving urban topics or materials, even in the context of some other field (e.g., social or cultural history, industrialization, early modern Europe, imperialism, etc.). In addition to the publication of a newsletter and to the sponsorship of sessions at scholarly meetings of major historical organizations, the Association intends to offer prizes and to undertake other activities to enhance the visibility and nurture the growth of urban history.

Individuals who wish to join the Association should send 1989 dues of $20 to: Professor Michael H. Ebner, Executive Secretary & Treasurer, c/o Department of History, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Illinois, 60045.

"Who knows only one culture or one country understands none. To know nothing of what happened before you were born or of what lies under your own nose is to remain forever a child. Unless you can hear the hour strike, slightly out of sync, on several clocks, you cannot know the variety of which Asia, and the world, are composed and yet at the same time their essential oneness and interrelatedness."


---

WHAC COUNCIL

Three-Year Terms:
(1988-1990)

Mary Evelyn Tucker
Iona College

Julia Chancy Smith
University of Virginia

Sam Jenike
Walnut Hills High School
Cincinnati, Ohio

Two-Year Terms:
(1989-1990)

Edmund Burke III
University of California

John A. Mears
Southern Methodist University

Heidi Roupp
Aspen High School

One Year Term:
(1989)

Philip D. Curtin
The Johns Hopkins University

Lynda Shaffer
Tufts University

Peter N. Stearns
Carnegie-Mellon University
THE PURPOSE OF THIS SUMMER CONFERENCE IS to explore with some of the country's leading historians and teachers how political revolutions have both influenced and changed societies. Professors, teachers and Aspenites will participate during the day in seminars after listening to the keynote speeches listed below.

The conference will begin with a reception at the Aspen Meadows at 6 p.m., Thursday, June 8 and end by 4 p.m., Saturday, June 10.

There will be two breakfast sessions devoted to teaching world history, one by the members of the history departments of the Air Force Academy and Brigham Young University, the other by Fay Metcalf, Director of the National Commission on Social Studies, and Mark Welter, World History master teacher.

If you would like additional information about the World History Association, or have questions on this conference, please call Heidi Roupp; Aspen High School — 303/925-2972, home 303/923-3661.

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC BASIN 1770-1880 presented by Philip D. Curtin, Johns Hopkins University, Past President of the American Historical Association. MARXIST REVOLUTIONS presented by Vladimir P. Buldakov, Institute of History of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. REVOLUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST presented by Leila T. Fawaz, Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy and Peter von Sivers, University of Utah and editor of The International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: PLACE OF REVOLUTIONS IN WORLD HISTORY presented by William H. McNeill, Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago, Past President of the American Historical Association.
The World History Bulletin is sent only to members of the World History Association. Yearly dues (January through December): U.S. $10.00; (for students, unemployed, disabled, and senior citizens: U.S. $2.00).

Name

Mailing Address

Affiliation, if any

I have enclosed $__________ for the dues of the World History Association

Mail to    Dick Rosen
Executive Director
History/Politics Department
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA 19104

All dues MUST be paid in U. S. currency. Please use checks drawn on an international bank or by the use of an international money order.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Send notification as soon as possible to Dick Rosen, Executive Director, World History Association, at the address shown above.

1 time $200 1/2 page 1 time $130
2 times @ $190 2 times @ $125
3 times @ $175 3 times @ $115
$80
2 times @ $75 Spring/Summer — March 1
3 times @ $60 Fall/Winter — October 1

Deadlines for Copy

World History Bulletin
Department of History and Politics
College of Humanities and Social Sciences
Drexel University
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Nonprofit Organization
U.S. Postage Paid
Permit No. 144
Philadelphia, PA

TIME VALUE

Third Class Mail
Address Correction Requested