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A Commitment to Quality!

WESTERN SOCIETIES
Primary Sources in Social History

Volume I: From the Ancient Near East to the Seventeenth Century
Volume II: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present

RICHARD M. GOLDEN and THOMAS KUEHN, both of Clemson University

A chronologically arranged anthology of primary sources in social history for introductory Western Civilization courses. Reading lengths range from three to eight pages. Each volume contains 40 readings divided into five categories. Topics include readings on the life of St. Germanus, Spanish society in the reign of Philip II, and the Russian peasantry.


THE WEST AND THE WORLD SINCE 1945

Third Edition

GLENN BLACKBURN, Clinch Valley College of the University of Virginia

A concise contemporary history, organized around four themes: the superpowers, the wealthy nations, the poor nations, and intellectual and spiritual issues. Emphasizes social and intellectual history through case studies on Japan, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Muslim world. Revised to reflect recent changes in world history.

Paper / 147 pp. / 1993
WORLD HISTORY BULLETIN
Newsletter of the World History Association

FIRST INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF THE CHINESE
SOCIETY OF ANCIENT AND
MEDIEVAL WORLD HISTORY
Nankai University
Tianjin, 13-17 September 1993

Patricia O’Neill
Central Oregon Community College
Bend, Oregon

Thanks in part to the work of Ray Lorantzas, President of the World History Association, and Wang Dunshu, Professor of History at Nankai University in Tianjin, China, the First International Conference on Ancient World History in China and the Fourth Congress of the Society of Ancient and Medieval World History in China was held at Nankai University from September 13-17, 1993.

The goals of the conference were: to promote academic contacts between Chinese and foreign scholars and to explore the ancient civilizations, including China, in a global context. The broad topics for the conference were:

- the rise of the state and the city-state in antiquity
- the ancient civilizations: cross-cultural perspectives
- connections and comparisons between ancient world civilizations

The weeklong conference included two days of plenary sessions, in which eminent historians, both Chinese and foreign, gave lectures on topics such as the study of the classics in China and the West and continued on page 2...

SECOND INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF THE WORLD
HISTORY ASSOCIATION
Hawaii, 24-27 June 1993

A personal view from the other side of the
Pacific Rim

David Christian
Macquarie University
Sydney
NSW 2109

As a recent convert to world history, I was extremely keen to attend the 2nd International Conference of the World History Association. For an Australian, Hawaii is just next door, which made attending that much easier. The University of Hawaii organized an efficiently run and extremely enjoyable conference; and who can object to Hawaii, even when marooned in Waikiki, which is not a scholar’s paradise. Jerry Bentley, Herb Ziegler and their colleagues deserve our thanks and congratulations. Highlights for me were the two lectures about the great Polynesian migrations that completed the neolithic colonization of our planet. In separate talks, both superbly illustrated with slides, Nainoa Thompson, Sailmaster of the Polynesian Voyaging Society, and Ben Finney of the University of Hawaii, talked of their journeys across the Pacific using traditional navigational methods, in reconstructed Polynesian canoes. Colin Palmer and K.N. Chaudhuri gave predictably stylish lectures on transoceanic themes. Palmer spoke on aspects of black ethnicity in sixteenth-century Mexico, and Chaudhuri on ways of conceptualizing the history of the Indian Ocean.

Though I have my own ideas about what world history is, or what it could be, I wanted to find out what others thought it was. In Australia, world historians are still rare, and colleagues tend to treat them with suspicion, so I had only a vague idea of the agendas of other world historians. I left Hawaii with a clearer impression. What other history conference could offer such a range and variety of topics? There were papers on the evolution of Sassanid armor, chaos theory, the ecological history of Polynesia, piracy in S.E. Asia. There were discussions on methodology, on world-systems theory, on the teaching of world history at different educational levels. The sheer variety of papers was a delight. So was the attitude of the audiences to this diverse fare. Clearly world historians do not expect to know all there is to know all...
the rise of the city-state in China and in Greece. A stellar presentation was given by Jerry Bentley, editor of the *Journal of World History*, on cross-cultural exchanges on the Silk Roads in Classical and Post Classical Times. This was, from my perspective, one of the few truly global treatments in a somewhat European weighted conference. The working languages of the conference were Chinese and English. At the plenary sessions, the participants were given headsets which could be set to either English or Chinese. There was a remarkable group of young Chinese students who translated the papers instantaneously — which required a tremendous facility in both languages and a broad historical background to be able to translate many of the technical terms. The second half of the conference was arranged into sectional sessions, where again a combination of Chinese and foreign scholars presented papers on a wide range of topics concerning ancient world history.

The conference participants were housed primarily at the Nankai University Guest House and ate all meals together. There were approximately 100 Chinese scholars and 80 foreign scholars from 19 countries who attended the conference. The daily interaction at meals and in conferences afforded much fruitful discussion about scholarly pursuits; many new friendships were made and possibly some contacts for future exchanges. In many ways the personal contact between foreign and Chinese historians was as important as the scholarly exchange at the conference sessions.

Midweek in the conference the sponsors of the conference arranged a day long tour to the Eastern Qing Tombs and a less touristed part of the Great Wall. The group traveled in a caravan of buses for the trip. One of the side benefits of the tour was the chance to see some of the countryside and the changes happening in the smaller cities and villages. The tombs of the Qing emperors were fairly well preserved and the section of the Great Wall was quite impressive.

The conference organizers also arranged for two... continued on page 3.

Christian... continued from page 1... there is to know about their discipline. That's impossible. So here were people willing to learn, and to learn from unexpected quarters. That made the discussions more open-ended than those of many more specialized conferences I have attended.

Some aspects of the conference disappointed me. There were papers so obscure that I began to fear that world history could become a refuge for those whose specializations fit nowhere else. I have no objection to obscure topics, but papers within world history must surely offer to illuminate broader themes. The conference also left me feeling that world history has still to break decisively with the small- and medium-scales. Some speakers clearly felt that world history is modern history, as the world has only become a single unit in recent centuries. This is a depressingly modest conclusion for what should be a very ambitious approach to history and historical processes. Besides, it ignores the unity of the human species, and the great migrations by our species that give world history a unity stretching back to the Stone Age. World history can be (and I hope it will try to be) about the entire history of our species. (Indeed, as Alfred Crosby has shown, and as John McNeill showed at this conference, we need not confine ourselves to our own species.) That is a definition worth fighting for. If it does such ambitious themes, world history will go the way of most other sub-specialties.

I was also disappointed by the fact that the average participant was rather like myself — a middle-aged, tenured white male academic from USA-Canada-Australia-New Zealand. This also made me fear that world history could go the way of many other sub-disciplines, becoming just one more intellectual ghetto. If a greater variety of historians do not take up world history, the discipline as a whole will lose, but so will world history. World historians may drift into the dangerous parochialism of the powerful. History will miss one more chance to take up the larger philosophical issues it has so often ducked in the past. It will once again miss the chance to debate the meaning of being human. continued on page 3.
Christian...

Still, as I expected and hoped, the conference attracted an unusual number of intellectual pirates who felt, as I do, that world history can and should concentrate on the very large scale, beginning with the origins in Africa of our hominid ancestors. Without a clear view of the Palaeolithic, we will miss the peculiarity of human history as a whole. If historians miss that, they are missing something very basic indeed! I left the conference more convinced than ever that, if it is to fulfill its promise, world history must face squarely the unique challenge of combining a vision of the large-scale with the rigour and discipline that historians take for granted at smaller scales. This is not an easy task, but we will not solve it if we concede too much to the small-scale methodological frames in which most historians still work.

O’Neill...

evenings of entertainment at Nankai University. One evening was a display of Chinese folk singing, dancing, magic and acrobatics. The other evening was an introduction to Peking Opera. Both of these were attended by a lively group of foreign and Chinese people.

None of the conference participants went home hungry. Our lunches and dinners were of gargantuan proportions, including a wide variety of foods and tastes. On the last night of the conference all of the participants gathered in a famous Tianjin restaurant for a farewell banquet. The group then reluctantly broke up; some went back to their home countries, while others boarded a train for a tour of Xian and parts west.

I would like to thank Professor Wang Dunshu and Ray Lorantias for all the countless hours of pre-conference planning and arranging. It was their vision and commitment which brought this conference to life and made it so enjoyable for everyone. It truly was a "world history" conference.

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CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Send notification as soon as possible to Dick Rosen, Executive Director, World History Association, Department of History/Politics, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104, FAX 215/895-6614, or e-mail <rosenrl@dunx1.ocs.Drexel.EDU>.

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World History Bulletin — Advertising

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Deadlines for Copy

- Spring/Summer — March 1
- Fall/Winter — August 15

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Professor Wang Dunshu

Secretary-General
The Chinese Society of Ancient and Medieval World Historians

Now that the First International Conference on Ancient World History in China and the Fourth Congress of the Chinese Society of Ancient World History has started I would like to make a brief explanation of these proceedings.

The conference is jointly organized and sponsored by Nankai University and the Society of Ancient and Medieval World History in China. The purpose of the conference is to promote the academic contacts between Chinese and foreign ancient historians and to explore the ancient civilizations, including those in China, in a global context. There are two major themes of the conference: the rise of the state and the city-state in antiquity; and cross-cultural perspectives to the ancient civilizations, that is, the cultural connections and comparison of the ancient civilizations.

In July 1992, Nankai University and the Society sent out invitations and announcements for the conference. We received the strong support of scholars and academic institutions from all over the world. I should like to point out that the Society is directly supported by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of World History under it. Also, the Academy of Social Sciences in Tianjin, the Tianjin Society of Social Sciences, the History Department of Tianjin Normal University, the Chinese Association of Pre-Qin Dynasty History and the World History Association in the United States expressed their intention to co-sponsor the conference. Consequently, the organizing committee of the conference was organized by the representatives of these institutions, plus Heidelberg University and Lincoln University of New Zealand. Moreover, we invited some distinguished scholars who had shown their interest in the conference to stand as the members of the Honorary Committee.

More than 70 foreign scholars and around 140 Chinese scholars are attending our international conference. On behalf of the organizing committee I would like to thank you for your presence and contributions to the conference. I am sure we will be successful and "will produce a fruitful exchange of ideas among all the participants." And, as the distinguished Dr. Joseph Needham wrote in a letter to me, we will "shed new lights to the study of ancient history."
First International Conference of the Chinese Society of Ancient and Medieval World History
Nankai University
Tianjin, 13-17 September 1993

Professor Mu Guoguang
President of Nankai University

Now the First International Conference on Ancient World History in China and the Fourth Congress of the Chinese Society of Ancient World History are being opened here. As the host of the Conference I would like, on behalf of the faculty, staff and students, to express our congratulations to the Conference and our welcome to all participants from China and abroad.

This conference is a great event; more than 70 international scholars from 20 countries and more than 100 Chinese historians from many Chinese universities and institutes have come to attend the conference. Among them are many eminent historians and scholars. Their participation upgrades the academic status of the event.

Study on the ancient world history is necessary because a correct understanding of the past will enable us to understand the present and to foresee the future. In the past, as one of the ancient aberrations of the world, China has had a glorious history and culture. At present, with the remarkable development in its economic and cultural construction, China is playing an increasingly important role in the world community. Therefore, it is of great academic significance to hold the conference in such a country as China to study ancient world civilizations from a global perspective. As Professor Robert McAdams, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute, an expert on Mesopotamia Studies, wrote in his letter, "I have long cherished the hope that this broad theme would find a place within the great scholarly traditions of your country." Now, his hope has materialized on the campus of Nankai University and I feel greatly honored to be the host.

Also I would like to give you a general description of Nankai University. It was founded in 1919, by Mr. Zhang Bolin and Yan Xin, patriotic Chinese Educators.

Our late premier Zhou Enlai was among the first group of students. At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the campus was bombarded by the Japanese. Then the University moved inland and jointly formed the Southwest Associated University with Beijing University and Orghaha University. At the end of the war, it moved back to this place. Since the founding of New China, especially since the opening and reform from 1929, Nankai University has made great progress. There are now 22 departments, 20 institutes, 2000 professors and 11,000 students. With more than 70 universities abroad we have established relationships for cooperation and exchange. In the field of humanities and social sciences, Nankai is strong in economics and history. I'm confident this occasion will help to upgrade our research work and to promote international exchanges. Of course, due to limited resources we still have much room for improvement, and we do hope you will forgive us for any inconveniences.

In conclusion, I would like to offer my best wishes of success for the conference and express my welcome and gratitude to all participants.

WHCA’s President Speaks at the Opening Ceremony of the First International Conference of the Society for Ancient and Medieval World Historians in China
Monday, 13 September 1993

We of the World History Association look upon this conference as a giant step in the globalization of the organization, and we are most proud to be a co-sponsor of it.

The WHA officers and Executive Council do not, however, mean to take any credit for the development and materialization of this momentous event. World historians everywhere are and will be indebted to the work of the Secretary-General of the Society for Ancient and World Historians in China, Professor Wang Dunshu, and to Nankai University’s President Mu Guoguang, who most eruditely gave his strong and unflinching support.

Please allow me to add that Nankai University has, from its founding, been much aware of the growing integration of the world’s societies and of the existence of a cross-cultural network that evolved through the ages and that had reached reality in the twentieth century. Zhang Bolin, Nankai’s first president, and his co-founders were clearly aware of how all societies of the world had come to play a role in what was rapidly becoming a global community. We owe our knowledge of Nankai’s history and the role played by Zhang Bolin, its most prominent founder, to the scholarly writings of a member of the Nankai History Department, Professor Liang Jisheng.

This is a giant step in the organization of a conference dealing with world history, for it is the first to be sponsored from several sources: China and the World History Association. It is a true beginning, for plans are in the wind for a prospective similar cross-culturally organized conference in Florence, Italy come 1995.

More plans are in the offing to have an exchange between China and the World History Association for the summer of 1994. In this exchange, China and the World History Association plan to work together in
drawing on the teaching and scholarly content that each has thus far developed. The emphasis will be on trade and cultural exchange from the days of the Silk Roads and how that early history continues to have an impact today. You will see more information on this event coming forth in the newsletter of the World History Association in the coming issue. (Any of you who do not belong to the World History Association might want to think about joining the growing numbers. We can and will accommodate you and with spirit.)

Now, how did this World History Association come into existence? It celebrated its tenth anniversary in 1992 with an international conference held in Philadelphia, which, by the way, is one of the sister cities of Tianjin. Philadelphians are constantly reminded of their association with Tianjin by virtue of a finely sculptured arch that spans 10th Street in their city. This arch was a gift to Philadelphia from the people of Tianjin during the successful leadership of the then-mayor of Tianjin, Mr. Li Ruihuan. Li Ruihuan, by the way, is now the head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee, a segment of the Chinese government that is multi-faceted in its views and in which Zhou Enlai, a son of Nankai, and his wife, Deng Yingchao, played an important role in its founding and development. In the United States, the history of history comes from its founding and growth. During the nineteenth century, the greatest emphasis was on the development of a national history. The nation was new and saw the need for the recognition of its unity. The American Historical Association was founded in the 1880s and, of course, is still the most encompassing of historical organizations in the United States.

By the end of World War I, the U.S. saw itself as being part of a larger entity: Western civilization. It was the course in Western civilization that proliferated from the early 1920s and into the 1940s and 1950s. It came to be the required course in most colleges and universities — as well as in the pre-collegiate courses in the schools.

By the 1960s, in the U.S., there came to be a clear recognition that the global era had come into being. Scholars began to look at history from a totally global perspective. This was the decade when some of the important writings of world historians William McNeill, Leftos Stavrianos, Geoffrey Barraclough and others came into print. It was world — not national, not regional — history that came to be the need for an understanding of human development. Global history had arrived. The twentieth century came to represent a new age of history — it was now a global community.

But where was leadership organized for this new history? It did not exist in full until the early 1980s when the World History Association was founded. In ten brief years, its membership approaches 2000; its membership includes people from all inhabited continents, and from over 30 different countries. In the United States, six affiliates have been firmly established with two more in advanced stages. Affiliates are in the preparatory stages in Canada, in the United Kingdom and with a hint from the Netherlands and Italy. Some talk has occurred with the prospects of an affiliate in China. Perhaps, this conference will spur the development. It is a conference making a wide stride for world history in more ways than one.

In 1990, the Journal of World History began to print scholarly articles in the field. It was awarded recognition as being the best new scholarly journal by the Society of Editors of Learned Journals in the United States. (Its founder and editor, Jerry H. Bentley of the University of Hawaii, is here as a participant in this conference.)

The World History Association is honored by its participation in this gathering, and its president is humbled by being included as an “Honorary Member of the Conference’s Committee.” But he accepts these recognitions with alacrity in the name of the World History Association.

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**POSITION IN ISLAMIC WORLD HISTORY**

**History (Islamic World).** The Department of History at Miami University invites applications for a tenure-track assistant professorship, beginning in the fall of 1994, in the history of the Islamic world. The appointment requires the ability to teach the history of the Middle East and other areas of Islamic influence, as well as world history. Position is contingent on budgetary approval. Ph.D., scholarship and teaching experience expected. Send letter of application, c.v. and references to Search Committee, Department of History, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 45056. Review of applications will begin on December 7, 1993. AA/EOE.
OBITUARY

James E. Hassell of the Philadelphia College of Textiles and Science and a member of the WHA, died at age 55 on 29 September. Professor Hassell was known for his outstanding teaching and was the recipient of the President's Award for Teaching Excellence in 1986. He will be sorely missed by his students, by his colleagues, and by the World History Association.

A special thanks — to Lynne Rancer, Publisher, Inc., 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, CO 80301, for the contribution to the request for books in world history from Mihai Manea of Romania.

CALLS FOR PAPERS

Call for Papers: Papers or panels on any historical topic or time period for possible presentation at the Spring meeting of the New England Historical Association on April 23, 1994 at Bentley College in Waltham, MA may be submitted by January 15. Contact the NEHA Executive Secretary, Peter Holloran, Pine Manor College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167.

Call for Papers: for possible presentation at the New England American Studies Association (NEASA) annual conference on "American Cultures: At Home and Abroad" at Brown University on May 7-9, 1994. Contact Fritz Fleischmann, Babson College, Babson Park, MA 02157-0310; (617) 239-4400; Fax (617) 239-4312, by February 15.
Free Workshops and Tutorial on Using Computers for History

The History Computerization Project now offers free workshops and a printed tutorial on the use of computer database management for historical research, writing, and cataloging. Those unable to attend the workshops can still obtain the 80-page workshop tutorial by mail. The workshops and tutorial give organizations and researchers a chance to see how easy it can be to build a historical database, at no cost or obligation. No prior computer experience is required. The project, sponsored by the Regional History Center of the University of Southern California and the Los Angeles City Historical Society, is building a Regional History Information Network through which researchers and repositories can exchange information. The Los Angeles Bibliography Project has created a database of source materials, and a directory of historical repositories. Both projects employ the History Database program, running on IBM PC compatible computers. The computer classroom includes 10 IBM PCs connected to a shared database. The course textbook, Database Design: Applications of Library Cataloging Techniques, by David L. Clark, is published by the TAB division of McGraw-Hill. For a current workshop schedule and a free copy of the tutorial contact: History Computerization Project, 24851 Piuma Road, Malibu, California 90265. Phone: (818) HISTORY, (818) 591-9371.

AWARD FOR WOMEN AT ABD STATUS IN HISTORY

The Coordinating Committee on Women in the Historical Profession, the Conference Group on Women’s History, and the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians announce the fourth annual competition for a $500 Graduate Student Award to assist in the completion of thesis work. Applicants may be in any field of history, but must be female graduate student historians in U.S. institutions who have achieved A.B.D. status. Deadline for submissions is December 1, 1993. For application forms and information, contact: Professor Cornelia Dayton, Department of History, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717; (714) 856-6521 (message), (714) 725-2865 (Fax).

CONFERENCE

TEACHING GLOBAL HISTORY, a one-day conference for college, university, secondary and elementary instructors, will be held Saturday, February 19, 1994 at MiraCosta College in Oceanside, California. The conference will include practical roundtable sessions on approaches and methods for teaching world history, as well as guest speakers on pertinent topics. Registration is $20, which includes lunch. For more information, or to receive a registration flyer, write or call:

Lisa M. Lane
North County Global History Project
MiraCosta College
One Barnard Drive
Oceanside, CA 92056

FELLOWSHIPS IN MILITARY HISTORY

The United States Army Center of Military History offers two fellowships each academic year to civilian graduate students preparing dissertations on subjects relating to the history of warfare on land, especially the history of the U.S. Army. Possible topics include military biography, campaigns, military organization and administration, policy, strategy, tactics, training, technology, logistics, and civil-military-social relations. Each fellow receives an $8,000 stipend and access to the Center’s facilities and technical expertise. Applicants must be American citizens and have completed, by September 1993, all requirements for the Ph.D. except the dissertation. Interested candidates should contact Dr. Clayton Laurie, Executive Secretary, CMH Dissertation Fellowship Committee, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Franklin Court Building, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3402, tel. (202) 504-5364, fax (202) 504-5390. The deadline for applications and supporting documents is 1 February 1994. EOE.
TWO EDITING OPPORTUNITIES
from NATIONAL ARCHIVES

The twenty-third annual Institute for the Editing of Historical Documents is scheduled for June 19-30, 1994, in Madison, Wisconsin. Jointly sponsored by the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC), the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, and the University of Wisconsin, the institute will provide detailed theoretical and practical instruction in documentary editing and publication. Further information and application forms are available from the NHPRC (NP), National Archives Building, Washington, DC 20408 (phone 202/501-5610). Application deadline is March 15, 1994.

The National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC) will offer three historical editing fellowships in 1994. Partial funding will be provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Successful candidates will receive a stipend of $27,500 and spend 10 months at a documentary publication project beginning in the summer of 1994. Participating projects are The Adams Family Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston), The Correspondence of James K. Polk (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), and The Emma Goldman Papers (University of California, Berkeley). Applicants should hold a Ph.D. or have completed all requirements for the doctorate except the dissertation. Further information and application forms are available from the NHPRC (NP), National Archives Building, Washington, DC 20408. Phone: 202/501-5610. Application deadline is March 1, 1994.

COMMUNICATION — A REQUEST

We would like to request, through you, from willing members of WHA to send us even just used books on world history. We would like to upgrade our courses. I personally teach a course called Capitalism and Imperialism in History — some sort of an Africanized Third-World world history. It is very difficult to obtain relatively good reading materials — let alone textbooks.

We will really appreciate very much any materials we may receive. We thank you very much.

Yours sincerely,

Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba
Associate Professor of History
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
P.O. Box 35051
University of Dar Es Salaam
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania

BULLETIN OF THE ASIA INSTITUTE 6
published in October 1993, carries the following studies that could be of interest to WHA members.


The BULLETIN OF THE ASIA INSTITUTE, @$65.00 for volume 6, may be ordered from the editorial office at 3287 Bradway Blvd., Bloomfield Hills, MI 48301.
Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau Pre-Collegiate Teaching Award

The Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau award is an annual award given to recognize the contributions made by pre-collegiate teachers to improve history education. The award, to be given for activities which enhance the intellectual development of other history teachers and/or students, memorializes the career of the late Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, University of Louisville, and especially her path-breaking efforts to build bridges between university and pre-collegiate history teachers. The successful candidate will receive a certificate, a cash award of $1,000, a one-year OAH membership, and a one-year subscription to the OAH Magazine of History. If the winner is an OAH member, the award will include a one-year renewal of membership in the awardee’s usual membership category. Finally, the winner’s school will receive a plaque suitable for permanent public display.

Eligibility: Pre-collegiate teachers engaged at least half time in history teaching, whether in history or social studies, are eligible.

Selection Criteria: Successful candidates shall demonstrate exceptional ability in one or more of the following kinds of activities:
- Initiating or participating in projects which involve students in historical research, writing or other means of representing their knowledge of history.
- Initiating or participating in school, district, regional, state or national projects which enhance the professional development of history teachers.
- Initiating or participating in projects which aim to build bridges between pre-collegiate and collegiate history or social studies teachers.
- Working with museums, historical preservation societies or other public history associations to enhance the place of history in the public realm or to enhance the place of public history in pre-collegiate schools.
- Developing innovative history curricula which foster a spirit of inquiry and emphasize critical skills.
- Publishing or otherwise publicly presenting scholarship that advances history education or historical knowledge.

Nomination Procedure: Candidates may be nominated by any person familiar with the nominee’s professional accomplishments or standing. Nominators shall submit to the OAH award committee a two-page letter indicating why the teacher merits the Tachau Pre-Collegiate Teaching Award.

Deadline for Nominations: December 1, 1994

All entries should be clearly labeled, “1995 Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau Pre-Collegiate Teaching Award” and should be mailed directly to each of the following committee members:

Dr. James F. Adomanis, Committee Chair
Social Studies Specialist
Anne Arundel County Public Schools
2644 Riva Road
Annapolis, MD 21401

Professor Sandra Van Burklo
Department of History
Wayne State University
3094 Faculty-Administration Building
Detroit, MI 48202

Ms. Kathleen Kean
Nicolet High School
6701 North Jean Nicolet Road
Glendale, WI 53217
WORLD HISTORY EDUCATION AND THE POLITICS OF AGNOSTICISM
A Program for Cross-Cultural Amity

Nelson Edmondson
Michigan State University

During roughly the past decade, in what seems in retrospect a surprisingly overdue development, many American colleges and universities have replaced their core-curricular surveys of Western civilization with courses in world history. In a world grown small through advanced means of communication and transportation, and the economic interdependence of nations, it has seemed to many academics that a parochial Western-cultural orientation is no longer intellectually sound or morally defensible. In sympathy with this outlook, and having myself been involved for several years in the organization and teaching of a course at Michigan State University on the “Humanities in World Perspective” (a year-long interdisciplinary course including topics in the history, religion, philosophy, and visual arts of Western, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, and African cultures), I have become increasingly intrigued by the question of how the positive impact of such courses might be enlarged. My conclusion, which will be the purpose of this paper to amplify, involves a double strategy, part curricular expansion and modification, part administrative or political implementation.

As they now stand, world history courses usually begin with an account of the “pre-historical” appearance of humans on earth, followed by the emergence of the first “civilizations” in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Indus Valley; the courses then typically proceed, with variable organization and emphasis, to give accounts of the Hebrew, Assyrian, and Persian cultures, the civilizations of India, China, Greece, and Rome, the rise of Christianity—and so on through the commonly recognized major phases and aspects of the human odyssey up to the present. But while these courses are thus wide-ranging, and may afford students a basic historical literacy, in my view they are still too narrow an approach to the type of understanding called for in today’s world. I believe that the one-year course in world history needs to be expanded to at least a three-year integrated package of courses involving also the natural and social sciences. While a knowledge of history is indispensable for understanding how the human situation came to be what it is, the sciences are equally indispensable as aids in coping with that situation today. The natural sciences segment of this package of courses, while including instruction in the basic scientific principles and methodologies involved, would focus on those global problems which modern science has either itself been in part responsible for causing, or conversely might be helpful in solving: pollution of the oceans, destruction of the rain forests, acid rain, nuclear waste disposal, population management, international disease control, depletion of the ozone layer, and space exploration. The social sciences segment of the package would focus on international conflict resolution, arms control, world fiscal and trade policies, the maldistribution of wealth among the world’s peoples, international crime cartels, and comparative cultural strategies of social organization and personal adjustment. In our present intensively interactive world, it is only through the combined study of world history and the natural and social sciences that students can acquire the understanding needed to deal as effectively as possible with major human problems. Colleges and universities bold enough to mount such integrated packages of courses should make them available to, if not required of, all students in satisfaction of their core-curricular or general-educational requirements.

"Increased knowledge of other peoples may lead to increased appreciation of their beliefs and customs..."

However, if it be granted that such sets of courses are basically desirable, questions remain as to how they could most meaningfully be conceived and implemented. With regard especially to the history and social sciences segments of the package, one of their obvious goals would be to provide students with a greater knowledge of the diverse peoples of the world. Increased knowledge of other peoples may lead to increased appreciation of their beliefs and customs, and in practical terms such knowledge can be useful in cultivating successful diplomatic or commercial relations. But such knowledge can be two-edged. The knowledge of foreign cultures does not guarantee respect for those cultures; familiarity often breeds contempt. I submit that to surmount the latter stumbling block, we need to go beyond the mere description of the beliefs and practices of diverse groups of people, and push the study of world history to the level of explicit recognition of a predicament, which from a planetary perspective all people have in common, namely the predicament of the uncertainties and limitations of human understanding. It seems fair to say that the quintessential aspect of being human is that people ask larger questions than they can answer; their curiosity outruns their ability fully to understand their own existence. Or, better said, various groups of people have been able, to their own satisfaction, adequately to understand existence, but only in ways which assert the truth of their own beliefs in contrast to the falsehoods of other equally sincere people. Concerning truth and falsehood, surely the totality of existence, whatever its unimaginable ultimate
dimensions, is neither "true" nor "false," it is simply "there." The truths or falsehoods of aspects of existence, then, are products of the human activity of making judgments, while the imperfections of that judging activity often lead to conflicting assertions, without there being any available criterion whereby to resolve the differences in a manner compellingly persuasive to all interested parties.

"But such knowledge can be two-edged."

Indeed, one of the clearest lessons to be learned from the study of world history is that the religious and philosophical record of humankind amounts to a long catalogue of such conflicting assertions. Humans have been unable to achieve universal accord concerning either what sectors of "actuality" (or "reality," or "being") there are, or what are the available modes for apprehending the same. Different persons have reached different conclusions in regard to the authenticity and efficacy of modes of judgment known as "empirical," "rational," "intuitive," and "mystical." Various persons have been variously persuaded that their judgments have corresponded with sectors of being known as the "material," the "mental," the "conscious," the "subconscious," the "collective unconscious," the "metaphysical," or the "divine." Some persons have asserted the co-reality of several levels of being, while other persons have "reduced" all putative levels to one—the material, the mental, or the divine. The contradiction between some judgments has been complete, as in the case of the assertions, "There is a god" and "There is no god." Other cases of contradiction have been only partial, yet significant; for example, if divine actuality be granted, some persons have asserted polytheism, others monotheism; or, granting the latter, some have asserted pantheism, others transcendency; or, granting the latter, some have asserted providentialism, others deism. As specific examples of the countless disparities along the spectrum of beliefs, the Islamic concept of one transcendent god is incongruous with the Mahayana Buddhist concept of a hierarchy of transcendent Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, while neither of these doctrines is compatible with the animistic beliefs of various African and other tribal peoples, and none of these beliefs in turn can be true in the view of the philosophy of logical empiricism. The latter maintains that theological and metaphysical propositions, being neither logical tautologies nor empirically verifiable, can be neither true nor false, now even genuinely hypothetical, but only nonsensical—although this philosophy is simply one more judgment incorporating the assertion of its own truth.

Persons who believe in a transcendent god may consider that all contradictory human judgments are overcome by the omniscience of their god, such persons thus regarding ultimate non-contradictory comprehension as extant in the cosmic scheme of things, only moved back a step, as it were, from the mundane to the divine level. Such persons may anticipate that after their death in this world, they will join their god and thereby achieve their own omniscience. The Christian doctrine of the "beatific vision" approximates this anticipation by supposing that persons saved and in heaven will directly see and know god, become themselves supernaturally enlightened, and fully comprehend what were, during their sojourn on earth, ineluctable mysteries. One of the doctrines of Hinduism in a sense carries this anticipation even further. Those individuals who finally escape the cycles of transmigration and attain moksha (salvation) fuse totally with brahman, the latter constituting the infinite, eternal, indescribable essence or ground of all being. Such persons cease to exist as individuals, not in the sense of becoming nothing, but in the sense of becoming one with everything; being indistinguishable from the ultimate unity of brahman, they are beyond the sphere of polarities and contradictions. However, from the non-sectarian perspective of global history, the beatific vision and moksha are only two among many unverifiable beliefs made by persons of merely finite comprehension.

In view of abiding differences among religious and philosophical convictions, I maintain that the package of world courses should stress that the most comprehensive knowledge available to all humans alike is simply the indisputable knowledge that all such convictions have been entertained. This observation is not helpful in the sense of a positive philosophical forest instead of the trees, and to consciously apprehend this perspective is to achieve the philosophical integrity of human finite understanding. To be sure, if any given religious or philosophical version of existence is valid, then it is ipso facto valid for all humans, whether they realize it or not, as all persons share a common universe. However, from a panhuman vantage point there is no way to establish if any doctrine is indeed valid, notwithstanding that some of them are more widely accepted or discredited than others, and persons who, through their study of the spiritual and intellectual history of the world grasp this aspect of the human condition would thereby, it may be hoped, incline to a philosophical modesty productive of forbearance toward people of differing persuasions. Beyond all matters of attraction or repulsion which given persons may experience in reference to various doctrines lies the inclusive human condition of inconclusive understanding, and the study of world history should expressly elucidate this condition.

But if acknowledgement of this inconclusiveness reaches beyond the attractions or repulsions of culturally diverse epistemologies and ontologies, would not the moral corollaries of those doctrines also appear inconclusive? And if persons were to order their behavior in line with that inconclusiveness, would this not be conducive to a
disastrous moral permissiveness? I think not, for what may be called philosophical as well as religious agnosticism ("agnosticism" being taken to mean the inability to know with assurance if any religious and philosophical system is valid) has a corollary morality of its own, namely that all religious and philosophical creeds and doctrines deserve the right to be entertained and morally acted upon, but only to the point of infringing the same right in the case of other doctrines. To vitiate this principle would be to allow the possibility that some particular doctrine, destructive in its principles toward other doctrines, is assuredly valid; therefore the destructive actions of the adherents of that doctrine toward nonbelievers should be morally acceptable to all people; this allowance would render the posture of agnosticism self-contradictory and self-stultifying. Agnosticism involves tolerance for doctrinal diversity, but not, aside from self-defense, for violence toward persons who hold beliefs different from one's own.

"Scientific understanding is problematical in a different sense."

Scientific understanding is problematical in a different sense. On the one hand, science is a component common to the intellectual enterprise of all but the most "primitive" cultures, and scientific judgments stand a better chance than do religious and philosophical judgments of being globally embraced. For example, all physical scientists—whether they be, say, American democrats or Chinese communists, Nigerians or Saudis, Mormons or Sikhs—accept the validity of the periodic table of the chemical elements, indicating the atomic number, atomic mass, and other data concerning the known elements. The persuasiveness of this and great fund of other scientific findings is virtually universal for the good reason that palpable transformations in nature observed or induced in accordance with those findings provide repeated public confirmation of their validity—evidence which individuals often can ignore only at their physical peril. Non-scientists, to whom scientific formulae may be unintelligible, are equally persuaded by the force of this evidence.

However, while scientific knowledge is for the most part globally accepted, various aspects of that knowledge strongly reinforce the sense of limitation produced by humanistic understanding. The package of world courses, while recognizing the store of well-established scientific findings as indispensable for dealing as effectively as possible with today's problems, would at the same time emphasize that science fails to provide a full understanding of existence. For one thing, scientific knowledge constantly evolves; repeatedly in the history of science what has been known with assurance at certain times, has later been abandoned, altered, or expanded. In some cases, more comprehensive new findings have modified older views through reducing their general validity to a validity for special cases. For example, Einsteian physics provides more penetrating and inclusive interpretation of gravitation (conceived of as deriving from the curvatures of space occasioned by the presence of spatial bodies) than does earlier Newtonian physics (which conceives of gravitation as a "force" operating between bodies), yet the latter remains usefully valid for making certain calculations. In other cases, entirely new knowledge is brought forth; humans did not discover bacteria until the nineteenth century, or viruses until the twentieth century; they did not discover the existence of the planet Neptune until the nineteenth century, or quasars until the twentieth century—and so on in a vast number of equivalent cases. Such expansion of knowledge inspires of itself no anticipation that it will cease, and suggests that scientific understanding has always remained limited to an indeterminate degree, in that humans have not been able at any point in the past to realize with what portion of the total arc of actuality, from microcosm to macrocosm, their accumulated judgments have at that point corresponded. That is, at all successive points in the past, scientific judgments have been, and remain today, collectively incomplete.

Moreover, the growing edge of that incomplete understanding is frequently marked by conflicting interpretations. To consider an example from scientific cosmology, the view currently favored by most astronomers is that the universe began with the so-called Big Bang. Between ten and twenty billion years ago a tiny bit of matter of infinite density and immeasurably high temperature exploded with incredible force, and out of the components of that explosion were eventually formed the stars, planets, and galaxies of our known (visible) universe. The Big Bang theory describes a universe that continues to expand as a result of the initial explosion, with the galaxies receding from each other at great speeds. One theory holds that the universe will thus expand forever, although the stars of the receding galaxies will eventually burn themselves out, the universe will lapse into darkness, and all life will cease. But many astronomers think the expansion will someday come to a halt, whereupon gravity will draw all spatial units back into an enormous implosion as violent and spectacular as the initial explosion; as the universe had a "beginning," so will it have an "end." Some astronomers speculate, however, that the collapsed universe will again explode, again expand, again collapse, and so on; they envisage, that is, a universe which oscillates through unending cycles of birth, death, and rebirth. In any case, the question of the ultimate wherewithal of the bit of matter that exploded, either once in the original Big Bang or repeatedly in cycles of Big Bangs, remains unanswerable. Equally unanswerable on scientific
The social sciences, while comparable in certain ways to the natural sciences, have their own problems and limitations. The social sciences, while comparable in certain ways to the natural sciences, have their own problems and limitations. For example, the behavioral sciences (psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology) deal with human personalities, alone and in groups, and must grapple, thus, with the copious idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies which personalities display. Yet, personalities are not entirely erratic in their functions, they exhibit certain regularities and patterns, and behavioral scientists employ a variety of methods, including controlled experiments, case studies, sample surveys, and statistical analyses, by way of identifying those patterns. From among the fund of well-established behavioral findings consider the following:

Repression of strong unacceptable motives is sometimes accompanied by overt behavior and conscious feelings that are opposite to the repressed tendencies ("reaction-formation").

This insight, along with a substantial number of kindred findings, may be of use to various persons challenged with understanding the intricacies of human conduct; persons ranging, say, from social workers, to psychotherapists, to policymakers engaged in international negotiations. However, as they develop, the behavioral sciences, like the natural sciences, are often characterized by contradictory interpretations. For instance, the doctrine of "behaviorism," maintaining that human habits are the reflection exclusively of conditioned physical (glandular and motor) reactions, stands in contrast to the "depth psychologies," which explain human actions in terms both of conscious and unconscious divisions or levels of "mind." In any case, and again in a manner reminiscent of the natural sciences, when behavioral findings are viewed from a wider philosophical angle none of their interpretations explain human beings in any definitive sense. What the behavioral sciences—or the social sciences—generally can accomplish, given the fact that humans do exist, is to identify aspects of their personal and group dynamics and their institutional practices, and to develop strategies, when thought needful, for modifying the same.

To summarize the foregoing discussion, humans require the knowledge provided by the study both of global history and the sciences in order to cope as well as possible with today's problems. However, beyond the practical benefits of such study, there emerges the further clear message that humans hold conflicting religious and philosophical beliefs, the validity of none of which can be established on a basis irresistibly persuasive to all people, while scientific knowledge, which is widely convincing, evolves, remains ever incomplete to an indeterminate degree, is characterized by competing interpretations on its frontiers, and is in any event incapable of resolving religious and philosophical issues. From a global standpoint, this inconclusiveness and incompleteness of human understanding is the one spiritual and intellectual situation that overarches all particular, parochial beliefs, and those individuals who consciously grasp this commonality of the human condition, should, one may suppose, be in a favored position to think and act simply as earthlings, rather than as ethnically distinct, and religiously or philosophically, or even scientifically, arrogant enthusiasts. The final thrust of the set of world courses should be to foster a disinclination to such arrogance.

The final thrust of the set of world courses should be to foster a disinclination to such arrogance.
scenario, major universities around the world teaching approximately the same package of courses. Eventual result: a significant portion of the educationally advanced stratum of the world population in possession of a common global understanding.

The major import of such a development would derive from the fact that within most nations heads of state and other high-level decision makers are drawn from the educated classes, and if the educational system here proposed were to become operative, eventually persons schooled by the set of world courses might become pre-eminent within their societies. Imagine, finally, the world governed by a fraternity of leaders sharing a common global-historical cognizance, including, importantly, an acute awareness of the limitations of human understanding, leaders who were thus disabused in significant measure of religious or intellectual conceit, and who were thus ill-disposed toward the kind of doctrinal gridlock so often productive of hostile and destructive activity. Cooperative programs of technical research and esoteric scholarship are already in place among American and world universities. Would it not be desirable, at this point in history, to establish a global consortium of institutions devoted to fostering a common global understanding, thereby to seed the echelons of authority in the nations of the world with individuals possessed of that understanding? Perhaps the World History Association could serve as the initial catalyst of such a venture.

"Perhaps the World History Association could serve as the initial catalyst of such a venture."

In this regard it may be recalled that differences of religious or philosophical conviction, while by no means always or necessarily negative in their effect, have nonetheless all too often been a major factor in the instigation of military aggression or the protraction of conflicts among peoples. To be sure, in such conflicts it is often difficult to know in what degree the leaders and their votaries on either side are truly motivated by their professed religious/philosophical/ideological principles, as distinct from consciously or unconsciously appealing to such principles merely to legitimatize greed for power and dominance, or conversely to legitimize grievances of unjust political, social, or economic discrimination. Such ambiguity has characterized, among countless examples, the medieval struggles between Christendom and Islam, or the sixteenth and seventeenth century wars between Catholics and Protestants, or the missionary activity of the centuries of colonialism, or in our own century the hot and cold wars between communists and their foes, or the Japanese Shintoist principle of divine emperorship as a supportive sanction for territorial expansion, or today the disputes between Jews and Muslims in the Near East, or between Muslims and Hindus in India. But whatever degree of purely self-aggrandizing motives involved, surely the admixtures of ideological justification sensed by the participants in such conflicts have contributed significantly to their intensity. Today the United Nations, through its forum of negotiations and through the employment of peacekeeping forces, strives to preclude or quell open conflicts. However, in view of the proclivity for ideological self-righteousness which continues to be exhibited by major sectors of humanity, there appears to be limited hope for the establishment, through such measures alone, of lasting world peace. Perhaps, then, the chance for peace would be enhanced through the embrace by international heads of state, together with some sufficient number of their deputies, of religious and philosophical agnosticism, as nurtured through their common study of the intellectual history of the world. Agnostic rulers would perceive that human beings in this stage of their evolution need to be governed by leaders who function simply as passengers on “spaceship earth,” rather than as culturally divisive fanatics.

One dilemma facing this program would be that its establishment in various less liberal nations would presumably depend upon the good offices of highly placed persons there, but which persons would need to have been motivated by their own experience in world-educational programs as yet nonexistent in their countries. The solution to this problem could come through the gradual percolation into the educational enterprise of such illiberal societies of individuals who, as students abroad, had participated in and been favorably influenced by the world courses.

More fundamental problems would recall certain issues raised in the enduringly provocative Republic of Plato. The crucial supposition behind the concept of the globally taught package of world courses is that they would eventually produce a cross-cultural educated class, whose members would be influential in the world of practical affairs, and who would incline toward mutual toleration based upon agnostic reservations. Meanwhile, however, it seems unlikely that the majority of “average” persons in whatever sectors of the world will abandon their cherished parochial beliefs—understandably, since holding such beliefs remains an important source of their identity, their self-esteem, and often their hope for a future in some next and better existence. Evidently most people worldwide will continue to need the emotional equilibrium acquired by coming to rest in one or another set of beliefs, typically of the sort which agnostic leaders trained in the world courses would find of dubious or only tentative validity. Those leaders would constitute a cross-cultural corps of persons possessing the temperamental capacity to abide in philosophical uncertainty, and having the benign-Machiavellian skill to override the intercultural animosities of their various constituencies. In other words, those rulers would constitute, in Plato’s sense, a class of “philosopher-
kings,” though with certain differences. Plato’s rulers are a small minority of persons who, through selective breeding and prolonged education, are alone capable of apprehending ultimate truths as these reside in eternal and unchanging “Forms.” The latter are supra-empirical realities perceived by the mind alone, and constituting archetypes for classes of tangible objects and qualities of objects, as well as of moral actions. “World-history kings,” by contrast, would be those individuals who recognize best the uncertain nature of all metaphysical schemes, including the one of Plato.

Nonetheless, both Plato’s rulers and the world-history trained rulers would have to claim some moral advantage as the sanction for their paternalistic rule. Plato’s rulers are those few individuals who, must crucially, achieve an immediate knowledge of the “Good,” the supreme eternal Form, and are thus in the best position to apply justice through their rule, justice being realized by maintaining a contented equilibrium between three distinct classes of persons, (rulers, soldiers, and workers), with members of each group performing their appointed tasks in a philosophically united society. By contrast, world-history rulers, in directing a radically more complex world than that of ancient Greece, would recognize that philosophical diversity is an ineradicable aspect of human experience, but would attempt through their overarching agnostic fraternity to maintain cross-cultural peace between diverse groups. Actually, for Plato, the Form of Good has an exalted status beyond that of an extrasensory prototype for morally good behavior, for it is also the generative source of the very capacity whereby humans can have any valid knowledge at all; the Form of Good is “the cause of knowledge and truth.”

Thus, whereas Plato’s kings attain their mandate to rule through their exclusive knowledge of the Good, which includes a knowledge of the ultimate source of knowledge, world-history leaders would deserve to rule, in important part, because of their mutual admission of ultimate ignorance.

If the world-educational program espoused above were to become determinative in international relations, would the resulting peace prove to satisfy some inherent human need for the exhilaration of messianic zeal, frequently carried over into the excitement of murderous international or cross-cultural conflict? I should think not, at least not for the great majority of people, who, it seems safe to say, would prefer to avoid the possibilities of displacement, impoverishment, and mutilation typically attendant upon violent conflict, but also considering how much would be left under conditions of global anarchy for the stimulation of individuals. International peace, as here conceived, would not require a colorless ethnic homogeneity, nor would it preclude the continued experience on the personal, or family or community level of the spectrum of successes and failures, hopes and disillusionments, depletions and tragedies, which characterize human life under the best of conditions and provide its fascination. What the politics of agnosticism would provide is the optimum opportunity for the greatest possible number of persons to achieve such satisfactions as the contingencies of an imperfect world may allow.

"International peace, as here conceived, would not require a colorless ethnic homogeneity..."

Those satisfactions would stand to be increased through cultivation of the arts, and for its part the package of world courses would ideally have its history segment expanded from a one- to a two-year course, in order to deal more adequately with the visual and performing arts of different cultures. Works of art are reflections of human aspirations, anxieties, and gratifications, which at some rudimentary level are surely common to all peoples, and through contemplating the expression of such feelings in the aesthetically concentrated forms of world art, persons may have their lives enhanced and intensified at the same time as they cultivate a more cosmopolitan orientation. For example, while a great portion of the world’s visual art and architecture has been executed in the service of particular religious beliefs, these works typically exceed in their appeal the verbal doctrines with which they are associated, and may function as avenues of cross-cultural appreciation. One does not need, necessarily, to be a Christian to stand in awe of the structural skills employed in the service of religious faith, as evidenced in the Gothic cathedrals of Western Europe; one need not be a Muslim to relish the incomparably beautiful and intricate colored-tile adornments, incorporating Koranic calligraphy, found on the mosques, madrasas, and mausoleums of Turkey, Iran, and Uzbekistan; one need not be a Buddhist to marvel at the iconographical ingenuity of the great stupas of Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and Indonesia. From an agnostic vantage point these monuments alike represent victories of the human spirit in the very teeth of a teleologically unfathomable universe.

Footnotes


3. I borrow the term from Barbara Ward, Spaceship Earth (New York, 1966), which presents an eloquent plea in favor of a "patriotism for the world" as such.

WINNER OF WHA's NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD, 1993
"Homer's Greece: A Poetic Odyssey to Confidence"*

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Greece. From the billowing sea, the rocky coast, the brilliant light, and the mountainous countryside, came the Greeks. They united to form one of the greatest cultures on earth. Though they came from all areas of the Aegean and Mediterranean, the Greeks were held together by a poetic view of themselves — the poetic view of Homer.

The story of Homer's Greece begins during the Mycenaean Age. In an era of wealth, war, and power, life centered around a king who ruled every aspect of his subjects' lives. His peasant subjects believed him to be divine, with special access to the gods. The king himself led warriors into battle during the many wars which kept the country wealthy. The king, with his government officials, controlled the vast Mycenaean empire that included all of later Greece. Wealthy aristocrats made much money on shipping and pirating and ate fattened oxen and drank rich wine three times a day. They even employed a writing system to keep track of government and business affairs.

Around 1200 B.C., Dorian invaders attacked from the north and destroyed the Mycenaean empire. They destroyed the palace, and with it fell the government, the writing system, the wealth, and the glory of Mycenaean. With superior weapons, the Dorian invaders gained control of many Mycenaean cities, but without governing skills, they were unable or unwilling to set up a government in place of the Mycenaean one. Instead, chaos resulted. Many Greeks fled the invaders and began to live like foreigners as they settled in their new land. Others, such as the Spartans, stayed where they were and let the Darians permeate their cities and their culture. Some Greeks, confused by the failure of their divine king, struggled to find a new life, religion, and government. Still others, such as those in Ionia and Athens, tried to keep their Mycenaean customs against the forces of the Dorian invaders. The united Mycenaean empire turned into numerous city states going in different directions. The pottery, echoing the people's chaos, changed from well-organized Mycenaean pictures, into abstract designs. The Greeks entered the Dark Ages.

Into this environment, Homer was born in 850 B.C. He probably lived on the island of Chios, where stories of the Mycenaean past still flourished. Life was hard for these people, trying to make a living and keep out the Dorian invaders. They took comfort in their stories of ancestral heroes of Mycena where food and gold were plentiful and men behaved as heroes or perhaps even as gods.

Homer may have become a traveling bard, singing his poems and stories wherever he went.

It may have been at one of the popular festivals that Homer recited his first work, the Iliad. In hexameter verse and masterful epic style, Homer sang of better days when the Greeks were united under the Mycenaen and fought bravely during the great Trojan War. His poem focused on one brave general, Achilles. Achilles, after being insulted by Agamemnon, his king, kept his own sense of personal honor by withdrawing from the battle to await an apology. Without Achilles' help, the Greeks began to lose the battle. Finally, the Trojans killed Achilles' best friend. Achilles, vowing to take vengeance, returned to the battle and fought bravely against the Trojans. In a final climax, Homer ended his long epic with the story of Achilles' triumphant duel with the Trojan king Hector.

Homer's second poem, the Odyssey, told of Odysseus' heroic return from the Trojan War.

Homer's stories of ancient heroes spread throughout Greece and into foreign lands as his poems were recognized for their literary greatness. For hundreds of years, the Homeridae, a group of Ionian bards, worked to popularize and preserve Homer's work. Several centuries later, Athenian booksellers competed to publish new editions of Homer's poems. School children memorized the epics and scholars quoted them to prove points. Greeks not only regarded Homer's poems as popular stories, but as historical works. Later Greek poets and playwrights imitated Homer's style and incorporated some of the same themes into their own works. The philosopher Xenophanes said, "All men's thoughts have been influenced by Homer from the beginning."

Homer's poetry gave answers and confidence to people confused by the Dorian invasion. The Greeks became proud of their heritage and confident in their own abilities as they looked to Homer's heroes for answers.

Homer's heroes had values such as patriotism and honor, in contrast to the confused descendants of Homer's day. Homer's stories of Achilles, Odysseus, and other Mycenaen who fought bravely for their country, inspired his listeners to do the same. Greeks became conscious of their Greek heritage and were willing to fight their culture and homeland. Isocrates, a writer during the Persian War, said that Achilles inspired the Greeks to fight against the barbarians.

In Homer's Iliad, Achilles and the other heroes were always conscious of their personal self-worth and honor. According to Homer, each person's "Arete," the Greek word for honor, was worth guarding with one's life. "At least let me not die without a struggle or ingloriously, but in some great deed of arms whereof men yet to be born shall hear," Hector said in
Homer’s *Iliad*. Homer’s heroes who defended their honor at Troy led to Greeks who proved their honor at the Olympic games or in battles to defend their city-state. In plays such as *Antigone* or philosophical statements by Socrates, the Greeks echoed the Homeric concept of honor worth proving.

Homer gave the Greeks confidence in a new, uniquely Greek religion. After the failure of their divine Mycenaean king, each city-state had set up its own local religion and gods, different from those of other city-states. Homer united all the Greeks by giving them a universal pantheon of twelve human-like gods. Greek religion was born.

Homeric religion permeated the Greeks’ thinking for the next thousand years. In Homer’s poetry, gods such as Athena, Apollo, and Zeus, often came to earth to help warriors and heroes. The Greeks derived a better understanding of their own identity from stories of gods in human form who caused both good and evil. When the Greeks won the Persian War, even an impious general remarked, “It is not we who have done this, but the gods and heroes.”

As the Greeks accepted Homer’s values and religion, their understanding of their own identity grew. Only a century after Homer composed his epics, the Greeks began to make realistic human statues. After centuries of geometric vase patterns, vase painters began to put pictures on their work, taking as their inspiration scenes from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Greeks sailed the seas once again and engaged in trade. Poets, historians, and philosophers recorded their works in volume after volume. Greeks were no longer in a state of confusion. The confidence they derived from Homer’s epics enabled them to move forward into a new era.

Even down to the time of Alexander the Great, Homer’s poetry remained a source of inspiration and encouragement. Alexander not only carried a copy of the *Iliad* with him on all his campaigns, but claimed descent from several Homeric heroes, including Achilles. Imitating Achilles, he confidently took revenge on the Persians. Proud of his homeland, Alexander sought to spread Greek culture all over the globe. For Alexander and countless other Greeks, Homer’s poems were their source of answers.

Homer’s epics stand, not only as two beautiful poems, but as the source of the Greeks’ confidence in themselves and in their abilities. Arising out of the confusion of the Dorian invasion, the Greeks entered the understanding of the Classical Age. Through Homer’s poetry, the Greeks reached an understanding of themselves and from that understanding emerged a culture.

**The Process of Research**

Homer’s poems communicated confidence to the Greeks, and influenced their society as few other writings ever have influenced a nation.

Researching this project was challenging because so little is known about Homer. I went to the University of Maine library, the Bangor Library, and the Boston Public Library to find information. I read books on Homer, but these often only analyzed discrepancies in the Homeric text or delved into questions of authorship. Books on ancient Greece were more useful, although I had to read many of them before I was able to form a thesis. I then turned to primary sources. No Greek literature exists from Homer’s time save the poet’s own work, so I had to turn to later writings. I considered any literature from the ancient world (before A.D. 500) as a primary source because the author lived in a Homeric culture. I tested all my theories against primary sources. Books by Herodotus, Plato, and Isocrates offered unique perspectives on Homer’s world.

When I wrote my script, I had trouble forming a unifying theme. Homer’s influence is seen in many areas of Greek life, so I was not sure how to approach the topic. I finally decided to view Homer’s poetry as the source of the Greeks’ confidence in themselves and their culture. This view seemed to agree with primary and secondary sources, and it encompassed other areas of Homeric influence.

Archaeology has uncovered a wealth of Greek artifacts, so finding slides was not difficult. For music, I used compositions by a modern Greek composer, as well as music which was composed with Greek ideals in mind.

Homer’s poems were the driving force behind Greek society. Societies have often been affected by communication. Churchill’s speeches inspired his countrymen to action in World War II, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is still remembered today, and the Declaration of Independence set into motion a country that has remained for over two hundred years. Homer’s poetry is different from these in that his poems are works of fiction and probably were designed solely for entertainment. His countrymen, confused by the Dorian invasion and subsequent disintegration of their country into city-states, looked for answers to their problems and found them in Homer’s poems. Homer’s *Iliad* was the most popular book in Greece for nearly a millennium. Homer emphasized the value of man, so the Greeks based their culture on the individual. Homer told of human-like gods, so the Greeks worshipped these gods. Homer preached a doctrine that every man should do his best. Classical Greeks applied this doctrine in the area of athletics and warfare. With his stories of heroic ancestors, Homer gave the Greeks confidence in their culture. His poems were the driving force in Greek culture through the Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Ages, even influencing Roman, Hebrew, and Eastern societies. Yet Homer’s poems were most popular in his native land. Through Homer’s poetry, the Greeks reached an understanding of themselves. Homer brought them on a poetic odyssey to confidence.

(Annotated bibliography comprised is 17 pages of primary and secondary sources.)
Book Reviews

World Civilizations: The Global Experience

Something unfortunate seems to happen when otherwise accomplished historians produce textbooks for survey courses. They retreat from our vexed struggles with essentializing, teleology, and ethnocentrism, and fall back on some of the most problematic conventions of our discipline. Consider World Civilizations: The Global Experience by Stearns, Adas, and Schwartz. Like too much textbook writing, it defines and valorizes “civilized peoples” in opposition to a phantom “primitive” state; like too much textbook writing, it essentializes continental and national characters (Europeans, Africans, Frenchmen, Chinese, etc.); and like too much textbook writing, it imposes an often ill-fitting periodization scheme, thereby suggesting that all human “civilizations” have shared an overall historical trajectory. Few of us subscribe to these notions when we talk with our colleagues in seminars. Yet all too many of us resort to these disciplinary conventions when we educate our students.

Stearns, Adas, and Schwartz begin their text with a persuasive argument for comparison as a strategy for highlighting distinctive and significant features of particular social orders (xxix). But because they restrict their coverage to societies they deem “civilized,” they limit the range of possible comparison, and thereby forego opportunities to encourage students to doubt their own assumptions about human nature. To cite an important example, capitalist accumulation is never juxtaposed to radically different forms of trade, such as the Kula of the western Pacific. The text thus systematically avoids any relativizing of familiar economic forms and motives: from this text’s perspective, the exchange of tribute goods in the Aztec Empire “interfered with the normal functioning of the market”—as if commodity exchanges were a human norm (387, emphasis mine).

Moreover, the text’s exclusion of societies deemed “primitive” effectively places such societies outside of history. Hunting-gathering appears here as a stage of social “evolution” (xxvii) surpassed roughly 5,000-10,000 years ago (15 and 189), rather than as a mode of production practiced by peoples sharing historical time—and struggles—with agricultural and industrial societies. In sum, this version of world history marginalizes a great many human societies and possibilities.

Overtly racial histories are, of course, out-of-date. Yet one of the most entrenched conventions of historical narration—presenting personified continents as trans-historical agents—reproduces racial categories and affirms the hegemonic notion that these are objective facts rather than contingent products of history. In a characteristic passage, Stearns, Adas, and Schwartz write of “Europe,” in the centuries after the fall of Rome, “gropping for civilization” (353). Such facile reifications and presumptions of a later historical formation prevent students from understanding contemporary social identities and groupings as historical phenomena. To do otherwise requires that we explain to students the distinction between social identities of different times—between, for instance, Europeans (a geographic and physiognomic term) and the people of Christendom (a religious term). And it requires as well that our telling of world history makes central those colonial crossings from which modern racial distinctions gradually emerged.

World Civilizations similarly fails to establish the contingency of national groupings and identities. It misleads students by telling them that Louis XIV’s realm possessed “a common culture and language” and was, therefore, a nation-state (512). Concomitantly, it ignores the historical construction of French citizens through education, military service, and other state activities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Regrettably, the fixing of identities that takes place in this textbook undercuts its greatest strength: its focus on the historical importance of “contacts among different societies” (xxvii). Yet even in narrating moments of “contact,” the text represents the parties to cultural crossings as inert. It consistently avoids telling students that such crossings shape and constitute social groupings, even as such groupings share such crossings: in short, it fails to tell students that the identities and groupings that enter into historical encounters are not necessarily those that come out.

One of the most awkward features of this text is its deployment of a uniform periodization scheme for all “civilizations.” It is here that the text seems most crudely Eurocentric. Delineating roughly A.D. 500 to 1450 as a single “era” (the “post-classical”) will not jar historians of Christendom, but there is much less motivation for dividing, say, the history of East Asia at these dates. Indeed, as a result of this periodization scheme, the text’s discussion of the Chinese eunuch who led naval ventures in the early fifteenth century is divided between chapters 20 and 28. I would guess that this fragmentation via periodization is why the authors have not noticed that they have rendered
the eunuch's name as "Cheng Ho" when he appears in the "post-classical era" and "Zhenghe" in the "early modern period" (cf. 476 and 654). Moreover, these alternate transliterations receive totally independent entries in the (generally unhelpful) index.

In judging survey textbooks (and reference works), many of us have our own idiosyncratic rules of thumb. For world history texts, mine are the discussions of the Haitian Revolution and the Massacre at Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Indeed, I started teaching world history in part because I wanted to treat as historic both the agency of oppressed peoples and the conflicts between modern states and fourth world peoples. To my disappointment, this text devotes only four sentences to the first of these topics — just enough to dismiss as derivative the anti-colonial struggle of enslaved human beings: the "rebellion" in Haiti, the authors write, "was really an extension of the French Revolution" (730). Thus more than fifty years after C.L.R. James's path-breaking The Black Jacobins, the French Revolution is discussed without considering the importance of Haiti's slave plantations for the formation of classes in France, or of actual human slavery for enlightenment ideals of liberty and equality. The mutual sharing of colony/metropole—of Haiti/France—is simply left out. On the nineteenth-century United States' systematic assault on Native Americans, the text is virtually silent, speaking instead of the American experience "taming a frontier" (695).

Notwithstanding all I have said, it is quite clear that a great deal of work went into producing this textbook. Unfortunately, we will have to do better than this if we are going to provide our students a historical education befitting their citizenship in a multicultural world. The established formulas will not do.

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A History of the Human Community

For the serious world historian, William H. McNeill's A History of the Human Community: Prehistory to the Present, a revised edition of his earlier The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community, is both a necessary addition to his or her library as well as a possible textbook for an introductory world history course. McNeill, author of the well-known work, Plagues and People (1976), incorporates a global approach throughout his text; he is not limited to any one place or region. In contrast to many world history texts, this work cannot be dismissed as Eurocentric. From the onset, McNeill claims that one of the forces of history is the "contacts between different cultures... because such contacts start or keep important changes going" (p. xv). Thus he adopts a thematic approach that precludes regionalism. Another example of his global perspective is revealed with his comparison of the West's impact on the Americas after 1500 with Europe's effect on Asia and India. The arrival of Europeans to the Americas brought an end to some civilizations, like the Aztecs, and significantly altered others. Conversely, when Europeans arrived in China and Asia, results differed — populations were not wiped out and cultures remained intact.

Themes such as agricultural and technological development also enhance McNeill's text and contribute to its success as a global history. He explores agricultural changes at great length in the early and later periods. One of his four effective photo essays (each is four to eight pages), "The Use of Plants and Animals in Agriculture," reviews farming tools, methods, and products from prehistory to 1600. He demonstrates the importance of technological advances in discussing the "Chariot Age," which started in 1700 B.C. and lasted until 1200 B.C.

The chronological framework also reflects the expertise of a world historian. In his discussion of medieval Europe, McNeill ends the chapter at 1200, just as Europe is embarking on a new era. He chooses this year because it is at this time that the Mongol Empire begins to prevail in Eurasia, with global ramifications.

In addition to the depth and breadth that this textbook offers, another attractive feature is McNeill's use of illustrations. Throughout, McNeill provides numerous photographs that further define a culture or time, such as an Indian portrait of an English gentleman awkwardly sitting cross-legged surrounded by Indian servants at the beginning of British imperialism in India. Underneath each picture is a lengthy caption, explaining its significance and helping the student recognize the underwritten sources of the past.

McNeill also relies on diagrams, many of which demonstrate a shift in thought, such as one entitled "Two Ways to Think about Modern Times." Vignettes on topics ranging from Charles Lindbergh to Confucian philosophy are sprinkled throughout the text and add interest to the general topic being discussed. The bibliographies following each chapter are also informative, particularly with their citations of primary sources. For example, in the bibliography for the chapter entitled, "The World Beyond Europe: 1500-1700," McNeill cites a document written by the king of the Congo to the king of Portugal in 1514 for a non-Western perspective followed by The Life and Letters of St. Francis Xavier for a Western viewpoint.
Still, a few problems remain with the text. For all of McNeill’s substantive research, he says little about the role of women in history, either in early or modern times. Another omission is any serious discussion of the Holocaust, which is not even listed in the index. Finally, more maps are needed for the recent past, including at least one contemporary world map. Nevertheless, A History of the Human Community: Prehistory to the Present is an excellent world history textbook—it furnishes a framework for students to assess the world they live in and guides them to a richer, deeper understanding of cultures outside their own.

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A History of World Societies

“We made social history the core element of our work,” the authors state in their preface (I, xix). This is in keeping with their earlier Western civilization textbook, and the previous editions of the text now under review. The claim is justified, for they have produced a well-written and highly readable text, with an emphasis on social history, lavishly buttressed by 500 illustrations, 294 in color, 131 maps, and 46 timelines and genealogies.

The emphasis is on story, not analysis, and the undergraduate reader might well find this an entertaining and informative companion through the history survey. For the instructor trained in world history, and able to provide additional analysis into why things happened, A History of World Societies could be a useful complement. The authors also state that they made “a determined effort to strike an effective global balance,” and that they stressed “the links between civilizations” (I, xix), but their efforts in these directions were less successful. About two-thirds of the text is focused on Europe, and about three-fifths on the period since 1500. A better title for the work would be “Western Civilization in Global Context.” There is nothing wrong with that approach (indeed, there is much to be said for it), but why not call it so?

Considered as social history, there were three areas receiving insufficient attention, the first being the early history of technology: the plow, the stirrup, lateen sails, the introduction of print to Western Europe. All but one of the above are mentioned, but not given their due. For example, “The Printed Word” receives less than a page (I, 520), and is limited to the statement: “Scholars in many disciplines have attributed Luther’s fame and success to the invention of the printing press” (I, 541). In addition to the relative neglect of early technology, there is little on the history of diseases. The plague receives modest and Eurocentric treatment, but there is only one reference each to malaria and smallpox, none to AIDS, and, indeed, none to most diseases. Although the germ theory is discussed, Alexander Fleming and penicillin, Jonas Salk and the polio vaccine, go unmentioned. Third, there is little here on how environment and climate have affected human history, especially, and ironically, with regard to Europe itself. In other respects, this is fine social history.

A more fundamental criticism is that the text does not have a clearly articulated conceptual framework (suggestively, there are four references to Arnold Toynbee, none to McNeill). This is instead a compendium of information, with memorable anecdotes and stories, but with a certain lack of perspective.

Minor caveats follow. The Paleolithic and Neolithic periods are sketchily covered (a common failing in survey texts). Greek historiography appears only in passing references to Herodotus and Thucydides. There are gaps in the treatment of European thought, with no mention of Boethius, St. Anselm or William of Occam. The Nestorians are not mentioned. In an effort to see Europe as an entity, important national and regional variations are sometimes obscured. There is little here on Eastern Europe, with the exception of Russia; this text would not help the student understand current Balkan turmoil. In fairness, any reader of any text would have a little list.

None of these criticisms precludes the use of this text by an instructor prepared to fill in the gaps, and provide more extended treatment of causation, and of history beyond Europe. Indeed, the authors help by providing excellent annotated bibliographies at the end of each chapter. The last reference noted was for 1991, fair enough for a text published in 1992, but more guidance to relevant journals and general reference works would have been welcome. An attractive feature is a sixteen-page introduction to Volume II covering material in Volume I, which ends in 1715. Both volumes open with an essay on mapmaking. The text is also available in a one-volume hard-cover edition, and a three volume paperback edition. Some overlap chapters among the volumes is designed to accommodate the various periodizations used in survey courses. Although length might daunt the reluctant undergraduate, this text is likely to please, as a visually attractive and readable introduction to Western and world history.

James Stephen Taylor
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INTEGRATING AFRICAN HISTORY INTO THE
WORLD HISTORY COURSE:
SOME TRANSGRESSSIONAL PATTERNS*

by
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University of Wisconsin – Green Bay

"Same old human story/ The saddest winds do
blow/ While we are trapped in the language of dark
history/ Underneath the human rainbow.” – Johnny
Clegg and Savuka.¹

"Africa is at once the most romantic and the most
tragic of continents…. There are those, nevertheless,
who would write universal history and leave out
Africa.” W.E.B. DuBois²

Africans and Americans have been in direct
contact for over 400 years. Indeed, at the time of the
American Revolution, 20 percent of Americans were
from Africa. The ancestors of the average African-
American family in the United States today arrived by
the late eighteenth century, whereas the average white
American family can only trace their roots in this
continent back to the late nineteenth century, a
striking refutation to the notion that the U.S. should
be seen essentially as a Europe-derived society.³

Much of what Americans think of as their own music,
speech, style, cuisine, and art originated in, or was
heavily influenced by, African immigrant
communities.

Africans brought a rich cultural heritage to the New
World, including proverbs, aphorisms, and folk tales
that entered America’s oral and written tradition.
Many African terms enrich American English,
including the West African “OK”.⁴ Most varieties of
American popular music have some African-
American origins or connections, including blues,
jazz, soul, reggae, bluegrass, and rock. Indeed, great
musicians like Duke Ellington and Louis Armstrong
drew directly on African rhythms and melodies. Art
historians have long noted how African sculpture and
masks influenced Picasso, Matisse, Modigliani, and
other masters of the Western art tradition. Cartoons,
from the Road Runner to Disney characters, were
clearly influenced by African figure caricature. It is
too often forgotten that the U.S. owes much of its
power and wealth to black labor, slave or free, and that
Americans make heavy use of raw materials exported
from Africa, from chocolate and cola to chrome and
oil.

Yet, most Americans know little about Africa. The
media images of the continent have long been
misleading and stereotyped, from King Solomon’s
Mines and The African Queen of an earlier era to
Tarzan and the Phantom of today’s comic strips, not
to mention the ethnocentric jungle rides at
Disneyland. More dangerously, the notion of
“Darkest Africa” and “heathens” remains fixed in the
U.S. imagination, reinforced by news reports of
“tribal” conflicts, AIDS epidemics, and “barbarous”
African leaders like Idi Amin and Bokassa. It is
sobering to note that the U.S. media do not refer to
“tribalism” in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet
republics, Canada, or Northern Ireland; nor do

"Yet, most Americans know little about Africa.”

they it note that Idi Amin was just as atypical of
African leaders as Serbia’s ruthless president
Milosevic is of European leaders. As Bohannan and
Curtin argue, “only after we strip away the pervasive
web of myth about Africa can the reality of Africa
emerge.”⁵

A major contributor to American misperceptions
is the way world history has been taught — or not
taught — in U.S. schools for many decades. For
much of this century the core non-U.S. history course
in both secondary and higher education was some
version of Western civilizations, with an emphasis on
the rise of Western Europe and its antecedents in the
Near East. As many critics have noted, this
amounted all too often to a view of the “mainstream”
of history as essentially “American history pushed
back through time,” as Philip Curtin phrased it.⁶ In
this scenario, civilization arose in the ancient Near
East, passed through southern Europe (Greece and
Rome) to northwestern Europe, and then across the
Atlantic to North America. Hence, it provided a
distorted view of history, denying most non-Western
civilizations any real relevance. The Eurocentric
view of history undoubtedly exaggerated Europe’s
role in world history (at least before 1500) and
conveyed the misleading impression that European
history existed in some sort of vacuum, underplaying

*This paper is based on a presentation at a workshop for high
school teachers on “Teaching Africa in World History,”
sponsored by the Milwaukee History Teachers Alliance, the
Milwaukee Metropolitan Historians Association and the
Milwaukee Public Schools Humanities Council, held at
Riverside High School in Milwaukee, November 14, 1992. I
would like to thank Jean Fleet and Bruce Fetter for inviting me
to participate in the workshop.
the role of imported ideas, technologies, and the like in the rise of the West. Indeed, there was a pronounced contempt for African history, exemplified by the classic statement of Hugh Trevor-Roper that this history only amounted to “the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe.”7 Africa, then, had no history, or at least none worth noting until the arrival of the more “advanced” Europeans introduced dynamism into Africa.

“Maps never reflect a neutral reality....”

Even world maps used in the U.S. distorted reality to conform to the American world-view; the notorious (but still much utilized) Mercator projection greatly exaggerated the size of Europe (a dubious “continent”) and North America while diminishing the actual size of Africa (not to mention southern Asia). Maps never reflect a neutral reality; they subtly shape perceptions of the world. Hence, for many years, what passed for historical writing on Africa mostly revolved around the activities of Western individuals and governments. Only in the 1960s did this situation begin to change substantially; decolonization and the independence of most African nations, not to mention the burgeoning civil rights movement in the U.S., forced a reappraisal of African history by Western scholars less influenced by social Darwinism, racism and the ideological assumptions of colonialism. By the 1970s the academic study of African history had grown far more sophisticated and knowledge of indigenous historical patterns grew apace. But this growing knowledge base, and the more sympathetic treatment it encompassed, was very slow to permeate into the secondary schools, or for that matter into history department curricula and the emerging course on world history/civilizations that began to develop in the late 1960s.8 The majority of college world history courses remained for the most part “Eurocentric,” with Western civilization as the heart, supplemented by some attention to other “great traditions,” especially China and India. Depending on the course or text, Africa, the Middle East (after the Egyptians, Sumerians, and Hebrews), Southeast Asia, and Latin America were accorded sparse or negligible treatment.9

Perhaps due to that lacuna a bitter reaction to the old Eurocentric history emerged in the late 1980s known as Afrocentrism. The assumptions of leading Afrocentric scholars provided a mirror image to the old Eurocentric school, indeed in its most extreme form dismissed the older history as essentially a lie designed to perpetuate the power of whites and denigrate non-whites. In the Afrocentric view Africa, not the West, was the fountainhead of civilization, and a whole new way of conceptualizing world history must be developed. In their critique of the ideological assumptions of Eurocentric approaches and their claims for the significance of African history, the Afrocentric scholars offer some valid points, even if many historians of world and African history have been making some of the same arguments for several decades.10

But, like the more rigid adherents to Eurocentrism who reflexively dismiss challenges without acknowledging the evidence, some of the Afrocentric scholars go well beyond the available sources and historical evidence in their zeal to forge a new paradigm. Rather few of the Afrocentrics have academic credentials on the subjects about which they propound, leading most historians of African and world history to dismiss many of their arguments (such as the absurd notion of “Ice People” and “Sun People” propounded by Leonard Jeffries) as propaganda rather than scholarship. Historians have rather easily demolished many of the claims in the Portland African-American Baseline Essays, which oversimplify ancient Egyptian society, are based mostly on outdated and generally discredited sources from early in the century, promote the dubious notion that African mariners established the Olmec civilization of ancient Mexico, and offer scientific theories with little or no empirical evidence.11

But we need not accept the more extreme arguments of some of the Afrocentrists in order to be able to integrate African history into world history and demonstrate the authenticity of African history. For historians of African and world history have long been making a good case for both the essential importance of Africa in its own right and as a critical component of world history. What is needed is not a Euro- or Afrocentric history but rather a “human rainbow” or globalcentric history. It is important for teachers to understand that Africa was not isolated from world history; rather, many African peoples were very much tied to what Marshall Hodgson termed the “Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex”: A common zone of interaction beginning with the dawn of civilization and encompassing Eastern Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Western Asia, southern Europe, north and northwestern Africa, and Eastern Africa.12 In the remainder of this essay I will briefly outline six themes that will suggest how Africa can be integrated into courses on world history.

1. The Peopling of the World From Africa

The first long chapter in the human past began in Africa.13 There is a scientific consensus that, absent any real contradictory evidence, the ancestors of Homo sapiens sapiens (modern humans) evolved exclusively in eastern and southern Africa between five million and one million years ago. Archaeological discoveries seem to point to several stages in this evolution, even if there is a controversy about the various species and their relationships. These early hominids demonstrated increasing specialization in survival activities, with men increasingly hunters and
THE BOX: A Unique Approach to the Final Exam in World History

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Several years ago Ron Wiltse wrote "Suggestions for a Beginning Secondary World History Teacher" which appeared in the World History Bulletin and became an organizational guide for both beginning and seasoned world history teachers. Ron is assembling a collection of useful visuals for teaching world history. For more information, please write Ronald Wiltse; 128 Bluet Lane, San Antonio, Texas 78213-2501.

Each student chose a theme from the whole year's work and expressed that theme within a box of some sort. There were three components to the box assignment, therefore three components of one final exam grade. The box was created first; a five minute oral report to the class came next; last was a 1 1/2 hour essay explaining the theme and the box's contents.

The box was evaluated in terms of creativity, visual appeal, the number of ideas expressed by the objects within the box, and how much work was put into its planning and production. The in-class presentation was evaluated in terms of clarity, brevity and depth of analysis of the theme summarized. The essay was evaluated in terms of creativity, organization of the idea or theme, thoroughness of the exploration of that idea, depth of analysis and grammar. During the presentations, I photographed each box and videotaped the proceedings.

Here are some examples of the themes:

1) Modern humankind - the sorts of connections we have with the past, the pressures put upon us by institutions and issues, possibilities for our future. This was expressed by the figure of a human pulled by many wires and surrounded by slogans and images.

2) The mixed effects of British colonialism upon Australia - The box was filled with miniatures of special effects like a Bible, boomerang, a crown and a bag of minerals.

3) The comparative dilemmas of Japan and China today - traditions versus modernization. The box had two compartments, one containing symbols of the forces for change and tradition in Japan, the other showing the contrast in China.

4) The nature of historical issues or events - how each person views them uniquely. This was portrayed by a face mask: one-half was lit, the other half was shaded. Images representing historical events and issues were on either side of the mask.

5) Modern man and his ability or inability to break free of the forces working on him - A figure of a man was placed in a bird cage.

6) The multiplicity of causes of World War I - A pointed block painted "Serbia/Austria" supported a balance beam painted "Alliances." On top of the beam were blocks of the countries involved and the "isms" of the times which motivated action.

7) The hopes and realities of the communist revolution in Russia - Objects symbolizing dashed hopes were included in a red box.
8) A doll’s house of history - The house opened up to reveal miniatures of religious, political, and social ideas set about in a living room.

As one might expect from honors students, many of whom are more comfortable working with assignments primarily involved with reading or writing or teacher-imposed structure, many reacted with expressions of panic. “This is too global!” “How can you depict ideas visually?” “This is so much work.”

Reactions afterwards were of pride of accomplishment. “I learned so much this way.” “I really can be creative.” The most important reaction came after they saw each other’s work during the class presentations. They were so impressed by the talents of their classmates. The oftentimes lonely atmosphere where the group is separated into competitive test-taking individuals was broken down.

WORLD HISTORY: TEACHER PREPARATION THROUGH UNIVERSITY-HIGH SCHOOL COLLABORATION
by Howard Spodek and Charlene Mires
Temple University

As America’s high schools have begun to introduce the study of world history, teachers often have found themselves unprepared because university history departments have not offered such courses for generalists; nor have they taught world, rather than Western, history. Responding to this gap in teacher preparation, the National Endowment for the Humanities has awarded support to an extraordinary dialogue now under way in Philadelphia.

Twenty college professors from twelve colleges and universities have joined with about twenty high school teachers from public urban and suburban schools, private schools, and the Archdiocesan parochial schools of Philadelphia to explore ways of teaching world history in universities. During the two-year NEH-funded project, participants will meet regularly to consider issues of content, concept, and skills; the sequencing of learning between (and within) schools and universities; the mentoring of intending teachers; the use of museum resources; various methods of assessment; and the use of historical thinking in all aspects of life and in helping students form personal values. The university and high school teachers will meet together to read and discuss primary texts, interpretations, and textbooks; visit one another’s classrooms; discuss museum resources with museum curators; and work in small groups to analyze and construct curricular materials.

Many of the project participants as well as the project director, Howard Spodek, have previous experience grappling with the issues involved in teaching world history. From 1987 through 1991, a very large collaborative project sponsored by the School District of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Alliance for Teaching Humanities in the Schools (PATHS) brought together fifteen university professors with one hundred high school history teachers. First, the university faculty helped the teachers gain an up-to-date understanding of world history and its historiography; then, the teachers redesigned their high school world history course. The result was a new curriculum in the school district and many revitalized teachers.

The current project transposes the process, bringing in high school teachers to advise college professors about the needs of future teachers. The new project is not intended to produce a standardized curriculum; rather, the goal is that each professor find new ways of teaching world history. The ideas generated through the project may be shared beyond Philadelphia through publications and, perhaps, summer seminars after the project concludes.

The project, “World History: Teacher Preparation Through University-High School Collaboration,” began in October. The first session was devoted to sharing curricular experiences, a topic that generated lively discussions about interactive teaching techniques and issues of content versus process in teaching. The group’s work will continue through June 1995. Updates on the continuing dialogue will be published periodically in the World History Bulletin.

AN EXAMPLE OF COURSE STANDARDS AND ASSESSMENT

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Over the summer and early fall national standards for world history have been the focus of world history teachers across the nation. The current educational reform, the national standards movement, grew out of an education summit convened by President Bush and the nation’s governors in 1989. Content standards in the core academic subjects, English, math, science, history, and geography, were to be written. Since then other subjects have been added, some funded federally and some privately. The approach to standards varies with the subject. Some are content specific while others take a broad brush approach. In response to the current debate in Colorado over world history standards, Marilynn Hitchens, past-president of the WHA, has organized a standards assessment which addresses the issue of historical literacy, course content, and assessment.
Content and Assessment Standards - World History

Essentially the course content and methodology will drive standards and assessment. The first assessment mechanism will ask students to write in analytical essay form about any number of the eleven essential historical concepts included in the course and to illustrate them with specific historical examples. These historical examples will be studied by a Historical Methods Inquiry Module which is aimed at teaching students how to think historically. Thinking historically asks the student to investigate and framework any historical moment by asking the right questions — time, place, environmental and world historical context, change, connections, and legacy and then to investigate the moment using correct historical procedure — factual information, documents, visual evidence and viewpoint. The student will then write about the historical moment in narrative form. The third standards assessment involves habits of the mind. Students should be able in any historical reading to identify key structures essential to the historical discipline like culture, civilization, diffusion and so on. The assessment component, therefore, will involve three tasks: an analytical essay on content, a narrative essay involving historical methods inquiry, and a reading component asking students to identify historical habits of mind peculiar to the discipline.

COURSE CONTENT

I. The Anthropological Revolution and Hunter-Gatherer Society
   A) Australopithicus, Homo habilis, Homo erectus, Cro-Magnon
   B) Animism, tribal social and political life, art LITERACY: Physical evolution, culture, challenge and response

II. The Agriculture Revolution
   A) Agricultural and pastoral societies — riveraine and steppe
   B) Indus Valley and/or Tigris-Euphrates, Nile Valley, Shang China, Olmec (HMIM) LITERACY: Civilization analysis

III. The Metallurgical Revolution and Iron Age Empires
   A) Metallurgy and its applications
   B) Empires
   C) Achaemenid Persia and/or Chou/Ch’in China, Aryan Indian, Dorian Greece, Hittites and Assyrians, Toltecs (HMIM) LITERACY: Cultural diffusion, nomadic versus sedentary, empire

IV. Classical Belief Systems
   A) Oriental—Folk and/or Confucianism, Taoism (HMIM)
   B) Occidental—Zoroastrianism and/or Judaism, Christianity, Rationalism, Islam (HMIM)
   C) Indian—Hinduism and Buddhism (HMIM) LITERACY: Comparisons, values and ethics

V. Classical Civilizations
   A) The classical model
   B) Greece and Rome and/or Mauryan/Gupta India, Maya, Khmer Cambodia, Han/Tang/Sung China, Yamata Japan (HMIM) LITERACY: Historical constructs

VI. The Feudal Breakdown
   A) The feudal model
   B) Feudal Europe and/or Helan/Kamakura/ Tokugawa Japan, Rajput India, Appanage Russia (HMIM) LITERACY: Cause and effect

VII. The World of Islam
   A) Islamic dynamism—Ummayad and Abbasid
   B) Mughal India and/or Safavid Persia, Seljuk/Ottoman Turkey, African Kingdoms (HMIM) LITERACY: Interconnections, cultural layering

VIII. The Commercial Revolution
   A) Long distance trade—Indian Ocean and/or Atlantic Ocean, Silk Road, Trans-Saharan or Pacific galleons (HMIM)
   B) Mechanisms of capitalism
   C) Socio-political change—Renaissance and/or nation-state, middle class and bourgeois revolution, Columbian Exchange, colonialism (HMIM) LITERACY: Modes of change

IX. The Industrial Revolution
   A) Technology and systems
   B) Socio-political change—ideologies and/or empire, environment, urbanization, worker class (HMIM)
   C) Models of industrial change—Meiji Japan, Germany, U.S., Russia (HMIM) LITERACY: Economic and political systems

X. The 20th Century and World War
   A) European Interocene warfare
   B) The World Fronts—Internal and external (HMIM)
   C) Results—Cold War and/or decolonization, modernization (HMIM)
XI. The Communication Revolution

A) Technologies
B) Results—World markets and/or world culture and counterculture, world environment, space, migration (HMIM)

While the course outline provides the content framework for the course, the approach to the content should be narrative. Below are several constructs or ways to approach world history. At the high school level the narrative approach is preferable.

Course Constructs

The Turning Point Construct
The Anthropological Revolution
The Neolithic Revolution
The Agricultural Revolution
The Commercial Revolution
The Industrial Revolution
The Technological Revolution

The Social History Construct
Hunter-Gatherers
Agricultural/Pastoralists
The Merchant
The Industrialists
The Technocrats

The Political Construct
Tribe
Theistic State
The City-State
The Imperial State
The Feudal State
The Nation-State
Global State

The Horizontal or Links Construct
Peopling of the Earth
The Eurasian Ecumene
The Indianization of S.E. Asia
The Islamic World
The Age of the Mongols
The Columbian Exchange
Liberal Revolutions
Industry and Empire
Modernization

The Narrative Construct
Life of the Hunter-Gatherer
Settling Down
Civilization Emerges
The Age of Empires
The Feudal Hiatus
Islam Across the Afro-Eurasian Continent
The Age of the Mariner
The Emerging World Market
Man and Machine
World War
Global Culture

Course Content

Students should be able to write an analytical essay on each of the following.
1. Physical transformation of man and hunter-gatherer society.
2. The agricultural/pastoral revolutions and one example of each.
3. Metallurgy and one iron age empire.
4. One Oriental, Occidental and Indian classical belief system.
5. One classical civilization.
6. Feudalism and an example.
7. Islam and one Islamic civilization.
8. The Commercial Revolution and one result.
9. The Industrial Revolution and one result.
10. The world wars and one result.
11. The communications revolution and one result.

Historical Literacy

1. Historical methods inquiry. Students should be able to take any world historical topic and examine it historically. They would have to locate it in time and place including forces of the environment, give it a world context, examine change and connections, and make a statement of importance or legacy. They would do this by using factual information, documents requiring weighing of evidence, visual evidence and viewpoints. They would then write a narrative essay about the historical topic.

2. Students will identify in a reading principles of the historical discipline like cause and effect, cultural diffusion, geographical determinism, political, social, economic and cultural components, viewpoint, interconnections, challenge and response, systems constructs, change and value judgments.

The world history standards are the responsibility of the National Center for History in the Schools, a cooperative UCLA/NEH Research Program. The draft copies of the world history standards will be available for review during the spring semester. If you would like a copy or would like to become part of the WHA review committee, please write Heidi.
females increasingly gatherers; the latter was probably more crucial for food provision but in any case cooperation between the sexes and group members was the key to survival. About 1.6 million years ago Homo erectus ("upright human") evolved in east Africa; by about 1 million years ago some of them were migrating out of Africa, carrying with them primitive tools, more sophisticated hunting skills, and an ability to adapt to new environments (including knowledge of fire). Over the next 800,000 years or so Homo erectus occupied northern Africa, Europe, southern Asia, and China, as evidenced by the fossils later termed "Peking Man" and "Java Man." Although there is considerable debate about their identity and the nature of the migration, this can certainly be considered the first great migration in human history, a migration corresponding to climatic change with the ebb and flow of the Ice Ages as well as the periodic drying out of the Sahara region.

At this point the story becomes more complicated and controversial. Homo sapiens sapien clearly descended from Homo erectus but there is much debate about the mechanisms. Some scholars postulate that the evolution of Homo erectus into Homo sapiens occurred in different parts of the Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex simultaneously, perhaps 70,000 years ago, with frequent contact and interbreeding between various groups so that genes spread widely throughout the hominid pool and perpetuated a single species even if there were pronounced (but essentially superficial) differences in skin color, eye shape, and the like. This is sometimes termed the "candelabra model" of evolution.\(^\text{14}\) An alternative approach is provided by scholars supporting what might be called the "Eve model." In this scenario Homo erectus evolved into Homo sapiens only in east Africa, and then spread throughout the Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex, displacing and ultimately dooming Homo erectus. The physical differences that were perceived as distinct "races" emerged later. The evidence for the "Eve" model includes the fact that (so far, anyway) the earliest Homo sapiens remains have been found in east Africa (from 100-200,000 years ago). More controversial is the study of genetic codes, especially the mutation history of mitochondrial DNA; these studies postulate a common "mother" (or "Eve") to all present-day Homo sapiens who lived in east Africa some 200,000 years ago.\(^\text{15}\)

Recently the genetic studies have come under serious attack which has compromised their credibility; but the notion of Homo sapiens deriving from Africa has by no means been discarded as one of the possibilities.\(^\text{16}\) If accurate, it would suggest a second great migration out of Africa, through Asia to Australia and the Americas. Certainly, regardless of how they evolved, there is evidence of Homo sapiens in Southeast Asia and Australia by some 40,000 years ago. Traditionally the first migrations across the Bering Straits to North America and beyond were dated at around 12,000 years ago, but some recent (and still controversial) discoveries as far south as Chile suggest human settlement as far back as 35,000 years ago. Ultimately then, Africa was the source for human societies which gradually developed more sophisticated ways of life before some of them moved to the continents. All Homo sapiens constitute one species who can interbreed, communicate, and trade with each other. Close genetic links between peoples do not always correspond with observable physical differences, which is why many anthropologists reject the concept of fixed "races" entirely; there has been too much genetic intermixing.\(^\text{17}\) Essentially we are all cousins whose antecedents can be traced ultimately to Africa.

2. Egypt as a Gateway to Africa, Asia and Europe\(^\text{18}\)

Recently there has been a major historical controversy as to whether ancient Egypt should be seen as essentially a European/Near Eastern civilization (the forerunner of Western civilization) or rather as an African civilization populated mostly by black Africans who then sprinkled the evolving European culture (including Greece) with African ideas and influences (the idea of the Black Athena).\(^\text{19}\) In other words, the controversy revolves around the debate between Eurocentrism (a strong force among Western classicists) and (in various permutations) Afrocentrism. Generally most specialists on world or African history would probably take an intermediate view, seeing Egypt as very much a mixed civilization with roots in, and ultimately varying degrees of influence on, Africa, Europe, and Western Asia, in other words the "gateway" to north, south, east and west. Egypt (the upper Nile valley and delta) was populated over the ages by people from the south, the west, the northeast, and later even the north; emphasizing one source at the expense of the others is misleading. Inflated Afrocentric claims for advanced Egyptian technology such as gliders cannot be substantiated; but the reality of Egypt was remarkable enough that it does not need exaggeration.

Study of the art left by the ancient Egyptians suggests that some pharaohs were light-skinned and some dark, no doubt reflecting the racial mixture of the society. The Nile River runs deep into Africa and certainly was a highway for people and ideas, including quite probably the notion of divine kingship that underpinned Egyptian royalty. Some historians speculate that early Egyptian civilization may have received major boosts from the migration of Saharan peoples (of various skin hues) into the Nile as the once heavily populated region dried out. Invaders and settlers (probably in small numbers) from the Near East also arrived at various times; later
Hellenistic Greeks brought their blood and ideas. It is quite possible that the people of the Nile delta (Lower Egypt) had lighter skins than the people of the hill-framed valley south of Cairo (Upper Egypt); the two regions were quite distinct although united under one kingship. Very likely the Egyptian population included peoples of Semitic, Berber, Hamitic (Ethiopian-Somali) and Nubian (black) origins.

The Egyptians had long connections with black Africans to the south; well-established trade networks reached the black peoples of the middle Nile and beyond to the Congo basin in the south and the Ethiopian plateau to the southeast. In fact, Egypt was a crossroads of trade, with probable connections to the Berber peoples of Libya and Algeria to the west, the Hamitic peoples to the west along the Red Sea, the Semitic peoples to the northeast as far as Syria, and the Caucasian peoples of southeastern Europe. From the south came ivory, ebony, animal skins, gold and later iron, exchanged for furniture, silver, tools, paper, and linen, among other commodities. At various times the Egyptians controlled places as far afield as Palestine and Nubia; periodically Egypt itself would be conquered or dominated by outsiders, including Libyans, Nubians, Persians, Macedonian Greeks, and finally Romans.

For African history it is important to understand the connection between Egypt and the black Africans of Nubia (roughly present-day northern Sudan). The civilization of Kush arose in Nubia as a major trading terminus; later, as caravan routes linked Kush with the Niger basin, the Congo basin, and the Ethiopian highlands, it would provide goods from central, southwestern and southern Africa to the peoples of the Mediterranean region as well as the Red Sea region. Some Kushite goods were transshipped to India and China; Chinese copper vessels have been found at Meroe. Long a colony of Egypt, the Kushites succeeded in conquering Egypt for a time in the eighth century B.C.E. before being pushed out by the Assyrians. From 600-100 B.C.E. Kush became the major African producer of iron, with the capital of Meroe sometimes termed the "Pittsburgh of ancient Africa." Iron technology, originated in the Middle East, may have passed through Egypt to Kush, which had many sources of iron ore; from Kush it may have permeated into other parts of black Africa although some historians postulate an independent development of ironmaking. It is clear then that both Egypt and its related civilization of Kush, linking the peoples of Africa and the Mediterranean, played central political and economic roles in the larger Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex. Many African states should be seen as successors to these civilizations and some African peoples trace their political ancestry back to that region.

3. Islam and Global Commerce in West Africa

The rise of the great kingdoms of the Sudanic region of West Africa is closely linked to the expansion of both global religion, Islam, and a global commerce that linked southwestern and central Africa with North Africa, the Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East. Between the eighth and fifteenth centuries Islam expanded out of its Arabian heartland to become the dominant religion in North Africa, parts of West Africa, Iberia, Western Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, the archipelago realm of Southeast Asia, and the East African coast, with spurts to Muslim minorities in locations as afar afield as China and the Balkans. Hence was created Darul Islam (the "Abode of Islam"), an interlinked Islamic world stretching from Morocco to Indonesia and joined by both a common faith and trade connections. Ibn Battuta, the great fourteenth-century Moroccan traveler, spent years touring the length and breadth of Darul Islam, as far as the coastal ports of China. One of his last trips was to the kingdom of Mali in West Africa, on the southwestern fringe of Darul Islam but linked to the Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex through the Muslim-dominated trans-Saharan trade roots that ultimately reached as far as the South China Sea.

"Islam tapped into the camel caravan routes that had existed for centuries."

Beginning in the ninth century C.E. Islam filtered down the trade routes across the Sahara, carried peacefully by merchants, teachers, and mystics in much the same way it had arrived in the islands of Indonesia. Islam tapped into the camel caravan routes that had existed for centuries. Indeed, it was likely trade between West and North Africa that prompted the formation of the early states such as Ghana, which was flourishing by the eighth century C.E. For generations kola nuts, palm oil and especially gold from the Guinea coast to the south had been traded northward for salt, dates, textiles and horses. The Sahel (the vast grasslands just south of the Sahara also known as the Sudan) had become the terminus between north and south. By the tenth century Ghana's rulers, at their pinnacle of power, had converted to Islam, adding a new dimension to West African life even if it took many centuries for Islam to permeate throughout, and reconfigure some of the sociocultural values of the population. Sudanic civilization became very mixed, demonstrating absorptive qualities and the ability to tolerate varied patterns of belief and lifestyle. As was so common in the world, not least in Africa, the societies that evolved combined external influences and local genius.

Ghana was the first of the great empires and kingdoms that rose and fell in the Sahel over the next half millennium, the best-known of which were Mali and Songhai. All had Muslim rulers (but only partly Muslim populations) and also derived some of their economic rewards from taxation to the caravan trade.
The famous pilgrimage to Mecca of the Mali ruler Mansa Musa, taking with him thousands of retainers, in the fourteenth century exemplified the wealth and power of his state. It was said that he spent so much money in Cairo that the Egyptian currency was devalued. These kinds of international connections enticed many visitors and sojourners to the Sudan, including poets, architects, teachers and traders from places like Spain and Egypt. Islamic universities were established, most famously at Timbuktu in the fourteenth century; its faculty and student body were drawn from many lands. Eventually the Sudanic style of state, influenced by the world beyond, would become a model for kingdoms to the south and southeast in the forest zone.

As trade expanded, slaves became more prominent as a commodity to be shipped north, where they were sold in North Africa and (to some extent) Iberia. The black slaves filled various niches as domestic servants, laborers, soldiers, and even administrators; over 700 years perhaps 2-4 million slaves were transported northward on the trans-Saharan caravans, a significant figure but small-scale compared to the numbers that would eventually be taken across the Atlantic by Western nations over a 400-year period. Nonetheless, this trans-Saharan slave trade acquainted West Europeans, most especially the Portuguese, with the prospects of eventually procuring slaves directly in West Africa, one of the spurs to Portuguese exploration down the West African coast in the fifteenth century. Hence, the caravan trade and expansion of Islam brought many West Africans into closer communication with the peoples of the larger world and generated more sophisticated civilizations; but they also ultimately contributed to enticing rapacious Westerners to explore the “mysterious” lands to the south.

4. The East African City States and World Trade

The expansion of both Islam and global commerce also integrated another African region, the East African coast, into Darul Islam and the wider world. The coast stretching from present-day Somalia down to central Mozambique was a cultural melting pot, where a unique hybrid society emerged as a result of the evolution of a great trading system linking East Africa with varied societies of the Indian Ocean and beyond. For at least 2000 years the coastal peoples of East Africa have been in constant contact with seafaring folk from Arabia, Persia, India, Southeast Asia, and even China, a confluence that generated a fascinating mosaic of various cultures, languages, religions, and economies. The prevailing wind patterns facilitated sailing up and down the coast. Not surprisingly then, ancient Phoenicians visited the area, and trade with Greece and Rome flourished. Indonesian seafarers visited the coast for a millennium beginning around 200 B.C.E., bringing with them various tropical plants (bananas, coconuts, yams) which proved well adapted and spread throughout tropical Africa, and also settling the island of Madagascar. Later Arabs would come to dominate the coastal trade, seeking ivory, shells, skins, gold, and copper from what they called the “Land of Zanj” (“Land of blacks”).

The major permutations occurred when Bantu-speakers began settling along the coast in the first millennium C.E. Bantus and Arabs intermixed in the coastal cities that developed along the coast such as Mogadishu, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Kilwa, and Sofala; they were soon joined by small numbers of settlers from Arabia, Persia, and India. Although Bantus remained numerically dominant there was much intermarriage and cultural fusion; the result was the evolution of a new people, language and culture known as Swahili, essentially a mix of Bantu and Arab Islamic with many cultural features similar to other Islamic hybrid peoples around the Indian Ocean realm. The Swahili language became not only a venue for powerful literature but also the lingua franca of the coastal zone, later permeating deeper into east and central Africa as far as the Congo basin. Islam became dominant along the coast but in a flexible form that accommodated many local realities and customs. The Swahili settlements became independent city states, with no political uniformity but domination by influential trading families; interregional and international trade was their main activity.

“In the early fifteenth century peaceful Chinese trading fleets arrived, the largest expedition in history before the expansion of the West.”

The “Golden Age” of the coast commenced around the ninth century and reached its peak from the twelfth-fifteenth centuries. Ships from Arabia, Persia, and India regularly visited the coast; Ibn Battuta traveled south as far as Kilwa. In the early fifteenth century peaceful Chinese trading fleets arrived, the largest expedition in history before the expansion of the West. The various foreign traders brought pottery, Chinese porcelain, glass beads, and Indian cotton, trading them for iron, ivory and slaves. Slaves from East Africa were sent to Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Western India; the magnitude of the trade is unclear, perhaps 1-2 million before it was terminated in the nineteenth century. The East African city states were an integral part of the greatest trading network of the premodern world, the Great Indian Ocean Maritime Trading Route that was generally dominated by seafaring Muslims (Arabs and Indians) and linked China in the east through Southeast Asia to India, Persia, the Arab societies, southeastern Europe, and East Africa.

By about 1000 C.E. trade networks into the interior expanded, a situation facilitated by the discovery of gold in the plateau of Zimbabwe. The Shona people developed a great kingdom in Zimbabwe from the
thirteenth through sixteenth centuries, with their prosperity based on mining gold, copper, and iron. Soon they were trading these minerals to the Arab and Swahili traders down from the Zambezi River at Sofala, turning this coastal port into a major destination of merchants seeking to export gold around the Indian Ocean basin; Zimbabwe flourished from the trade. But the wealth of the East African coast, not to mention the products that flowed northward and westward along the Indian Ocean trading networks, would prove a terrible temptation to Europeans who were, in the 1400s, developing the naval and military capability to seize and dominate the trading systems, in the process devastating and destroying the Swahili city states.

5. Africa and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade

One study has contended that “modern race relations have their origins in, and cannot be understood apart from, the global expansion of Europe that began in the fifteenth century,” which forged an unequal relationship between white and nonwhite peoples while also creating “a global distribution of power and privilege along the lines of color.” Contemporary racism and the exploitation of black peoples have their origins in early Western relations with tropical Africa. The most prominent factor in this situation was the trans-Atlantic slave trade which developed beginning in the sixteenth century. Slavery had existed in many African societies just as it had worldwide, and some black slaves had long been transported along the caravan and sea routes to North Africa and the Middle East just as Caucasian slaves had for centuries been dispatched from the Black Sea region to southwestern Europe. The economic evolution of the newly discovered lands of the “New World,” especially the introduction of sugar planting, created a tremendous market for labor that could not be filled by free labor. Soon ships from various European nations (first Portuguese, then English, Spanish, French, Dutch, Danish, and American) began procuring slaves in West Africa and shipping them across the Atlantic to meet the limitless demands of the new plantation economies.

Profits from the slave trade sourched along with the volume of slaves, and the West African coast from Senegal down to Angola was soon dotted with European forts to obtain, store, and ship slaves. Europeans traded cotton goods, guns, iron, rum, and tobacco for slaves, often with the cooperation of local African chiefs but sometimes acquiring slaves by force, as exemplified by the Portuguese conquest of the great and prosperous kingdom of the Kongo and their ruthless depredation in Angola. The total number of Africans involved in the slave trade is a matter of great debate among historians, but most sources point to something on the order of 9-12 million Africans landed in the Americas over four centuries. But for every slave sold at auction, several had died in storage or on the notoriously overcrowded, disease-ridden slave ships.

“But for every slave sold at auction, several had died in storage or on the notoriously overcrowded, disease-ridden slave ships.”

savages unworthy of civilized treatment; the heritage of that dehumanization can be easily seen today. The slavers, the cooperating African chiefs, the plantation owners, shipbuilders, and other groups linked to the trade directly or indirectly were all reluctant to abandon a lucrative source of profit.

The slaves transported across the Atlantic became largely a plantation labor force. Unlike slavery in traditional African societies these New World slaves had few if any legal or customary rights; they were simply treated as cost items in the production process, to be bought and sold at the whim of the owners, their lives on plantations governed by the imperatives of the marketplace. Slave owners sought maximum profit regardless of human consequences since the markets for sugar and other plantation crops expanded constantly. Other perhaps than subtle passive resistance or conceivably escape to the remote interior, African slaves had little choice but to tolerate the situation; the myriad of slave revolts were brutally crushed.

The impact of the slave trade on Africa is the subject of much historical debate, with varying balance sheets being offered. Clearly the negative consequences varied from region to region, group to group. Without a doubt coastal regions of West and Central Africa did succumb to chronic warfare, an “enslave your neighbor or be enslaved” syndrome. European guns made the region a vast battleground. Some peoples, among them Kongoilese, Ibos, and Yorubas, were disproportionately transported, their societies badly disrupted. Some districts were badly depopulated. But the degree of African complicity in the tragedy is disputed. Traditional interregional trade was clearly hampered; external trade was lubricated mostly by the Western desire for slaves. Conservative historians argue that the trade facilitated the diffusion of new food crops (corn, peanuts), that some African states developed a highly dynamic commercial orientation, and that Africa quickly recovered demographically from the population losses. And yet, the heritage of racism made Africans and their descendants in the New World a permanent underclass, treated with contempt; learned Western intellectuals once argued (and some apparently still do) that Africans were naturally inferior in intelligence. Africa came to be seen as a continent in desperate need of Christianity and
Western tutelage, setting the stage for, and justifying, the later colonialism of the continent.

But the greatest impact of the African slave trade was to more forcibly link black Africa to the larger world, especially to the Americas. The triangular trade saw the movement of slaves from Africa to the New World, where they grew sugar, cotton, and tobacco for shipment to Europe; the lucrative proceeds would then purchase guns, rum, textiles, and other commodities for shipment to Africa to obtain more slaves. Perhaps more than any other commodity, sugar (grown by African slaves) generated the European drive for empire and also facilitated the transition to an industrial economy in Britain. African culture influence and population came to be especially predominant in the slavery-defined “plantation zone” stretching from Virginia southward through the West Indies to northern Brazil and the Pacific coast of Colombia. A substantial percentage of all people of African descent, probably at least one-third by 1800, live today in the Western Hemisphere. They constitute most of the population of countries like Jamaica, Barbados, and Haiti, half of the population of countries like Trinidad, Belize, and Guyana, and substantial minorities in countries like Brazil (37%), Cuba (27%), Panama (30%), Venezuela (10%), and the U.S. (11%).

The African diaspora left its imprint in the New World. Some slaves escaped from plantations and set up African-type maroon communities in the interior of places like Jamaica and Surinam. Many African descendants showed a tendency to synthesize Western and African customs, creating hybrid religions (Haitian voodoo, Cuban santeria), music, and sometimes even language (the Gullah dialect of the Georgia Sea Islands). African words enriched the English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese patois, in some cases substantially. And yet everywhere African Americans faced discrimination or racism long after slavery had ended. Some freed slaves returned eventually to West Africa, becoming important segments of the urban population in states like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria; some of their descendants became nationalist proponents or even presidents. All of these patterns created what might be called an “Atlantic System” that spanned Western and central Africa, the U.S. South, the Caribbean basin, and the northern and eastern coastal zones of South America, defined by a particular sort of economic activity, some shared sociocultural traits, and the numerical prominence of Africans. Ultimately then, as Manning argues, African slavery was linked in some way to most of the major developments of modern world history, including the industrial revolution, the rise of capitalism, the scientific revolution, rapid population growth in the Americas, and the expansion of colonialism.

Between 1500 and 1914, and particularly between 1870 and 1914, that portion of the globe now called the “Third World” was conquered or impacted by Western nations and divided up into colonies or spheres of influence, in the process brought into an emerging world economic system dominated by the West. These societies were then categorized as “backward” or “underdeveloped”; lubricated by the ethnocentric pretensions of social Darwinism, Westerners took the innate inequality of peoples and societies for granted while the imperatives of capitalism spurred Western businessmen (and their supporting governments) to seek new resources and markets in the tropical world. And yet, the wealth gap between Europe and the more sophisticated Third World societies (including some in Africa) was small or even nonexistent in 1500; by 1914 it had grown wide indeed and continues to grow.

Many scholars believe that “underdevelopment” and “development” are two sides of the same coin; the imperialism of the Western powers transferred wealth from the “periphery” (Third World) to the “core” (the colonizing powers) for investment in their own productive capacity while locking their colonies into dependency based on extractive economies and labor exploitation. Hence, it is argued, first the trans-Atlantic slave trade and then colonialism contributed to the underdevelopment of Africa by draining away the most productive sector of the population and then imposing a new kind of economic system discouraging diversified, multifaceted growth, rendering many of the former colonies economically vulnerable today.

For Africa, the most common form of Western imperialism was colonialism, that is direct political control.

For Africa, the most common form of Western imperialism was colonialism, that is direct political control. While a few areas such as Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa became Western colonies in the era of the slave trade, the fullblown scramble for Africa would only commence with the end of the slave trade and the onset of the industrial revolution in Europe which greatly accelerated the need for natural resources that could be processed into industrial or commercial products as well as new markets to consume these goods. Soon European traders were obtaining African products such as peanuts, palm oil, gold, timber, and cotton; but the Westerners encountered impediments to their activities, not the least of them an emerging African mercantile class that competed with them.

Economic factors, combined with European
political rivalries, and a powerful industrial technology (including weapons) soon combined to generate a more forward and ruthless policy of incorporating African territories. By World War I the great European powers had divided up the African continent between them, piling the way for full-scale economic penetration and incorporation of Africa into the world-system. Conquest was achieved peacefully if possible (through deceptive treaties, bribery, divide and rule, and the like), by ruthless force if necessary (such as the notorious punitive expeditions in Kenya which slaughtered many uncooperative villages in the imposition of the “Pax Britannica”). There were many episodes of resistance (such as Samory Toure in the western Sudan and the British wars with Ashante) as well as rebellions which punctuated colonial rule (such as the Maji Maji in Tanganyika and the Ibo women’s protests in Nigeria).

The impact of colonialism in Africa had many parallels to other regions such as Southeast Asia. Politically it created artificial countries as European colonizers drew up boundaries that ignored traditional ethnic relationships, dividing some ethnic groups and joining some incompatible or historically antagonistic societies together; this created a basis for later political instability. Christian missionaries accompanied European bureaucrats and businessmen, setting up schools and clinics but also denigrating African culture and promoting Westernization; Christian converts often became divorced from their traditional cultures and communities but were never accorded equality in the racist colonial order. In some colonies (such as Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and South Africa) many European settlers arrived, obtaining the most fertile land for themselves and establishing strong discriminatory laws and customs to restrict African civil and economic rights.

“Colonial economic policies tended to undermine African society in various ways.”

Colonial economic policies tended to undermine African society in various ways. In the quest for revenues colonial governments imposed taxation policies that promoted a shift from subsistence food growing to cash crop farming and mineral exploitation; hence many Africans became involved in growing crops like cotton, cocoa, rubber, and palm oil or mining copper, gold, oil, chrome, cobalt, and diamonds for the world market; their livelihoods now became subject to the chronic fluctuations in the world price for their commodities, determined largely by the whims of Western consumers and corporations. If economic incentives did not work authorities and planters sometimes resorted to forced labor, most notoriously in the Belgian Congo where perhaps half of the population died from overwork or brutality over a twenty-year period. Much land was turned over to Western-owned plantations and Western companies owned most of the mines. Many African men were recruited or forced to migrate to other districts or colonies for mining or industrial labor, establishing a permanent pattern of short- or long-term labor migration. Many of the major cash crops that dominated African lives were not indigenous; for example, peanuts and rubber were brought from South America. Colonial governments imported Asians to build railroads, work on sugar plantations, or become middle-level retail traders; soon Indians had become the commercial middle class of East Africa and the Lebanese of West Africa, increasing the pluralistic nature of the society.

Gradually Africans came to be integrated into the world economy as producers of raw materials and consumers of Western food and consumer goods. Many colonies became economic “monocultures,” dependent on the export of one or two major commodities (copper from Zambia, cocoa from Ghana, peanuts from Senegal, cotton from Sudan, etc.). Conservative historians argue that colonialism increased the productive capacity of the land and constructed an economic infrastructure. This is true but the question must be asked as to the purpose and ultimate beneficiaries of these policies that globalized the African economies. Whether colonialism stimulated modern development or retarded and distorted is one of the central questions of modern African history as it is of South and Southeast Asian history. The end of colonialism (for most, in the 1960s) has not in most cases dramatically transformed the economic structure and prospects of the African nations or the essential structure of the world economy in which they are enmeshed. The rise of nationalism and the consequent wave of decolonization and liberation constitute another phase in the globalization of African history and politics that deserves a more extensive treatment than can be mounted here.

Conclusions

African history then must be seen not only as an authentic and dynamic saga of indigenous African development but also as integrated into larger global processes. Historian Ronald Segal has argued that:

Africa has its own rich sweep of events, outside those which European conquest and settlement have recorded. The era of European dominance is short even within the margin of human history. Long before, in the evolution of man himself, Africa has helped shape history. And while the centers of European culture flourished, decayed, and sprouted in their turn, empires in Africa rose, ruled, resisted, and succumbed. Scholars studied and disputed in Timbuktu and Paris, and what the Italians accomplished with pigment, the artists of Benin achieved with bronze. The cultures were different, but only on the horizontal. The vertical, the separation into superior and inferior, was a product of conquest.

Africa was an integral part of world history and needs to be studied as such.
1. From the album Shadow Man (EMI CL 90411, 1988).


10. For example, Basil Davidson has been promoting a much more sympathetic reading of African history for four decades. His classic work, The Lost Cities of Africa (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), still stands up well and provides a highly readable introduction to an Afrocentric history linked to the wider world.


18. For classroom purposes, a useful film that brilliantly and effectively covers much of the ground discussed in this selection is Episode 1: “Different But Equal,” in Basil Davidson’s 8-part series Africa.

19. The most important presentation of the seminal role of a chiefly black Egypt has been presented by Martin Bernal in his 2-volume Black Athena (New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 1987 and 1991). See also Cheikh Anta Diop, Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology (Brooklyn: Lawrence Hill, 1991). For recent assessments of their arguments see the review essays in American Historical Review, 97/2 (April, 1992), 440-464.

20. Good summaries of these points can be found in Basil Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outlines (New York: Collier, 1974), pp. 21-18; Curtin, et al., African History, pp. 44-51.


22. In the Davidson film series Africa, the first half of Episode 3: “Caravans of Gold” is quite good on the Sudanic states and the caravan trade.

23. An excellent introduction to Darul Islam in the 14th century through the travels of Ibn Battuta can be found in Ross Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta (Berkeley: University of California, 1986). For a broader but brief overview of Islamic


27. The second half of Davidson’s “Caravans of Gold” provides an exciting picture of the East African trading cities and Zimbabwe.


31. The first part of Episode 5: “The Bible and the Gun” in Davidson’s *Africa* has a brief analysis of the slave trade.


36. The debate began over 30 years ago, with Davidson (in *African Slave Trade*) arguing for the negative consequences and J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver suggesting that it may have at least brought some limited benefits to certain parts of West Africa. See their *A Short History of Africa* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966). Since then many historians have joined the fray on one or another side. For recent accounts see, e.g., Manning, *Slavery and African Life*; Curtin, *African History*, pp. 227-248.


43. Episode 6: “The Magnificent African Cake” in Davidson’s *Africa* series provides a very judicious overview of colonialism in Africa. The “Exploitation” episode in the Ali Mazrui series, *The Africans*, offers a great deal of stimulating if controversial material that should prompt animated class discussion.

44. One of the most cogent presentations of this argument is Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle L’Ouverture, 1972). For a broader study which includes an excellent discussion of Africa see L.S. Stavrianos, *Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age* (New York: William Morrow, 1981). For a brief but valuable study of imperialism
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION AS
A WORLDCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE:
DEFINING INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION *

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The idea of international education is no longer a new idea. A full generation has grown up within the global village. The generation-old call for international education has now become so common to so many that it has, too often, become a cliche. It may be common knowledge that international education should happen, but the actualization of international education is far from common in American schools and colleges. International education has become one of those virtues that almost everyone praises but few practice and even fewer truly understand.

To too many of its “supporters,” international education is simply the study of foreign cultures and nations and no more than this. In other words, for some Americans international education is that part of the social studies which remains after you have


subtracted American history and government. To many American foreign language teachers, international education is only the study of foreign languages and related anecdotal information about the cultures where the languages are spoken. As a consequence, many American schools and colleges merely add a European history course or a several-credit requirement in foreign languages to their graduation requirements and then mistakenly claim to have joined the international education club.

The mere acquisition of information about particular foreign places and tongues is not international education. Courses in French history and language are not evidence, by themselves, that the student who has taken these courses has gained, or has even been exposed to, international education. This is because international or global education is study which enables the student to acquire a global perspective and a sense of worldmindedness. Intensive study of French history and/or language (or of German history and/or language, or of the history and/or language of any single cultural area or nation) cannot provide the student with a global perspective or with a sense of worldmindedness. The successful student may become an excellent Francophone, become enraptured with French culture, yet remain quite ignorant of the vast majority of the world’s peoples and their interactions. There are plenty of reasons for the intensive study of one or two cultures, but such narrow specialization is not international education.

Courses which do bring international education into the curriculum are courses which satisfy the two parts of international education: 1) education for a global perspective; 2) education for worldmindedness. Education for a global perspective examines the interdependence of all the nations, cultures, and peoples of the world. Here students learn about historical and contemporary patterns of cultural diffusion, become aware of global problems (such as global warming, acid rain or ocean pollution), develop a broad perspective of the economic and technological interdependence of past and present nations and cultures, and acquire numerous other perspectives which build a truly global view, a worldcentric view. A worldcentric education, generally, requires courses that aim globally. A college student could complete a thirty-credit major in the French language and never once come into contact with a worldcentric idea, never develop a global perspective. In order to receive some international education, our French major must include in his or her education some worldcentric courses besides the major’s thirty Francocentric credits.

As for that second part of international education, education for worldmindedness, it is the affective part of international education. The cognitive knowledge acquired in the development of a global perspective is incomplete without the feelings part of international
education, i.e. instruction for worldmindedness. In developing a global perspective, a student will come to understand, for example, that the global warming threat is truly a global threat and will be solved only by a global effort. The United States alone will not be able to solve this world problem, nor Japan alone, nor any single nation working alone. In developing a sense of worldmindedness, the student goes beyond understanding the global nature of this problem to being concerned for the welfare of others and for the environment all over the globe. With a sense of worldmindedness, the student cares, cares that others besides the people in his or her own nation will suffer the negative effects of the global warming-caused ecological nightmare. Or with overpopulation, a student in Sweden, which does not have an overpopulation problem, would care about the welfare of the people in Bangladesh who do have an overpopulation problem. Several courses in French or in German or in some other language will not build in an American student a concern for people suffering from overpopulation in India or China. Learning about the Japanese language and culture may help an American student develop empathy for one small part of the world population, the Japanese, but will do little toward teaching the student to care about all peoples of the world, to be a world citizen.

Again, it must be pointed out that there are numerous reasons for students to emphasize, to study in depth, particular cultures and languages. The American college student earning a major in Chinese studies will need to complete thirty or more credit hours in Chinese history, literature, philosophy and language. But this same student needs some course requirements, as part of his or her general education, aimed specifically at international education, i.e. learning to think worldcentrically as well as Sinocentrically.

Nor should international education be considered in opposition to or in place of the student’s study of his or her own culture and nation. In the United States, some conservative opponents of international education have created a false dichotomy where one is either totally patriotic to the United States or totally internationally minded. In reality, one can love one’s own culture and nation — be a good patriotic American — and also be a good world citizen. Learning to care that children are starving in Africa does not mean that one will have less concern for one’s own nation. Cultural literacy of one’s own culture is extremely important, but equally so is world cultural literacy. Thus, American students should study both American history and world history. Japanese students should study both Japanese history and world history. The student who has studied the literature of the student’s own culture but not a survey of the world’s literature is as poorly educated as the student who has a grasp of literatures around the world but is illiterate about his or her own culture’s literature. Every curriculum has room for the study of both the local and the global. Every curriculum needs both; the local and the global are synergic and support one another.

The human species and its greatest creation, civilization, desperately need the true international education discussed here. Numerous global problems threaten our species. Requiring American students to take a few foreign language courses or a few European history courses, courses lacking a truly global perspective, will not prepare students to think globally about international trade, international relations, global overpopulation, destruction of the earth’s ozone layer and so forth. The solving of these global problems will require global cooperation. People cannot cooperate with one another unless they understand one another, and this requires global/international education. Thus, all students need to study a world history which is truly a world history and not merely a Western civilization course falsely labeled world history. All students need courses in world geography and/or world cultures and/or international relations, courses which specifically develop the global perspective.

H.G. Wells once said that “Civilization is a race between education and destruction.” And, this is a race between teams, tag teams, with various members. On destruction’s team the members are threats: threat of a global ecological disaster, threat of nuclear war, and other assorted threat members. On education’s team, international education is a key player. It is a member whose potential will go mostly undeveloped unless we properly understand what international education really is. Social scientist Kenneth Boulding once said that, “If the human race is to survive it will have to change its way of thinking more in the next twenty-five years than it has in the last twenty-five thousand years.” International education’s worldcentric perspective and sense of world citizenship will be two of the more important new ways of thinking needed by our international species.

The world is a patchwork quilt of hundreds of different nations and cultures, each represented by a distinctly different patch. To study only one or two nations or cultures is to see only one or two patches, to see only a very small part of the world quilt. The examination of even several or a score of patches does not lead to an accurate picture or understanding of what this multi-patched quilt looks like in the whole. Some students and scholars will be attracted to particular patches and look closely only at these, but there is a time when these favored patches need to be seen as the small parts of the complete and large quilt they are. One needs, at times, to step back and look the whole quilt over. Stepping back for the larger view means stepping into world geography and world history survey courses.
COLLEGE BOARD TESTING IN WORLD HISTORY

by Lawrence Beaber, Educational Testing Service, and Ross E. Dunn, San Diego State University

The guidelines for the World History test in the College Board's Achievement Testing program have recently been modified to reflect new emphasis on global and cross-cultural history in the classroom. These modifications are well summed up in the test's new name: "World History" replaces "European History and World Cultures." Indeed, the old title may seem quite appalling to the world-historical sensibilities of the 1990s. Its implied message that Europe has a history but other regions of the world have only "cultures" reflects scholarly attitudes prevailing in the early 1960s.

The College Board Achievement Testing program, which will become part of the enlarged SAT in 1994, consists of hour-long multiple-choice exams in twenty-one different subject areas. Scores are reported on a scale of 200-800. A number of colleges and universities have traditionally required test scores from three achievement tests, along with SAT scores, as part of admissions documentation. In 1992-1993, approximately 3500 students took the soon-to-be retired European History and World Cultures Test at two national administrations, one in December and the other in June.

The origins of this test go back to 1961 when the Board asked Educational Testing Service (ETS) to work with representative committees of college and high school history teachers to develop specifications for two multiple-choice history achievement tests of one hour each: the American History and Social Studies Test and the European History and World Cultures Test. In the first European History and World Cultures Test, administered in 1963, approximately 75 percent of the questions were on European topics, 20 percent on South and East Asia, and 5 percent on Africa and the Middle East. The chronology of the exam was European centered and the approach primarily political. The intellectual climate that informed the test is revealed in the following excerpt from the minutes of the meeting where the specifications were set:

Major emphasis will be placed on the period from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries with due attention to institutions and values which have their roots in earlier times. History will be the basic discipline, with geography (environmental influence) and government also stressed. Approximately 75 percent of the questions will be concerned with the institutional, and 25 percent with the intellectual and creative. The inclusion of and the weight given to areas will be determined largely on the basis of the state of historical studies in these areas. Little history of Africa having as yet been written, the continent should, for the present, be considered from the point of view of its contacts with Europe. Similarly, studies of the Middle East have not yet reached the stage of studies of East Asia and South Asia. Latin America, except for relations with Europe in the colonial period, should be considered the province of the committee for "The American History and Social Studies Test."

The content specifications for the European History and World Cultures Test remained fundamentally unchanged for the next two decades. For several years in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the testing population for all the achievement tests declined so precipitously that the European History and World Cultures Test was only offered once a year, and no new forms were developed. In the early 1980s, the period when the World History Association was being formed, the College Board called together a new committee of college and high school teachers to review and revise the specifications. This committee recommended that the African, Asian, and Latin American content of the test be increased relative to the European content, and it revised the approach to include newer scholarship in social and economic history. The chronology was also readjusted to provide better coverage of the earlier periods.

Then in 1990, the development committee, drawing on the results of a series of high school curriculum surveys of course content in world history, world cultures, and European history, recommended to the College Board that the test specifications be further revised to include even more non-European content. The committee also recommended that beginning in 1994 the test be renamed "The World History Achievement Test," synchronizing this change with the introduction of the new SAT program. The College Board accepted both recommendations. The current examination is made up of ninety-five multiple-choice questions and lasts one hour. A committee of five examiners, including three college and two secondary world history teachers, prepares the test forms. The group meets with ETS test specialists once or twice a year in Princeton, New Jersey, to discuss and approve draft tests and to review test specifications. Throughout the year committee members write new questions for pretesting and review each other's work by mail. World history teachers and professors who are not committee members are also enlisted to submit test questions. To provide essential statistical information, ETS asks college instructors to administer pretests in their lower division world history courses. (Administering these pretests to high school students is not practical for a number of reasons. Therefore, college instructors who volunteer to administer the
pretests are much appreciated.) All questions on both the pretests and the officially administered final forms of the tests are subjected to statistical analyses to determine their validity, clarity, and freedom from content or language that might disadvantage particular test takers because of their gender or ethnicity.

The latest guidelines break test content down as follows:

- Europe 48-52%
- Middle East 10-12%
- Africa 8-10%
- South Asia 5-7%
- East Asia 9-11%
- Latin America 5-7%
- Global 5-7%

These specifications have reduced the content assigned to European history to 48-52 percent of the test, a change from about 75 percent in 1963, and about 60 percent in 1984. Content apportioned to non-European world areas and to “global” questions has been increased accordingly.

These changes, made to reflect changes in the school curriculum in the direction of world-scale history, have raised a number of interesting issues. The test development committee has repeatedly wrestled with two important questions: Should the test’s content be based on what is currently taught in the majority of schools? Or should it serve to some degree as a priming pump for innovation in world history instruction? Our view is that the test should reflect the needs and interests of the forward ranks of world history teachers, but that it should not make a sudden, radical break with the older test forms because the transition in this country from the traditional Western Civilization course (sometimes called world history) to global-scale history continues to be gradual. Therefore, the number of questions assigned to European history remains relatively large to ensure that the test does not do a disservice to the very large number of college-bound students whose world history education still emphasizes Europe.

As the test is currently designed, overall student performance is satisfactory; that is, a significant percentage of students achieve high scores, showing the test is not too difficult for the population. Given the present state of world history instruction nationally, the Eurocentric bias in the exam has not been completely eliminated since performance would probably drop to an unacceptable level. The College Board, however, will continue to survey high schools to assure that the test continues to evolve in conformity with classroom practice.

To guide writers in constructing appropriate questions, the test specifications include two basic rules: 1) Questions should test “a concept or an idea that is important for the examinee to know or to understand”; 2) Questions should reflect the pedagogical content to which students are most likely to be exposed. The test development committee routinely refers to the contents of the world history textbooks most widely used in high schools to measure the appropriateness of draft questions.

The current subject outline calls for reduced specificity of topics for questions in European history and expanded treatment of subject matter pertaining to other world areas. The outline also encourages writers to devise questions that have comparative, cross-cultural, or global elements, as well as questions focusing on particular civilizations or regions. To illustrate, the previous subject outline divided world history into nine primary geographical regions (Ancient Greece and Rome, Medieval Europe, Early Modern Europe, Modern Europe, Middle East, Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and Latin America). A tenth category was entitled “Global.” In this framework the categories under the European headings were finely detailed. For example, under the sub-heading “Philosophical and Scientific Revolution,” the testable topics included:

- “Biology/Medicine: Harvey, Vesalius”
- “Rationalism: Descartes, Spinoza”
- “Empiricism: Bacon, Locke”

Some teachers might argue persuasively that no legitimate world history course could exclude a class period or two on the thought of Spinoza! But it is interesting to contrast this level of specificity in European history with the five main categories under the regional heading “Africa.” These were “Prehistory, Early African Empires, Effects of European Discovery and Exploration, Nationalism and Independence, and Modernization and Cultural Change.” Sub-categories for these African topics were hardly developed at all.

The current specifications divide subject matter, not into world regions, but into six world-historical periods: Early Physical and Social Developments among Hominids (i.e. Prehistory), Ancient History to 500 B.C.E., 500 B.C.E. to 500 C.E., 500 C.E. to 1500 C.E., 1500 C.E. to 1900 C.E., and Twentieth Century. Under each of these primary period categories sub-categories list subjects related to all the major world regions, thereby achieving a much greater balance in the density of recommended subjects. For example, “Philosophy and Political Thought” is still a category under “Modern Europe,” but Spinoza and other luminaries are no longer specifically named. On the other hand, the blanket category “Early African Empires” is replaced by several categories under “500 C.E. to 1500 C.E.” that include, among others, “Empires of the Western Sudan,” “Bantu Migrations,” and “Forest Kingdoms of Ife and Benin.” The current outline also includes under each period heading a category listing several “Cross-regional Developments” or “Global Trends.” It is worth noting that this drastic revision of the outline by no means aims for encyclopedia coverage of “everything” in world history. The current
specifications document is only slightly longer than the old one.

The revised specifications should result in test forms that reflect the realities of history education in the schools while encouraging greater attention to non-Western cultural traditions, important developments within regions or civilizations, comparative investigation, and large-scale patterns of change involving peoples of differing cultures and languages in common experience. In its new configuration the College Board World History Test will challenge students to demonstrate broader understanding of major developments in human history.

The population taking the old test has remained small compared to the number of students taking the achievement exams in English composition and mathematics. However, interest in the new World History Test is likely to grow for four principal reasons. First, the number of states requiring high school students to study world history will almost certainly continue to grow. California is a good example of that trend. Second, the educational community will become more aware of the purpose and value of the achievement tests once the new SAT testing program is introduced in 1994. The College Board confidently expects the test-taking population for all the achievement tests to rise significantly. Third, the Board’s new Pacesetter program, which is to include an academically challenging and rigorous one-year world history course for tenth graders, will be a factor in encouraging more students to take the World History Test. Fourth, the federal government’s development of national educational standards is likely, given the thrust of projects already underway, to include a statement supportive of greater attention to world history in the schools.

Change in the College Board’s testing of world history is a positive sign of the strength of the world history movement. We doubt that such change would be occurring were it not for the growing visibility and influence of the World History Association. Many members of the association have worked with the College Board and ETS to encourage curricular and assessment reforms. These reforms will enrich the world history education that all young Americans deserve to receive.

END NOTES

1. Minutes from the College Board European History and World Cultures Committee Meeting, Princeton, October 1961.


THE BURDEN OF POWER IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD*
William Woodruff
University of Florida

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am honored to be here today to speak about “The Burden of Power in a Fragmented World.” I bring to the task the maturity of years spent not only in studying and writing history, but in living it. As a small boy in a northern British schoolhouse my eye often rested on a tattered wall map of the world. Much of the map, I remember, was painted red. “Our empire,” said our teacher, proudly. Even as a child I used to wonder how it came about that we British could own so much of the world, while some of us had no shoes. Well, the map has gone, so too (except for the Rock of Gibraltar and Hong Kong) has Britain’s far-flung, once majestic empire. Lost in time...in one man’s lifetime.... Such is history.

* * *

For us Americans, history tells us that we have reached a dividing line between the consolidated, Western-centric world which began with Columbus, and a new world order in which Western man will no longer play the overwhelmingly dominant role that he has played in the past. (By Western man I mean Europeans at home, and those Europeans who have migrated in great numbers across the globe. To me Russians in East Asia are just as much part of the impact of Western man as we are ourselves.)

“In 1914 almost the whole world was under Western tutelage.”

The end of the Cold War has not only concluded an ideological duel between two Western ideas, championed by two great powers — the Soviet Union and the United States (both of whom are European in origin) — it has terminated a remarkable period of history in which Western power was unquestionably supreme. During the past 500 years, propelled by colossal energy and nerve, by a divine as well as a worldly mission, and with an extraordinary sense of superiority, Western man triumphed throughout the world. In 1914 almost the whole world was under Western tutelage; only Japan and Ethiopia were outside Western political control. In Europe’s colonization of the world, existing ethnic, tribal, national, racial, and religious traditions were largely disregarded, if not treated with contempt. It is this period of history which some people are presently trying to unlive.

As I see it, we are now poised between the geopolitics of the Western Age and the geopolitics of

a new world order in which the threat of ethnic, religious, racial, and national wars has reemerged. The threat is worldwide. Yesterday we worried whether the Soviet Union, in an effort to reach the Persian Gulf, would extend its rule to parts of Iran. Today we worry whether Islamic Iran might extend its influence into former Soviet territory.

We are in the process of unliving an extraordinary, unique chapter of world history — one with which we Americans, as the most Western of Westerners, have become identified. We find ourselves carrying the burden of power which we have inherited from the European Age. We are trying to alleviate some of the worst aspects of Western colonization; not least the West’s extraordinary sense of superiority. Within our own country, we have recognized the rights of minorities; internationally, we remain Western-oriented. We think of the Western world as the norm, of values as universal values. For the time being, the real power of many international organizations still rests in Western hands. (Four out of five of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are Western.) Although there are many aspects of Western civilization that have been embraced by the world, we find it hard to understand the eagerness of some Asians and Africans to unlive or resist Westernization and modernization. If the world is becoming less stable than it was during the period of Pax Europa and the Cold War, it is because the unparalleled and unprecedented consolidation of the world by Western man provided a degree of political and economic centralization that had never been seen before and might not be seen again. It is wishful thinking on our part to assume that this will now be followed by the worldwide triumph of Pax Americana.

* * *

We Americans are part and parcel of Western expansion. Our occupation of North America was just as much the outcome of Western European expansion as Russian occupation of Siberia was the outcome of Eastern European expansion. If there is any difference between American and Russian expansion, it was the relative ease and the speed by which our own territory and aggrandizement were obtained. There are few other examples in history of any group of people coming into possession of such a vast, rich area so swiftly and at so little human and material cost. It required only minimal defense to protect what we had won. Peaceful neighbors, distance and the British fleet were our guard. The threat from the Pacific had still to appear. The only military forces we had abroad at the end of the nineteenth century were in the Philippines and the Caribbean. There was no ambiguity in those days about foreign policy: it was supremacy in the Western hemisphere. We left it to the other Western powers to police the rest of the world. The good fortune we enjoyed in our colonizing age helps to account for our optimism, our sense of uniqueness, and of mission to the world. All Christian nations have had a sense of mission; Americans were both messianic and idealistic. If we Americans have been historically naive, we had good reasons for being so. The century before 1914 was the period of primary and secondary production. Never has the law of increasing returns operated as well as it did then, not only for us, but also for the whole of the Western world. Little wonder if Western Europe and North America prospered; little wonder if famine was banished from the West; little wonder that this was an age of utopias.

* * *

Until the late 1930s America’s business was to look after America. There was a moment with the collapse of the European civilization after the First World War when it looked as if we might change our policy from looking after America to looking after the world; especially the Pacific world where in 1919 Japan had become a Great Power. But the Senate repudiated Woodrow Wilson’s proposals at Versailles, and our policy of isolationism (except on the high seas) was continued. The leading Western powers, particularly Britain, France, and the Netherlands, met the burden of world defense. In 1919 our troops were brought home from France in record time; in the postwar boom the war was soon forgotten, and our small military and financial losses were quickly absorbed. Relative to our resources, the burden of defense for the First World War, and for most of the inter-war years, was inconsequential. After Japan agreed at the London Conference in 1930 to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, we felt sufficiently reassured not to increase our bases at Pearl Harbor — a decision we would later regret. While the war drums grew louder in Europe and Asia, defense-wise America slept.

"By the 1950s, the Cold War had bifurcated the world."

Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 changed our attitude to the world. With the Soviet Union we willingly led the Allied powers to victory, first in Europe and then in the Pacific. Unscathed by war at home, we poured out blood and treasure in the Allied cause. With the end of the war (with European imperialism in a process of retreat and abdication) and the Soviets and Americans drawn into the vacuum of power created by Europe’s collapse, the United States assumed the world responsibilities it had avoided almost thirty years earlier. Convinced that Roosevelt’s trust in Stalin had been betrayed, Truman introduced his Containment Policy. By the
1950s, the Cold War had bifurcated the world.* Although the two superpowers represented only about ten percent of world population, they sometimes acted as if the rest of the world did not exist.

The threatened political fragmentation stemming from Europe’s collapse and the unraveling of its empires was temporarily delayed by the extension of American and Soviet rules across the world. By the 1950s United States defense policy entailed policing all the continents. There followed the wars in Korea and Vietnam — wars which stemmed directly or indirectly from the breakdown of European rule in Asia. Had Europe remained strong, had its outward thrust not faltered, had it not resulted in the bifurcation of first Europe and then the rest of the world, Americans would never have fought in Korea and certainly not in Vietnam. Nor would there have been a Cold War.

Even with the constraining influence of the Cold War, which resulted in the greatest and most perilous arms race human ingenuity and folly have ever devised, most of the world continued its local and regional struggles for independence and influence. As European power in the world declined, a patchwork quilt of separate nations began to appear across the globe. At the Bandung Conference of African and Asian nations in 1954 (in which the Russians were refused participation on the grounds that they were Europeans) a Third World of non-aligned nations was established. Its aim was to break the economic and political ties which hitherto had bound it to the West, as well as to distance itself from American-Soviet rivalry. This world, which was most of the world, was intensely anti-Western. It held an enduring memory of the worst aspects of Western colonialism — an opprobrium which we have inherited.

* * *

While the gradual substitution of American and Soviet power for European power in the post World War II period threw an immense defense burden on our shoulders, it was not beyond our ability to bear it. If we showed a remarkably generous and enlightened face to the world from the 1940s to the 1960s, it was partly because we could afford it. We occupied the richest area of the world; we were the most productive people on earth. (In 1948 we accounted for half of the world’s gross national product.) Unlike all the other major belligerents of World War II, we had emerged from the war richer than we had entered it. In the 1950s President Truman never doubted that we possessed sufficient wealth to contain communism; “to run the world the way the world ought to be run.” President Kennedy vowed that America would “pay any price, bear any burden” in the interests of liberty.

“President Kennedy vowed that America would ‘pay any price, bear any burden’ in the interests of liberty.”

We not only felt ourselves able to meet any threat, pay any price, we also intended, under Pax Americana, to save the world from poverty and hunger. The first law of economics — scarcity — was banished; affluence became the order of the day. With Western-induced “tricks of growth” we believed that the whole world was headed for linear progress along Western lines. Not until the Vietnam War did President Johnson discover that the burden of defense had exceeded what he thought was politically acceptable to the American taxpayer. As President Reagan would do later, he masked his fiscal problems by resorting to large deficit spending. Here lie the origins of the crushing of foreign debt which our nation bears today.

* * *

The collapse of Soviet power in 1991 has suddenly presented us with world problems which we had not expected to meet. Our anti-communist defense stance has become obsolete. The Soviet system (flawed in human and economic terms) is disintegrating. Russian power would have disintegrated earlier had not the Cold War forced it to respond to the American challenge. Today, antagonism between the United States and the former USSR has given way to a remarkable degree of cooperation; euphoria reigns.

The positive side of all this is that we have been spared annihilation. The negative side is that the disintegration of Soviet power and the Soviet empire will result in further instability. A collapse of Russia’s politically consolidating role in the world must bring in its train a growing threat of further political fragmentation and dispute. (A major Islamic threat to Russian rule which was crushed in central Asia in 1916 is recurring today.) A new Russian storm (not least the threat of an unmanageable flood of refugees in search of food and political freedom) might well become a reality. I have searched in vain for an example of disintegrating empire which did not leave great bloodshed in its wake.

Regardless of the outcome of Soviet disintegration, the world is breaking out of both Soviet and American molds. We are entering a new era in which the West will no longer dominate the world — not even from Washington or Moscow. It is non-Westerners who will increasingly decide whether or not the world will live in peace. For the time being, the collapse of Soviet power has made the world more United States-centric, more unipolar than it was. But that, I think, is purely temporary. The geopolitical and the geoeconomic equations of the bipolar world have in fact been changing since the

*One wonders if the real world knew that it had been bifurcated... any more than the world of 1949 knew of the Treaty of Tordesillas under which the Pope divided the world between Portugal and Spain.
1960s. Regional centers of power have appeared in Europe, the Americas, and Asia. The temporary eclipse of Asia by the West during the past half millennium is over. In some respects Asians are beginning to eclipse us. We can no longer take it for granted that the “American Way” is a universal gospel. Our task is to adjust to a world in which the non-Western peoples (who outnumber the West four to one) are going to influence world affairs more than they did in the Western Age; not only in terms of power but in terms of values. Reality today is multi-racial influence and multi-power maneuvering. Our Greco-Roman mental and intellectual traditions are under challenge. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi undid British power in India by expressing the spiritual traditions (“soul force”) of the Hindu. Our tradition of concrete truth, for instance, of either black or white, is unacceptable to cultures accustomed to a much greater degree of ambiguity. (For example, in contrast to the Christian belief of good versus evil, the Indian god Siva expresses a unity of opposites; he is the god of birth and death, life and destruction.)

“Reason points one way, emotion points another.”

While some parts of the non-Western world will continue to hold Western beliefs, Western ideas, economics, and technology, others will tread a very different path. Some will stress the primacy of individual rights; others will place a greater stress on consensus, balancing individual interest with a sense of obligation and public duty. Whatever the basis of future rivalry and accord between humankind, ultimately, we shall have to accept the fact that no nation, no continent, no race, no civilization, no religion has a monopoly of truth; that all societies, all human institutions, have their strengths and weaknesses.

* * *

One thing is certain, we have reached a most paradoxical stage of world history. While science, technology, economics, ecology, health care, and a host of other forces are drawing the world together (these forces demand a global order), intangible forces such as religion, race, and nationalism are beginning to break the world apart. Reason points one way, emotion points another. When in politics emotion clashes with reason, emotion usually emerges triumphant. Politics based on emotion rather than reason dominate our political life. History suggests that the world is not fully capable of rational behavior, and that the West errs in assuming that its own exceptional “Age of Reason” is normal and universal. On balance, an exaggerated belief in reason (e.g. in the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Chinese Revolution of 1949) has proved as deadly to intellectuals as exaggerated emotion.

Compared with the fractious regional worlds that are emerging, we might come to look back on the Cold War as one of the more stable periods in modern history. It at least provided a balance, one superpower offsetting the other; one stressing the collective, the other individualism. There was a common basis of understanding; a degree of reason prevailed; regional wars were not allowed to get out of hand.

Time and again during the Cold War, the balance of terror saved us from destruction. Unless we can redesign the United Nations so that it reflects the changing power structure of the post-Western Age, and is able to uphold international law, the world is in danger of becoming anarchistic. In the absence of bipolar tension the center of gravity of power has shifted from the world to the region. The one-time global threat is now replaced by regional threats. New life has been given to the age-old national and religious disputes within the regions themselves.

* * *

National aspirations fire the struggle between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In 1990 Saddam Hussein appealed to the ideal, and perhaps illusion, of Arab nationalism. National aspirations lie at the heart of the discord in Northern Ireland, in Belgium, in Spain, in the Baltic States, in Canada, in former Soviet-controlled Central Asia, in south-west and south-east Asia, in Eastern Europe, and throughout the countries of the Middle East. The present civil war in the former Yugoslavia is an example of what is to come.

The resurgence of Islamic power throughout the 1980s also threatens conflict. With Moscow’s authority disintegrating, and the central Asian Islamic republics declaring their independence, there is a growing fear of civil war. Pakistan promotes the idea of an Islamic economic and military zone (similar to the European Community) stretching from Morocco to Indonesia. In the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, as well as in the Sudan, resurgent militant religious fundamentalists, with American modernity as their chief enemy, seek political power. Iran has already been transformed. The fall of the Shah’s Iran is an example of the potential destructiveness of cultural elements when introduced into an alien cultural environment. Many other countries, including the conservative regimes of Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia (whose leaders are pro-American) are threatened by the ongoing Islamic revolution of the masses. Islam is an austere faith, naturally opposed to the extravagance of some Middle Eastern Arab leaders and Western modernization. In such a volatile region we need to keep an ear cocked not only to the palace, but also to the bazaar. While a military response by Islam on a worldwide scale is unlikely, Islamic fundamentalists could provide the United States with a lot of trouble within regions, especially within the Middle East. Learning to live with the uncomfortable facts of the
Islamic revival calls for greater tolerance and understanding on our part. The more we try to beat down Islam with a military response, the stronger Islam will become. Spiritual issues cannot be settled by the force of arms.

“Spiritual issues cannot be settled by the force of arms.”

Meanwhile, far from having reached the end of history, ethnic differences, national aspirations, and religious fundamentalism are causing the world to arm to the teeth. The sale of sophisticated weaponry is growing. China, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, North Korea, Argentina, and Brazil either have nuclear weapons or have the capacity to produce them. A growing number of nations in Asia, Africa, and the Americas either have or are working to produce stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Regardless of American protests, ballistic missiles — with ranges far exceeding the Iraqi scud missiles — are proliferating throughout the world. So are Exocets, Silkworms, and portable anti-craft systems like the Stinger, now produced not only by the United States, but by a number of countries including China, South Africa, and Egypt. Equally important changes are going on at sea. The new danger is not that the world will be set on fire as a result of great power rivalry, which for the time being is behind us, but rather as a result of some minor nuclear-armed power losing its head. Our high-tech conventional weapons can be no match for a madman in possession of a nuclear bomb.

The extraordinary diffusion of advanced weaponry going on in the world — the shift of power from a bipolar to a multipolar world — demands from us Americans a different world outlook from that which we have held for the past forty years. As the leading power, we cannot abruptly abandon the responsibilities which we accepted during the Cold War (as the Russians are now doing). Nor is there any other great power which can replace us. None has the same global military reach. Yet to be the policeman of the whole world is to ensure that the non-Western world will be against us. To try to impose dogmatically the universality of our Western beliefs, to go on insisting upon the status quo, would be contrary to the historical currents of the last half century. If you read the map of history from the angle of a non-Westerner, things look very different. During the Cold War, with bases throughout the world, we were the solution to the problem of containing communism; now we are looked upon by some as part of the problem — as obstructing self-determination. Both from a political and a financial point of view, the time has come when, without increasing world instability, and with the focus upon our vital interests, we somehow have to withdraw selectively from those regions of the world where we are no longer wanted. (The Philippines is only one of several examples.)

* * *

There is a more compelling reason why we have to reduce our burden of world defense. We can only continue it by running the risk of becoming bankrupt. A transformation has taken place in our overall economic situation these past twenty years. We have gone from dominating the world economy to being increasingly concerned about the effect of the world economy upon us. There has not only been the economic challenge presented by the resurgence of Germany and Japan (whose economic competition we helped create); our own mismanagement and fiscal profligacy have brought us to the edge of insolvency. The indebtedness of the United States government especially to foreign lenders has reached a level where it is affecting our political and economic independence; it is probably the greatest threat facing this country today. The crippling economic cost of running such a deficit is not as worrying as the loss of world leadership that such a deficit must eventually entail. Debtors never have led the world; certainly not a world where geoconomics is taking precedence over geopolitics. The United States is still by far the dominant power, but its capacity to govern the world economy has been considerably eroded. One does not need an occult reason why the United States had to pass the hat around to finance the Gulf War. We may cast ourselves as the world’s arbiter (as the top cop) but the truth is we longer have the overwhelming economic, financial, and industrial power to sustain such a role. The immediate challenge is to redistribute more evenly the defense burden of the world. The burden which we willingly carried in the late 1940s is not feasible today. As the world’s leading military power we cannot avoid the responsibility of leadership, but our power to lead, especially our financial power, is much more circumscribed than it was.

There are those who will reject this reasoning on the grounds that the United States is stronger than ever. With only five percent of the world’s population, it still accounts for twenty percent of the world’s goods and services; its share of world GNP today is almost as large as it was in 1970; its portion of gross world product has remained roughly

“At what point in our history were we satisfied with the status quo?”

what it was in the late 1960s. All of which, I think, misses the point. The United States did not rise to greatness by being satisfied with a position it held twenty years ago. At what point in our history were we satisfied with the status quo? The American dream, the American mystique is one which looks for ever-greater prosperity. Historically, we are not a “marking-time-people.” This is perhaps the first
generation of Americans that is not going to enjoy a higher standard of living than its parents. For the first time in our history we have met with the law of diminishing returns. We are suddenly discovering that progress is not linear; that much of life is a bell curve. Is it possible that we have been pursuing a mirage of plenty all these years?

None of these things imperil us as much as the human problems that face our society. Our domestic scene is plagued by growing poverty, a falling standard of living, a crisis in education, a growing army of unemployed and unemployables, drug addiction, and lawlessness. It makes no sense to talk about carrying the burden of world defense, of going to the help of others, if our home front is in disarray. The most valuable things we possess are our homeland and our people. For some time now we have focused on “high tech,” while forgetting human values. The limits of the possible have always been set more by human imagination than by material resources.

* * *

In deciding what to hang on to and what to let go, I suggest that our first priority should be the development and consolidation of our own hemisphere. More than anywhere else in the world, it is here that our destiny as a nation will ultimately be determined. Canada, with whom we share the longest peaceful frontier, has become our most important partner. Hitherto, our attention to Latin America, except for wartime alignments, or actions prompted by the threat of communism, or odd military excursions, has largely been one of benign neglect. Instead of fostering friendly and cooperative relations with those south of our permeable border, instead of treating them as partners in a common cause, we have largely ignored them while concentrating attention on Europe and the Middle East. Recently, disregarding the OAS Charter which we helped to create, our policy in Latin America has been one of unabashed unilateral, military intervention. We only have ourselves to blame if some of our Latin neighbors still regard us as an imperialist power ready to use them for our own ends.

“I know of no nation in the world that affects our vital interests as much as Mexico.”

Our relations with the countries south of the border are unlikely to improve until we recognize that the southern and northern halves of the American continent are inextricably intertwined and interdependent; that geographical and historical ties bind us inseparably together. We cannot go on neglecting the part of the world that has given us the fourth largest Spanish-speaking population. Latin American debt, illegal immigrants (who if population trends continue, could well become a torrent) and narcotics, threaten the very stability of our country. I know of no nation in the world that affects our vital interests as much as Mexico. The seemingly insurmountable social, economic, and political problems that wrack the country are our problems as well as theirs. They are not problems that military can solve. They call for diplomacy, understanding, and human skills. We Americans have felt too secure in the possession of our homeland; Latin America might well become our Achilles' Heel.

Our neglect of Latin America can partly be explained by the attention we have focused on Western Europe. Now that the Cold War is over, the basic military reason for our being in Europe no longer holds. We have to reorient ourselves to a different Europe and a different world. The Europeans themselves are concentrating on the consolidation of their own region — a lesson that we should take to heart. What our future military role in Europe will be depends on what happens in Eastern Europe; it also depends on the continued willingness of the American taxpayer to go on underwriting Europe’s defense. While the Europeans are hardly likely to refuse help that reduces their own defense budget, they cannot expect us to defend them in perpetuity. It is just as absurd for us to have expected French troops, who helped to defeat Britain at Yorktown in 1781, to be garrisoned on American soil in perpetuity. Obviously, the ties that bind us to Europe are too strong to be cut overnight. There is a role for us to play in a redesigned NATO, but our earlier dominant role in Europe’s defense belongs to another period in history.

If Gorbachev's idea is realized and Russia and its new Commonwealth find economic and military security within the European house, a new region of "Euroslavia" might well emerge, stretching from Britain to the Urals. Such a region, with a population of 750 million and a relatively high standard of living should surely be able to defend itself.

Our defense stature in East Asia is much more problematic than it is in Europe. The resurgence of Asia, after being eclipsed for half a millennium by European colonialism, is the outstanding fact of contemporary history. This is a region where I doubt that we shall ever be able to control events again. Although we have provided stability to the northwest Pacific rim for many years, the chief Asian nations in the area — China, Korea, and Japan — are unlikely to continue to accept our leadership. It is a region from which we could easily be excluded. Certainly, we can expect to meet with growing resistance. While we cannot withdraw our support from Korea and Japan overnight, it is inconceivable that we would be pressed by these nations to keep a military presence there much longer.

The major threat to American interests — despite North Korea's bomb rattling — must come from China or Russia. India will try to take advantage of the maneuverings of the other powers but is unlikely
to challenge American interests. China’s chief aim is to recover the Maritime Provinces north-east of the Amur River, which Russia took in the nineteenth century. As China still regards itself as the Middle Kingdom and the oldest civilization, we should be sparing in giving advice or preaching on the moralization of politics. Regardless of our protests, the Chinese are likely to go their own way and sell arms to whom they please. Whoever comes to power when the present old guard dies, the authoritarian tradition (that has been thousands of years in the making) is likely to remain in Beijing.

The unraveling of the Soviet empire will create a vacuum to which, in time, China might move. It would be ironic if the specter of Soviet communism, which has receded, were to be replaced by the specter of Chinese communism; doubly ironic if China were to contest Russia’s access to the Pacific. When China develops, it will change the present leading powers in East Asia. China cannot rise, Russia cannot decline without affecting American interests. Northeast Asia is a region where we might be drawn into Sino-Russian war, though it is not clear on whose side we would fight.

Japan, the country that undid Western colonialism in the East, is today the sheer anchor of United States foreign policy in East Asia. While sensitive to the continued presence of United States troops on its soil, it is not trying to push us out of the region in a hurry. Of all the northwest Pacific rim countries, it is the most friendly toward us, the most Westernized, and the most reliable. Hitherto a bystander in geopolitics, Japan has now reached a point where it has no choice (as the second most powerful economic nation in the world) but to make its influence felt. The Iraq War — dependent to an extraordinary degree on Japanese money and technology — has awakened Japan to the realities of power and world responsibility. It is perhaps the last war in which Japan will acquiesce to American decisions. Since 1945 the Japanese have been satisfied merely to respond to world affairs; henceforth they will help to shape them.

Harmonious relations with Japan are crucial to America’s interests. Japan and the United States are very strange cultural partners, but the pact between them is vital. Japan benefits in trade, investment, and defense; the United States in trade, capital, and world strategy. What endangers the alliance are two different views of reality. One is dominated by tradition, the other by the market. Whereas the United States adheres to the laissez-faire philosophy of free trade, Japan regards the market as no more than a guide: one of many factors to be considered. The present controversy over rice is a case in point. We cannot understand why the Japanese would want to pay such a high price for rice when they could obtain much cheaper supplies from California. They do so because rice is not just another commodity, it is their traditional staple. To say that Japanese business methods are unfair is to disregard the different cultural roots of their economic system. The worst error we can make is to assume that the Japanese economic system is like ours, or will become so in due course. Until these cultural differences are taken into account, the Americans and the Japanese will continue to talk past each other.

“The worst error we can make is to assume that the Japanese economic system is like ours, or will become so in due course.”

Of all the regions, the Middle East occupies our attention most. Possessing the two essential ingredients of war — motivation and fear — few other territories have taken so much of our time, energy, and wealth. Countless empires and nations have fought there, buried their dead, and (usually with military and political objectives unrealized) gone home. The last two great powers to evacuate the area — and whose former defense responsibilities we now carry — were Britain and France. As a result of British colonial history, we ourselves have been drawn to the center of the Arab/Israeli conflict and the area’s defense.

Although the United States (under President Wilson) had earlier supported Arab rather than Jewish claims to Palestine*, it was instrumental in the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Since 1948, in war and peace, we have unstintingly supported Israel’s cause. In public aid alone, the United States since 1948 has granted much more aid to Israel than it did under Marshall Aid to the whole of Western and Central Europe. Israel remains the largest recipient of United States aid.

Israel presents us Americans with a most difficult dilemma. While morals and politics make it impossible for us to abandon it, the financial task of supporting it is becoming increasingly difficult. Our support not only adds to Arab hostility toward us, it entails the ever-present danger of becoming involved in still another Arab/Israeli war. The British struggled with this problem long before we did; they finally despaired of finding a solution and handed the matter to the United Nations. Growing financial difficulties eventually forced Britain to evacuate the entire region.

Desperate as it is, the Palestinian/Israeli dispute must be seen in the context of the area’s resurgent religious fundamentalism and revolutionary nationalism. Explosive tensions exist not only between Arab and Jew but among Arabs themselves. The problem of boundaries (which are regarded as an illegitimate legacy of European colonialism) extends far beyond Iraq and Kuwait. There is a danger that a defeated Iraq may now fall prey to its hungry neighbors. If the Palestinians and the Israelis, thanks to the heroic efforts of Secretary of State Baker, settled their dispute

*The King-Crane Commission (1919).
tomorrow, the likelihood of war in the area would remain. We shall be fortunate indeed if we succeed in bringing a comprehensive peace to a region where everybody else failed.

* * *

Sometimes for better, sometimes for worse, we Americans have become the inheritors of an unprecedented European historical era which some of the non-Western world is now trying to unlive. While much of the science, technology, economics, and cultural imprint of Western man will remain, the resurgence of the much larger non-Western world is inevitable. The political hegemony of the world by the West (much of which has fallen to us) is diminishing. Even if the United States had the economic strength it possessed in the 1950s, it is fairly evident that a new world security order will have to reflect the whole world, not just Western interests. We are moving into a multipolar world in which the best we can hope for is a more coherent world order based upon world consensus rather than Western domination. What will follow, I think, is a balance of power between regions. Many of the world’s growing ethnic, national, and religious problems will have to be settled at the regional level. While the United States is not in an irretrievable decline, it is becoming increasingly apparent that we are carrying a defense burden for the rest of the world which we are no longer able to bear. It is unreal in political, military, and especially economic terms for any nation (not least for ourselves in our present straightened financial circumstances) to guarantee world security. We neither possess the financial means to be the sole policeman of the world, nor can the growing cultural problems that face the world be solved by the sword. Solutions can only be found by diplomacy, understanding, and political will. Rather than presuming to know what is good for the whole world, we shall have to be much more considerate of other people’s aims and values. As long as we are the leading military power, we cannot avoid worldwide responsibilities we will have to share. The Gulf War was probably the last war where other countries paid the piper while the United States called the tune. We cannot prevent a shift in emphasis from dominance to partnership. Whatever we do, we should keep before us the basic objective of our foreign policy: which is to maintain the security of the United States and to uphold its fundamental values. In this task we are not faced by a new crisis, but by a new opportunity.

Biographical Sketch

WILLIAM WOODRUFF

William Woodruff is the Graduate Research professor in Economic History at the University of Florida in Gainesville. He holds degrees in the humanities from Oxford, in science from London, in economic history from Nottingham, and in commerce (honorary) from Melbourne, Australia.

A Fulbright Scholar from Britain to Harvard in 1952, he subsequently taught at the University of Illinois. In 1956 he went to Melbourne, Australia, as head of the Department of Economic History and, later, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Commerce. During 1965-1966 he was a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.

Dr. Woodruff has lectured extensively in America, Asia, Europe, and Australia, and has been guest professor in residence at the Freie Universität, Berlin, Waseda University, Tokyo, and St. Antony’s College, Oxford. His research in world history and global development has received the support of the Houblon-Norman Committee of the Bank of England, the Fulbright Committee, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Japan Society for the Advancement of Science.


He is also the author of a widely published and translated autobiographical novel, Vessel of Sadness, dealing with his experiences with the British Infantry during World War II; an allegory, Paradise Galore; and an autobiography, Billy Boy.

Dr. Woodruff is a United States citizen and lives in Gainesville, Florida.

THE EAST-WEST CENTER
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The East-West Center is a public, nonprofit education and research institution that examines such Asia-Pacific issues as the environment, economic development, population, international relations, resources and cultural communications.

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The East-West Center was established in Hawaii in 1960 by the U.S. Congress which provides principal funding. Support also comes from more than twenty Asian and Pacific governments, private agencies and corporations and through the East-West Center Foundation. The center has an international board of governors.

Applications are being accepted for a three-year renewable limited appointment beginning August, 1994 as a Fellow in the humanities or human sciences to work within the Program for Cultural Studies providing expertise on culture and nationalism. The Fellow will be responsible for planning and conducting collaborative research projects on comparative issues of culture and nationalism in Asia or the Pacific Islands. Topics of particular interest to the program include relations among ethnic, religious and gender identities in national and transnational contexts; representation of tradition and nation in literature, film, media, and other forms of public culture; and national cultural policies and multiculturalism.

**REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS:** Ph.D. in a discipline of the humanities or social sciences with experience conducting research on issues of culture and nationalism in Asia or the Pacific Islands. Junior-level applicants must demonstrate the ability to conduct high-quality research, and senior-level applicants must have post-Ph.D. experience with a record of significant publications on issues of culture and nationalism and a record of success in raising funds and managing research projects.

**PREFERRED QUALIFICATIONS:** Fluency in an Asian or Pacific language. Research experience on Japan or Southeast Asia. Ph.D. in a discipline of the humanities. Research approaches demonstrating historical and comparative perspectives are preferred. Demonstrated ability to work collaboratively to develop international projects.

**SALARY:** $33,623.00 to $47,920.00 per year, depending on qualifications, plus cost-of-living allowance currently at 22.5% (subject to change) and an attractive benefits package.

Submit cover letter including position title and a statement addressing how the qualifications are met, a resume, and names and addresses of three professional references. Screening and assessment will be based on the materials you submit. Send to: Wanda Dial, Personnel Office, Dept. East-West Center, 1777 East-West Road, Honolulu, Hawaii 96848 or FAX to: (808) 944-7970. Applications must be postmarked/FAXed by **December 31, 1993**.

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**Executive Council Meeting**

**WORLD HISTORY ASSOCIATION**

Ililikai Hotel
June 24, 1993

President Lorantas called the meeting to order and introduced two guests who have added to the globalization of the organization, Professor Wang Dunshu of Nankai University and Professor K. N. Chaudhuri of the European University Institute. Professor Wang, Secretary General of the Society of Ancient and Medieval Historians, described the plans for the fall conference at Nankai which is co-sponsored by the World History Association. Professor Chaudhuri, introduced by Jerry Bentley, proposed a three-day world history conference in Florence in 1995. Theme, timing, location, expenses, sessions and local arrangements were discussed. Professor Chaudhuri will submit more specific details for the conference at the WHA meeting in January in San Francisco.

Jerry Bentley suggested that a small, standing committee be responsible for developing conference plans and getting a five year calendar established. Mark Gilbert recalled that a program committee, in charge of conferences and chaired by Peter Stearns, already existed. Jerry Bentley indicated that Carl Reddell's committee could be expanded to deal with conferences and affiliate meetings to avoid scheduling conflicts. Marie Donaghay explained that the American Historical Association plans a convention schedule so that meetings are rotated throughout the country and sites are repeated from time to time. John Mears recommended that the theme of the meeting in Florence should build upon the site. Carter Findley suggested that Professor Chaudhuri should select a theme which will allow the participation of scholars with many different interests. John Mears suggested that the planning committee could do future conference planning. After more discussion it was decided to co-sponsor the next conference with the Rocky Mountain Regional Affiliate, October 8 & 9, 1994, in Aspen with “Environment in World History” as the theme.

Ray Lorantas reported that the nature of the WHA has become more active and the number of requests for information about world history and the organization are increasing. This, in turn, increases the opportunity for new members to become an active part of the organization. Ray welcomed Ralph Crozier as a new member of the Council. His coming from Canada is another indication of the expansion of the organization internationally. Ray announced that this year's winner of National History Day was a senior from Bangor, Maine. Tim Connell has proposed that the WHA change the nature of its participation in National History Day. It was agreed to consider his ideas at a subsequent meeting.
Dorothy Goodman as chair of the International Committee requested $100 for postage which will be arranged by the president. The Council was encouraged to seek new members, especially interested teachers and historians from other countries. The World History Association at the AHA meeting in San Francisco, January 6th through 9th, will have four programs organized by Judith Zinsser, Tim Connell, Dorothy Goodman, and Mark Welter. The executive director’s report was circulated.

Marie Donaghay gave the treasurer’s report from January 1 through June 17, 1993 and reviewed current financial data. The extra ten dollars, which so many members have generously contributed, funded many of the Association’s new activities.

Heidi Roupp reported on membership, the China Program, and National Standards.

Membership — Twenty-five organizations had been contacted requesting that they include information about WHA membership in their publications. However most of these organizations classify membership announcements as advertised and require a fee. The OAH agreed to print our announcement if in exchange the WHA prints membership information about the OAH in the Bulletin. Roger Beck questioned the difference in results between mailing brochures and paid advertisements. After some discussion it was decided to try paid announcements during the following year.

The China Program — Thirty individuals participated in planning a Fulbright grant proposal for a China Exchange Program. Because the Fulbright proposal was due in October and organizations are notified in February or March, Fulbright recommended that we solicit applications for the program assuming that our grant would be funded. We received 135 requests for information concerning the program. Unfortunately, the proposal was not funded. Theodore H. Van Laue noted that those who completed applications were a remarkably able group of educators. The Council decided that the best course of action was to reapply to Fulbright and to seek other foundation funding.

National History Standards — The World History Association formed a Curriculum Standards Committee at the December 1992 business meeting in Washington, D.C. to review the world history standards. The committee members are Tim Connell of Laurel School, Dorothy Goodman of Friends of International Education, Marilyn Hitchens of Wheatridge High School, Don Johnson of New York University, Craig Lockhard of University of Wisconsin, Greenbay, Erich Martel of Woodrow Wilson High School, Dick Mueller of Defense Intelligence College, Judith Zinsser of United Nations International School and Heidi Roupp of Aspen High School as Chair. Initial reviews of the 1992 world history materials by Craig Lockhard, Dick Mueller, and Don Johnson were sent to the National Center for History in the schools. On behalf of the committee and WHA, Heidi Roupp invited members of the National History Standards project to participate in the Hawaii conference. Joan Arno and Gary Nash came as representatives and participated as part of a panel on teaching world history. The National History Standards project added WHA members to its writing team and Ross Dunn will lead a curriculum task force to write standards for the period from 1300 to 1700. Heidi Roupp suggested that Tim Connell of Laurel School and Erich Martel of Woodrow Wilson High School be made co-chairmen of the World History Association Review Committee and organize a committee review of the standards to be written during the summer and fall of 1993.

John Mears presented an outline for the organization of the planning committee. A planning committee with an open ended agenda is needed to address the continued development of the organization. The committee will review how the WHA has developed over the last ten years and the current state of the membership to set goals for the continued development of the Association.

Jerry Bentley, Editor of the Journal of World History, reported that during 1992 the Journal received 48 article submissions. Of these 16 were accepted after review and scheduled for publication. The increasing number of high quality submissions has made it possible for the Journal to present more articles and review articles per issue. Meanwhile, Professor Herbert Zeigler, the Journal's book review editor, has organized a sizable group of willing reviewers, and he has lined up an imaginative slate of books for review. Jerry described a new feature of the Journal, "The Forum" section which will present several articles revolving around the same theme. Volume 5, number 1 (spring 1994) will present two articles by Linda T. Darling and Jason Thompson in a forum on "Europeans in the House of Islam." As the flow of contributions and space permit, future issues of the Journal of World History will most likely feature additional forums of articles dealing with common themes.

Carl Reddell is continuing his organizational work with the affiliate organizations. The affiliate representatives were reminded to keep Carl informed of plans and activities of the regionals to avoid scheduling conflicts. A complete report is forthcoming.

Marc Gilbert concluded the reports with a recommendation that a permanent repository of the WHA archives be with the Executive Director and that the organization consider the systematic collection of conference papers and related materials. A publication committee could be organized to print materials from this collection of interest to the membership.

Amie Schrier moved that the meeting be adjourned. The motion was seconded by Marie Donaghay. The meeting was adjourned.

Respectfully submitted,
Heidi Roupp
Secretary, WHA 1991-1993
NAPOLEON IN EGYPT
ABD AL RAHMAN AL-JABARTI; INTRO BY ROBERT TIGNOR, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

The book is an Arab view of a turning point in modern history. Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt in 1798 was the first contact between a Western power with imperial goals and an ancien régime of an African society.

"[Al-Jabarti] resents the French invasion, ridicules their claim to be a defender of the faith, rejects their belief in liberty and equality, despises their lack of morality and personal hygiene, but approves their efficiency, common loyalty and cooperation, and wonders at their technical and scholarly abilities. There was much he admired in these uncouth barbarians who even had a translation of the Koran in their luggage. . . . Al-Jabarti’s work has been a treasure house . . . .” —Journal of the American Oriental Society


WOMEN IN ISLAM
WIEBKE WALThER, UNIVERSITY OF BAMBERG

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