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This issue of the World History Bulletin includes several outstanding articles, including one from the Peoples Republic of China (Zhōnghuá Rènmin Gònghéguó) and one from Canada. Four of the remaining articles focus on the areas of Central Asia and the Near East, in an effort to provide a Teaching Forum on the region. The final article included in this issue is the winning essay for the 2004 World History Association/Phi Alpha Theta Undergraduate Paper Prize.


In these pages you will also find an article by Wang Shoukuan, entitled “Agriculture and Agricultural Civilization of the Yellow River Drainage Basin.” While in China this past summer, I asked Professor Wang to write a short essay on the Yellow River Basin, to give our world history teachers a Chinese perspective on the topic. He accepted my offer, and submitted his essay in both English and báihuà (vernacular written Chinese). The English version was edited by Bulletin personnel, the Chinese version was not.

The reports from AP-WORLD and H-WORLD will appear in the Fall 2005 issue. The promised short piece on the Fulbright-Hays Travel Abroad program (to China) in which I participated this past summer has also been postponed until the Fall. As noted in the previous issue of the Bulletin, the essay will be an introduction to the hundreds of graphic images that I collected and will make available to any teacher who wishes to incorporate them into their classroom.

Finally, a reminder that the Fall 2005 issue of the Bulletin will feature a discussion on Medieval World History, concerning the thousand years between 500 and 1500 CE. Fred Bisson will serve as Guest Editor of the issue, and essays on this subject are solicited. See the Call for Articles on page 26.

Micheal
Dear Colleagues,

I want to use this presidential message to highlight some conference activities of the WHA and to praise the individuals whose hard work makes them possible.

One of the signs of the growing maturity of the WHA is the quality of the panels that it presents, not simply at our own annual meeting, but at the conventions of the American Historical Association. The panels co-sponsored by the WHA at the January 2005 American Historical Association meeting in Seattle, spotlighted the value of world history’s embrace of important issues. The WHA sponsored five sessions, of which four had also succeeded in making their way through the AHA’s rigorous panel screening. Not only did this year’s panels include some stellar scholars, but their presentations also stirred stimulating discussion from their audiences.

Under its energetic chair, Steve Gosch, the WHA’s Conferences Committee approved the panels a year ago, and Steve personally organized and chaired the lively session on "World History and Social History: The Promise of Interchange" at which Kenneth Pomeranz explored the intersections of social history and modern empires, and Merry Wiesner-Hanks examined women, gender, and sexuality as topics in world history. The third panelist, Peter Sterns, reprised for this different audience the keynote address he had given at the WHA conference in June 2004. Much discussion followed from the large audience.

The roundtable on "Globalizing American History: Promises and Pitfalls," which I had the honor of chairing, attracted a similarly impressive audience. Artful presentations by Peter Coclanis, Ed Davies, and Carl Guarneri examined the parameters and prospects of this important new approach in U.S. history. Among the many in attendance were several college textbook editors, eager to translate this trend into a new generation of textbooks. In many ways, the most original presentation was by Susan Douglass. Not only was her PowerPoint analysis of the growing convergence and interaction between world history and U.S. history standards at the pre-collegiate level full of surprising information and insights, but it was also a stunningly good illustration of the utility of the WHA’s efforts to foster exchanges between scholars and teachers. Although there are many obstacles to the implementation of these pre-collegiate standards, I could not help suggesting to the audience that the schools seemed to be ahead of the colleges in globalizing the teaching of American history.

The exploration of American history’s global connections in terms of a particular topic was the subject of the third WHA-AHA panel, "United States Empire, Race, and the City, 1848-1919," chaired by Carl Nightingale.

The scheduling of the WHA-sponsored panel on "International Law in World History" at 8:30 on Sunday morning, was probably the cause of its lower attendance, but the enthusiasm of the panelists assembled by Professor Ved Nanda of the University of Denver Law School, was in no way diminished, nor was the relevance of their thoughtful papers. The various presenters came mostly from law and political science backgrounds, which demonstrated how important it is for world history to cross disciplines as well as crossing the arbitrary boundaries of nations and continents. In the discussion that followed, the panelists readily acknowledged the need to broaden their approach to this subject beyond the Western legal tradition in which they had been trained. Some were brand new WHA members.

The need to catch a flight back to the east coast prevented me from attending the WHA’s final co-sponsored session, "Teaching the Analysis of Primary Sources and Change over Time in the World History Survey," chaired by Sharon Cohen. The mix of panelists from universities (Jessica Barber and Heather Streets), high schools (Cohen and Rob Denning), and elsewhere (Despina Danos of the Educational Testing Service) illustrated another integrating aspect of the WHA.

As I write, the WHA proposals for the 2006 AHA meeting in Philadelphia are being readied for submission under the able leadership of Anand Yang for the WHA Conventions Committee. More immediately, Alfred Andrea, the current chair of the Committee is working out the final arrangements for our momentous overseas meeting at Al-Akhawayn University in Morocco in June. Under the leadership of Kerry Ward, the Program Committee is reviewing the substantial body of panel and paper proposals that have been submitted for that conference. The quick rescheduling of this meeting site made the task of the Committee much harder than usual and they have come through splendidly.

Many thanks to these tireless and talented folks!

Sincerely,

David Northrup
The meeting began at 5:03 p.m. with a summary of the Executive Council meeting. When the meeting opened, there were twelve people present. Within twenty minutes the number rose to 21.

1. President David Northrup informed everyone that headquarters had just undergone a complete turnover in staff. The first personnel change was the hiring of Kristy Ringor to replace Jenna, followed shortly thereafter by Kieko's decision to return to graduate school to finish her dissertation; Robert White was hired to replace her. Prior to leaving, Kieko reviewed her job description, and indicated that it was not clear the position required a PhD. The Executive Director's time was spent mainly on business and management issues, not academic ones. It might be better to have a masters degree rather than a PhD. As a result of this discussion, the qualifications were changed. The finalists who emerged included one PhD in history, two MBAs, and one law degree with another administration possibility. Robert White was the person who emerged as the best candidate for the position. He has experience in fundraising, grants, administration, etc. We are glad he accepted this position, as half-time and with the small salary that WHA offers. The Executive Director position is not his full-time job. David Northrup spent a lot more time on this than he expected, and is very pleased that it all went well.

2. The WHA has also focused on developing a new conference site for our next annual meeting. Cape Town collapsed, and luckily Al-Akhawayn University was willing to become our host site for this year. It is located in Ifrane, 60 miles SW of Fez, and we are very happy to offer this option. Al Andrea has been working on planning this meeting, and pressing for greater planning for future meetings. Yesterday, the council accepted a proposal for the 2006 conference in Long Beach, 2007 in Milwaukee where possibly two universities could host, and in 2008, a more definite conference in London at Queen Mary's College. This is the longest line-up of future conferences the WHA has ever had. The Conference Committee chair may well be the most important position after elected officers.

3. Originally, David joked that he was very worried that the treasury would be empty when he passed the baton to his successor, but Roger has reassured him. Roger indicated that all renewals are now going to Hawaii, but while the transition occurs, some membership money is staying in Charleston, some with Roger, and some in Hawaii. Roughly $85,000 in Charleston, and $42,000 in Hawaii, for a total of $127,000 going into the new year. This is the high receipts point of the year, because now we begin paying out.

The Endowment Fund has a total of $24,860. A couple of new lifetime members have been added, so perhaps there is another $4,000-5,000 for the Fund.

Questions: Is the influx of money due to new members? We have reached a high point of 1291 members. (We are getting new members, but the most significant factor appears to be the internet which is helping us set up on line.) Are there any overseas members? (A few from Europe and Australia. Another factor that may account for the favorable monetary position was the revenue from the George Mason University conference; it created $19,000 in profit. About half came from the book exhibits and space rental; this will probably not be a part of the Morocco conference.)

Larry Beaber mentioned that the World History meeting in Leipzig in September is a possible place for recruiting members.

4. David has begun discussions with publishers for a multi-year proposal for support, but this year was a particularly poor one and they are facing restrictions and cuts. He expects continued conversations will lead to more sponsoring. Pearson Publishers will double its commitment to one of our essay prizes, and they are willing to sponsor the London conference in a large manner. They already sponsor Felipe Fernandes-Armesto's lecture series in world history at St. Mary's College. Other publishers may help to sponsor the keynote speakers. Bedford has promised to pay for coffee breaks over a three-year period. Houghton-Mifflin has not forgotten and will revisit the issue this year. This could relieve a little of the money pressure.

5. The Council has approved a modest sum for a speaker at a world history breakfast at the NCSS conference. The Council has also proposed that the coming years' budget includes funding for the support of officers and/or possibly for the executive director to attend conferences. The Research Corporation of the University of Hawaii (RCUH) funded the Executive Director's travel at $3000. After June, RCUH will no longer be doing this, and WHA will need to pick it up. This is an attempt to ease the financial strain of individuals who are serving the organization.

The Executive Committee is looking for new sources of funding. We hope for some short-term modest grants. Maybe even larger projects with more money attached, so that we can do many of the things that we have always wanted to do. Another possibility is to pursue the ideas mentioned in the strategic plan. We need a better system to obtain volunteers and to round them up.

Ralph suggested that people we ask to do unpaid volunteer work might have some recompense. Through the good offices of Charles Cavalier, Prentice-Hall is sponsoring the reception after this meeting. John Voll mentioned that in good times wise individuals do not spend all the money they own; instead they establish a rainy day fund, not an endowment. MESA acted in this way and needed it; he suggested we begin to set one up, for just such a reason.

Roger - we have been saving $30,000 in a savings account in order to do just this. We could place this in a Vanguard fund where we could make money at a better rate than the 1% for savings.

David - The assumption that we will be out of money is no longer valid, so therefore for the first time we can develop a savings strategy.

Larry - is there a plan to continue to grow the membership? What about regular ads in the NCSS?

Roger - last night the Council voted to have a breakfast at NCSS rather than a table.

Micheal Tarver mentioned a previous quid pro quo with NCSS arranged by Kieko, whereby we carry their ads in exchange for ours. There will be mem-
Maggie Favretti - One idea for raising money is to create tours with a university or institution that manages guided tours. Smithsonian tours are successful as are many others. This could be a wonderful idea for high school teachers and might offer some informal mentoring on the issue of world history. This has been impeded till now by lack of database.

7. Kristy Ringor summarized the Executive Director's report:
   - Our new database is finally nearly operational. We need to work out a few bugs, but it has been updated and we now have one place where all the information can be accessed and managed. It allows us to create mailing lists based on regions, states, or even break them down by categories or areas that are of interest to the query.
   - Financial matters are being centered in Hawaii; this will create a more solid picture. Robert White is very happy to have this consolidated. With all the information centrally located, it will help decide the organization's best direction.
   - We are also working on basing the WHA's website in Honolulu because of the awkwardness of having the web manager in Texas.
   - Hawaii has an excellent fundraising network and we hope to work on it shortly to identify fund raising avenues for the organization.
   - Kristy's background is in public relations and media, and she has many ideas regarding ads and media that could be developed and distributed to the news. Although her majors are in political science and media, all of her jobs have been in media and public relations.

New Business
   - There are extra copies of the fall Bulletin, which is looking for articles for publication.
   - Update on the AP-World History exam. An estimated 60,000 students are expected to take the 2006 test next May. That could be 180,000 essays, thus the College Board always needs readers. Some of these people move into WHA memberships. We are very pleased that many WHA members come into the group. You can place yourself into the pool on line. Dates look to be June 3-9, with June 2 to be a travel day.

Adjourned 5:55 pm

Submitted by Jacky Swansinger, Secretary.

WHA - Executive Council Meeting
6 January 2005 -- 3:25 pm
Seattle, at the AHA Annual Meeting


Due to snow and poor flying conditions, the meeting began late, and the order of the agenda was adjusted to accommodate those present. Roger Beck opened the meeting.

Executive Committee Report
The new Executive Director at the Honolulu headquarters is Robert White, replacing Kieko who resigned effective November 1. Kristy Ringor is the new administrative assistant. Robert prepared the executive report, but was unable to join us in Seattle.

WHAs annual conference held at George Mason University last June raised $19,200. Attendance was not as strong as the year before, but the organization did well.

Mr. White wishes to improve outreach and public agenda. He is very interested in fundraising and he is sanguine regarding our prospects for even greater success in our endeavors.

Headquarters will continue regularizing operating procedures. The database is, at long last, nearly operational. There are still a few bugs, but it is ready for the executive council or executive committee to formulate queries. The base is now accessible.

An operational procedures manual has been sent out.

We still need to develop a credit card use policy for the executive committee and/or other individuals who need to use credit in the organization's interest. At the present time, credit card payments are traveling cross-country, but this may change in the near future.

Besides personnel changes and additions to the executive headquarters, there are a few supply needs. Hawaii could use another desktop, wiring for one phone, and more phones. The cost will be $1,000. Obtaining another printer, copier, and fax machine will require an additional $500.

Discussion: The status of the web site came under question. The council suggested that Kristy could take the web site into her area of responsibility. Everyone agreed that it would be a good idea. It was also suggested that HQ create a mail address that identifies WHA as the organization and make the web site more effective for the organization.

Treasurer's Report
Roger Beck began by sharing boxes of chocolate originating from the new store he and his wife run.

Moving operations to Hawaii has begun; all new memberships received since October have gone to Hawaii for processing. Credit card renewals are still occurring in Charleston, and cannot yet be done in Hawaii. The accountant does not have a full report of the monies because of the splitting of the accounts between Roger, working in the continental US, and HQ's in Hawaii.

The account in Charleston has $26,306.00 in savings. The checking account holds $54,245 for operating expenses. During the month of December, another $5,406 was added from credit card renewals.

Totaling the Treasurer's accounts with those held in Hawaii, the combined sum is $127,065.22, or approximately $15,000 more than the WHA has ever held before. As mentioned previously, $19,000 resulted from the conference at GMU. Dues and therefore membership with about 1245 members. We do know that 1300 members will cover our expenses on a yearly basis.

It should be remembered that although conferences abroad tend to cost
us less, we also make less profit from the book exhibits. However, foreign conferences have more costs covered for us by host institutions.

**Bulletin Report**

**Bulletin** Editor, Micheal Tarver, requested the assistance of the Executive Council to meet the WH Bulletin deadlines. Submissions can be forwarded either to HQ or directly to Tarver. In order to be effective, more attention to time and orderly submission are needed. Last fall’s October 15th deadline still led to the Bulletin being distributed in the final week of December. Michael mentioned he is also recruiting more essays to include in the bulletin.

A question was raised regarding availability of old WHA Bulletins to distribute at regional and local conferences. Extra Bulletins are housed in Hawaii and can be bulk shipped.

Recent issues are in process of being placed into PDF files for easy access by computer and possible future distribution online.

**Conference Report**

The Road to Morocco is going well. A letter of agreement has been signed, and the Program Committee is finalizing details for a Moroccan keynoter who will speak on the theme of the Mediterranean. The program committee will very likely obtain a second keynoter soon. The Committee is also working on a post-conference travel special. At the present time, the conference fee is $230 and includes all meals. Ifrane is an expensive city, and transportation is being organized from Casablanca to Ifrane. Information about transportation from Casablanca to Ifrane will be available by early February.

Discussion centered on specific questions about the program. February 1 is the deadline for panel submissions. The local arrangements committee expects that only 10 - 12 panels may be scheduled because of the expense of getting to the conference site.

David Christian was approached to serve on a world history historiography panel. A number of Australians have indicated they would like to attend. Questions concerned the balance of keynote speakers and plenary panels; subsidies for people who cannot afford to join us; how to differentiate people who might belong to the association in other countries versus those who are simply applying across the Internet; and whether one needed a visa. For Americans the answer to the last question was no.

Some discussion occurred on the logistics of the conference and the need to act more quickly, advertise more broadly, and connect with other organizations. Ralph Crozier was asked to elaborate on the experience in Seoul. Seoul was aided by the participation of high school teachers and other groups who attended. ETS sent ten people for special world meeting, which they cannot do this year. It was suggested that we advertise with ISME, Fulbright-Hays, and French universities, and that we find other subfields that could be connected.

The overall theme of the conference is twofold: Africa and world history and the Mediterranean and world history.

**2006 - The Conferences Committee** proposed California State University, Long Beach, as a potential conference site for 2006. Dean Gary Richard and K-12 teachers would be strong participants in this conference. Other organizations that could be involved in the conference are: California History of Social Science funding, and the Society for Education, graduate students from Irvine and UCLA. Long Beach is less likely to offer many dorm options. The downtown hotels are the best and most likely, places to stay. We could explore the possibility of hosting specific institutes as one way of sharing the costs of advertising and organizing. Steve Gosch seconded the motion to approve this choice and the motion passed unanimously.

**2007 - Alfred Andrea indicated** that the Committee was exploring Milwaukee as a possible conference site in 2007. The University of Milwaukee and Marquette University were possible hosts. The discussion of Milwaukee as a site was positive, with many favorable comments on the general environment and the public museum. Steve Gosch moved the council agree to explore the possibilities; John Voll seconded; and the motion was approved unanimously.

**2008 - On behalf of the Committee, Andrea proposed St. Mary's College at the University of London as the site of the 2008 WHA meeting.** The global studies program there is eager to host, and Pearson Prentice-Hall is willing to work to subsidize the conference. Discussion concerned setting up and sponsoring a books exhibit on world history. Steve Gosch moved the proposal for acceptance, seconded by Susan Douglass. Discussion ensued regarding the validity of hosting a "world history" conference in another English speaking country. The majority position held that since we do not seek out English speaking countries, and our last two conferences have been in Seoul and Morocco, it should be acceptable to go to London. The proposal was moved by John Richards; seconded by Anand Yang; and passed unanimously.

**Journal of World History Report**

There will probably be a slight delay in the journal schedule. There was nothing else to add beyond the original report.

David Northrup suggested that perhaps just an annual report from the journal might be a better notion than a semiannual report. The press subscription list probably breaks them up based on institutions and individuals and offers double checks on membership lists.

A member asked if any paper in the journal could be tied to a specific teaching idea and developed in the bulletin. Jerry Bentley said it could be done, but would require some organization. Deborah Johnston stated that she would be willing to act as central coordinator for this idea; Jerry Bentley would send the articles that offer the best chance of centering on teaching. Susan Douglass indicated she would also be willing to help. Deb will distribute tasks to other people to create this new session.

**History Connected Report**

Heather is pleased all is going well. Nothing to add.

**Finance Committee**

Nothing to add to report.

**Constitutional Issue**

Roger Beck has indicated that he will be retiring from the position of treasurer at the end of 2005, now that the full transfer of functions to Hawaii has occurred. This provoked a discussion of the role and duties of the Treasurer.

The WHA Constitution places the
treasurer in charge of financial operations. However, the treasurer does not have to perform all the day-to-day activities, which have not been transferred to the Executive Director. The treasurer now exercises his duties through the Executive Committee and the Finance Committee.

In the recent past, all of the financial minutiae has fallen to the treasurer. This has kept him from concentrating on the broader financial picture. The recent changes that made the job less burdensome should also make it more attractive to future candidates.

As the process becomes more transparent and routine, it should be easier to enable the treasurer to focus on the long-term health of the organization, rather than on the daily details of the checking account.

**Other Suggestions**

John Richards proposed the fiscal year should be changed to Sept 1, so there is enough time to prepare the formal reports for the end-of-year meeting. He also asked if the organization does a yearly audit. The answer was no.

WHA is not large enough to do a yearly audit, but we do file a 999 form. Richards indicated that he did not find this an acceptable answer. The fact that the organization has grants and different sources of income, requires it to have audits. The center for Afghanistan studies in NC has just hired an auditor to cover their processes and procedures. David Northrup: "This is one of the reasons why the executive committee is happy to have hired Robert White, because he will be able to pursue these suggestions."

John Richards made a motion "to move with all deliberate speed to develop an audit and accounting process". Seconded by Ken Pomerantz and four others, unanimous agreement.

It was decided that HQ should look into the possibility of voting on the internet on the issue of responsibilities for financial management and the respective roles of the treasurer and the executive director.

At this late moment, council welcomed new members Avi Black, Bin Wong, and John Voll, and thanked Susan Douglass, Anand Yang, and Ken Curtis, who are leaving us, for their fine service.

This was also the moment to thank Kieko Matteson for her service and recap some of the details of her decision. Kieko had indicated in October that she was ready to return to completing graduate school, but first she helped the WHA find her replacement. David Northrup reported that Kieko had proposed lowering the educational requirement for the Executive Director, since a PhD or ABD was not needed to run the office. Changing this requirement to a masters degree broadened the field of applicants. The four finalists included one history PhD, two health care administrators, and one lawyer and member of a board of education in Hawaii. Robert White’s experience managing conferences and grants helped push him to the top of the list.

Our contract with University of Hawaii indicates that the History Department at Hawaii should be consulted. Jerry and the chair were players in these discussions; although they would have preferred an academic, they are supportive of the WHA’s choice. The council has the first call on this position; Jerry was speaking from the point of view of the department and not of the Council. Al Andrea mentioned that the original planning assumption was that the part-time director would likely be hired by the Department as a history adjunct, and this explains why the Department was to be consulted.

Ralph Crozier - Early discussants believed that a PhD would be a more useful background. Additionally, the realization that we could not offer a great deal of money led us to think of an ABD candidate.

John Voll - This is based on the area studies model. The committee used Carter Findley’s experience to create the model.

John Richards: what is the term of appointment for the new director? No development on this issue.

**Finance Committee**

The bylaws change presented by the committee was voted on and unanimously accepted.

Avi Black was welcomed. (late arrival due to snow and weather)

**Nominations Committee**

The task of coming up with nominations for executive members and new officers is constitutionally mandated. Two members are rolling off this committee, Ross Dunn and Tom Davis, replacing are Bob Bain and Ken Pomeranz. They were voted on and accepted.

**Teaching Committee**

Heidi Roupp– WHA should sponsor a reception at each NCSS meeting. It is time to budget this item regularly and annually. In the past, WHA has had a table, but it is very expensive. ($1000 per table). Discussion ensued.

Questions centered on the costs and benefits of hosting a reception, buying presence through a table, an exhibit, people. Suggestions were made to share a table with other exhibitors (ex: AHA), or offer a breakfast hosted by the WHA. Discussion also occurred on whose responsibility it was to lead this initiative.

Final discussion centered around three different options.

1. Have a table
2. Sponsor a breakfast
3. Submit registration fees of our people on registered panels.

John Richards’ Motion: "Exec Council supports the funding of a speaker at a breakfast at NCSS, and urges the teaching committee to devise innovative ways to improve the presence of the WHA at the meeting. " Bob Bain seconded; the motion passed unanimously.

**Membership Recommendations**

1. Kristy has developed a new poster for the web. Council supports modifications to the web and also asks her to redevelop the WHA brochure.
2. Prize Awards - $800, $400 is given by Pearson, $200 by Phi Alpha Theta, and $200 by an anonymous donor. Andrea proposed a free WHA membership for either the winner or the top two winners. We could also offer a student membership to the WHA; most particularly to recent graduates. Would this be a worthwhile concept for undergraduates? Yes, say Linda and Alan. Seconded by Linda Black. The motion to provide a student membership to future prize winners carried.

Where can one obtain WHA membership coupons for world history summer institute participants? Linda suggest-
ed that each member of the regional areas could contact each world history listerv so that they would receive brochures and coupons. They could be distributed at summer institutes, but leaders of institute would need to be contacted. (This would include Michele).

**New Business**

Ralph: It is time for the Executive Council to consider whether elected officers should receive some kind of financial help to attend all the meetings and conferences. This is especially true when many conferences are involved. The issue of time, money, and effort is rather hard on some people. Unlike the President of the United States, you should not have to be rich to be an officer of WHA. Ralph made the suggestion that the Council consider a modest subsidy for elected officers.

Discussion ensued as to the nature and purpose of the money. Motion proposed: The Finance Committee shall establish a travel budget for officers and any other extraordinary expenses to meet official functions as needed. This should be developed within the yearly budget projections of the finance committee. Seconded by Richards; vote carried unanimously.

**Discussion of Committees**

It was agreed that the inactive Media Committee, Research and Graduate Studies Committee, Technology Committee, and Ad-hoc Bulletin Committee, be abolished.

Committee on Committees may need reviving. The Grants Committee, established to approve grant applications involving the WHA, no longer needs to stand alone, as its functions can be handled by the Finance Committee.

Brief comments regarding dinner.

Motion to Adjourn Swansinger seconded. Meeting adjourned at 6:50pm.

Submitted by Jacky Swansinger, WHA Secretary.

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**World History Connected**

*worldhistoryconnected.org*


“Teaching Africa in World History” also features 5 regular columns as well as book reviews written with an eye to their use for the classroom.

World History Connected is also pleased to announce that it has joined the History Cooperative’s collection of online academic journals, which will allow the journal greater visibility and will allow more teachers access to the journal’s contents (for the History Cooperative, go to [http://www.historycooperative.org](http://www.historycooperative.org)). As always, in order to ensure that teachers have unlimited access to World History Connected, the journal remains free to all users.

In 2005, World History Connected will expand from two to three annual issues, which will be published in May, September, and January. Deadlines for submissions are January 15, June 15, and October 15, respectively. World History Connected urges scholars and teachers of world history to submit articles, essays, and reviews on all aspects of teaching world history and on the state of the field. All articles are double-blind peer reviewed. Authors may find submission guidelines at [http://worldhistoryconnected.pres.s.uiuc.edu/submissions.html](http://worldhistoryconnected.pres.s.uiuc.edu/submissions.html).

World History Connected is published by the University of Illinois Press and receives generous funding from Washington State University, the College Board, and private donations. It is an official publication of the World History Association. Staff includes co-editors Heather Streets (Washington State University) and Tom Laichas (Crossroads School); associate editor Tim Weston (University of Colorado, Boulder); assistant editor Cynthia Ross (Washington State University); Executive Director Heidi Roupp; and book review editor Ane Lintvedt (McDonough School).
The WHA is delighted to announce that its 2005 conference will be held at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. The conference's dual themes, "The Mediterranean in World History" and "Africa in World History," reflect Morocco's special geographic and cultural position in world history.

Located near the historic walled city of Fez, Al Akhawayn University is an English-medium university. Current plans include a university-sponsored reception held within traditional Moroccan desert tents.

The reasonable Registration Fee ($230 for WHA members and their spouses, $260 for non-WHA members) includes all meals from dinner on June 27 through breakfast on June 30 (8 meals). On-campus housing (all with private bathrooms) costs $37.50 (single person in a single room) per night. Double rooms (two people) are $45 per night. Ground transportation from the airport in Casablanca to the conference will be $70, round trip, or $35.00, one way, for those participating in the exciting five-day, post-conference tour, which ends in Casablanca.

Keynote Speakers

Professor Abderrahmane El Moudden, Department of History, University Mohammed V, Rabat; Visiting Fulbright Scholar, Princeton University. "Crossing towards the Other: Conflict and Interchange around the Mediterranean in the last Millennium" Summary: Despite all the enmity and hatred that seem to be wrapping world affairs today, world history, when considered in the longue durée, shows today much more interchange, even through conflict, than in previous centuries. If knowing the Other is the first step towards understanding and accepting alterity, we can assume that today's world is much closer to the stage where knowledge of the Other limits tension and conflict. Yet, conversely, knowledge may be used as intelligence and be then a means of power and domination at the disposal of the most powerful. Hence, it can be at the origin of worsening misunderstandings. In a seesaw movement, clash and dialogue compete to win over the relations between world societies and states. Major movements set the stage for a broad periodization: Jihad vs Crusades, conquests and counter-conquests; Renaissance and Nahda, colonial powers vs new nations; between clash and dialogue.

Professor David Northrup, Department of History, Boston College. President, World History Association. "Africa in World History: Some Early Modern Examples and Broader Perspectives." Summary: A wealth of research in recent decades has made it clear that Africans actively participated in and shaped encounters with the Muslim and European worlds. Nevertheless, analyses stressing the patterns of outside agents are far more common than those examining the patterns of African actions and responses. This address looks for patterns in the encounters of African political leaders with the early Portuguese and uses the results to propose frameworks for rethinking earlier and later encounters.

The WHA has arranged for 2 post-conference tour options.

Option 1 - one-day, guided tour of the walled city of Fez, including lunch, for $55, June 30. FULL DAY FEZ VISIT --- A full day to explore Morocco's most fascinating city - Fez. The tour of this medieval city, which is a world heritage site, includes the old and new medinas and visits to some of their numerous shops, where artisans produce Morocco's age-old arts and crafts. First visit the King's Palace, and the Jewish and Arab sections. Then visit the 14th-century religious schools (medersas) of Bou Inania and Attarine. Also, Karaouiyine University, one of the oldest in the world, Najarine Fountain, the Mausoleum of Moulay Idriss, and a famous tannery, where skins are cured and dyed in enormous vats. A full day to explore the impressive labyrinth of souks in the old medina of Fez, declared by UNESCO to be one of the world's cultural treasures. Lunch will be served in a Moroccan restaurant in the old medina of Fez. At the end of the day return to Ifrane. Participants should plan to overnight at the university and avail themselves of the optional transportation to Casablanca on July 1. Please note: The quoted fee of $55 is dependent on a minimum of ten (10) participants.

Option 2 - five-day tour of Morocco, Fez--Marrakesh--Essaouira--Casablanca, JUN 30 to
JUL 5

Day 1: Ifrane - Volubilis, June 30. After breakfast at the university, we travel by luxury bus to Fez through lovely countryside dotted with vineyards and olive groves to the town of Moulay Idriss, named for its founder, Morocco's most venerated saint. He was one of the great grandsons of the prophet Mohammed and his tomb and shrine lie in the heart of this pilgrimage town. Continue to nearby Volubilis, capital of the Roman Empire's province of Mauritania. The ruins date back mainly to the 2nd and 3rd centuries CE, but excavations indicate that the site may go back another 500 years or so, to the Carthaginian traders who settled here.

Day 2: Fez, July 1. Ancient Fez, nestled in a high valley and resplendent with minarets and domes, has a dazzling medina that is a completely preserved medieval Arab city. It is unique in the Arab world and has remained essentially unchanged for centuries. We explore the extraordinary sights, sounds, and smells of this amazing city, visiting craftspeople at work and checking out the souks, renowned for their distinctive rugs, pottery, and bronze pieces. We also visit a traditional tannery, a Koranic school, and the Qaraouyine Mosque, formerly one of the oldest universities in the world.

Day 3: Fez - Beni Mellal - Marrakesh (480 Km), July 2. After breakfast at the hotel, we travel to fabled Marrakech, an ancient city of immense charm and beauty, with the High Atlas providing a beautiful backdrop. Stop for lunch en route. Arrive in Marrakech and overnight.

Day 4: Marrakesh, July 3. We discover its secrets, with an excursion through the medina and various souks, and to the astonishing Djemaa el Fna, the central square replete with snake charmers, fire-eaters, and fortune tellers. We visit the magnificent Saadian Tombs, the luxurious and architecturally unusual Bahia Palace, and the Dar Si Said, a beautiful 19th-century house that now serves as an arts and crafts museum.

Day 5: Marrakesh - Essaouira - Casablanca (500 Km), July 4. After breakfast at the hotel in Marrakesh, we travel to Essaouira passing stands of the indigenous Argan trees on which we may see the area's famous tree-climbing goats. Essaouira is a charming 16th-century coastal town enclosed by 18th-century battlements. We spend time walking through a town noted for its houses with blue shutters, artisan workshops, and boat builders, all of which combine to give it a colorful atmosphere. The Portuguese built a fort in the 16th century, and in the late 18th century, Sultan Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah built up the town as a military port. It later prospered during the era of European sea trade. Today it is still an important fishing port and market town. Arrive at Casablanca, visit the Hassan II Mosque before reaching the hotel for an overnight in Casablanca.

Day 6: Flight home. Transportation to the airport. Please note: A $200 deposit is due with conference registration and no later than April 30. The total tour fee (approximately $400) is dependent on a minimum of twenty (20) participants. Fewer than 20 will result in cancellation of the tour. In the unlikely event of cancellation, the otherwise non-refundable deposit will be returned and participants informed of the cancellation well before June 27, so that they make alternate plans. The remainder of the fee, about $200 depending on the number of tour participants, is due in Moroccan currency at Ifrane on June 27. The fee includes transportation, services of an English-speaking guide, five nights in four-star hotels (double occupancy), and five breakfasts. It does not include other meals or tips to the guide and driver. The supplement for a single room is $200.

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Externalization vs Internalization: Adapting Central Asia to World History

Brian R. Parkinson

[Editor's Note: This essay thoroughly develops “Incorporating Central Asia into World History: An Outline” which appeared in WHB, Vol. XX (No. 2), pp. 26-27.] Central Asia has rarely been at the forefront of world history, thus it has been largely ignored in world history textbooks and courses, yet this interesting region has much to offer to the field of world history. Many facets of Central Asian history connect to the broader mosaic of world history. But how should teachers incorporate Central Asia within world history? How can they relate the major themes of Central Asian history to those of the outside world? This essay examines Central Asia as a product of both internal and external forces. Central Asia integrated and absorbed foreign influences, internalizing them and making them its own, meanwhile exporting its own native forces. To make this case, the essay divides Central Asian history into three broad periods: Medieval Central Asia; Mongol Era; and Russian Imperialism.

It was from the Silk Road that Central Asia was easily able to spread many of its own native ideas and assimilate foreign ones. Many of the region’s indigenous forces, such as nomadic migration, the Mongol conquests, and the conflict between pastoral and sedentary societies, moved outward to affect other parts of the world. It even had an impact on Islam through its native _madrasas_ and Sufism, which are discussed later in the paper. Central Asia has also absorbed external influences, such as religion, imperialism, nationalism and decolonization. Each of these is relevant to world history.

Medieval Central Asia -- For much of its history, Central Asia has been situated at the crossroads of many civilizations, just along the Great Silk Road, tucked in between the Chinese, Europeans, Arabs and Indians. There, in the middle of these grand civilizations and cultures, Central Asia connected the Orient with the Occident, linked by economics to major patterns in world history. The Silk Route served not only as a conveyor of goods but also concepts, as Western ideas traveled eastward and Eastern philosophies and technologies filtered into the West, like Buddhism and gun powder for example.

What did it externalize? One of my students once asked me, “What ever did Central Asia give to the World?” This is an important question, for Central Asia has changed world history. Broadly speaking, ancient Central Asia externalized two great forces, migration and Islamic mysticism.

Diaspora and Migration -- Beginning in the fifth century, there was a Turkic exodus that spread out of Mongolia into Central Asia. For centuries prior to Genghis Khan, the winners of the tribal battles for predominance on the Orkhan Steppe in Mongolia, forced the vanquished off to the west. These periodic Turkic migrations out of Mongolia eventually left Mongolia ethnically pure, cleansed of Turks. The Turks progressed west and southward into Central Asia in a migration conquest, not a trade diaspora, as happened to Africans during the slave trade. They forever altered the ethnic makeup of Central Asia. Previously, Central Asia had been predominantly Persian and Indo-European; but when the waves of Turkic tribes penetrated into Central Asia, they pushed these Persian groups to the fringes, thus allowing Turkic tribes to occupy the great steppe and basin of Central Asia, which prompted a Turkification of the area. Interestingly, it was one of these defeated groups, the Golden Horde, that the Mongols expelled to the west and subsequently ravaged Russia.

Turkic migrations transformed the sedentary culture of Central Asia, for these steppe peoples were nomadic. Over time, this Turkification of the region endowed Central Asia with a more nomadic character. Pastoral nomadism centered on herding, a practice that provided all the necessities for life on the steppe. These nomads followed a seasonal migratory pattern. Although seemingly innocuous, the pastoral nomadic lifestyle of these migrants enhanced their ability to expand and conquer neighboring groups and civilizations.

Pastoral nomadism accorded its practitioners certain martial advantages. Practices developed in herding proved devastating in combat. Turkic nomads grew up hunting and herding from horseback. Their ability to shoot from horseback provided them with a mobile and lethal means to overcome sedentary, infantry-based armies. These men carried portable double-compound bows capable of piercing enemy armor from over 450 meters. The Mongol pony, their indigenous horse, had great endurance and allowed Turkic groups to cover 160 kilometers per day. Though not tall in stature, the Mongol Pony was rugged and sturdy. Native to the region, these horses could survive on their own. The combination of the skills acquired from herding, the double-compound bow and the Mongol Pony, produced a formula for the political domination of Central Asia.

Sufism -- Central Asia made major contributions to Islam, specifically in the form of Sufism, a native form of mysticism that Islam assimilated, as well as _madrasas_, religious schools where students would learn Arabic, the Qur’an, and the
Sufism expanded out of Central Asia to shape much of the Islamic world. Today, Sufism is present in Islamic societies from Africa to Indonesia. Sufi poetry influenced the Persian and Arabic languages. The linkage of Sufism as an ideology with tribal powers provided assabiya, or unifying force, for conquerors like the Safavids and the Ottoman Turks.

Sufism is essentially Islamic mysticism. It developed in Central Asia out of the fusion of Islamic sedentary civilizations and Buddhist nomadic cultures. Central Asians were receptive and tolerant of foreign beliefs. They slowly converted to Islam after being overwhelmed by such men as Qutayba ibn Muslim, but they were never Arabized. The Islamicized populations of Central Asia generally accepted Sunni Islam and the Sharia (Qur’anic law); however, the culture and lifestyle of the nomadic steppe peoples of Central Asia did not readily conform to the rigors of Islamic law. Sufism helped convert these steppe tribes to Islam. Central Asian Sufi orders, such as the Yasaviyah, were established along trade routes in order that they may reach out to travelers. These missionaries proselytized to the Turkic peoples on the steppe. Meanwhile, the Naqshbandi Order spread Sufism thru economics. The Naqshibandis ministered to Iranian and Tajik peoples while operating in travel lodges. The followers of these Sufi orders believed that they could better disseminate an Islam that was more loving and caring.

Central Asian Sufis asserted that “Official Islam” lacked compassion, and, according to the historian Svat Soucek, “Muslims eventually began to feel the need of bridging the chasm separating them from the austere God of the Koran, and of finding a path to His more immediate and comforting presence.” They desired something more from religion, specifically a closer connection to God. Sufis believed that they could achieve a union with God based on love. This notion contrasted sharply with the general perception of Muslims submitting to God out of fear.

Sufism has enjoyed much influence in Islam both inside and outside of Central Asia. Shah Ismail (1501-1526) combined tribal and religious power to form the foundation of the Safavid state. The Ottoman Turks, advancing westward into Anatolia, adopted Sufist elements of Islam. For the Ottoman Turks, Sufism was essential to converting their own frontier kinsmen as well as those in newly-conquered areas in the Balkans. This assabiya enabled the Persians and the Turks to garner the political support of their people, since they held religious authority.

Many people associate Sufism with proselytizing to frontier, pastoral nomadic groups in Central Asia, but Sufism expanded from Central Asia to South East Asia, to East Africa, and to Muslim Spain (al-Andalus). In fact, Sufi merchants were largely responsible for bringing Islam to South East Asia and converting the Malays and Indonesians. Sufism helped assimilate the recently-annexed areas along the frontier because of its emphasis on love and a connection with God, rather than strict accordance with the Qur’an.

The Madrassa-- It was these Turkic groups who introduced Sufism, as well as the madrassa, into Islamic and Arab culture. The Seljuk Turks fostered the madrassa. Originally, madrassas were schools that inculcated religion, teaching students Arabic, Islamic theology, as well as the Qur’an and Hadith. Their studies often lasted between five to eight years. The madrassas were first founded in Central Asia in the eleventh century, just prior to the rise of Genghis Khan. Madrassas had a special religious curriculum aimed at training men to become clerics or civil servants. As all the subjects came within the realm of religion, madrassas did not teach any secular subjects. By sending their children to a madrassa, parents ensured that their children received some education, albeit a religious one. These madrassas extended the Islamic world from Indonesia to Turkey and the Maghreb. These schools are still prevalent in places like Pakistan and Indonesia.

What did it internalize? External forces saturated Central Asia and shaped the course of this region’s history. Generally, intellectual diffusion is not a one-way street; ideas flow in both directions. Such is the case of Central Asia, where the region received much from the world surrounding it. The Arab Muslim conquests of Persia and all the way up to the Syr Daria River brought with it much Islamization, but little Arabization to Central Asia. This vast region absorbed, adopted, and assimilated these forces, remaking them into something that was culturally its own.

Islam-- Islam was not the first religion to thrive in Central Asia. There were no indigenous faiths to the area, but the region had already been exposed to many foreign systems of belief prior to the arrival of Islam in the seventh century. Merchants from Central Asia who had conducted long-distance international trade came into contact with many doctrines, and the great number of religions in Central Asia testifies to the great tolerance of the region. The Silk Route carried Buddhism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Nestorian Christianity, and Siberian Shamanism to Central Asia. Even today, there are Jewish communities in Central Asia. Central Asians adopted and absorbed all of these foreign beliefs, assimilating them and making them uniquely Central Asian. By the tenth century, all of the non-monotheistic faiths had disappeared from Central Asia in the face of Islamic conquest.

As his armies swept into the area in the seventh and eighth centuries, General Qutayba ibn Muslim introduced Islam to Central Asia. His Arab Muslim forces defeated the Persians and completed their expansion into Trans-Oxiana by 715 C.E. The Islamic Caliphate absorbed the newly-conquered territories. An Arab Muslim victory over the Chinese at the Battle of the Talas River in 751 C.E., secured the region and repulsed the only major challenge to Islamic rule. Thus began Central Asia’s slow process of Islamization. The triumph over the Chinese made it possible for Islam to take deep root in the region, but Islamization did not take place overnight - it took centuries. Interestingly, the Arab conquerors did not want a rapid conversion of Central Asian peoples because that meant they could not reap the benefits of taxing non-Muslims. Trans-Oxiana slowly Islamicized, although it never Arabized. The peoples of Central Asia remained culturally Turkic and Persian. Central Asia retained its Turkic and Persian lan-
It took generations for Islam to become fully ingrained in the culture of Central Asia. Unlike other areas where Islam filtered into societies from the bottom up, as in South East Asia, Islamization in Central Asia occurred from the top down. The key to the Islamic conversion of Central Asia was Islam’s willingness to allow the native peoples take part in the process. Elites submitted to Islam to maintain their status and position in the new society. The Arab Muslims offered the Central Asian nobility important positions in the administration so long as they practiced Islam. This policy provided the opportunity for the native elite to rule in their own right.

The Persian Saminids made Islam the official state religion, established a school of theology in Bukhara, and the Sheikh Al-Islam read sermons in Arabic. Islam had a remarkable ability to assimilate indigenous Central Asian frontier customs as it advanced through the region, allowing some traditional practices to remain so long as it accelerated conversion. By accepting certain harmless practices in order to Islamicize Central Asia, the Arab Muslims mirrored Christian efforts to Christianize Eastern Europe during the Drang Nach Osten.

Islam in Central Asia differs greatly from that which originally came out of the Gulf. In order for Islam to take root in Central Asia, it had to make some concessions to the native, specifically the pastoral-nomadic culture. The rigid, strict brand of Wahabi Islam so prevalent in the Gulf, was not accepted in the region. The Turkic, pastoral nomads did not submit to the rigors of this Islam, and their nomadic lifestyle was not so conducive to the Islam of the conquerors. Instead, what emerged from the mix of Arab Islam and Turkic pastoral nomadism was Sufism.

**The Mongol Era** — The period ranging from the great Mongol invasions of Central Asia to the eve of Russian Imperialism was also a time of nativism in Central Asian history. Central Asia moved to the fore of world history at a point when indigenous forces in Central Asia shaped the world around it. During this phase, Central Asia externalized the Mongol conquests. The region also coped with competing internal pressures, such as the dynamic between the sedentary and nomadic societies in Central Asia. Foreign influence waned, as the two civilizations sparred for control of the region. It did, however, internalize foreign technology and the proceeds from victory.

**What did it externalize?**

**The Mongols** — The Mongols created the largest empire in history - yet it was with enormous difficulty that they even united as a people. Perhaps the greatest obstacle for the Mongols was their own divisiveness and tribalism. Inter-tribal strife was commonplace, but once they joined together, the Mongols expanded deep into Central Asia, Russia, China, India, and the Middle East. Temujin, who later became Genghis Khan, brought this fractured people together and developed a method of governance and expansion that lasted long after his death in 1227. He reorganized Mongol society, providing the impetus for expansion and producing a safe and reliable means of transferring power at his succession.

**A New System for Unity** — Genghis Khan’s success was the result of his convictions and his management skills. Exposed to Nestorian Christianity, he had a keen awareness of his personal destiny, which inspired him to achieve great accomplishments. His sense of kismet and his charisma enabled him to bring the various Mongol tribes together. Genghis Khan undoubtedly concluded that God predestined him to function as His temporal ruler on Earth.

Prior to the ascension of Temujin as Genghis Khan in 1206, the Mongols were an unstable confederation of clans and tribes roaming the Orkhon Steppe. He presided over peoples who had experienced constant warfare since 1160. Genghis Khan consolidated all of these tribes into a single Mongol “nation.” He reorganized them under a new system, giving Mongolia society more cohesiveness and unity. He developed a new political order that deviated from tradition, forcing his Bogatores (Ninety-nine Commanders) to swear the Baljuna Oath of total allegiance to him. These men held the most elite positions in Mongolian nobility. Genghis Khan charged each of his Bogatores with 1000 soldiers and a tribal unit of 1000 families, and each tribe was responsible for a particular pasture and fielding of 1000 men. Genghis Khan then took advantage of the Mongol assembly, or kuriltai, which appointed him as the first undisputed ruler of the Mongols, uniting them under the authority of his position as the universal khan.

Genghis Khan was the ultimate source of justice, consolidating his position and making it more authoritarian. His law, or Yasa, strengthened Mongol, rather than clan or tribal identification. He based his law on shamanist principles, and the Yasa served as the social and political laws binding all Mongols together. His system had the added effect of assuaging previous tribal conflicts by assigning members of one tribe to military detail with other rival tribes, thus emphasizing collective responsibility. He forced the men from one tribe to stand guard over the pastures of other tribes, weakening tribal loyalty and reinforcing his own leadership.

**Expansion** — Genghis Khan stimulated Mongol expansion and conquest of Central Asia. First, he subdued inter-tribal warfare. Then, following steppe tradition, he externalized the violence of the steppe. Genghis Khan’s reorganization of Mongol society forged units around him into a coherent fighting force. He delegated authority to the men whom he could trust most - his Bogatores; these men shared in his glory.

Genghis Khan offered incentives to those who went to battle in his name. The spoils of victory went to the men who fol-
lowed him into battle. Genghis Khan received ten percent of the loot and divided the remaining ninety percent among his 
*Bogatores.* This plunder included the inhabitants of all subjugated lands, which resulted in dramatic depopulation of conquered ter-
ritory, as the khan received his share of artisans and craftsmen to be sent back to Karakorum.

Early difficulties in campaigning against China’s sedentary peoples prompted Genghis Khan to adjust his strategy. By lay-
ing waste to all of northern China, Genghis Khan aimed at annihilating their way of life, turning the region into pasture land for 
his herds. He surrounded Beijing and starved the city’s inhabitants into submission. He accomplished this by destroying their crops. 
Genghis Khan systematically obliterated everything in order to send a message that it was futile to resist him.

**Succession** -- The Mongols were the only steppe tribes whose empire expanded following the death of 
the founder. Most of the Mongol conquests actually transpired after the death of Genghis Khan. Unlike previous tribal confedera-
tions, it did not implode owing to the fact that Genghis Khan had invented a strategy for Mongol expansion. Previously, there exist-
ed a series of politically unstable Mongol tribal confederations loosely bound under a *kagan*, a charismatic ruler with claims of 
divine right. These tribal confederations expanded when they were stable, but they were often volatile and thus usually imploded.

Genghis Khan stabilized Mongol society and made it less fractious, while at the same time constructing a framework for 
successive Mongol generations to follow. By embodying autocracy in the position of the universal khan, Genghis Khan made 
the position of khan institutional, not personal, building a new foundation for legitimacy. Previously, leadership had rested on charis-
ma. Moreover, the universal khan had to be recognized at a *kurilatai*. He could not be self-proclaimed.

Under this new system, Genghis Khan had ultimate and absolute authority, and only one of his four sons from his first 
wife, Borte, could succeed him. To be considered a legitimate inheritor of the throne, one had to be a descendent of Genghis Khan’s 
four sons. This dramatically limited the number of contenders for the khanate, narrowing future competition for succession. Only 
they had Genghis-Khanid legitimacy. Genghis Khan’s plan also fused older steppe traditions with his new vision. He bequeathed 
to his sons parts of the world yet unconquered, so that they had to win these areas and establish their own control. This stipulation 
produced an incentive for them to work together in order to collect their patrimony.

**What did it internalize?** Genghis Khan’s descendants greatly expanded the Mongol Empire into Central Asia. There 
they reunited with their Turkic cousins who they had expelled from the Orkhon Steppe some 1000 years earlier. They confronted 
Turkic peoples who had altered their lifestyle since their days on the steppe. During this native period in Central Asian history, the 
region witnessed the struggle between steppe and sedentary civilizations. This conflict between the two cultures faded over time 
and eventually led to a Turk-Mongol fusion under Timur Lang, an imitator of Genghis Khan. However, the climates, environ-
ments, and periods in which these two men lived were dissimilar, so they dealt with distinct conditions and circumstances, thus 
producing institutions that while endeavoring to achieve similar goals, differed in many respects.

**Steppe vs Sedentary** -- One strategy Genghis Khan adopted to conquer cities was to hire foreign siege-warfare 
experts. The Mongols did not have the military technology necessary to overcome Chinese urban defenses, thus they imported for-
eign technology and peoples. To compensate for a lack of native talent, they incorporated foreign engineers into their army. The 
Mongols hired Arab, Persian, and Chinese siege experts to solve their difficulty defeating cities. Their knowledge of siege warfare 
enabled them to construct the catapults, siege engines, and towers used to subjugate cities. Adding these new sedentary peoples to 
the Mongol army inevitably caused problems, for these men came from distinctly different cultures, so they did not interact well 
with the pastoral nomads. Genghis Khan had a specific approach for combining the mobility of the Mongol armies with the slow, 
bulky siege engines of the sedentary armies. He kept the Mongol cavalry independent from the siege engineers comprised of for-
eign mercenaries. Genghis Khan skillfully blended these two groups to his strategic advantage. Later, Tamerlane, imitator of 
Genghis Khan, had difficulty bringing these two groups together as well.

For the Mongols, building an empire proved much easier than maintaining one. There was an inherent need for the steppe 
nomads to loot and plunder. Mongol leaders took advantage of this by exporting the violence of the steppe, but the Mongols had 
difficulty comprehending sedentary civilization. They easily forced many cities to capitulate. When they were successful, they were 
able to instill fear in their enemies, but once subdued, the Mongols needed local officials to ensure that taxes and tribute flowed 
freely back to Karakorum. They did not understand the settled culture or know how to maintain order in that environment.

**Turko-Mongol Fusion** -- The Mongols were the first to unify the Eurasian steppe. Their occupation was a 
wholesale takeover, but once in Central Asia, the Mongols had trouble coping with the differences between steppe and sedentary 
civilizations. As the Mongols migrated southwestward down the steppe, they did not displace the Turks already in Central Asia. 
Instead, the Turks absorbed and assimilated the invading Mongols. Early on, the dominant Mongols offered the Turks a deal to 
either merge with them or suffer harsh reprisal. So as the Mongols progressed westward, their armies gained strength as more and 
more Turks joined them. This resulted in armies that were mostly comprised of Turks, not Mongols. Over time, the Mongols 
 Turkified, as the Mongol ruling elite adopted Chagatai, a Turkic tongue.

Chagatai (d.1241) was the second son of Genghis Khan and his wife Borte. His patrimony included the area between the 
Caspian Sea and the Tarim Basin. Chagatai mostly concentrated on the domestic issues in this region. While not interested in fol-
lowing in his father’s footsteps, Chagatai played an important role holding the Mongol empire together. Like his father, Chagatai
performed his duty as the upholder of *Yasa* and Mongol tradition. He also designated a new Turkic literary language written in the Arabic script. He was an excellent representative of the Turko-Mongol fusion.

*Inju* was Chagatai’s solution to the conflict between the steppe and the sedentary. It consisted of a political system designed to separate two cultures, where both societies could maintain their own traditional laws yet remain subject to the authority of Chagatai and his descendants. *Inju* was also an economic arrangement granting the Mongols a share of the wealth produced in sedentary lands. Those who participated in *inju* were entitled to their allotment of the common imperial settled possessions. At first, all of the conquered cities were property of the khan, but over time access to the wealth of the cities extended to the nomads who took part in *inju*. Those who cooperated with the Mongols were rewarded with a portion of the profits.

*Inju* was a dual administrative system and a form of indirect rule. Chagatai was conscious not to force *Yasa* on sedentary Muslim cities; however, *Yasa* continued to be exercised on the steppe. In sedentary areas, they continued to use a bureaucratic tradition with a Muslim administration. So long as the urban Muslims did not openly resist Mongol control, they could go about their daily business, free from Mongol interference in their cities. The steppe continued to abide by customary Mongol law, while in the south, the people in the cities lived according to the Sharia. *Inju* was a practical solution to the difficulty of governing the two separate societies, but it ultimately did not resolve the problem of uniting the Turks and Mongols.

Over time, these Mongol-Buddhist pastoral nomads presiding over a sedentary Islamic culture, slowly Turkified. They became a Mongol minority controlling a Turkic majority. For this system to work, the Mongols had to speak the language of the people they ruled. So instead of the Mongols imposing their language on the majority of the population, they learned Turkic.

*Inju* did not accommodate the needs of either society. In fact, it encouraged friction between the two civilizations because it placed hardships on both the sedentary and steppe peoples. While the nomads benefited handsomely from *inju*, it also was demanding for them to uphold *inju*. The Mongols received tribute, slaves, and status from ruling over sedentary lands, but the costs of sustaining this empire were heavy. It disrupted the nomadic way of life because they often had to take part in exhaustive campaigns lasting years at a time. The nomads were unaccustomed to a considerable amount of government interference in their lifestyle. Increasingly, they viewed the prospect of maintaining an empire as a burden, and preferred their pastoral lifestyle on the steppe. They considered *inju* incompatible with their traditional nomadic way of life. They sought more independence and stability, so they began to defect from the system and return to the steppe.

Meanwhile, those living in the settled lands chafed under *inju* as well. Although they recognized that government was an essential part of life, *inju* encumbered the sedentary populations. By adding supplementary taxes, the Mongols further stressed the settled population. The Mongols’ method for raising additional taxes was unpredictable and disruptive. This annoyed the city folk accustomed to more regular taxation. *Inju* did not mesh well with either lifestyle. The practice rested on force, not utility. The Mongol state had two different societies that were often in conflict, so it was never in a state of permanent stability.

There were numerous points of contention between the two groups but also many commonalities. Both groups originated on the Orkhon Steppe. While the Turks had settled down over the years, their culture was still rooted in the principles of pastoral nomadism, just as the Mongols. Also, both groups organized along tribal lines. Each followed a pattern of co-opting one tribe into another, and both followed a patrimonial distribution of inheritance. Their languages were related, coming out of the Ural and Altaic families, and the proximity of their languages helped facilitate a fusion of the Mongols with their Turkic hosts. The only major distinction between the two societies was religion, but once the Chagataids converted to Islam in 1333, this difference disappeared. So while the Mongols adopted the Turkic religion of Islam, the Turks incorporated the Mongol political concept of Genghis-Khanid legitimacy. To have political legitimacy in Central Asia, one had to trace their lineage to Genghis Khan through one of his four sons. Genghis-Khanid legitimacy lasted in Central Asia until 1920.

Rulers like Genghis Khan and Tamerlane (also known as Timur, Temur, Taimur, Timur Lenk, Tımır-I Leng, Tambahlaine, Taimur-e-Lang, Timur the Lame, and Timur Lang) attempted to assuage the differences between the two cultures, or actually develop a political arrangement that could harness the best attributes of each society without the dangerous side effects of combining the two civilizations. Tamerlane (1370-1405) came out of Central Asia and was a product of Turko-Mongol fusion. He descended from a Mongol clan, but he was born and raised a Muslim and spoke a Turkic language. For the first time in Central Asia’s history, the region was not part of another empire but at the center of world events. Tamerlane constructed a new political and military machine that was deeply ingrained in the political background of the Chagatai Khanate. His new order lacked stability because *inju* satisfied neither the steppe nor the sedentary peoples. Tamerlane eliminated the Chagatai practice of *inju*.

Tamerlane imitated Genghis Khan’s use of the assembly, stating, “With the people of the twelve classes and tribes I conquered and governed kingdoms; and with them I strengthened the pillars of my fortune, and from them I formed my assembly.” Recognizing that there was a serious conflict between the nomadic and sedentary cultures under his control, Timur Lang provided a framework where both societies could live in harmony. He exported the violence of the steppe, which best served the interests of the sedentary population. This meant peace at home in the settled areas of Central Asia and war abroad.

Tamerlane ordered his political connections in a series of concentric rings. At the center of his political circle were family and close allies. The second ring consisted of the Barlas Clan and loyal tribes from which Tamerlane traced his lineage. The third circle was made up of the supporters of peoples that Tamerlane had defeated; the second and third rings balanced one another. The outermost bands included Timur’s hereditary professional administrators and bureaucrats, soldiers from the steppe areas for his cavalry units, and finally the Persian sedentary populations, where Tamerlane recruited his soldiers for his infantry and siege units.

Tamerlane also imitated Genghis Khan’s success in the field. To accomplish his military goals, Tamerlane designed a mil-
itary that was well adapted to the environment in which he lived. However, unlike Genghis Khan, Tamerlane increasingly combined his cavalry, siege, and infantry units, placing his heavy cavalry at the center of formations. Tamerlane feared his enemies aligning against him because he did not physically occupy conquered lands like Genghis Khan. He reasoned, “And at this time it came into my mind, that if the rulers of those countries should join together to oppose me, I must be well prepared... and my Ameers gave this counsel saying, ‘We must go prepared to war.’ And I resolved with myself, that I would make them obedient to me, one by one; and that I would chastise those who refused to submit.”

Much like Genghis Khan, Tamerlane left conquered lands under the control of those loyal to him. Determined to keep his army occupied, Tamerlane made certain that it was constantly on campaign. He had a very hands-on approach to managing his army. He lacked faith in his army, and he did not have confidence in other men to lead it, so he led his military on campaigns against the Ottomans, Mamluks, Chinese and Indians. In his own words, Tamerlane described his lack of trust in his Ameers (Generals), “I deliberated with myself concerning the Ameers who opposed the reduction of Hindostan, whether I should throw them down from their commands, and give their troops and their Kusheens to their Kotuls.” Tamerlane’s military was the product of a Turko-Mongol fusion, employing Turkic siege techniques and the Mongol cavalry. Moreover, in the tradition of Genghis Khan, Tamerlane was not above using terror as an effective means to conquer sedentary populations. Svat Soucek explained, “Timur was a ruthless conqueror not unlike Genghis Khan, and spent much of his life engaged in military campaigns that wrought similar massacres and destruction.” Tamerlane described the punishment for those who resisted him, “I entered Bughdaud [Sic], and I commanded that they should slay the seditious inhabitants of that city; and that they should throw down the castle and the buildings thereof, and make them level with the earth.”

Tamerlane represented the transition from Medieval to modern society in Central Asia. His army had an early form of artillery. He had gunpowder technology and ventured to monopolize the market so that other powers could not use it. He also took advantage of the steppe to form an empire that promoted trade to help rebuild the cities devastated from years of Mongol and nomad rule. He attempted to reactivate and dominate the Silk Route, even going so far as to campaign against the Mamluks, Indians, and Chinese, in order to divert all trade in his direction.

**Imperial Russia to the fall of the USSR** — Central Asia maintained an important position in the world economy with its location along the Silk Road; that is, until European maritime technology and navigational techniques allowed Europe, or the West, to supersede this region and its important trading route. It was disastrous for Central Asia when European merchants navigated the Cape of Good Hope to safely deposit their finished goods in India, picking up raw materials for the trek back to Britain. Central Asia would no longer be a major factor in the international trade from South and East Asia to the West. As trade along the Silk Route dwindled, so too did Central Asia’s economic importance on a larger scale. The wealth stopped passing through Central Asia, and many of the towns that functioned as trading posts along the Silk Route slowly dried up and became ghost towns. Interestingly, the effect of the new trade routes from Europe to Asia not only affected Central Asia in this manner, but the Middle East and North Africa as well, for European maritime achievements circumvented the Middle East and North Africa, thereby severely damaging their economies.

**What did it externalize?** Central Asia externalized two major movements during this period, Jadidism and Pan-Turkism. “Jadid” comes from the Arabic “new.” Jadidism was an Islamic reformist movement in response to Russian Imperialism. It was an intellectual movement, calling for new or “jadidist” interpretation of Islam to deal with colonialism. On the other hand, Pan-Turkism was an attempt to unify all the Turks in Central Asia, as well as Anatolia, Russia, and China. Proponents of Pan-Turkism followed Al-Afghani and the Pan-Islam movement.

**Jadidism and Pan-Turkism** — The Jadidists coped with their subordinate position to a European Christian power by refocusing on Islam. They concluded that there was nothing wrong with Islam, so there had to be a problem with their interpretation of Islam. The trouble lay with them, not their religion. They aspired to mature as Muslims. Incidentally, this same notion was advanced in other Muslim nations colonized by Europeans. Jadidists believed that they had to diagnose the ills of their society in order to revitalize it. They endeavored to remain Muslim, yet be strong, so they addressed the educational, cultural, and political difficulties within the Muslim community.

Thinkers like Marjani (1818-1899) considered the Ulama the root of the problem for Central Asian Muslims. He believed that these clerics were too conservative and traditional. Marjani noted that there was no Ulama in early Islam, so he deduced that the clerics were the source of the plight of Central Asian Muslims. For Marjani, the Ulama was a corruption of Islam. He advocated a return to the time before the Ulama, when Muslims were free to interpret Islam for themselves. Marjani also called for better education, because only a well-educated Muslim could formulate proper responses to their questions. This meant taking education out of the clerics’ hands and placing it within the secular realm.

Marjani hoped for more students to study the sciences, so that they could be competitive in the modern world. He was anti-Russian, but he also acknowledged that students had to learn Russian in order to prosper, for they resided under Russian domination and needed to function in a Russian-controlled society. While Marjani advocated the introduction of more secular subjects, he also felt that students should continue to learn the Qur’an and Hadith.

Gaspirali (1851-1914) founded Pan-Turkism and later became the leader of the Jadidist movement. He operated in both
worlds, fluent in both Russian and Turkic. Gaspirali agreed with Marjani’s observations and criticism of the Ulama, but he also recognized that a major obstruction of their educational improvement was their lack of textbooks. He developed a common Turkic language, which conveniently resembled his native language of Tatar. He believed that one universal Turkic language would facilitate unification and strengthen the Muslim Turkic population in Russian Central Asia with their cousins in Anatolia and northwest China. Gaspirali published textbooks in Tatar Turkic for use across the Turkic world. Unlike Marjani, Gaspirali was not anti-Russian; he was pragmatic enough to concede that the Russians would be in Central Asia for a long time. Gaspirali was not interested in political independence; he merely concerned himself with educating Muslim Turks and establishing schools.

Gaspirali established his first school in Crimea in the 1880s. He educated his students there in the basic Islamic subjects, as well as the physical sciences, geography, Turkic, Russian and Russian history. He aspired to prepare his students with the skills required to succeed in the Russian Empire. Gaspirali encouraged Tatar businessmen to fund this educational effort. He considered it in their best interest to do so, as the Tatars had extensive business connections in Central Asia.

There was resistance to Jadidist efforts in Central Asia and elsewhere. The Ulama actively tried to suppress the Jadidist movement. They quickly realized that if the Jadids had their way, it would end their monopoly on education. Clerics strongly opposed early attempts to establish Jadid schools. Once the Jadids opened a school, the clerics mobilized to shut it down. The Ulama contended that the Jadids were un-Islamic, branding them bad Muslims.

The first generation of Jadids concentrated on education and Islamic renewal, but the following generation became much more politicized. This transformation began with the Russian defeat at the hands of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and continued with the Russian Revolution of 1905. Japan proved that a non-European power could beat the Russians, calling into question Marjani and Gaspirinski’s beliefs that Russia would always control Central Asia. The Tsarist government barely survived the Russian Revolution of 1905. To survive, it had to grant concessions, including a Parliamentary system and suffrage. While Russians received the franchise, Central Asians still had no suffrage. Their substandard treatment led to more political activism, as Jadidists were pro-change.

What did it internalize? Years after the Russians first came into contact with the Golden Horde, Russian imperialism brought the Russians back in touch with the nomadic Turkic populations on the steppe, and later, into the sedentary heart of Central Asia, where they sought to Russianize these Central Asian Turkic populations. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Russianization gave way to Sovietization, and men like Joseph Stalin attempted to make Central Asians into good little communists. This included forced collectivization and anti-Islamic campaigns. Later, the growth of nationalism in Central Asia, while part of a broader, worldwide pattern of nationalism, certainly remained exceptional in many respects. The Soviets encouraged nationalism. Moreover, many states in Central Asia, when faced with the prospects of decolonization, preferred unity with Moscow and chose to fight to remain a part of the USSR. Meanwhile, other states happily went their own way towards independence.

Russian migration and Russianization -- Russia emancipated its serfs during a peasant population explosion in 1861. In 1864, Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov circulated a letter to all the European capitals, insisting that in the interest of security, Russia had to assert its dominance over the steppe. Russia was searching for an outlet to its burgeoning peasant population, so it issued the Resettlement Act in 1889, enabling Russian peasants to migrate to Central Asia, an act which was meant to solve their population problem.

Tsarist Russia progressed slowly into Central Asia, collectively absorbing the areas that it conquered, and attaching all newly-acquired territory to the core of Russia. Russia took over two centuries to fully progress into Central Asia and put down deep roots in the region. Russian migration into Central Asia accompanied this imperial conquest, as the major impetus for settlement was the Tsarist State. Determined to stay in Central Asia, the Russian military brought peasant populations with it to colonize the land, cultivate it, and build more forts. Russian settlers flooded this area, and by the end of the eighteenth century, Russian populations outnumbered some native populations, including the Bashkirs, who comprised only twenty percent of the population. By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the European population outnumbered the Kazak population in its traditional homeland. While there was a major influx of Russian migrants into the steppe, few Europeans migrated to the southern, more sedentary areas. There was continuity to the peasants’ agricultural lifestyle, for climate on the Kazak steppe was similar to that of the Russian agricultural lands. This was not the case in the sedentary south. Unfortunately, by the Russians physically occupying the land and farming it, they disrupted traditional nomadic life; they took land where the nomads had previously grazed their herds.

Further Russianization of the steppe occurred when Russian settlers brought their native Russian institutions to Central Asia. New Russian institutions in Central Asia disrupted the old, native systems. Previously, tribal elders served as community chieftains and preservers of customs. Nomadic communities had chosen their own leaders. The Russians brought separate groups together, forcing them to designate one leader by consensus, thereby encouraging infighting and diminishing a potential threat to Russian authority. The Russian pattern of imperialism also included co-option. The Russian state attempted to incorporate tribal and clan chieftains into the Russian imperial structure, by offering them the privileges of rank. They integrated Genghis-Khanid princes into the Russian nobility.

When confronted by these nomadic steppe peoples, the Russians exhibited a definite cultural bias. They did not view the steppe nomads as a legitimate power like the Ottomans or the Safavids; instead, they considered them chaotic and weak groups who naturally needed to be conquered. This notion favored Russian justification for imperialism in Central Asia, enabling Russia’s
manifest destiny to conquer these peoples. The Russians deemed the natives inferior, refusing to grant them neither the full rights nor privileges of Russian citizenship. Legally, the Russians regarded the natives as second-class citizens, and while they did not have the same obligations as the Russians, they still had to pay taxes. The Russians even separated the justice systems for natives and Russian settlers, allowing Central Asians to continue to operate the traditional Islamic court system, while Russian courts had jurisdiction over all matters involving a Russian.

There was a language barrier between the Russians and native populations. The Russians were uninterested in learning native languages, so they employed the Tatars, who functioned as intermediaries between the Russians and Turkic groups. Even though the Tatars were Turkic, they had learned Russian over the years from their close contact with Russia. The Russians were disdainful of their Muslim subjects and unwilling to speak their languages, so to some extent, the Russians depended on the Tatars.

Sovietization and National Policy -- After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Communist Party declared that they would end the tsarist system with regards to the separate nationalities within the empire. The Communists acknowledged the tsarist nationality policy was exploitative, only benefiting the Russian elite. They promised to allow the diverse nationalities to exercise some control over their national sovereignty.

Stalin (1924-53) directly engaged Soviet Central Asia by reorganizing and Sovietizing the region. He delimited Central Asia along national lines, erasing earlier boundaries and redrawing them in the form of national republics. Stalin wanted to grant each particular nationality its own state with its own native institutions. They could have their own communist party and even their own education system in their native language.

Even though Stalin believed that nationalism was a false consciousness, he deliberately chose to recognize nationalities. He even defined them. For Stalin, a nation had to have a community of language, territory, economic life, and psychology. He thought that the concept of nationalism would eventually fade away and merge with socialism. By forming national republics, Stalin hoped to advance these “nations” towards socialism. He aimed to Sovietize these Central Asians, endowing them with a new Soviet identity that would transcend national differences. Stalin reasoned that there were stages in the evolution of a society, starting with the tribe, progressing to the nation state, and finally, Sovietism.

Fearing a possible uprising, Stalin did not want one large Muslim Turkic nation in Central Asia, so the Soviets delimited these states to reflect an ideal engineered by the Communist Party, not a native reality. The Soviets mostly drew boundaries along linguistic lines. They also contributed to standardizing written languages in Central Asia, by sending Soviet ethnographers and linguists to different regions in order to classify their nationalities and languages. The Soviets charged these same men with developing written languages for these peoples so that they could be educated in their national language. Most Soviet Central Asians were illiterate in their native language. Linguists began by designating a new script for these Turkic languages. They dropped the Arabic script for a couple reasons. First, it is difficult to use and does not match well with the Turkic languages, as Arabic is a consonant-driven language, and Turkic tongues emphasize vowels. The Soviets also assumed that by doing away with the Arabic script they would be neutralizing Islam in Central Asia, cutting it off from its roots. Interestingly, the Soviets did not force the Cyrillic script on Central Asians, for they wanted to avoid looking imperialist. Instead, they selected the Latin alphabet. The ultimate goal for the Soviet linguists in Central Asia was to foster national literatures. They hoped Central Asian authors would compose works in their native languages; however, these had to be “Nationalist” in form and “Soviet” in content. The Soviet goal was to mold Soviets out of Central Asians. They desired someone who identified themselves as a Soviet, rather than according to their individual nationality.

Stalin wanted these Central Asians to appear nationalist but believe in socialism. In other words, they could seem outwardly nationalist, but they must be inwardly socialist. The essence of their beliefs had to be socialist in substance. Stalin endeavored to engineer a Soviet mentality for all of these nationalities, so the Soviets had to educate these Soviet Central Asians in atheism and scientific materialism, in order to produce future generations of socialists.

Collectivization -- The Soviet Union had a centrally planned economy, which ended the free market and private enterprise in Russia. Stalin transformed the Soviet economy so that the Kremlin set all production decisions and objectives. Moscow devised Five-Year Plans that established the quotas to be met over five years in each economic area. National republics were responsible for meeting their production quota targets.

Part of the process of nationalizing the Soviet economy included the forcible collectivization of agriculture. This meant nationalizing the means of production and all agricultural assets. The state now owned everything, and it resettled Central Asian nomadic populations into collective farms, which had to meet the production quotas set in Moscow.

Stalin attempted to fundamentally alter the behavior of Central Asians. Under collectivization, there was no more seasonal migration. Unfortunately, the Soviets knew very little about pastoral nomadism. By destroying their nomadic way of life and absorbing them into collective farms, the Soviets effectively decreased the proportion of Kazaks living by their nomadic lifestyle to twenty-five percent. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Kazaks emigrated to China with their herds to escape forced collectivization.

Naturally, the Kazaks reacted negatively to this threat to their traditional way of life. Civil war erupted in Kazakhstan. The Basmachi Rebellion started with Kazaks who had escaped the collective farms. These Kazak peasants unleashed their anger against those very farms, raiding them, and killing all the Soviet officials and party workers they came across. During this period, a full
one-fifth of the Kazak population was lost to murder, disease, and migration.

In the more sedentary Uzbekistan, collectivization focused on the production of cotton. The centrally planned economy called for Uzbekistan to be the state’s cotton provider. The Jadids voiced opposition to collectivization and its Five-Year Plans which took no account of the native populations, subordinating their needs to those of the state. Moscow effectively turned Uzbekistan into a monocultural economy. The first Five-Year Plan curtailed cereal production and increased cotton production so that it could be sent to European Russia for manufacturing. Jadids protested this form of economic imperialism, where they were converted into the cotton supplier for Russia.

Anti-Islam Campaigns -- Lenin did not attack Islam in Central Asia due to the fact that the Soviets were initially weak in Central Asia. He was cautious not to provoke a Holy War with Islam. Islam posed a serious problem for the Soviets. The Soviets did not understand how best to undermine Islam since it lacked a hierarchy like that of Christian churches. Instead, the Soviets tolerated Islam, allowing Muslim rituals, Sharia courts, and madrassas, to continue. However, in the late 1920s, Stalin reversed the Soviet policy of toleration towards Islam and began an outright assault on the religion. Stalin wanted to consolidate power and was not interested in sharing any with Islam, but Islam was difficult to suppress because it was not confined to a building like a church, nor did it have a clergy. Moreover, Islam was closely woven into the fabric of everyday life in the Turkic community.

Under Stalin, the Soviets began their direct assault on Islam in 1927. He judged Islam to be at odds with communist morality. Stalin nationalized all waqf land and endowments. The Soviets appropriated their property and income and returned it to the peasants. They also took education out of the hands of the mullahs and secularized it. The Soviets took control over every aspect of Islamic life, eliminating the need for Islamic charitable foundations. The state closed the doors to mosques and converted them into community centers. They shut down Sharia courts as well. The Soviets pushed mullahs out of their positions, forcing them to publicly denounce themselves. However hard the Soviets tried to destroy Islam in Central Asia, it was unwilling to go away. Instead, Islam went underground to avoid state persecution.

The Soviets were entirely unable to persuade Central Asians on the merits of Communism over Islam. In fact, Central Asians regarded their coordinated efforts to convert Muslims into Communists as disingenuous. For example, the Soviets began an anti-veiling campaign on the 1927 International Women’s Day, orchestrating public demonstrations of women casting off their veils, symbolically liberating themselves from the oppression of Islam. Unfortunately for the Soviets, it was not long before these same women were covering up again, so Soviet Central Asians learned quickly that they only had to appear outwardly Communist and the state would leave them alone.

Not only did the Soviets attack veiling, but they also went after any Islamic ritual which they deemed incompatible with Communism. This incorporated many of the Five Pillars of Islam, including the daily prayers, as they interfered with daily life and productivity at work. Fasting during Ramadan hindered the planned economy, for it left workers weaker and less productive. The Soviets also forbade polygamy because the Soviets saw it as being inconsistent with their legislation on family and equal rights for women. The Soviets also outlawed the Hajj to Mecca since they wanted to maintain strict control over their borders and their citizens. They were not interested in having Central Asian Muslims come and go as they pleased.

Unfortunately for the Soviets, their efforts to undermine Islam in Central Asia did not prevent Muslims from practicing their religion, especially as they went sub rosa. There were two forms of Islam during this period, Official Islam and Unofficial Islam. The Soviets recognized and supported Official Islam because it could work with it and control it. Unofficial Islam, on the other hand, went underground to escape the rigors of Soviet regulation. There, Sufi brotherhoods survived clandestinely, as Unofficial Islam discovered ways to evade Soviet control.

Under the exigencies of World War II, Stalin relaxed his anti-Islamic policies. He formed Muslim Spiritual Directorates to normalize relations between Moscow and Islam, granting Islam limited privileges. Stalin thought that he could accomplish two goals with his Muslim Spiritual Directorates; he hoped to garner the approval of his Western Allies and Muslims abroad, and he wanted the directorates to be a tool to better preside over his Muslim subjects. The directorates produced official clergy indebted to the Soviet state, yet the government in Moscow provided them with control over Muslim religious life. The Soviets placed all mosques under the supervision of the Directorates. They prohibited any religious activity outside of official mosques. Furthermore, the state made certain that all official clergy had to be registered with the directorate. To ensure and encourage moderate clergies, the directorates both appointed and paid them. The Soviets banned any unrecognized clergies and arrested those who operated without government permission. Directorates and registered clergies were the only ones permitted to discuss religion with the state. They acted as representatives of Islam, and only they were the spokespeople for the government. By founding the directorates, the Soviets attempted to confine and manage Islam.

While Stalin reversed his policies on Islam during World War II, Khrushchev revived the crusade against Islam in 1959. As a devout communist, Khrushchev recognized the necessity of advancing atheism. Khrushchev was an avowed de-Stalinizer, so he made headway relaxing government control over some areas of Soviet life; although, Khrushchev revived religious persecution. In terms of Islam, the number of mosques dropped from 1500 to almost none. Khrushchev further restricted Official Islam, but Unofficial Islam remained popular in seclusion. Local officials tolerated Unofficial Islam, ignoring all of the underground prayer houses and Qur’anic schools.

While the unofficial mullahs received no formal training, the people still accepted them as legitimate religious leaders. They ministered to their worshippers with sermons and prayer as well as performing traditional Islamic rituals. These men of
Unofficial Islam were openly hostile to the Soviets and critical of their atheism. Although Unofficial Islam opposed the Soviet Government, it did not reproach Official Islam, even though Official Islam appeared totally beholden to the Soviet state. It did not protest Communism’s atheistic tendencies nor did it denounce Marxism. Official Islam did not recognize a conflict of interests between being a good Muslim and being a good Communist. The persistence of Unofficial Islam speaks to the continued perseverance of traditional social customs in Central Asia.

In fact, patriarchal Muslim families in Central Asia hindered Soviet attempts to crack Islam. They resisted Soviet efforts to substitute their traditional customs with new Communist family values. The position of the elders within the family unit remained indisputable. The youth respected their elders and were unwilling to offend them, so the Communists had great difficulty passing off ideas as modern and progressive. The young were more likely to accept Communist ideas had they been marketed as traditional. So the Soviets were unable to transform the Central Asian family in the manner which they had intended.

Brezhnev was not a devout believer in atheistic Communism, so he ended the anti-Islam campaigns in 1964. Instead of continuing to persecute these Central Asians based upon their religious identity, Brezhnev considered it best to leave the Central Asian Muslims alone, so long as they did not stir up trouble. By looking the other way, Brezhnev directly assisted Unofficial Islam’s survival. During the Brezhnev era, Unofficial Islam helped promote traditional social practices associated with Islam, and thus Islam slowly became intertwined with national identities. One’s nationality fused with their identity as a Muslim. In other words, to be an Uzbek or a Kazak meant that one was also a Muslim. Their national and religious characters were bound together.

Conclusion -- Central Asian history can be taught in a number of ways; however, I think it best to adopt this thematic approach by examining patterns of externalization and internalization. Students need to understand how these native and foreign forces helped shape the region. This method is also useful because it connects Central Asia to the broader patterns in world history, such as religion, imperialism, nationalism, and decolonization.

Bibliography


Notes
3 Ibid., 42.
4 Ibid., 43.
5 Ibid., 48.

From H-WORLD: Andre Gunder Frank died peacefully at 8:30 a.m. on April 23, 2005 in Luxembourg, in the presence of his loved ones, after a long and brave struggle against cancer and its complications. He was a brilliant and highly productive analyst of political economy and related social sciences who produced fundamental insights on global social interactions, from the 1950s until his death, and whose analysis was always connected to campaigns for social justice. He was a founding figure in the current expansion of studies in world history, and his 1998 book, ReOrient, won the World History Association's book prize. He is survived by his wife, Alison Candela, who gave him loving and essential care in his last years, by his sons Paul and Miguel Frank, and by their families. His remains will be cremated at a small ceremony on April 26, and his ashes will be placed next to the remains of his first wife, Marta Fuentes, in Amsterdam. He was born in Germany in 1929, spent his formative years in Switzerland, and moved to the United States in 1941. He did his undergraduate studies at Swarthmore College and his doctoral work in economics at the University of Chicago, in 1957. In 1962 he moved to Latin America, soon married Marta Fuentes, and worked with her in studies of political economy and social justice; they and their children escaped Chile at the time of the Pinochet coup in 1973. Thereafter he worked in Europe, including over ten years at the University of Amsterdam. From 1994 he lived and worked in the U.S.; he and Alison Candela met in Florida in 2000 and later married in Boston in 2003. He had already gained wide attention for his economic analyses when his 1966 article in Monthly Review, "The Development of Underdevelopment," coined an essential phrase and an interactive historical analysis of dependency in economic growth. In the course of 34 books, 350 articles, and 130 book chapters (with numerous translations in 25 languages), his analysis of world affairs evolved steadily, always ahead of the current consensus. His biography and publication list is online at http://rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/index.html. While his work had world-historical implications from the first, it was in his last fifteen years that it became explicitly world-historical, in *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (co-edited with Barry Gills, 1993), *The Centrality of Central Asia* (1992); and *ReOrient: Asian Economy in the Global Age* (1998). At his death, he was near to completing a sequel to ReOrient, a volume on the fundamental changes of the world economy in the nineteenth century. It is expected that his colleagues will prepare this work for publication. Gunder Frank was an extraordinary individual, able to sustain an immense international network of friends and associates, and able to carry on an energetic campaign of original and critical scholarship though he never gained strong institutional support for his work. He was blunt in academic debate, brilliant in his linkage of history and theory, extraordinary as a phrasemaker, and warm and caring to a fault in his personal relations. All those who knew him will have specific memories of his contribution to their lives. For myself, I want to express gratitude for his friendship and advice, and for his decade of association with the World History Center and his contribution to the studies of a dozen doctoral students in world history at Northeastern. It is expected that one or several memorial gatherings will be held, in the months to come, to celebrate his life and work and to honor his passing. --- Pat Manning, World History Network
World-History Textbooks and their Others
Luke Clossey
Simon Fraser University

I have valued textbooks for as long as I have valued learning. As a boy, I somehow acquired a copy of Cladwell and Merrill’s *World History: The Story of Man through the Ages*, which whet my appetite for the mastery of all historical knowledge. Like an armchair Alexander, I would set out on annual campaigns, first securing ancient Egypt, then marching across the Arabian Desert to Mesopotamia. Whatever chapter I occupied at the time I understood, but when I glanced backwards I saw only the sands of oblivion swallowing up all beyond my immediate view. Either my mind did not have the necessary capacity, or the textbook did not have the necessary conciseness. But my interest and ambitions have endured.

My appreciation for the premium worthy textbooks place on clarity and comprehensiveness has not diminished as over the years, I began to approach them more as a teacher than as a student. When I was invited to teach the world-history survey in the Spring of 2004 at the University of California, Berkeley, I did not hesitate to assign a textbook. I wavered only in selecting one, and I finally chose Bentley and Ziegler’s *Traditions & Encounters*. It had served as the textbook in previous semesters, and Bentley’s *Old World Encounters* had helped draw me into world history, as thumbing through its pages left me with a favorable impression. I thus assigned the second half of *Traditions & Encounters* to supplement a course reader of primary sources ranging from Hammurabi’s Code to George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address. In a single semester, the course — offered through the International and Area Studies Teaching Program — surveyed all of human history, although it did focus on the last five centuries.

Only after the semester concluded did I seriously reflect on the role of the textbook in the course. During the final lecture, I asked students to complete a two-page survey that addressed key aspects of their experience. Most students found *Traditions & Encounters* a useful supplement to lectures, while a few felt it irrelevant. Two thirds of the students acknowledged reading more than half of the assigned pages. More revealing were students’ responses to my request for general comments on the textbook. A clear correlation formed between these responses and how much of the text they reported reading. Those most conscientious in doing the reading appreciated it as a reliable chronological overview to which they could turn for a review of material that had been presented in lecture, as well as for an introduction to material that had not. The students who had done less than half the reading, on the other hand, found that it was “long” and “boring”—although they, too, appreciated it as an overview. Some of these students also reported its usefulness as a reference book. (Perhaps they found reference books “long” and “boring,” too.) No such observation was made by the students who read more.

The conclusion that remained in my mind was that the textbook had two functions: Students used it both as an overview or survey and as a reference book. These two functions strike me as fundamentally contrary, for the best survey is concise, while the best reference book is detailed. Could the traditional textbook be replaced by two tools, each performing one function? This essay looks briefly at traditional textbooks before considering alternative surveys and alternative reference works.

### Traditional textbooks

I have since had an opportunity to study a range of world-history textbooks, although my method was hardly comprehensive: I skimmed some ten thousand pages and stopped only occasionally to “dig” postholes in strategic sites. I based my final evaluation partly on the balance in coverage between Western and non-Western history, and partly on the accuracy and extent of two topics, somewhat arbitrarily chosen as iconic subjects of world history—the Society of Jesus and the United Nations. I was surprised at how many failed my criteria. Some were revealed to be essentially Western-Civilization textbooks that had been “globalized.” A couple of textbooks parroted biased and popular accounts of the Jesuits, and one commonly used text all but ignored the U. N. Only four excelled: Bullett et al.’s *The Earth and Its Peoples*, Spodek’s *The World’s History*, Stearns et al.’s *World Civilizations*, and the *Traditions & Encounters* that I had used previously.

I did not make even a superficial survey of the multimedia material corollary to these textbooks, as every previous examination of them had proved disappointing. The first “interactive map” on the *Traditions & Encounters* CD-ROM, for example, simply allows the user to select which information (such as *Australopithecus* sp. or *Homo erectus* sites) is displayed. Since these are easily distinguished on the map in the textbook itself, the interactive map adds nothing, and in fact loses ground by erroneously relocating the Lascaux Grotto from Dordogne, France, to the Gulf of Mexico. A simple animation showing change over time would have been far more instructive.

### Surveys

The best survey avoids excessive detail. It features breadth but tempers it with coherence and an organizing principle. Perhaps this can best be achieved by a single voice. Traditionally, the single-author interpretation has held an especially central place in the world-history sub-discipline. William H. McNeill’s *The Rise of the West* marked a new era in the genre. In McNeill’s own retrospective evaluation, this work gives voice to an “intellectual imperialism” reflective of the role the United States then played in the world. Nonetheless, it remains highly readable and informative, and in the right hands, its distinctive perspective could be used to pedagogical advantage by introducing historiographical concerns to the course. The diagrams McNeill worked out with artist Bela Petheo exemplify the strategic presentation of historical processes.

More recent single-author surveys tend to be more concise and less systematic. Geoffrey Blainey’s *A Short History of the World* includes some impressive
comparative chapters, for example, on ancient astronomy and early-modern agriculture, although it certainly fails my Jesuit and United-Nations criteria. Equally readable and yet more idiosyncratic is James C. Davis’ The Human Story, which devotes a half dozen engaging pages to McDonald’s (but none to my Jesuits). Two of the most popular one-volume surveys include J. M. Roberts’ The New History of the World, now available in a revised fourth edition, and Peter Haugen’s World History for Dummies, which combines the superficiality suggested by the title with an innovative organization primarily thematic rather than chronological. The main units survey “Civilizations,” “Mind, Soul, Heart,” “War,” and “People.” Perhaps the most appropriate choice for most courses is The Human Web: A Bird’s-eye View of World History, which William McNeill has written with his son J. R. McNeill. Increasingly relied upon as a resource for instructors developing lectures, this work differs most strikingly from the traditional textbook by its emphasis on global processes. Whether it provides sufficient background on those historical phenomena which transpire largely within a single polity, depends largely on the students’ own backgrounds.

One of the greatest commercial, artistic, and literary successes in this genre has been the three volumes of Larry Gonick’s Cartoon History of the Universe, which reach to the Renaissance at a cost lower than that of the first volume of most standard textbooks. Although he often points out historians’ debates, Gonick clearly selects interpretations and runs with them. All textbooks do this; perhaps Gonick’s stands out because he so unerringly chooses the most interesting interpretation. This series clearly betrays a preference for high-level narrative, although it could easily serve as background for a lecturer’s broader brushstrokes. The narrative is traditional, though engagingly told, and it is usually the illustrations that ham up the material. A survey of modern history might assign Gonick’s third volume in the first week to bring the culturally illiterate up to speed, up to the Renaissance—and what a pleasure to begin a course with a reading featuring so infectious an enthusiasm for the study of history.

A handful of other surveys have voices especially distinctive, either for the perspective or the historical circum-
stances of the author. Rather more sophisticated than most standard textbooks, David Loy’s A Buddhist History of the West is structured around arguments rather than a comprehensive chronology. It does not seek to present a survey, but the breadth of its arguments makes it a survey in spite of itself. Although Loy’s Buddhist study of “lack” is limited to Western civilization, its perspective is so consistently and strikingly non-Western it could lead to discussions of world history.

A truly intrepid instructor might be tempted to use the survey as a vehicle for an even more singular voice. The histories of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee may well be too programmatic to be useful, but H. G. Wells’s The Outline of History and Jawaharlal Nehru’s Glimpses of World History offer surveys better contoured to the evidence. More challenging possibilities might include José Ortega y Gasset’s An Interpretation of Universal History or even William Swinton’s racist Outlines of the World’s History. Various ways could be found to integrate these works into the course curriculum; the final project for students in my upper-division world-history course is to write the preface for a world history. All of these works afford so strong and consistent a perspective that a creative instructor could use them as kindling for discussion.

References

Certainly, standard textbooks are meant to serve as reference books; the existence of an index betrays this intention. What surprised me is how often students’ research stopped at the textbook. For formal research projects, students headed for the library, but searches for answers to more everyday questions relied on the textbook. Any teacher of world history is profoundly impressed by the ability of students to raise questions that outflank the instructor’s knowledge or the textbook’s coverage. I expect that many of these research romps through the index, even when successful, yielded little more than a cursory identification.

The alternative is encouraging students to turn to more substantial reference resources. When students would ask me basic but obscure questions during office hours, I would sit them down at my laptop and have them search my Encyclopedia Britannica. (The Encyclopedia Britannica 2005 Deluxe Edition on CD-ROM retails for around U.S. $30.) Modern technology can make these just as convenient as the textbook, and the Internet rivals the most distinguished traditional reference rooms. Free online encyclopedias include the Columbia Encyclopedia and Wikipedia, the coverage of which is continuously expanding beyond its strengths in contemporary history. In the latter case, students should be aware of the theoretical dangers but impressive reliability of free-content wiki resources.

The most bare-bone works arrange facts chronologically: John B. Teplee’s Timelines of World History and Bernard Grun’s The Timetables of History: A Horizontal Linkage of People and Events keeps its signature format—divided into regions, then organized chronologically—it features far more depth than a mere timeline book, and includes maps and genealogical charts. Sections like that on “Global Interaction Networks” compensate for the regional divisions. The revised edition is available online.

For easily comprehensible presentations of information with a geographic dimension, nothing has improved upon the historical atlas. Oxford’s magisterial Atlas of World History may be beyond most students’ budgets, but the less expensive DK Atlas of World History also presents stunning maps that illustrate the themes likely to appear in an introductory course. Its first half features highly useful world maps, and the rest of the book gives more detailed information arranged by region. 2004 saw the release of a revised edition of the first volume of the compact Penguin Atlas of World History: From the Beginning to the Eve of the French Revolution—certainly a well-priced addition to the syllabus of the first semester of a one-year survey course.

Conclusion

Of course every instructor makes textbook decisions based on personal style and preferences as well as the nature of the course and its likely students. Lectures that focus on establishing a clear narrative might render a survey text redundant, in which case the Encyclopedia Britannica CD-ROM may work best. Discussion or tutorial sections that emphasize analysis could be built around exercises involving the DK Atlas
of World History. Any of these, indeed even a combination of two of them, costs substantially less than a traditional textbook. As more primary and reference sources materialize on the Internet, it is becoming possible to develop innovative world-history curricula at a minimal cost to students. The next time I teach a world-history survey, I may well again assign a traditional textbook, but it will not be a decision made lightly.

Notes


Works Cited


Napoleon Bonaparte had three aims when he led a French expeditionary force to Egypt in 1798: “...to establish on the Nile a French colony which would prosper without slaves ...; to open a market for our [French] manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria ...; and to gain Egypt as a base from which an army of 60,000 would set out to the Indus ...”¹

To meet these objectives, the French had to build a modern state in Egypt with a stable and secure civil government. This French effort at nation-building failed. Much of the evidence for what Bonaparte tried to do comes from his own correspondence. The evidence for what went wrong can be found in the writings of Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, a scholar at al-Azhar University, a historian, and a member of a Sufi Islamic revivalist group, who, for all of that, was not unsympathetic to the French.²

When Bonaparte arrived in Egypt, he brought not only an army of 35,000 men, but also a Scientific Commission of over a hundred civilian scholars and specialists. This civilian corps tried to investigate all aspects of Egyptian life and history to assist Bonaparte in modernizing and controlling the country. Upon return to Europe, they produced the monumental 23-volume Description de l’Égypte that became the basis for modern Middle Eastern studies.

Bonaparte had no doubt that Egypt’s Mamluk government was neither stable nor secure. His proclamation on arrival spelled out what Egyptians could expect from the French: “For too many years, that gang of slaves, purchased in Georgia and the Caucasus have tyrannized the most beautiful region of the world. ... Once you had great cities, large canals, a prosperous trade, what has destroyed all this ... the Mamluks. ... Happy, thrice happy, are those Egyptians who side with us. They shall prosper ...”³

A product of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, Bonaparte believed that the Egyptian people would embrace the revolutionary concepts of liberté, égalité, and fraternité; that they would welcome a sound domestic order based on limited representative government, fair taxation, and personal security; and that he could use Islam to persuade the Egyptians of French good intentions. He failed in all three objectives due to cultural misunderstanding, shortage of French resources, opposition of religious leaders, and the invocation of a jihad against the French.

Under the Mamluks, Egypt was in a sad state. The glories of the Fatimid Dynasty (909-1171 AD) had faded under the Ayyubids (1171-1260 AD), and were extinguished when the Ayyubids’ slave-soldiers, the Mamluks, effectively took control (1250 AD). Nominal sovereignty passed to the Ottoman Turks nearly 300 years later (1517 AD). The tax and legal systems in Egypt in 1798 were essentially the same systems organized nearly three hundred years earlier by the great Ottoman leader, Sultan Salim I. The Mamluks who ruled the country on behalf of the Ottomans, however, had degenerated into a self-perpetuating band of warlords, looting the land while ignoring their Ottoman overlords.

A Turkish-appointed Pasha nominally ruled Egypt. He actually had little power. Real power rested with a divan (council) of seven Mamluk beys (lords) with the power to veto the Pasha’s decisions.⁴ Executive power was held by two leading Mamluk princes, the Amir al-Bilad (Commander of the Land) and the Amir al-Haj (Commander of the Pilgrimage to Mecca). Bonaparte defeated the Amir al-Bilad in the Battle of the Pyramids. The Amir al-Bilad then fled, together with the Pasha, into southern Egypt, while the Amir al-Haj fled to Syria.⁵ The only senior Mamluk official to remain in Cairo was the Qadi-Askar (chief justice).

The principal activity of civil government in Egypt was to collect the miri or land tax—a tax levied on each landowner and village. Jean-Lambert Tallien, a French economist on the Scientific Commission, described fully the tax system as it existed before the arrival of the French. The Copts, Egyptians who kept the Christian faith after the Moslem conquest, were the tax collectors. Tallien wrote: “they (the Copts) are in charge of all branches of financial administration, and not a single médin® (about 27 cents) is collected that does not pass through their hands.”⁶ The collectors were permitted to keep 50 médins for each 1000 collected. This system encouraged collection efforts, but also encouraged over-assessment and creative accounting.

Tallien estimated that $23 million in miri was collected just before the arrival of the French. This, together with other direct and indirect taxes, provided the government with an annual cash income of $32 million.⁸

In addition to the miri assessed in cash, there was also a miri in kind—wheat and barley—collected only in Upper Egypt, south of Cairo. Tallien calculated this annual in-kind revenue at 2 million bushels of wheat and barley, valued at $18 million.⁹ Altogether, the total government revenue could reach nearly $50 million annually.

The Qadi-Askar, the other senior Ottoman official in Egypt, was the chief judicial officer of the land. He upheld the Shari’a, Islamic law as expressed in the Qur’an and the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed). Under the Qadi-Askar, local qadis (judges) and muftis (jurisprudential specialists) interpreted and applied the law in individual cases. Closely related to the qadis, but not directly under the Qadi-Askar, were the ulema, or religious scholars, who taught Islamic jurisprudence at Cairo’s ancient university, al-Azhar.

Such was the structure of government in Egypt when the French arrived: inefficient in all but its corruption, stultified and rigid in its legal system, and supportive of a greedy and oppressive ruling caste. This was the government that the Egyptians had known and endured for hundreds of years.

Three days after his victory at the Battle of the Pyramids (24 July 1798), Bonaparte entered Cairo without resistance. He immediately began to reorganize the Egyptian government. Between 25 July and 2 August, Bonaparte ordered the creation of a nine-person divan for Cairo;¹⁰ organized a city police force;¹¹ began planning a national, or general, divan;¹² ordered the establishment of provincial governments;¹³ appointed provincial governors from among his generals;¹⁴ appointed a Copt as Chief Tax Collector with a staff of provincial assistants;¹⁵ and appointed French agents to supervise these provincial administrators.¹⁶ He also appointed a commission to sequester the property of the Mamluks,¹⁷ and ordered a forced loan of $2 million from the merchants of Cairo.¹⁸

The Cairo Divan was the model of Bonaparte’s plans for civil government. It consisted of nine of the leading notables of the city, the majority being ulema from al-Azhar. The Divan’s first instructions were to appoint two Agas (chiefs) of

Regime Change and Nation Building: Egypt, 1798-1799

Jackson Sigler
Florida State University
Police and form two three-man commissions, one to supervise the markets and provisions of the city, the other to register and supervise burials.19

As soon as he had landed, Bonaparte began reorganizing the civil government outside of Cairo. Capturing Alexandria, he co-opted the surrendered commander, Sayed Mohammed al-Kura’im, and put him again in charge. However, Sayed Mohammed, while cooperating with the French, continued to correspond with the Mamluk boys in Cairo. His letters, discovered when the French occupied Cairo, led to his arrest and conviction for treason. Given the option of a fine of nearly $650,000 or the executioner’s axe, Sayed Mohammed pleaded with the merchants of Cairo to ransom him “but they had not the means on hand to ransom him, for everyone was preoccupied with himself.”20 A respected Alexandria multi, Sheik Mohammed al-Massri, was appointed in Sayed Mohammed’s place.

Elsewhere, the French divided Lower Egypt, the delta country north of Cairo, into sixteen provinces under eight military districts. General Louis Charles Desaix was placed in charge of all of Upper Egypt extending from Cairo to Aswan. A Copt, Mo’allem Ya’qub al-Qubti (Jacoub Gazalle), was appointed Desaix’s chief advisor and Administrator. According to al-Jabarti, Ya’qub “was to … devise for them all types of traps and deceptions. … [and] these ruses deceived many of the country folk.”21 Despite al-Jabarti’s unflattering view of him, Mo’allem Ya’qob was smart, courageous, and fair. Largely through his efforts, Desaix acquired the nickname Sultan al-Adel—the Just Sultan.22 After Bonaparte left Egypt, a Coptic Brigade was formed with Ya’qub as its commander. When the French army departed, Ya’qob went with them.

Bonaparte next attempted to create a national government. On 4 September, he ordered the convocation of a Grand, or national, Divan composed of notables each province. French generals commanding the military districts were to name delegation members from among Egyptians who had distinguished themselves through talent, reputation, and “the manner in which they have welcomed the French.”23 On 4 October 1798, the Grand Divan opened in Cairo.

Bonaparte had drawn up a list of questions to be considered by the Grand Divan. He sought the Divan’s views on the composition of the provincial divans, the handling of inheritances, the administration of justice, and the collection of taxes. Bonaparte soon discovered that the members of the Divan were quite satisfied with the way matters of inheritance, justice, and taxation had been handled in the past. Their deliberations were verbose but seldom to the point. The French also tried to introduce a new and simpler method of land taxation, but the Divan called this “a very complicated issue and the most suitable manner of dealing with it was to impose a sum in a straight-forward manner in order to facilitate collection.”24 In short, keep things just as they were.

Bonaparte did manage to get the Grand Divan to approve a new tax on urban real estate. This was a graduated tax based on the value and type of property.25 The French, as usual, were desperate for hard cash, and, although even al-Jabarti admitted that this tax was fairer and more reasonable than most,26 the tax was one of the immediate causes of the rebellion that broke out in Cairo on 21 October 1798.

Increasing the revenue of the army was essential. Recognizing that the Grand Divan was not going to cooperate with a new land tax, Bonaparte, on 14 October, ordered that $860,000 be raised in two days — $340,000 to be assessed and paid immediately, and advance payments of an additional $520,000.27

Despite the Grand Divan’s inaction, Bonaparte also proceeded with plans for at least a quasi-representative government for all Egypt. On October 19, two days before a major rebellion broke out in Cairo and while the Grand Divan was still in session, he ordered an elaborate system of assemblies, city and provincial divans, and a new National Divan.28 Together, these would represent the ulema, the merchants, and even the fellahin and bedouin.29 The members of the provincial divans were to be selected by the French military district commanders from a slate nominated by an assembly. Bonaparte reserved the right to appoint the members of the Cairo Divan. Then representatives from these groups would meet in a national Divan.

Internal security was the other major concern of civil government in Egypt. From the beginning, Bonaparte tried to assure the Egyptians that their good order and security were of paramount importance to him. It was, of course, also critical to the continued safety of the French in Egypt. Bonaparte was strict with his own men; stricter with the local inhabitants. Incidents were ruthlessly punished. “Every day,” he wrote, “I have five or six people beheaded in the streets of Cairo.”30

The charge to the Cairo Divan included the requirement to appoint two agas, one for the city and one to control river traffic. When the Divan named an unacceptable candidate as chief of the city police, the French picked their own. He was a Greek Christian named Barthélémy, a part-time shopkeeper who had served as a doorman for a bey and as a member of the Mamluk artillery before the arrival of the French. Barthélémy quickly developed a formidable reputation for ruthlessness. A French writer described him thus: “When one saw him marching towards the Citadel, his naked scimitar in hand and followed by his chained prisoners, the spectacle was well-suited to suppress all evil intentions in many a heart.31 According to one story, when ordered by Bonaparte to clean up prostitution in the French barracks, Barthélémy beheaded 400 Egyptian prostitutes, had their bodies sewn into sacks, and dumped into the Nile.

The population of Cairo was accustomed to this sort of behavior from the Mamluks—although beheading 400 women may have been extreme, even for them. However, two other steps taken by the French to improve urban security were more unsettling. The first upset age-old custom; the second cost money.

The city of Cairo was a warren of individual districts, twisting lanes, and dilapidated buildings. With no central security force, individual neighborhoods, usually made up of immigrants from the same rural village or practitioners of the same business or profession who had banded together to protect themselves. These districts were cordoned off from each other, with walls and gates that were locked each night and guarded by a watchman. This system did not appeal to the orderly French mind, and shortly after their arrival, they ordered the gates taken down. al-Jabarti described the effect: “They ordered that the by-streets and gates leading to the alleys be opened and scattered groups of their soldiers set out to pull down and break to pieces the gates of the by-streets and lanes. … they continued … this activity in spite of the people’s anxiety and the rumors that the French soldiers were intent upon killing the people during the Friday prayer or other fantasies of this kind. … That happened after they (the Egyptians) had achieved a certain degree of security and
some shops had already opened. With the occurrence … they withdrew into themselves once more.”32

A few days later, a second security issue further vexed the Cairenes (inhabitants of Cairo). The French ordered every house and every third shop to keep a light outside burning throughout the night; the householders and shopkeepers were to be punished if the light went out. This order resulted in both unnecessary expense and loss of sleep—conditions that could have been avoided by leaving the gates intact.

Not all police problems in Cairo were so serious. The French soldiers loved to ride the little Egyptian donkeys, galloping them through the streets with the same insouciance French drivers display in Parisian traffic circles today. The resultant increase in accidents occasioned an item in the Order of the Day warning all French troopers to “moderate their speed when riding through crowds.”33

In his attempts to improve security and create more equitable tax collection, Bonaparte also inadvertently threatened the Egyptian’s Islamic self-image by applying the Revolutionary principle of égalité. Islam has always prided itself upon its tolerance of Christians and Jews,34 but they were, nevertheless, second-class citizens subject to a number of restrictions including the payment of a head tax. However, the French, besides continuing to use them as tax collectors, granted them legal and social privileges previously unheard of (e.g., to wear a colored turban, to ride a horse rather than a mule, to carry arms, and to bring a complaint about a Moslem in a neutral (French) court rather than in a Moslem one). Added to these disruptions, the control of the city police by the Greek Christian Barthélemy encouraged another group, the Shami Christians, to assert their rights. These were Greek Orthodox Christians from Greater Syria. Al-Jabarti unfavorably distinguishes between the “native” Coptic Christians and the “foreign” Shami Christians. The increased freedom and power of these two groups together threatened the Moslem Egyptians’ self-identity.

Bonaparte also attempted to win over the people of Cairo by claiming that he and the entire French army were on the verge of adopting Islam. This has been extensively documented. The effort, and its failure, was foreshadowed in Arabic and French versions of his first proclamation to the people of Egypt. The texts differ significantly in regards to Islam.35 The Arabic version contains the traditional Islamic opening of all official documents: “In the name of God, the clement and the merciful,” and goes on to add: “There is no divinity save Allah; He has no son and shares His power with no one.” This is omitted in the French version. In a subsequent passage, the French text reads: “I respect God, His prophet and the Koran more than the Mamluks do.” The Arabic text reads: “I worship God (Allah) more than the Mamluks do, and I respect His prophet Mohammed and the admirable Koran.” Finally, the French text reads: “tell the people that the French are true friends of the Moslems”; the Arabic: “tell the people that the French are true Moslems.” Bonaparte’s proclamation was not well received. Al-Jabarti quotes the entire Arabic text, and then begins a bitter critique with the words: “It ends here word for word. Here is an explanation of the incoherent words and vulgar constructions which he put into this miserable letter. …”36

Bonaparte also attempted to use mass propaganda techniques familiar to the Twentieth Century. Three celebrations fell closely together shortly after the French entered Cairo: the annual Festival of the Nile, a celebration that dated back to Pharaonic times; the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Mohammed (23 August); and the anniversary of the founding of the French Republic (22 September).37

The first two efforts were more effective as they both had historical precedents in Egypt. The Nile festival usually took place in August with the beginning of the Nile Flood. The festival was held when the level of the annual Nile flood raised the river to 16 cubits (7.32 meters) as measured by the Nilometer (device that measures water levels in the Nile) just upstream from Cairo.38 When the Shi’a Fatimids took Egypt from the Sunni Abbasidians in 969, one of the first public acts of the new Sultan was to participate in the Nile celebration; thereby demonstrating that he would maintain the great canal system upon which Egypt depended. In ancient times, the celebration had included the sacrifice of a living virgin to the river. By the Islamic period, this custom had been reduced to the throwing of a clay statue into the river and the cutting of a dike leading to Birket al-Esbekya in the middle of the city.39 Bonaparte, following the precedent of earlier conquerors, participated in the ceremonies that dated to pre-Islamic times, and then entertained the members of the Cairo Divan and other notables at his house on Esbekya Square.

The Birthday of the Prophet is calculated using the Islamic lunar calendar. In 1798, it occurred only five days after the Festival of the Nile. This festival has traditionally had far greater political overtones than the Nile feast, as the Fatimid sultans and their successors had used it as an occasion to lavish gifts upon their political supporters. Bonaparte continued this custom, and on this occasion, was hosted at a lavish Egyptian dinner by Divan member Sheikh Khalil al-Bakri.40

The celebration of the Republic was less successful. Elaborate banners in both French and Arabic were displayed in a Parisian-like Jacobean celebration—massed military bands played and soldiers drilled. Some Egyptian leaders understood the significance,41 but most Egyptians appeared simply confused. Even worse, the celebration ended on a low note when a demonstration by the French Balloon Corps failed.

Public festivals, European-type security, the beginnings of representative government, and respect for Islam were not enough to build a nation. Far greater were fear of change, higher taxes, Christian “rights,” and subversion by agents of the Sultan, who had been slipping into the city and calling for a jihad. On 21 October, rioting led by religious agitators broke out near al-Azhar. Nikula ibn Yusef al-Turki, another Arab historian of the time, wrote of the outbreak: “One fine day, some Sheik or other from Al-Azhar started to run through the streets, shouting, ‘Let all those who believe that there is but one God take themselves to the Mosque of Al-Azhar! For today is the day to fight the Infidel.’”42

The city commandant, Gen. Martin Dupay, went to investigate escorted by only five troopers. He was dragged off his horse and killed. Rioting spread throughout the city, and individual French soldiers and civilians were cornered and killed. Briefly, it appeared that the French would be overwhelmed. Then, French discipline and firepower cleared the streets, French guns in the Citadel bombarded the remaining pockets of resistance around al-Azhar, and the next day French cavalry took possession of the ancient mosque, ending the revolt. French-Egyptian relations would never be quite the same again. Afterwards, al-Jabarti wrote: “(the) French would always go armed. This happened after they had already felt safe with the Muslims and had ceased to bear arms at all and had played and joked with them.
For example, when a Muslim would stroll at night alone and pass a group of Frenchmen they would joke with him and vice versa. However, after this incident occurred both sects felt mutually repelled and each was on his guard.43 The Grand Divan adjourned and never met again.

In December, a new divan was created, but it was not the system of provincial and national divans that Bonaparte had devised just before the rebellion. Recognizing both the ineffectiveness of the divan system and the need to centralize power and authority with the French commanders, it was more symbolic than real, and it never had even the potential influence of the original. Its purpose was only to rubber-stamp French decisions. Bonaparte’s interest also waned. On 21 December, the day the new divan was announced, he left Cairo for an inspection of the Isthmus of Suez. Early the next year, he marched into Syria, and in August 1799, he abandoned the Army and returned to France.

While Bonaparte was in Syria, he left General Charles François Dugua in charge. During this time, Dugua had to suppress two additional rebellions. The first was instigated by the Qadi-Askar and the new Amir al-Haj44 who had been assigned to escort the Qadi-Askar to join Bonaparte’s Syrian expedition. Instead, encouraged by the Ottoman Sultan’s declaration of jihad, the Qadi and the Amir recruited an army of two thousand bedouin. They attacked a French supply column, but when a French punitive column pursued, the bedouin went back to the desert. The ringleaders fled to Syria to join the approaching Turkish army.

A holy man from Libya, Ahmed of Derna, led the second rebellion. Claiming to be the Mahdi, or envoy of the Prophet, he raised a rebellion among the fellahin and a few bedouin. In late April, the rebels took Damānhi, a town north of Cairo, and massacred the inhabitants of the small French garrison. A French relief column arrived, and the commander later reported: “Damanhur is no more; and twelve to fifteen hundred of its inhabitants have been burned or shot.”45 What happened to the Mahdi is unknown, but he never troubled the French again.

General Kléber, Bonaparte’s successor, created a Commission of Information on Modern Egypt composed of both military officers and members of the Scientific Commission.46 After the Battle of Heliopolis (20 March 1800) and the suppression of another ten-day outbreak of rioting in Cairo that followed, Kléber again reconstituted the Cairo Divan.47 Al-Jabarti was named one of the members. However, a young Syrian Qur’anic student named Soliman al-Halabi from Al-Ahzar, plotted with four other students to “kill the Christian.” In September 1800, Soliman succeed in killing Gen. Kléber at his residence. One of the students escaped; three others were beheaded. Soliman was impaled.

Kléber’s successor was General Jacques “Abdullah” Menou. Although Menou was married to an Egyptian woman, still considered Egypt a French colony and organized an elaborate civil administration. But not for long. A combined Turkish-British force invaded Egypt, and Menou negotiated the French withdrawal. The last French troops left Egypt aboard British ships in September 1801.

The results of Napoleon Bonaparte’s efforts to impose a modern, western-type government on Egypt are controversial, even today. The traditional view, as outlined by Shmuel Moreh of the Hebrew University and translator of al-Jabarti, is that the French occupation of Egypt marked the beginning the Arab renaissance. By destroying the Mamluk army, introducing reforms in the ruling class, provoking the people, including women, to join in political demonstrations, and permitting the indigenous Christians to take part in political affairs, the occupa- tion set the stage for the reforms and modernization efforts of Muhammad Ali in the next twenty years.48

Alternatively, the late Edward Said in his seminal work, Orientalism, argued that the French invasion of Egypt was not the beginning of the Westernization and modernization of the Middle East, but rather an “enabling project for all subsequent Orientalist enterprises.”49 The French under Bonaparte began the acquisition and organization of a mode of knowledge of the East which “[keeps] intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness… this is why every [subsequent western] writer on the Orient …saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruc- tion, even redemption.”50 Consequently, this knowledge was, Said argued, easily put into the service of Western — British, French, and now American — imperialism.

So a question remains — was Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt and his efforts to build a Western-style nation the beginning of the modernization of the Arab world, or was it simply the first reconnaissance probe of a continuing effort by the West to impose itself upon the East.

NOTES

5. The Turkish Pasha was Abu Bakr. The Amir al-Bilad was Murad Bey; and the Amir al-Haj was Ibrahim Bey.
6. The rate of exchange was approximately 15 médins to one French livre. Given the depreciation of French currency during the Revolution, the accountants of the expedition preferred to keep their records using this form of account rather than the new revolutionary franc. Accounts were also kept in francs and talars, a silver coin in wide circulation in the Middle East at the time. The dollar figures used here are based on the value of the livre’s 5.545 grams of silver; a 1/20 ratio of silver and gold, the current (Oct 04) price of gold ($13.58/gram) to compensate for inflation, and the exchange rates between the livre, the médin, and the talar given by Tallien.
8. Tallien, Journal, 228. One may be surprised by the precision of Tallien’s figures, which he claims to have obtained from the tax rolls of the Copts. However, al-Jabarti wrote: “They (the French) asked for the registers of the Ruznama (chief tax collector under the Mamluks) and kept them.” (al Jabarti, Chronicle, 41.)

38 The Nile flood is the result of June-July monsoon rains in the Ethiopian mountains around the source of the Blue Nile nearly 2000 miles south of Cairo.

39 Literally, Lake Esbekya. Usually, when the dike was cut, this part of Cairo flooded and the square turned into a shallow lake. This year it did not, as Napoleon had turned the square into an artillery park and diverted the canal waters. Herold, Bonaparte, 150.

40 Although the Chairman of the Divan was Sheikh Abdullah Sharqawi, Napoleon appeared to be on more friendly with Sheikh Khalil al-Bakri, another of the senior ‘ulama from al-Azhar. Al- Bakri gave Napoleon the Armenian slave, Rustum, who remained his valet for fifteen years. There is also a story that al-Bakri’s 16-year old daughter, Zenab, was Napoleon’s first Egyptian mistress. Direct evidence is slight, although al-Jabarti recounts that after the French left Egypt, the young lady was beheaded as “she had been debauched by the French.” (al-Jabarti, Merveilles biographiques et historiques, ou Chroniques, 9 vols. tr. from the Arabic, Cairo, 1888-89 and quoted in Herold, Bonaparte, 205.

41 “At the end of the (Arabic) month, the French began to prepare for their feast at Birkat al-Ezbakiya. That is because when they killed their sultan and their republic was proclaimed ... they made that day the beginning of their calendar and their feast.” (al-Jabarti, Chronicle, 60.)

42 Herold, Bonaparte, 192.

43 al-Jabarti, Chronicle, 102

44 Moustafa Bey had been appointed as the amir charge of the haj — the pilgrimage to Mecca — one of the five pillars of Islam — which had to be continued by the French to insure popular support.

45 Quoted in Herold, Bonaparte, 315.


47 Klébler first imprisoned the ‘ulama for cooperating with the attacking Turks and demanded a ransom of 12 million livres. He then reconstituted the Divan. (Elgood, Bonaparte’s Adventure in Egypt, (London, University of Oxford Press, 1936).

48 Shmeul Moreh, “Napoleon and the French Impact on Egyptian Society” in Bierman, Napoleon in Egypt, 94.


CALL FOR ARTICLES

The Fall 2005 issue of the Bulletin will feature a discussion on Medieval World History, concerning the thousand years centering around the end of the First Millennium, CE. Essays on this subject are solicited.

Is it proper to speak of Medieval History in a world context or should the term Mediterranean be limited to Europe? Do Europeanists own the term, or has it, by usage, come to signify any history between 500 and 1500 CE? Was a noted European Medievalist justified when he said he was shocked when he heard Chinese historians speaking of Medieval China? And what about Medieval India? Are there commonalities, not only in the Eastern Hemisphere but also globally which allow us to speak of a Medieval World history? What about the Medieval Warm Period? Was it a global phenomenon? What about the global environment during the Medieval Period?

These and other topics should be the concern of essays for publication in the Fall.

Please send submissions, no later than 1 October 2005, in MS Word format, to Wilfred Bisson at: bissonmwm@vol.com
Introduction

In 1921, as a response to disorder in newly acquired parts of the Empire, specifically Iraq, the British government devised what appeared to be a cheap, easy, and effective way to keep the peace. His Majesty’s Government would withdraw expensive ground troops and replace them with Royal Air Force squadrons. These air units would patrol wide areas of territory and assist government communication with the natives by dropping leaflets or transporting political officers for fact-to-face discussions. When such attempts failed, aircraft would be the means of delivering punishment that would halt native insurrection. All of this would be accomplished principally by aircraft, with only small ground units to guard air bases or to augment the aircraft. In some cases, the ground troops would move by armored car. In others, aircraft would transport them, a new concept that would be used extensively during this period.

This method was called air policing; the general strategic approach under the command of an air officer was known as air control. The plan was that this approach would be implemented until the Iraqi army had been built up, trained, and could assume responsibility for maintaining order.

This paper describes how air policing came about in response to a specific threat. It also describes its implementation and the overoptimistic way it was presented in government and military circles. Finally, it suggests why air policing did not live up to its billing as an effective means to stabilize the government in Iraq and why, perhaps, it never could.

The results of air policing never lived up to the desires of the government or the claims of its advocates. The outcome was the product of wishful thinking, honest errors, and horror in evaluating the results, and not altogether candid claims by air war enthusiasts.

This paper relies heavily upon accounts of the theory and practice of air policing, as well as debates on its effectiveness based on contemporary articles in the foremost military journal of the day (The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute) and books on military practice written during the first third of the 20th century.

On 2 July 1924, Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary to the British administration in Iraq, wrote the following to her father:

“The most interesting thing which happened during this week was a performance by the R.A.F., a bombing demonstration. It was even more remarkable than the one we saw last year at the Air Force Show because it was much more real. They had made an imaginary village about a quarter of a mile from where we sat on the Diyala ([Sirwan]) dyke and the two first bombs, dropped from 3000 ft, went straight into the middle of it and set it alight. It was wonderful and horrible. They then dropped bombs all round it, as if to catch the fugitives and finally firebombs which even in the bright sunlight, made flares of bright flame in the desert. They burn through metal, and water won’t extinguish them. At the end the armoured cars went out to round up the fugitives with machine guns. ‘And now’ said the AVM warily, ‘they’ll insist on getting out and letting off [sic] trench mortars. They are really no good, but the men do love it so that I can’t persuade them not to.’ Sure enough they did.

I was tremendously impressed. It’s an amazingly relentless and terrible thing, war from the air.”¹

The demonstration was similar to Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West shows that toured Europe before the First World War: spectacular, entertaining, and largely misleading. What Bell described was a simulation of air policing in action, a method its supporters claimed would bring peace and order to post-WWI Iraq.²

From 1918 to 1920, Iraq (formerly the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul) was run by a British administration taking its orders from the Indian Office and supported by the army. Although control had not been imposed over the whole region, as 1920 arrived, all seemed to be going well. Responsibility for the League of Nations Mandate was assumed in May; one month later, hostilities came to an official end. The revolt that began in June, however, changed everything. With heavy assistance from the Indian army, the revolt was defeated in November but the four-month conflict was a serious warning. It was the largest single British military campaign between the world wars.³ The British now realized that they would have to make substantial changes in their administration of Iraq.

Consequently, a major policy conference, called by Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill met in Cairo in 1921 to define policy in Mandatory Iraq.⁴ First, a single Department of State for Middle Eastern Affairs would administer the British Middle East, instead of splitting it between the offices in India and Egypt. Second, Amin Faisal of the Hejaz would be proposed as the king of Iraq, to eventually rule once the Mandate ended. Finally, ground troops would be withdrawn, their place taken by the Royal Air Force, which claimed that it would keep order more cheaply and effectively.

Cost effectiveness was the greatest impetus for this experiment in imperial control. Maintaining the empire, now at its greatest extent and with severely diminished resources created a serious problem. Even before the Cairo Conference, Churchill (also State Secretary for War at this time) had been reducing costs. Efforts such as demobilizing 4,000,000 men in 1919 weren’t enough.⁵ Even as the military commander, Aylmer Haldane, was suppressing the Iraqi revolt, he was directed to cut his expenditures by 50% in the coming year.⁶

Shortly after the Cairo Conference, in fact probably before it ended, Lord Trenchard, Chief of the RAF (Royal Air Force), drew up detailed plans.⁷ While relatively new, air policing had been used before. The first time had been during the three-week Somaliland revolt in 1919 (the work of the Camel Corps and prior Army accomplishments being, quite naturally, glossed over). In that same year in Waziristan, India’s northwest frontier, and Afghanistan, air policing had been used to some extent and judged successful. There was even precedent for using it in Iraq during the war to keep Arab tribes in line and away from the British while they were fighting the Turks.⁸

Trenchard’s concept of operations assumed that aircraft would be the principal (but not sole) means for enforcing order, based on the perceived virtues of aircraft. As Trenchard noted, “One of the principal assets of the air in the maintenance of internal order in this country will be the fact that the air is able to answer requests for assistance with a
celerity of which no other arm is capable.”9 This means had to be coupled with the willingness to make quick decisions to deploy these weapons. In addition to quickness, Trenchard saw that persistence in the attack and in maintaining contact would carry the day.

The objectives would be: cause damage (to property, it was emphasized), reduce enemy morale by persistently creating damage without hope of retaliation, and interference. This last point was envisioned as creating a reverse blockade: tribes could not leave specific areas to tend their flocks until they agreed to government demands.

Over the next year, the RAF deployed its forces and assumed responsibility for coordinating and leading all policing efforts. A total of eight squadrons of aircraft would be stationed on three main bases. Smaller bases would be used as required. Not all aircraft were bombers or fighters; two squadrons were transport groups. This airlift capability allowed commanders to airlift troops anywhere, evacuate casualties, and bring political officers to the tribes or tribal leaders to visit political officers in Baghdad.

While aircraft were the dominant tool, there was a definite role for ground troops. Armoured Car units could travel rapidly (in 1920s terms) as a show of force, usually on a “firefighting” basis although they often went on routine patrols. In addition, they provided security for the air bases. The Iraqi levies were assigned duties of keeping order by regular marching patrols, showing the flag on a regular basis, acting to prevent disorder, etc.

It was recognized, however, that these visitations would not always keep order. Trenchard described what would happen when regular visits did not work, and it is very interesting to note the tone that indicates a patient and merciful tone.

“If a tribe becomes restless in an area where there were no levies a demonstration by air would take place over its village and a message would be dropped to tell the chief that hostile action against him would have to be taken if he did not come in. This demonstration would be repeated for three or four times and if then necessary offensive action from the air should be initiated, in the first instance by attacks on the enemy’s flocks and cattle and then if he is still obdurate on his villages.”10 Trenchard was very quick to note that if no Iraqi levies were present, air raids were to be used as the tribes could not fight against airplanes.

All the while, aircraft would fly regular circuits, what Trenchard called “Air Route Marches,” a frequent patrolling of specific areas. As part of this activity, “aeroplanes would land, sometimes with and sometimes without the political officers, and visit the local chief and even bring him into Baghdad if required to see the Chief Political Officer.”11

In this detailed plan, Trenchard’s planned resources would be 3405 officers, other ranks, and “followers” for the air units and 228 of the same types of personnel for the initial three armoured car companies. In addition there would be one pack battery of less than 300 men and 1722 for combat support and combat service support. Four battalions of Infantry (2 British — 2211 men — and 2 Indian — 2002 men) would remain in the country. The cost was to be 4,186,100 pounds in the first year. Contrast this with the 60,000 troops and 2000 casualties involved in suppressing the 1920 revolt, at a cost of 100,000,000 pounds over a four-month period.12

The RAF would eventually operate six 200-man armoured car companies to perform ground support. Iraqi levies, paid for by the Iraqi and not the British government, would provide the bulk of ground forces. By its mobility, reach, and anticipated effectiveness at impressing the natives and meting out imperial justice, the RAF would, in the words of one later historian “use technology to magnify man power.”13 Additionally, it would reduce the extent and expense of logistical support as well.14

So, on a daily basis, how did it work? RAF Marshall John Slessor describes the basic operating procedures in his memoirs. First, the tribe had to misbehave in a way that opposed the government directly or was generally prejudicial against good order.15 The tribe would be notified of what was unacceptable and what the government required to make the situation right. A date was assigned by which these requirements had to be met. If the terms were rejected or ignored by the due date, the tribe would be warned about the possibility of punishment. These warnings were delivered directly by political officers, by dropped leaflets, by armoured cars with loudspeakers, or by neighboring tribal leaders. If there was no response or another rejection, a warning would be given 24 hours before the bombing would take place. Bombing would then be undertaken until the tribe surrendered – as Slessor is quick to point out, not unconditionally but under the original terms as discussed. As might be expected, Slessor was convinced that this method worked very well, not only in Iraq but everywhere it was tried in the Empire.16

Several of the duties performed by the RAF in Mandatory Iraq were quite similar to those that they had performed in that region in the years of the war, although their roles and responsibilities came to increase substantially. In addition to flying patrols and day and night bombing or machine gunning the opponents of the Iraqi government, air policing involved several tasks. These included transporting troops and evacuating casualties, flying in supplies and delivering the mail, evacuating civilians from dangerous areas, bringing in supplies for famine relief, transporting tribal leaders or political officers, and aerial photography and map making. In one particular instance, the RAF bombed and destroyed a dam built by a Shaikh with the intent of extorting money from his water-deprived neighbors. In addition, the RAF flew anti-slavery patrols all along the Persian Gulf during this period, and as a result of navigating over the area on a constant basis, it was able to establish the Imperial Air Routes in this part of the world.17

Air policing had several enthusiastic and influential proponents who were quick to assert how good it was, but a bit slow to recognize that there might be some drawbacks. The military analyst, B.H. Liddell, in his 1935 book, When Britain Goes to War, explains why he did not discuss air policing in Iraq in any great detail. He says that in reference to revolts there, “… time after time, the trouble disperses just as it begins to look as if it would be interesting to study. … the action of the air seems akin to, but more certain than, the application of radiation to a cancer. … In the majority of cases a mere demonstration suffices – it does not seem as if the Air Force can have had to spend much money on bombs.”18

In addition to economy-related arguments, there were also those that showed, at least in the minds of its proponents, that it was technically and tactically the
Journal different opinion that was also expressed, from the RAF, Army officers often had a
during this time, one is struck by the una-
on an average of two to four times a year
years. Air policing was swift, cost
that they would pursue in the coming
with the types and variety of missions
begun in a way that would be consistent
quickly and, by 1922, operations had
up the fact that there were ground troops
the benefits I have just listed here and
3,000 feet, the RAF could drop bombs
accuracy. One advocate claimed that at
point was that the reason this had not
been done in the past was that, because
the air units had been under army com-
mand, they had not been allowed to
(Obviously a rationalization for the use of
Air Command, that is, the command by
air units and air officers).

In a survey of articles and lectures published in the Journal, which appeared
on an average of two to four times a year
during this time, one is struck by the una-
nimity of the writers (or at least those
from the RAF, Army officers often had a
different opinion that was also expressed,
but less frequently in the pages of the
Journal). The opinions expressed stated
the benefits I have just listed here and
saw no problems nor any reason to bring
up the fact that there were ground troops
in Iraq that supported the RAF.

Air policing was implemented very
quickly and, by 1922, operations had
begun in a way that would be consistent
with the types and variety of missions
that they would pursue in the coming
years. Air policing was swift, cost
effective, and led to very few casualties
on either side. The reality was, despite
the claims of its partisans, somewhat differ-
ent. While between 1922 and 1924, no
tribe had to be controlled more than once
when air policing raids was employed.
However, as we will soon see, the method
was seriously flawed.

An aspect of air policing that its pro-
ponents emphasized was its humanitarian
nature. Collateral damage (our term, not
theirs), they claimed, was very slight
because of moderation (for example,
Slessor claimed that no bombing was
ever conducted without ample previous
warning) but also because of superb
accuracy. One advocate claimed that at
3,000 feet, the RAF could drop bombs
without hitting anything beyond 10 and a
half yards from their target.

Claims of accuracy and restraint of
bombing were not entirely true, however,
and while the discrepancy must have
been noticed by many, few raised any
objections. An exception was Air
Commodore L.E.O. Charlton. When
assigned as Chief Staff Officer, HQ Iraq
Command, he was told about the prin-
ciples and methods of air policing. In his
autobiography (written in the third per-
son), he tells of visiting a local hospital:
“Here he received something of a
shock in addition to the ordinary
cases, male and female, of eye trou-
ble, stone in the bladder, burns and
injuries, he discovered that several
beds were occupied by patients who
were being treated for bomb injuries,
the result of a recent punitive raid
from Baghdad. It seemed to him a
most cold-blooded proceeding and a
grave reflection on the ends of jus-
tice, that at one moment people were
so harmful as to deserve sudden and
terrifying death, and then so harm-
less that no expense was spared in
patching up their injuries. He was
aghast to learn on further inquiry that
an air bomb in Iraq was, more or
less, the equivalent of a police trun-
cheon at home.”

Charlton then describes a bombing
raid in which 18 or 20 women and chil-
dren were killed by aerial bombs and how
this led to his eventual resignation in
protest. His resignation was accepted, he
took an early retirement, and never suc-
ceded in getting a public inquiry.

Other questions were beginning to
appear about the approach. In November
1924, not long after Charlton’s experi-
ence, the State Secretary for colonies
wrote to the commander in Iraq about his
concern over the frequency of attacks.
The RAF’s immediate response is inter-
esting in that attacks on villages were
denied, although there were attacks on
“localities.” Further, they stated that
warning leaflets were dropped before all
raids. In the view of the RAF, all inhabi-
tants had been afforded the opportunity
to leave if they really wanted to.

Notes from the same time that were
taken concerning the improvement in
bombing, were a little less humane in
tone:
“Where the Arab and Kurd had just
begun to realize that if they could
stand a little noise, they could stand
bombing, and still argue; they now
know what real bombing means, in
casualties and damage; they now
know that within 45 minutes a full
sized village, … can be practically
wiped out, and a third of its inhabi-
tants killed or injured by four or five
machines which offer them no real
target, no opportunity for glory as
warriors, no effective means of
escape, and little chance of retali-
ation or loot such as an infantry col-
umn would afford them in producing
a similar result.”

And so, in one short paragraph the
argument in British eyes for using this
policy is combined with an important
reason as to why it could never be an instru-
ment for building a stable civil society.

In 1923, Churchill wrote, regarding
air control/air policing that “our difficul-
ties and our expenses have diminished
with every month that has passed. Our
influence has grown while our armies
have departed.” By contrast, two years
later, a British official wrote to the
Colonial Office, “If the writ of King
Faisal runs effectively through his king-
dom, it is entirely due to British aero-
planes. If the aeroplanes were removed
tomorrow, the whole structure would
inevitable fall to pieces.”

Note that the latter comment was
made four years after Faisal’s installa-
tion. Air policing had secured his govern-
ment and prevented disorder but without
stability beyond what could be enforced
while the RAF was present. The lack of
stability and effective peacekeeping that
would have allowed the Iraqi government
to maintain itself, is apparent to us who
can look back on the coups that took
place in the 1930s, 1940s, and up to 1958,
with effects that can be seen into the pres-
tent day. However, as we noted earlier,
there were those in the 1920s who accept-
ed the delusion that air policing was
effective.

That delusion was fed by the absence
of a repetition of the revolt of 1920. With
no major revolts, it was easy to believe
that cheap and easy means had succeeded
brilliantly. But that belief masked several
problems. Among these was the fact that
air policing never broke the power of all
its opponents. Shaikh Mahmoud, the
greatest figure of opposition in Kurdistan
was pursued unmercifully but not caught
until 1931. This case shows one major
flaw in the air raid method: although
much energy was expended in chasing
this individual, the effort went into cap-
Turing or suppressing him and not in the
diplomatic and political efforts to get him
and other Kurdish leaders to support the
government.

So, why was it believed to be effec-
tive?

Individuals in the government wanted to believe that cheap and easy peacekeeping was possible, so they believed in what they perceived as a success. Others probably truly believed that applying new technology to a problem could automatically solve it. And this was, after all, the period in which theorists such as Douhet and Mitchell were proselytizing their views on the capabilities of airpower. There may have been a genuine misunderstanding of what constituted success in a program to not just rule but to train for eventual independence.

Order was kept by coercion, by using force, with little personal contact and establishment of trust. Creating and keeping the peace based on general consent and participation, which are the prerequisites for a stable, civil society was never accomplished.

It is not original, but still appropriate to remind ourselves of Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. From the perspective of avoiding, in the short term, the type of rebellion that had broken out in 1920, the British succeeded. In terms of creating a stable base from which Mandatory Iraq could become a stable nation, they failed. As a small-scale war it was immediately successful. But, going back to Clausewitz, war is essentially a political activity and politics cannot be successfully done when one party is imposing force from 3000 feet, and the other has no means to reply.

Notes:

1 Gertrude Bell (ed. Lady Bell); The Letters of Gertrude Bell; Vol II; p. 701; New York; 1928. This demonstration was also described by Air Chief John Salmon in a letter to Trenchard. He claimed that during the demonstration, “there was hardly a bomb that was not within 20 or 25 yards of the target.” See Bombing Policy in Iraq, 1923-1924, Public Records Office AIR 5/338.

2 After the war, the dismembered Ottoman Empire lost large areas to be administered by France (Syria and Lebanon) and Britain (Iraq and Palestine) as League of Nation Mandates. This government and tutelage was to end when they could assume their place as stable, self-sufficient, and functioning states. In the case of Iraq, the British found it to be a largely, mostly uncontrolled, and definitely hostile territory with little infrastructure surviving from the Ottomans. However, being there was essential because of the proximity of Iranian oil fields and Iraq’s location near the communication routes with India.

3 Mark Jacobsen; Small Wars and Insurgencies; Vol 2; Number 2; August 1991; “Only by the Sword”; British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920; p. 323.

4 With the impetus of the revolt in Mesopotamia in the larger context of Britain’s situation in the years immediately after the war, there were four main objectives to this conference. The first was to realize as many economies as possible. Second there was the goal of upholding Britain’s honor. The third objective was to uphold Britain’s interests and, finally, to reduce commitments. See Klieman, p. 242.

5 Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab world: the Cairo Conference of 1921, p. 83.

6 Mark Jacobsen; Small Wars and Insurgencies; Vol 2; Number 2; August 1991; “Only by the Sword”; British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920; p. 327.

7 This summary of Trenchard’s plans is taken from AIR 5/477, Memoranda on R.A.F. Scheme of Control for Iraq (Mesopotamia), 1921, Public Records Office.

8 LTC John Tennant wrote of situations and their remedy that would prefigure Iraq a few years after the war. “Besides keeping a close watch on the enemy, the RAF assisted at several punitive expeditions against hostile Arab tribes. Political officers were distributed throughout the occupied areas, but the Arab populations were untrustworthy, and it was not safe to venture far from a British post without escort. They endeavoured to interfere with the Samarra railway and wrecked a train in which the G.O.C was traveling, fortunately in a rear truck. Lieutenant Colonel Magniac was murdered while taking a walk near Fulujah. When such atrocities took place the sheik concerned would be ordered to deliver up the offenders for justice. After burning the villages, shooting some of the tribesmen, and confiscating their flocks, they generally came in and surrendered. On the Euphrates about Sumailich, and up the Diala, no attention was paid to the British authority and it was necessary to send out small punitive expeditions. The heat made operations by day impossible; marching would be done by night and the villages surrounded and attacked at dawn. The air unit was of extreme value in these circumstances and eliminated the necessity of many such expeditions. If a tribe got out of hand a raid could leave the morning and bomb and machine-gun any village with a 100-mile radius. Such immediate and drastic action inspired terror in the Arabs; once hunted down by machine-guns from the air they never wished a second dose, and a bomb having blown up the happy home there was fought left but surrender.” LTC John E. Tennant; In the Clouds Above Baghdad; pp. 162-3.

9 Trenchard; AIR 5/477, Memoranda on R.A.F. Scheme of Control for Iraq (Mesopotamia), 1921, Public Records Office - Bombing Operations were undertaken on R.A.F. Scheme of Control for Iraq (Mesopotamia), 1921, Public Records Office - 'Of course one can see that Trenchard was, indeed, making up a lot of this as he was going along. What is very interesting is that despite their extensive colonial experience, the British had very little in the way of formal doctrine in how to fight small, colonial wars. (Brian Holden Reid (ed.), Military Power, Land Warfare in Theory and Practice, Frank Cass, Portland OR, 1997, T. R. Moreman, “Small Wars’ and ‘Imperial Policing’: The Theory and Practice of Colonial War in the British Empire, 1919-1939)” They based their decision on the fact that small wars were best fought on the basis of practicality instead of theory. They did not include anything in the way of advice in the Field Service manual until 1912. Officers wanting to learn anything about how to conduct warfare in the colonies against the natives, had to go to unofficial manuals or accounts. These would include Small Wars, Passports, or Imperial Policing, and Winston Churchill’s Malakand Field Force.

10 Memoranda on R.A.F. Scheme of Control for Iraq (Mesopotamia), 1921, Public Records Office AIR 5/477.


12 Barry D. Power; Strategy Without Slide Rule; British Air Strategy 1914-1939; p. 171.

13 V.G. Krieman, Colonial Empires and Armies, p. 197.

14 This was to be true although it was found that the initial transportation and logistical effort to deploy air squadrons overseas with their personnel, support equipment, POL, spares, etc. was nearly as great as that required for ground units.

15 Slessor admits that in this area, there was a certain amount of activity that was “winked at” implying that they were not out to instill a totally law abiding situation but one that would keep violence and lawbreaking to within tolerant levels, especially if it was not directed at the government. The question of what is an acceptable degree of lawlessness also calls into question this approach and the rationale behind it as a means of ensuring a stable state.


17 Citizens were flown out of Kabul in 1929. For an account of how this was for the civilians, see the beginning of James Hilton’s Lost Horizon where, of course those passengers end up at an altogether unexpected destination.

18 Through the time of the Mandate, the RAF was active in three areas. The first was the border area with Turkey up to 1922-23, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk withdrew Turkish claims to northern Iraq; the second area of activity was in Kurdistan during the revolt of Shaikh Mahmoud which lasted until 1931. The final area was in the south along the Euphrates and also along the border area with Arabia, especially from 1924 on.


21 The following activities for January through March in JRUSI LXVII (1922) pp.388 were noted. January. – No. 70 Squadron Vickers Vernon Troop Carriers moved by air from Egypt to Baghdad. Bombing operations were carried out in the Sulaimaniyah District as the result of a severe attack on a force of levies by tribal bodies. . . These tribes were subjected to bombing from 15 to 19 January, including night bombings on the night of 16 January, the situation being completely restored. In the Basrah district, the Sarkals of the Alwan and Badran sections of the Madinah tribes were bombed on 10 January, as a result of their continued refusal to pay rent and revenue. On the morning of 17 January, they surrendered unconditionally. February. – No bombing operations were carried out by the Royal Air Force, but many reconnaissance and demonstration flights were carried out. The aerial route between Baghdad and Cairo was remarked . . . March. – Bombing Operations were undertaken on 6 March against certain sections of the Suq tribe with complete success; the leaders of the rebel anti-sections surrendering immediately.

Armoured Car reconnaissance reports, Iraq 1921 Oct. – 1922 September, Public Records Office, AIR 1/431/15/260/18

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Memoranda on R.A.F Scheme of control for Iraq (Mesopotamia) 1921, Public Records Office, AIR 5/477


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Determining how applicable the concept of revolution is to the Arab world should start with the Arabic language. Although today loanwords are so common in every language that it is difficult to avoid them, it is useful first to stop and consider how people in a particular culture define those words and what surrounds them. In Arabic, a variety of words have existed since classical times to denote a range of acts against the established order from violent dissent to rebellion and revolution that are meant to bring about change in the political life, institutions, or social structure of a given society. These words include fitna (sedition), khourouj (departure), qivam (rising), intaza (breaking away), bughat (law-breaking), ikhtilal, ingilab, or thawra (revolution), and, most recently, intifadah (uprising).

The movements that all these words represent are as diverse as the Arab world and Arab history, but if we limit ourselves to the modern period they would include the revolt against the French in Cairo in 1798; the revolt led by the Egyptian officer ‘Urabi in 1882; the uprisings in Aleppo in 1819 and 1850, and in Damascus in 1830; the uprisings in Palestine, Hawran, and Mount Lebanon against Egyptian rule in the 1830s, the agitation in Mount Lebanon in the following two decades culminating in a civil war in 1860; the attack on the Christian quarter in Damascus in 1860; the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule in 1916; the Druze and Syrian revolts against the French in 1925-27 and the revolution of 1963; Palestinian popular agitation in the 1920s and 1930s leading to the revolt of 1936-1939, and the intifadah in progress since December 1937; in Iraq the tribal revolt of 1920, the military takeovers from that of Bakr Sidqi in 1936 to that of Rashid ‘Ali in 1941, and the revolution of 1958; the Egyptian revolutions of 1919 and 1952; the Algerian revolution of 1954-1962; the guerilla risings of 1965-1974 in Dhofar; the Libyan revolution of 1969; the civil wars in North Yemen in 1961-1967, Jordan in 1970, Lebanon in 1958, and from 1975 to the present.

Although these insurrectionary movements have differed in content, scope, and consequences, they were the result of structural changes associated with the industrial and technological revolutions. The impact of the West on the Arab world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is a central theme of modern history. The development of Middle East economies and peoples, the adoption of modern technologies, the growth of cities and of population, the diffusion of Western culture and of cultural gaps between a Westernized elite and the rest of the population, all became characteristics of the modern history of this area, as they were of all areas under Western influence. The Western presence took various forms from spheres of influence in the principal power centers of the region, to indirect control, occupation, or annexation in parts of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. In the last four decades, the impact of the West has also been felt in the form of the Arab-Israeli conflict—ever present, ever prominent—marked by confrontations in 1948-1949, 1956, 1973, 1978, 1982, and from 1987 to this day. This conflict is particularly central to the revolutions in the Arab world since the 1940s, when dissatisfaction with the status quo, appeal to new ideologies, and a search for legitimacy have all become, more than ever, characterized by the intertwining of domestic and regional issues.

Although all these insurrectionary movements have brought about profound change in the Middle East, some have been more effective than others. After describing traditional types of insurrections, it will be argued here that only the revolutions of the last four decades have resulted in profound and irreversible change in the social order.

Throughout the last century of Ottoman rule and in the interwar period of the European colonial domination that followed, Arab politics remained essentially unchanged, despite the transformation of the period, because the leaders of Arab political life withstood the threats it posed for their traditional status and role in their local societies. Arab politics remained in the hands of essentially the same groups, an elite that viewed the world and dealt with it in the old, familiar ways.

Because of that, insurrections that occurred in those years more often than not reflected fractional power struggles of a type that the historian Albert Hourani has classified, essentially, as traditional, in the sense that they have their roots in a status quo that had been in place for centuries. Hourani described this political life in the Ottoman period as the “politics of notables,” the members of prestigious local urban families whose inherited influence was based on their religious, military, or political position, and wealth accumulated from commerce or from landowning or tax-collecting (iltizam). In the cities where Ottoman power was centered, they acted as intermediaries between alien rulers and local society, for whom they acted as leaders. The political objectives of these notables, regardless of their diversity and their shifting coalitions, were to assert their leadership over the common people, to weaken or eliminate rivals, and to obtain influence with the rulers so that they could control local politics. They had no intention of overthrowing the political system and replacing it by another.

The dramatic changes of the early twentieth century seemed on the surface to have transformed the nature of politics in the Arab world. After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, and most of its Arab lands were brought under some kind of French or British colonial rule. These systems that replaced the Ottoman Empire elicited a variety of reactions. Independence movements had manifested themselves before the war—occasionally against the Ottomans, but more often against European rule whenever it was already in place—but now they took center stage. For all these reasons, politicians used new tactics to call for new political agendas.
Yet, had the nature of political life changed profoundly from what it had been in Ottoman times? The leading politicians of the first decades of the twentieth century were drawn from the same class of notables who had served as mediators in earlier centuries. Some have argued that the movements of independence that these politicians led against the European colonialists were truly revolutionary. But it is equally possible to argue, as has been done and as this paper proposes, that the aim of these early nationalists was not so much to overthrow the new rulers—a goal which they knew was far beyond their means—but to strike a bargain with them not unlike the one they had struck with their Ottoman rulers. Once again they would act as intermediaries between the rulers and the ruled. If this was the case, then the nationalists of the interwar period acted squarely within the tradition of Ottoman politics, because the European rulers could no more dispense with their mediation than the Ottomans could have done.

There were, of course, differences in how they interacted with the two sets of rulers. The Ottoman rulers had at least shared a religion and culture with the majority of their Arab subjects, and Ottoman rule had been stable, long-lasting, and clear in its objectives. European rule was, in contrast, shaky in the interwar years. Because of this and for other reasons, relations with the British and French rulers turned out to be unstable and fraught with tensions, and revolts against the British and the French occurred on a scale never seen under the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes, these revolts were wars of liberation: more often, they were simply a new manifestation of the traditional politics of notables.

Only in the last forty years has the nature of political life really changed. The cumulative effects of the social, economic, and political changes in the area have produced a different type of political life in which the notables have lost their power and revolutions of a new kind are possible. Wherever foreign rule ended, mediators became unnecessary and were turned into competing contenders for power. In their new struggles for rule, they aimed at the total overthrow of the regimes in place. To achieve that goal more often than not through control of the armed forces, they backed their claims to legitimacy with populist slogans and programs of social change.

But even now the old world has not been destroyed completely. In some countries, foreign and domestic pressures have not forced the issues to the point of revolution. Many revolutions in the Arab world are still unfinished and, as they take place, older conflicts based on ethnic, religious, economic, regional, and other differences surface. In some of the upheavals over the last decades, several coups d’état have occurred in succession, raising the question of whether they are again simply changes at the top and not revolutions at all. Sometimes it seems that the only revolutionary aspects to these new regimes are the humble origins of the people who bring them about. Sometimes, too, the revolutionary spirit of the initial phase has been reversed or slowed. Despite these reservations, however, the cumulative impact of these upheavals has been revolutionary, as I will illustrate with examples drawn from Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.

The first observation to make about the revolutions in these three countries is that in all of them power was transferred from the established moneyed elite to a new elite of humble origins, and usually small-town or country background. At the core is often an ethnic, sectarian, or regional subculture. Of the twelve members of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council in 1952, at least eight including Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Muhammad Naguib, and Anwar Sadat had rural origins or rural connections. Hanna Batatu, in his seminal work on Iraq, shows that Iraq’s revolution also represented either farms or small country towns against Iraq’s central city, Baghdad, and its traditional governing class. Abd al-Karim Qasim, Abd al-Salam Arif, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and Saddam Husayn all came from small-country towns and rural areas in the northwestern part of Iraq, and belong to the Arab Sunni Branch or Islam, as did the majority of those around them. The present ruling group all come from the Takrit region and the Abu Nasir clan. Saddam Husayn comes from this area, and his father was a peasant from the village of al-‘Awjah. In Syria, rural forces were also important in the revolutionary years 1963-1968, and included Druzes, Sunnis, and ‘Alawis, from small towns and the countryside. The core of Syria’s ruling group is also related: all, including Hafiz al-Asad, belong to the ‘Alawis from the al-Matawirah clan.

The ‘Alawis (or Nusayris) are an offshoot of the Shi’a branch of Islam dating from the ninth century. They make up about 12 percent of the population of Syria and live in the ‘Alawi mountains, where the peasants are notoriously poor. Hafiz al-Asad’s father owned a small plot from which he could barely scratch out a livelihood in the village of Qardaha in that region.

The transfer of power from the old to the new elite took place through the army. The army is the avenue of social mobility for the new elite and its road to power. It was also the natural agent of revolution because it provided a platform for the struggle against residual colonialism, the revision of unequal treaties in Egypt and Iraq, and resistance to such attempts at superpower hegemony as the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine of the 1950s. Finally, the military defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war acted as a catalyst for change among dissatisfied army officers: the role of the 1948 defeat as an agent of change in these revolutions was extremely important, and not yet appreciated enough in the West.

Remarkably absent in all three revolutions is the factor of religion. In the Arab world, it has been difficult to divorce the phenomenon of religion—the so-called “revival” of Islam—from the process of decolonization and anti-imperialist movements. It has also been difficult to divorce it from traumatic military defeats, particularly the one following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. But in the three cases under consideration and in others—the Libyan revolution was basically secular, the Algerian and Palestinian wars of independence—the religious factor was not salient. The new regimes have been essentially secular. Their secularism is derived partly from the socialist models they adopted and partly from their stress on the concept of their being an Arab nation as opposed to an Islamic community (ummah). On occasion, these regimes have even openly opposed or clashed with the religious elements, for the latter
became natural focal points of opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood became one of Nasser’s targets. The opposition to Hafiz al-Asad has rallied around the Muslim Brotherhood, provoking the government to retaliate ruthlessly, notably in Aleppo in August 1980 and in Hama in April 1981 and again, most forcefully, in February 1982.

Replacing religion has been the role of the ideological party in Iraq and Syria. The Ba’th party’s goals, as defined by its founders in the 1940s, were unity for the divided Arab nation, freedom from military, political, or cultural foreign (Western) domination, and socialism as the answer to the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of notables and, more generally, to those who benefited from the established social structure. In practice, the party split in 1966 and the differences between Syria and Iraq are today deeper than they have ever been, buy within each country the ideology of the party has served to mobilize national sentiment and to legitimize its revolutionary governments.6

In the two countries also, the relationship between the party and the army has been intimate. In both countries, the party infiltrated the army, politicized it, and then used it to overthrow the old regime and to solidify its grip over the government. The army became indistinguishable from the party, but in the case of Syria it eventually controlled the party.

Ostensibly it continues to rule in the name of the party, but real power is in the hands of the military men at the top and their immediate followers. Hafiz al-Asad was a Ba’thist before he became an officer; he made it to the top through the military and then subordinated the party to his rule. The party continues to be useful to him: instead of ruling in the name of naked power, he can rule in the name of the party and its ideology which he claims to represent.

In Saddam Husayn’s Iraq, in contrast, the party controls the army, though not to the degree of, say, the Soviet Union. Before coming to power, Saddam Husayn organized the non-military wing of the Iraqi Ba’th party and rose through its ranks. After he and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr had seized power in 1968, they developed ways of exercising control over the army. They made membership in the party a prerequisite to admission to military academies, indoctrinated the rank and file with the party ideology, and established in the armed forces new security and intelligence units directly dependent on the party’s national-security bureau which Saddam Husayn controlled. Probably because of these measures, and despite some expectations of the contrary because of Iraq’s heterogeneous population, the army has remained united during the Iraq-Iran war.

It is evident that the new regimes under consideration all rely on the authority of particular individuals. Neither the party ideology nor revolutionary platforms have prevented this cult from forming around the men at the top—a phenomenon for which there is no parallel in the old regimes. In the case of Nasser, it can be explained by his charisma and genuine popularity, but in the case of Saddam Husayn and Hafiz al-Asad, it owes much more to indoctrination and the authoritarian nature of the revolutionary regime. Both have perfected their systems of control with secret and security police, the abolition of parliamentary institutions, and, except to a large extent in Egypt, the control of the judiciary. In Egypt the revolutionary leadership has been relatively stable since 1952—even Sadat had been in power for ten years before he was assassinated. In Syria and Iraq the leaders have substituted longevity of rule for the succession of coups d’état that marked the earlier phases of their revolutions. In all of these countries, however, the transfer of power has not been completely resolved. Egypt has partially resolved it, in the sense that the death of one leader signals the takeover of another, but in Iraq and Syria it remains a thorny problem.7

Paradoxically, at the middle and lower level of decision-making, power-sharing is more widespread than it was before the revolutions. Extending the bureaucracy and enlarging the army have given the average citizen a greater chance to participate in government, if not more say in what it does, than he ever had before. In this and other ways, the revolutions have changed life once and for all.

In all three countries, the revolutions have expanded the public sector and enormously increased the role of the government in the life of the average citizen. Planning projects were put in place to determine the direction of social and economic change: nationalization was extended to private banking, large-scale industry, cooperative agriculture, health, welfare, housing, and education. In the schools, in contrast to the colonial period, the teaching of and in Arabic was stressed, and new generations of students have grown up on revolutionary slogans their parents had never heard. In Egypt, under Sadat, the “open-door policy” (infitah) reversed some of these trends, but the state is still more powerful and pervasive than it ever was under the monarchy.8

The bureaucracy and army have expanded dramatically in all three countries. Hanna Batatu has estimated that state employees, including members of the armed and security forces, pensioners, dependents of soldiers, and other state servants who depend directly on the government for their livelihood, constitute more than one-fourth of the population. The army constitutes a majority of these dependents, as it is the backbone of the government in its confrontations with Israel and its competition with other Arab states. Some of these dependents are artificially employed, either to reduce unemployment (until recently all graduates were assured of a state job in Egypt), or to buy off opposition.

Undoubtedly, dramatic redistribution of wealth has occurred. In the countryside, the landed classes have been destroyed. In Syria and Iraq it took the cumulative impact of successive revolutionary policies, but in Egypt it was achieved mostly during the Nasser era. In Egypt, another effect of the revolution has been the appearance of a class of rich and middle-class peasants: they now control over 62 percent of Egypt’s cultivated land and up to 30 or 90 percent of its stock of farm machinery.

In Syria in the 1960s and in Iraq in the 1970s, collectivization was at first encouraged, but private ownership and investment were then allowed to make a comeback. All three revolutions benefited the small land-holding peasant.

Nonetheless, serious problems remain: some 33 percent of all rural families in Egypt, 21 percent in Syria, and less than 13 percent in Iraq remain landless; peasants migrate in large numbers to...
the cities where they become unskilled laborers. Only Syria has had relative success in raising its per-capita agricultural production during the 1970s, although that nation presently faces serious economic problems. In Egypt, since the death of Nasser in 1970, and largely because of Sadat’s open policy, income for the middle and poor peasants has slowed, if not reversed, and some of Egypt’s limited arable land has been sold by the peasants for illegal housing and commercial undertakings. In all three countries, and especially Egypt, the revolutions have benefited casual laborers least.

Urban growth in all these countries has been dramatic. The growth in government and educational opportunities have increased the urban middle classes, who constitute the main beneficiaries of the revolution, although industrial workers have also prospered. This population increase has been concentrated in the main cities: Cairo, an extreme example, has grown from 2.3 million people in 1952 to about 14 million today.

Compared to what existed before the revolutions in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, radical change has not only occurred but its effects have filtered down to all levels of society. At the same time, expectations have not been realized. Production has suffered from the premium put on the expansion of the bureaucracy and the army; enormous problems of indebtedness have developed from mismanagement, defense expenditures, losses incurred in successive regional wars, and lack of economic development. The problems, coupled with the absence of parliametary institutions, the violent nature of the original takeover by these regimes, and unresolved questions of legitimacy and succession, leave these countries today with internal and regional problems which account for an increasingly restive opposition usually in the guise of the much talked about Islamic fundamentalism. What the future will bring is unclear, but it is unlikely to reverse the forces of change that were unleashed by the cumulative effects of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi revolutions.

1 This paper is indebted principally for its ideas to the scholarship of Albert Hourani, Hanna Batatu, and Walid Khalidi.


4 Albert Hourani, “Revolution in the Arab Middle East,” Revolution in the Middle East, pp. 65-72.


8Batatu, “The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions.”

W. Dirk Raat
SUNY-Fredonia
Emeritus; Arizona State University

This is one of currently sixty-seven books that belong to *The Way People Live* series. These books focus on different cultural groups (e.g., Amish, Communist Russia, etc.), people in a particular historical time period (e.g., *Life in Ancient Rome, Life in a Medieval Castle,* etc.), or people involved in a specific event (e.g., *Life on an Everest Expedition*). The series is designed to alter stereotypes, especially about the personal aspects of life. As such, although the political and military narrative is not overlooked, the emphasis is on what I would call “social history.” All the volumes in the series attempt to remove the reader from the present day by utilizing primary sources that reveal an honest and more complete image of cultures removed in time and space. *Life Among the Aztecs* succeeds in realizing the aims of the series.

The book is structured around seven chapters plus an introduction and epilogue. An overview of the contents indicates that the book is intended for a secondary school audience, not the college level. While the breadth of topics is commendable, the book overall lacks depth and (to be discussed later) avoids controversial interpretations. However, I must admit, that if a high school student brought the content of this book to my college “Pre-Contact America” class, that student would know a great deal indeed, and I would be a gratified teacher.

Diversity of subject matter characterizes this book. For example, the first chapter on “The Aztec People” treats of fashion, clothing, social classes and mobility, family life, rituals associated with growing up, marriage and adult life, sexuality, old age and death. These are certainly the interests of social history. After surveying government and law, the following third chapter deals with education and communication. Chapter four is entitled “Architecture, Arts, and Crafts,” and contains a discussion of Aztec temples and homes, artisans, sculptors, feather and metal workers, lapidaries, potters, weavers, and basket makers. The following chapter is on the economy, and covers production techniques from traditional, intensive, and chinampa farming, to markets, trade (including an insert on merchant spies), and transportation. The next section on warfare is probably the most informative of the chapters, especially relating the details of Aztec battle tactics and strategy, as well as the fate of dead soldiers. The seventh chapter, entitled simply “Religion,” describes the Aztec worldview and the role and reason for sacrificial rites. The author is to be commended for her epilogue which is devoted to developing alternative explanations for the Mexica defeat by the Spanish, especially alternatives to the traditional view that Cortés was believed to be an emissary of Quetzalcoat and as such disarmed his Aztec opponents. The book concludes with an impressive list of endnotes, a select bibliography, a thorough index, and a very necessary glossary of terms. For a book like this, that is intended for a pre-college audience, the scholarship is surprisingly sound and the works consulted are excellent sources that have survived the test of time.

A major strength of this work (and a goal of the series in general) is the way the author has integrated primary sources into the text. Many of these are pictorial, such as a replica of the Codex Mendoza that shows some of the punishments with which Aztec children were threatened (20), or an illustration of the medicinal properties of plants taken from the Spanish book *Aztec Herbal* (64). Some primary sources are inserts, either at the side or the bottom/top of the page, such as the description of the enormous market area of Tenochtitlán by Hernan Cortés as related to Charles V, king of Spain, in his *Letters from Mexico* (65). Finally, the author often places a quote in the text from a primary source. See, for example, her discussion of polygamy, concubines, and multiple wives when she notes, according to “one of Cortés’ soldiers, Bernal Díaz del Castillo, that Emperor Montezuma ‘had many women as his mistresses’.” (21) This, of course, from Díaz’s *Conquest of New Spain* as duly noted by the author (93, n.9).

While an admirable book in many ways, the work does suffer some weaknesses. Too often the book fails to relate the past to the present. For example, when the author speaks of the early migrations of the Azteca (referred to here as Mexica, p. 8) and their wanderings, looking to fulfill the prophesy of their patron god Huizilopochtli concerning a settlement place where an eagle with a snake in its mouth would be perched on a prickly pear cactus, she could have noted that same logo on the contemporary Mexican banner. Or again, when speaking of the ancient Mexica, the author might have noted that an individual Mexica is a Mexicano, and how the “x” in the Nahua language is pronounced “sh” or “Meshicano,” a term from which “Mexicano” and “Chicano” is derived. Less damning is the author’s tendency to introduce an unfamiliar term, such as “ideogram” (8) early in the text without a definition, and then to reintroduce the same term later with a definition (40). I say less damning because in this example the word “ideogram” could have been located in the glossary if the student were so inclined and knew how to use a glossary.

As indicated earlier, the work has missed the opportunity to expose the student to important interpretations that are controversial in both scholarly and non-scholarly circles. Two examples will hopefully suffice. When discussing religion, Hall expends much energy on types of sacrificial rites, but only notes in one case the association of ritualistic cannibalism with human sacrifice. Ritualistic cannibalism was the rule and not the exception for those occasions in which an enemy warrior was sacrificed. This was an important ritual for Aztec soldiers and part of the system of social mobility that enshrined a Mexican warrior with enhanced status. And, although the theories of Marvin Harris and Michael Harner have been highly criticized by the profession, the relationship of population pressure and protein deficiency to cannibalism is an idea that should be introduced to the readership. On another front, the sacrificial cult surrounding the imperial god Huizilopochtli separated the Aztecs from their neighbors and was indeed a new religious ideology. This ideology, according to Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur...
Demarest, was partly responsible for the decline of the Mexica society and economy after 1500 A.D. In effect, every young man captured in the provinces and sacrificed to the cult of the sun meant one less worker who could increase the productivity of the Mexica state. When the Spaniards came they were lucky enough to conquer a society in decline.

With these omissions aside, the book is too good not to be recommended reading for high schoolers in social studies and world history classes. Eleanor J. Hall is to be commended for her hard work in producing a readable and respectable text for her young audience.


Gayle K. Brunelle
California State University, Fullerton

The expansion of world history as a research and teaching field in higher education over the past several decades has led to changes in how world history is conceptualized. These changes have entailed the emergence of several fairly distinct approaches to world history, which can more or less accurately be summed up as “West and the World,” “World Civilization,” “World History,” and “Global History.” The “West and the World” approach is the most conservative and Euro-centric, as its focus tends to be on the ways in which the West, usually still envisioned as a “rising” and “modernizing” West, interacted with the rest of the world. As its title suggests, New Worlds: The Great Voyages of Discovery 1400-1600 is very much in this older, “West and World” tradition, and thus would be most suitable for courses geared this way, although it does have some problems even in that conceptual framework. It would not, however, be particularly useful for anyone teaching world history from a more integrated, thematic, or global perspective. To his credit, Fritze is quite open about his perspective from the outset. He states clearly that the story he wishes to relate is that of Europeans venturing to explore the larger world, and the series of “discoveries” that resulted in the expansion of European power and influence throughout the world. Needless to say, these “discoveries” were of lands new only to the European perspective—they were already inhabited and did not need discovering from the point-of-view of their inhabitants. But to Europeans of this era, the world south of the Sahara and Southeast of the Persian Gulf was largely unknown, and the New World as truly Terra Incognita to Europeans, despite the fragments of information remaining from the Norse voyages of the Middle Ages.

Fritze attempts to capture the wonder the discoveries of the Renaissance voyages elicited from Europeans, all the while reminding his readers that Europeans’ foremost goal in launching these voyages was not to discover anything new but rather to reach the riches of Asian civilizations already known to them. Europeans’ knowledge of the East, based as it was primarily on information derived mostly from the medieval voyages of Marco Polo and other travelers to the East when Mongol rule made such trips possible, tended to be badly out of date. But it still elicited in Europeans a thirst to find a way to reach the riches of Asia and tap directly into the spice trade, thus allowing them to circumvent the Ottomans, who controlled the most direct route to Asia. Centuries of warfare had demonstrated to Europeans that they would not be able to defeat the Muslims, whose power under Ottoman rule was waxing, rather than waning, in this period. Tired of paying expensive Venetian and Muslim middlemen, Europeans began, tentatively at first, to explore a route around Africa to reach the Indian Ocean.

It is this search, beginning with the Portuguese voyages of the fifteenth century, and ending with the discovery of the New World, circumnavigating of the globe and the conquest of the indigenous civilizations in the Americas over the next two centuries that Fritze chronicles in this book. It appears to be designed less for use in a lower division world history course than as a text in an upper division course on the early modern period. Most general world history surveys would be unlikely to use a book such as this, not because the text is too difficult to be accessible, as the book generally is well-written and quite readable, but because most world history surveys simply have too much information to cram in during a single semester to linger that long on the Age of Discovery. An exception might be a course taught from a “West and World” perspective that would be likely to include more emphasis on the European Renaissance voyages of discovery. This book might also be useful in a more advanced course on early modern Europe in which the instructor wanted to include a segment on European expansion. Even for this purpose, however, the book might be problematic for some instructors.

One problem that runs throughout the book is its Euro-centric perspective, especially in relationship with the Muslim world. Although Fritze does emphasize the power of the Ottoman Empire, he also envisions the European discoveries as initiating the beginning of the decline in Ottoman power, probably anticipating that decline, therefore, by a good century at least. He also overestimates the decay of Muslim commerce in this era, and underestimates the debt of Europeans to Muslims for almost all the commercial and navigational techniques to which he attributes initial European success in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Moreover, he accuses the Muslims of a distinct lack of curiosity regarding the world around them, and a concomitant lack of interest in exploration, which allowed the Europeans to become the great discoverers and colonizers of the modern age, rather than the Muslims. This is to miss an important point. The dar-al-Islam stretched from Mali in West Africa to China. Everywhere Europeans went in their “discoveries” except for the New World and southernmost Africa, they found Muslims already well entrenched. From 700 C.E. to 1400 C.E. Muslims via trade, conversion, and conquest, expanded their religion, culture, and commercial networks, across the globe. No, they didn’t reach the New World. But neither would the Europeans had they not already been underdogs desperate to find new routes to the East because the expansive Muslims had already locked up the best, most direct ones. Even then, the Europeans neither sought nor expected to find a continent lying between them and Asia, and as Fritze rightly points out, for at least a generation or two after the discovery of the Americas, Europeans considered the new lands to be mostly a nuisance, and clung obstinately to the hope that they would turn out to be islands rather than continents. Moreover, the Muslims continued to expand their influence in Africa and Central Asia, not to mention Eastern Europe, during precisely the centuries when Europeans were busy expanding their influence in the New World and elsewhere, largely because they, the Europeans, experienced at best limited success in territories where Islam was already entrenched. Finally, it should
be pointed out that the Muslims, like the Chinese, whose “abdication” of exploring zeal in this era also supposedly opened the way for European expansion, already controlled territories larger than Europe itself, let alone the much smaller nascent European nation-states that actually sponsored the voyages of exploration. They had no pressing need to venture further for trade or commodities, because they already inhabited huge, multicultural empires, were plugged into vast trade networks, and enjoyed the products of numerous geographical zones. It was the need of Europeans precisely because they inhabited a relative backwater that drove them to venture into unknown (to them) territory. Although Fritz alludes to some of these things in his book, his tale is still a rather old-fashioned one, rousing to read and lavishly illustrated, but still slanted more toward Europe than most world history instructors are likely to wish.

David W. Del Testa, ed. Global History: Cultural Encounters from Antiquity to the Present. Sharpe Reference, 2004. 734pp. $325.00 (cloth).

Jacqueline A. Ott
Arkansas Tech University

Primarily developed for the high school audience, this four-volume set demonstrates the importance of global history through an emphasis on cross-cultural exchange and interaction. Each article is introduced with interesting photography and includes a timeline, a clearly defined map, and a sidebar that highlights significant cultural events. Additionally, each chapter is supported with primary source documents and a short bibliography.

The four volumes cover all regions of the world and are divided into distinct, historical themes, Antiquity (5000 B.C.E. to 400s C.E.); The Spread of Religions and Empires (400s to 1400s); The Age of Discovery and Colonial Expansion (1400s to 1900s); and The Contemporary World (1900s to the present). Each book contains a well-written introduction that includes a section entitled “The Global Impact of Cultural Interactions during the Era,” a glossary and index.

The editor has designed the chapters, approximately eight to ten pages in length, to fit comfortably into the high school social-studies curriculum. As an example, the article entitled “Christopher Columbus and the Columbian Exchange” includes a timeline from the birth of Columbus through his second voyage; a clear and understandable map of the four voyages of Columbus, a sidebar that lists some of the consequences of this cultural interaction, and a letter from Columbus to King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella in 1493. Additionally, the editor directs the reader to related articles in the text.

The editor successfully tackles the difficult demand of presenting and interpreting an overview of global history by focusing on cultural turning points. High school students, inundated by high-tech graphics and sophisticated audio and visual stimuli, are presented with fresh ideas, concise articles, and excellent maps. Del Testa has challenged these young minds to consider the consequences of cultural interaction through the use of critical thinking and evaluation.


Rachel Silva
Arkansas Tech University

Erik Gilbert and Jonathan T. Reynolds’s Africa in World History attempts to expel prevailing notions and prejudices of African history. For years, Western intellectuals argued over whether Africa even had a history deserving study. Due in part to these arguments and their manifestation in popular culture, Americans have developed very biased notions of Africa and African history. Gilbert and Reynolds begin their textbook by presenting six common characterizations of Africa—“Primitive Africa,” “Wild and Dangerous Africa,” “Exotic Africa,” “Unspoiled Africa,” “Utopian Africa,” and “Broken Africa.”

Of these six characterizations, Exotic Africa, Utopian Africa, and Broken Africa are particularly interesting. Exotic Africa is defined as “stress[ing] the differences between Africans and other human societies—especially Western civilization” (xii). In Exotic Africa, people are naked or clothed in strange outfits, and religion is dominated by animism and superstitions. Americans can easily see an example of Exotic Africa by thumbing through older issues of National Geographic.

On the other hand, Utopian Africa portrays Africa as a safe haven, protecting Africans from the racism and oppression experienced by their ancestors. In this view, problems in Africa today are seen as a result of “the destruction of African culture and unity—usually by outside forces” (xiii). In other words, Utopian Africa blames Africa’s problems on European imperialism. Finally, Broken Africa can best be described as “Afro-Pessimism” or the idea that efforts to improve the social and economic situation in modern Africa are useless.

Gilbert and Reynolds, both of whom studied at the Boston University African Studies Center, believe that Africa has a real, complex, and valuable history, very much worth our study. They portray a balanced image of African history by undermining each of the six biased characterizations listed above. Another main goal of this text is to show how Africa fits into the fabric of world history, influencing cultures and being influenced in return.

Africa in World History is divided into two main sections. Part One covers Africa prior to 1500, while Part Two covers Africa since 1500. In Part One, the authors organize the chapters thematically to show that different regions of Africa had similar experiences. However, these chapters are broken down further into geographical units and periods of time to illustrate the overriding theme of diversity in the African historical experience prior to 1500.

In Part Two, the authors move to a pan-African approach because the European conquest of Africa allows them to compare African experiences under colonial rule and study the African continent as a whole. These chapters are further divided thematically to highlight different aspects of the African experience during the period. African political history is addressed in two chapters because the African independence movement of the 1950s and thereafter merits discussion in a chapter of its own. The authors also take a pan-African approach because European colonization helped to create a unique African identity. According to Gilbert and Reynolds, this new African identity was the result of the common experience of Africans under European colonialism and due to innovations in communication and transportation, which allowed for increased contact between Africans and the world as a whole.

Africa in World History successfully provides readers with a much more insightful and in-depth discussion of
African history than those covered in introductory world history textbooks. For example, when Gilbert and Reynolds discuss the Atlantic slave trade, they devote nearly half of a chapter to the history of the early slave trade in the Mediterranean, Europe, and Africa; the plantation system; sea trade routes; and the explanation for using Africans as slaves. All of this provides students with some background on slavery as an institution and a mode of production. They spend the remainder of the chapter describing the horrors of the Atlantic slave trade and its impact on African culture. The authors devote another chapter to West and West-Central Africa and the transformation of the region due to the Atlantic slave trade. World history textbooks usually summarize the African slave trade in less than fifteen pages.

Another example of Gilbert and Reynolds’s exhaustive research and superior rendering of African history is their coverage of European colonialism. The authors devote three chapters to the “New Imperialism” or the European colonization of Africa from 1850 to 1914. Chapter 13 explains why Europeans were able to divide and conquer Africa quickly during the period: Europeans had a monopoly on industry thanks to the Industrial Revolution, which supplied them with iron-hulled steamboats, quinine, and the repeating rifle. These innovations upset the balance of power between Europe and the rest of the world, allowing Europeans to exploit their advantages for economic gain and political prestige. Chapter 13 then uses three case studies to illustrate the different colonizing approaches of Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy. Chapter 14 describes how colonial regimes forced Africa to transition from subsistence farming to growing cash crops for export. European colonial governments needed to make money for their home countries and create a tax base in their respective colonies to fund the salaries of colonial officials. Chapter 15 identifies and describes the different means of colonial rule used in Africa, such as direct rule, indirect rule, and settler states. This chapter concludes with a discussion of World War I and World War II and their impact on colonial regimes in Africa. Gilbert and Reynolds’s three chapters on European imperialism in Africa provide a comprehensive and revealing narrative.

_Africa in World History_ is an informative, easy to read textbook that would pique any student’s interest. In addition to being a good read, this text has clear maps that are relevant to the material and timelines that give readers an overview of the periods being discussed. The glossary and index are helpful in navigating the book. The book contains many black and white illustrations in addition to sixteen pages of glossy color photographs. Instructors will appreciate the sections entitled “Voices from African History,” which include excerpts from primary sources. Gilbert and Reynolds make a conscious effort to portray African history inside a world history framework by including a section at the end of each chapter approaching the particular chapter’s topic from a global perspective. _Africa in World History_ succeeds in expelling readers’ preconceived notions about Africa—positive or negative—and gives a balanced view of Africans and African history.


_David Krueger_  
Arkansas Tech University

Part of the _Great Structures in History_ series, this book was organized so as to inquire “how and why such structures were built, what obstacles arose, and how they were overcome.” There are four other works in the series: _The Panama Canal, Stonehenge, The Roman Colosseum_, and _A Medieval Castle_.

The four chapters in the forty-page text are supplemented by an index, a glossary of terms, and an annotated listing of additional sources. Lynette’s book is an easy read, and it is strengthened by a number of drawings, photographs, and maps. Among the maps are ones that deal with the location of walls that were built during the Warring States Period, the Silk Road, and the Great Wall today.

For its size, Lynette’s book provides a surprising amount of specific information that will be of interest not only to young readers but to many of their elders as well. For example, we learn that there were 25,000 watchtowers along the Wall, with each tower spaced 600 feet apart (page 26) and that the Wall is wide enough for ten people to walk side by side on top of it (page 9). We also learn that only about 30% of the Wall is in good condition today, although a restoration project has been underway since 1984. Sadly, some sections of the Great Wall are being used today as tourist traps. Ironically, the tourists, in their turn, are inflicting much damage by trying to take pieces of the Wall for souvenirs while failing to dispose of their trash properly.

This little book is well organized and should be widely used in young adult classrooms. Lynette’s style of writing will create additional interest in one of history’s most famous construction projects, and many young readers will thank their teachers for introducing them to it.

A Final Correspondence with the Bulletin

Dear Michael,

I make bold to express some reactions to your Vol XX, No 2, Fall 2004, Some positive, others negative.

I am pleased to find in your pages some two dozen references that do well to promote good world history as I understand it. I observe them individually below. It will be more useful if here I concentrate on the much fewer but quite serious references that In My Humble Opinion MISlead the study of world history up the garden path.

I am VERY displeased to find the issue peppered with “CIVILIZATION/S” since there are NONE and NEVER have been any. One author cites our “father” Bill McNeill in support of the term. He does not mention that Bill reduced Toyne’s 21 to 3 in 1964, and to 0 in 1990, in Volume 1, Number 1 of the WHB’s big brother the JWH. I defy any reader, or writer, to point out even a single pristine essentialist civilization that exists or was formed independently from the process of world history [are we not historians of the WORLD?] and its neighbors. “China” was ruled for more than half of its history by NON “Chinese” even if some were assimilated.

Please excuse my long excursion, and I hurry to return to this issue of the WHB. I find the word “civilization/s” all over the issue on the following pages: p. 5 [3 times and as the core concept of half...
the model]; p. 13; p. 16 [2 times and as a goal]; p. 26; p. 29 [2 times]; p. 35; and p. 47.

So why do the several world historians on the pages cited refer to a wholly non-existent entity, and even make it central to half their course? My own argument against the existence of "civilization/s" one for that matter "modernity" can be found at http://rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/no_civilization.html

I welcome above the incorporation of Central Asia in WORLD history, since after all its peoples played a CENTRAL role in the formation of Persian, Turkish, Indian, Chinese, and even South East Asian civilizations, not to mention Russian and West European if they have any. I am sorry to disagree with Gandhi when he replied to a question about Western Civilization: "It would be a good idea." In fact it is a very BAD idea, witness 100 million war victims in the 20th century, more than in all previous ones combined, or to look around today . . .

Modernity [p. 30] is another term or concept that has no real-world counterpart. How could it possibly take or guide us through world history? And its use as a guide through world history can only lead us up the garden path.

[Volume XX, Number 2] calls for papers on the "Middle East"? Shame on you! Middle between where and where? or what and what? or whom and whom? The moment you ask, you get the answer. Besides, in European colonial times it was the "Near East." Only after World War II and the spread of neocolonialism, did anything or place become in the middle between us and them. We have already observed above what we allegedly are. And now our Great Leader . . . has a new "Plan for the Middle East" that stretches from Morocco [which is east of where?] to at least Pakistan, but then why not also to ex-Pakistani Bangladesh, or Malaysia, or Indonesia, or the southern Philippines . . . . [The World History Bulletin] wants to get there before George W. or following him?

The WHB wants "quality essays" thereon? I might write and send you one, and we'll see of what wide-ranging quality it may be. But I can assure you that it will begin with BANISH THIS MIDDLE TERMINOLOGY from our WORLD historical vocabulary, indeed from any scientific or even worldly conscious general discourse.

The comparative method [p. 6] can be useful, but when delving into its many pitfalls, how come there is no mention of its greatest one: It can yield no useful results if we compare two entities [e.g., two brothers or two civilizations or cultures - and these are often used as euphemisms for civilizations] if they grew up in relation to each other, and what's more, as part of a greater unit, that is a family with brothers and a world history with "civilizations," so that the "characteristics" of each were significantly derived from the other.

To see Latin America [pp. 28-33] and even the "identity" of its people as part of world history is all to the good, but not if one avoids the principal process and structure of its formation and still present condition, which is, in a word - and to coin a word - its DEPENDENCE on other parts of the whole rest of the world. On the other hand, "essentialist and teleological character can shed light" on nothing whatsoever, since they themselves have no real existence whatsoever. It is hard to see why Andre Gunder Frank's approach is subject to the criticism that it has "a restricted temporal framework (after the sixteenth century)" on p. 29 when on p. 33 he is cited with a book on "Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?," which clearly shows the latter.

Gunder
[5 February 2005]
Colonial Jamestown and Cape Town: A Discussion of Early Changes and Lasting Outcomes

Elizabeth Kamradt
Northern Kentucky University

In the 17th Century, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and the London Virginia Trading Company each established a tiny settlement on the shore of a vast and unfamiliar continent amidst established communities of different indigenous people. While their joint venture initiatives varied in terms of their business plans, both were profit driven, and each anticipated the establishment of long-term, interdependent trading relationships between their settlers and the local inhabitants in each location. Within a generation, both colonies’ development plans and their attitudes toward their indigenous neighbors changed dramatically. These changes were strongly influenced by the interplay of a complex mixture of economic, cultural, and psychological tensions between not only the colonists and the indigenous inhabitants, but also between members of the different classes within the settlements themselves. An examination of early patterns within the Jamestown and Cape Town settlements provides interesting insights into how the interplay of these factors combined to strategically shift colonial plans, transform early modern cultural perspectives, and set the stage for centuries of subjugation based on race and ethnicity.

Although the initial Dutch and English plans differed in terms of their reliance on trade versus direct settlement productivity, both plans clearly anticipated the establishment of direct, on-going interactions and trade relationships between their settlers and the local indigenous communities. The Dutch plan relied more heavily on trade, and according to MacKinnon, the VOC “initially had no intention of penetrating into the interior and settling the Cape” in 1652.1 Led by Jan Van Riebeeck, the 90 original colonists established Cape Town as a supply station for VOC ships engaged in the lucrative East Indies trade.2 The Dutch commitment to this original business plan was so firm, that VOC officials were not allowed to own land,3 and the VOC did not lease land to 12 “free burghers” for farming until 1657.4 Although the London Virginia Company expected their colonists to focus their efforts more heavily on developing profitable agricultural, industrial, and mining enterprises, the 104 original Jamestown settlers5 were also expected to trade for furs and begin trading for food almost upon arrival: “In all your passages you must have great care not to offend the Naturals, … and imploy some few of your company to trade with them for corn … for not being sure how your own seed corn will prosper the first year, to avoid the danger of famine, use and endeavor to store yourselves of the country corn.”6

In addition to establishing trade relationships, the 1606 “First Virginia Charter” also required the English settlers to develop personal ties with their indigenous neighbors with the express purpose of bringing the “Christian religion to suche people as yet live in darkenesse and miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and worshippe of God.”7 Given their expressed intentions and the relatively small number of colonists who set sail, it is reasonable to assume that both the Dutch and English colonists left Europe sincerely hoping they would be able to quickly, and rather peacefully, develop interdependent trading and on-going relationships with the Khoena8 of South Africa and the Algonquin in the Pawmunkey Empire in Virginia.

As the early colonists waded ashore, their perspectives toward the native inhabitants were shaped by their gender and class-based social systems, pre-Enlightenment Christian ideology, and their mercantile economic systems. Unlike our modern world view, early modern ethnocentrism was not racially oriented, and according to Kupperman, race would have been an “utterly foreign” factor for English settlers since they did not divide “humankind into broad fixed classifications demarcated by visible distinction.” The early Jamestown colonists would have initially perceived the physical differences they observed between themselves and the indigenous people they met as being “accidental” and “acquired characteristics” due to “environment and experience” and not as being “inborn,” determinist attributes.9

Underscoring the class-based focus of this early modern perspective, Kupperman provides an excerpt from a letter written to the Jamestown treasurer, Master George Sandys, by Michael Drayton in 1622: “But you may save your labour if you please, / To write me ought of your Savages. / As savage slaves be in great Britaine here, / As any one that you can shew me there.”10

Echoing Drayton’s perspective, the Governor of Cape Town from 1679 to 1699, Simon van der Stel, observed that the ‘Souqua’ were “just the same as the poor in Europe, each tribe of Hottentots … employing ‘them’ as soldiers and hunters.”11 Drayton and van der Stel’s observations illustrate that the 17th century gentry viewed indigenous inhabitants through a class-based prism based on their own hierarchical societies, and that pejorative terms like “savage” were not exclusively applied to people of color in other lands.

According to Toby Freund, the Cape settlers “clearly located the native Khoisan within the human community and conceived of these people through the same concepts, adjectives, and nouns by which they considered their own society.”12 Guided by their Eurocentric perceptions of civility, early colonists focused on outward manifestations such as: 1) physical posture, poise, and perceived physical health and beauty; 2) social distinctions demonstrated by costume and ceremony; 3) communal and individual abilities to store resources against times of need, and 4) evidence of a willingness to abandon perceived idola- try in favor of Christian spirituality, as all
being signs of civility. High status individuals exhibiting Eurocentric signs of civility were often described in quite positive terms, and sometimes were even accorded titles of nobility by early colonial authors. In a 1662 memorandum to his successor, Jan van Riebeeck referred to the Khoi Chief Oedasoa as being a “hereditary king or chief.” In 1585, John White referred to leaders within the Pawmunkeny Empires as, “The Princes Of Virginia,” and in keeping with the early modern perspective, White included a detailed description of the hair, adornments, posture, proportions, and clothing styles for both men and women in the ruling class.

In 1584, Amadas and Barlowe succinctly captured the perspective of the time as they described a group of high status Algonquin as “the King’s brother, accompanied with forte or fiftie men, very handsome and goodly people, and in their behaviour as mannerly and civill as any of Europe.” Conversely, the perceived absence of Eurocentric attributes of civility was frequently taken as being indicative of inadequacy or savagery.

Early settlers commonly used these standards to make differentiated judgments between individuals within the same indigenous populations, reinforcing the early colonists’ disinterest in broad racial stereotypes. According to Marks, “the Dutch did not distinguish between Khoi and San on physical grounds,” but rather their discriminations “resembled class divisions” and described a way of life: a “Hottentot or Khoi was a herder; a Bushman or San someone who quite literally lived in or by the “bush.” The pastoral Khoi lived in larger communities with hereditary chiefdoms and differentiated socioeconomic systems based on the size of the cattle herds. During the initial years, the Dutch developed interdependent trading relationships, employed, and even married Khoi women.

The hunting and gathering San who had few personal possessions, lived in small groups, and rarely had chiefs, were less well regarded by the Dutch. In 1620, Alvaro Velho described a Cape San as follows: “The inhabitants of the country towards the point of the Cape are, I believe, the most miserable savages which have been discovered up to now, since they know nothing of sowing or of gear for plowing or cultivating the soil, nor anything of fishing... They eat certain roots, which are their chief food... They cover their privities with the tail of a sheep, or wear a skin, of a sheep or other animal, like a scarf across one shoulder. For weapons they have an assagaye and a rather feeble bow, with its quiver.”

While the settlers’ initial perspectives were decidedly Eurocentric, and therefore inherently inequitable as applied to other cultures, it is difficult to imagine how they might have done or thought differently as they made their initial forays to establish global connections with different cultures. The notable point is that early European ethnocentrism did not initially include race-based, deterministic stereotypes. Instead, both the Jamestown and Cape Town colonists initially established their settlements with a cultural perspective based on their mercantile economic systems, their class-based societies, and their belief in the Divine Order of Being. It was this cultural perspective that came into conflict with the cultural requirements of native people in both locations, and it was this cultural perspective that was fundamentally changed as a result of events, tensions, and opportunities as the colonists developed new communities in new lands.

In addition to these cultural challenges, both groups of settlers were also affected by a significant psychological factor that further complicated attempts to establish amicable trading relationships with the local inhabitants, and often served to bind the colonists together in spite of internal tensions. The English settlers were fully cognizant of the mysterious disappearance of the Roanoke Colony in Virginia in the 1580’s, and the Dutch were aware of the fatal experiences of the Portuguese on the Cape in the 15th and 16th centuries. Therefore, both groups of settlers began their colonial adventure in the psychologically dissonant position of simultaneously fearing the indigenous communities around them, and yet needing them for the food required for survival. As evidence of both settlements’ concerns for their safety, both groups of colonists chose to spend their first days on shore in their new home building fortifications, and it was from within this framework that the colonists began their interactions with the native communities surrounding them.

During the early years of colonial development, the Khoena and Algonquin communities were far from being passive participants in a predetermined colonial drama, and native leaders and members within both these large, established communities had their own goals and agendas that significantly affected the course of events in both regions. As the European settlers began building their small forts, both the native communities enjoyed overwhelming population advantages, with 20,000 San and possibly over 100,000 Khoi living in the vicinity of the Cape and 13,000 to 14,000 members of the Pawmunkeny Empire living in the Virginia region. The native communities also shared certain cultural elements with one another that placed them at odds with the settlers’ cultures, including communal land ownership, commodity driven economies, and the view that even hereditary chiefs only held their position through their ability to provide for their people. In addition, leadership within both indigenous populations also shared two important objectives, which made them willing to initially tolerate the tiny, European invasion of their shores: 1) both native cultures were late stone age societies interested in trading for European metal goods; and 2) leaders within both communities saw opportunities to exploit trade opportunities and alliances with the Europeans as a means to further their political ambitions.

These goals gave the settlers an opening for the establishment of independent trading relationships. Though there were intermittent clashes, the first few years were relatively peaceful as all sides engaged in what Martin Quint described as a “mutual initiation period.” Throughout this period, the VOC forbade their employees from taking aggressive action against the Khoena, and similarly, The London Virginia Trading Company encouraged its settlers to maintain peaceful relations with the Algonquins. Though both companies were well aware of their settlements’ vulnerabilities and neither saw profitable outcomes arising from armed conflicts, both settlements repeatedly descended into armed conflicts with their indigenous neighbors within a few years.
of their establishment.

As the VOC East Indies trade intensified, demand for livestock and fresh vegetables at the supply station began to outstrip the pastoral Khoena’s ability and willingness to produce. The Khoena’s culture and economy was based upon their cattle herds, and minimally, 12 to 14 cattle were needed to maintain a stable and potentially growing herd. As Dutch demand impinged on critical herd sizes, increasing numbers of Khoena lost their cattle and others began to refuse to trade. To meet the needs of the growing VOC economic engine, the VOC responded by granting leases to 12 free burghers to begin plantation-style production farming on Khoena lands behind Table Mountain in 1657. In order to keep their labor costs at a minimum, Cape Town colonists chose to import slaves instead of free white laborers, and the first groups of slaves arrived at the Cape from Angola and West Africa in 1657.

Tensions quickly escalated as slaves escaped and allegedly sought refuge within indigenous communities. The Khoena realized the VOC was beginning to change its initial business plan, and the Dutch began to see the Khoena as being resistant to European acculturation and commercial progress. In 1659, the first of three Dutch-Khoena wars broke out. Led by a former VOC agent named Doman, the Khoena almost destroyed the Dutch settlement, reinforcing the colonists’ initial fears and raising concerns about trusting indigenous people within their community. Disagreements among the Khoena forced the confederation to sue for peace, but during the negotiations, the Khoena complained that the Dutch were: “taking every day … land which had belonged to them from all ages and on which they were accustomed to depasture their cattle. They also asked whether if they were to come into Holland they would be permitted to act in the same manner.”

The results of this initial war were both profound and indicative of future developments between the VOC, the Khoena, slaves, and white farmers. Following the war, the Dutch assumed private ownership of more ancestral Khoena lands, planted barrier hedges around previously communal land and water supplies, granted land leases to more white farmers, and imported more slaves. The Cape Town settlers’ negativity towards the Khoena grew both in degree and breadth, and native opportunities for acculturation in the Dutch community and inclusion in VOC business operations began to close.

As the Dutch economy grew, the original colonial intentions were replaced with pragmatic actions designed to feed the growing demands for supplies, land, and labor at Cape Town station. As VOC agents penetrated the interior looking for new suppliers, they spread the cultural and trade issues that had led to war with Peninsular Khoena communities, into other regions. Aggressive trading led to more of the Khoena possessing fewer cattle, instigated rivalries, encouraged raids, and led to intertribal warfare, weakening the Khoena’s capabilities to meet either the Dutch or their own needs. The Khoena attempted to consolidate in two more wars against the Dutch, but failed to decisively defeat the settlers. Following each war, the pattern of the First War repeated itself with greater intensity, as the Dutch grew more distrustful of the indigenous people around them and became more conscious of themselves as a community.

At the end of the Third War, the original settlement fort was replaced with a stone fortification called The Castle, and in 1679, the VOC officially changed their Cape Town business plan to Dutch colonial expansion. As the Khoena’s ancestral lands were opened for settlement, a population growth spurt among poor, settlers near the Cape caused thousands of settlers to take advantage of the opportunity, setting the stage for a critical shift in colonial perspectives. Within fifty years, the white population of settlers increased from 90 to 2000, and the population continued to grow to 6000 by the mid-18th century.

Within 17th century Europe, land ownership remained a key differentiator between classes, and poor families in England had little opportunity to aspire to land ownership and accumulate personal wealth. As thousands of poor, white settlers left the Cape to lay claim to ancestral Khoena lands in the interior of South Africa, they became part of a massive transfer in wealth from one people to another, and as they began their migration, they stepped outside the traditional social hierarchy, laying claim to new freedoms and privileges. In his article entitled “No Chosen People,” Toit quotes Governor Janseen as saying that the trekkers “call themselves ‘people’ and ‘Christians,’ and the Kaffirs and Hottentots they call ‘heathen,’ and thereby believe themselves entitled to everything.” As members of a growing, independent, white middle class, the trekkers discarded the class-based component of the early modern colonial perspective, and demonstrated a willingness to fight indigenous peoples, the VOC, and even the British Empire, in order to keep their new privilege, power, and property. And, given their experiences during the Dutch-Khoena wars and the process by which they obtained their property and privilege, it is not surprising that when the Afrikaners defined themselves and reconstructed their colonial perspective, they replaced class with race: “It struck me as a strange and melancholy trait of human nature, that this Veld-Commandant, in many other points a … benevolent and clear-sighted man, seemed to be perfectly unconscious that any part of his own proceedings, or those of his countrymen, in the wars with the Bushman, could awaken my abhorrence. The massacre of many hundreds … and the carrying away of their children into servitude, seemed to be considered by him …perfectly lawful.”

Similar cultural conflicts developed between English settlers and Native Americans during their mutual initiation period; however, in the Jamestown situation, the roles were reversed and tensions escalated twice as quickly. Within the Cape Town scenario, the Khoena responded to violence when colonial trading patterns threatened their survival, but in the Jamestown situation, the colonists were the group that resorted to arms to keep from starving. Within the Virginia settlement, the colony’s leadership failed to maintain control over their own trading supply line, and as a result, it destroyed its trading leverage with the Pawmunkney Empire. The individual colonists exacerbated the situation by continually arguing with one another about work assignments, and failed to grow adequate food supplies, making the colony critically
dependent on the Native Americans’ food supplies. Starting with a weak hand, the English failed to accommodate to the Native American’s trading patterns, and arrogantly insisted on vying with the Chief of the Pawmunkeny Empire, Powhatan. Trading relations stalled throughout 1609, and Powhatan ordered and enforced a complete trade embargo in the fall. The colonists were left without food supplies for the winter, and as a result, they entered the “Starving Time.”

When the colonists resorted to armed raids to extort food from villages within Powhatan’s Empire, both communities became involved in a war that lasted for five years.

While the Jamestown settlers’ difficulties were almost entirely due to failed leadership and internal class conflicts, the relationship issues that led to the first war between the Jamestown colonists and the Algonquin mirrored those that led to the first war between the Cape inhabitants - trade inequities and cultural issues. In both cases, cultural differences led to trading issues that threatened the survival of one of the groups, causing that group to respond by taking up arms. Following their initial colonial wars, both the VOC and London Virginia Trading Company took away similar lessons. As mercantile economies, both the Dutch and English had initiated their colonial efforts with a firm belief in trade as being a perfect foundation for interactions between all peoples. However, as they concluded their first wars, both the English and the Dutch had less confidence in trade alone, and both had increased their reliance on force and direct action.

The London Virginia Company adjusted its business plan to: 1) improve colonial leadership; 2) rely less heavily on trade with the Native Americans; 3) shift its labor strategy to increase productivity; and 4) investigate more aggressively opportunities to establish cash crop plantations. The company began sending many more craftsmen, farmers, and indentured servants, who agreed to work a number of years in exchange for their passage and a “headright” land grant at the end of their contract. Unlike the Dutch who preferred to purchase slaves, the English may have preferred indentured servants, since the company lost less money when servants died, and the colonial mortality rate was quite high.

As a result, many of the settlers who emigrated came from the poorest levels of English society.

Though famous, John Rolfe’s marriage to Powhatan’s daughter, Pocahontas, was unusual within the colony. Consistent with an early modern perspective, Rolfe viewed their marriage as an effort to form a noble alliance between two warring peoples in hopes of securing a truce and amicable relations. In a letter to Sir Thomas Dale in 1614, Rolfe shared his rationale for marrying Pocahontas: “My chiefest intent and purpose be not, to strive with all my power of body and minde, in the undertaking of so mightie a matter, no way led (so farre forth as mans weakenesse may permit) with the unbridled desire of carnall affection: but for the good of this plantation, for the honour of our coutrie, for the glory of God, for my owne salvation, and for the converting to the true knowledge of God and Jesus Christ, an unbelieving creature, namely Pokahuntras.”

The marriage alliance ended five years of war and helped to stabilize relations between the colonists for eight years. During this period, John Rolfe’s discovery of a tobacco hybrid suitable for Virginia soil marked the beginning of Jamestown’s success as a colony. The first shipment was exported to England in 1614, and the colony began to grow and expand. By 1618, tobacco exports to England totaled 40,000 pounds, and twelve years later, one and a half million pounds were exported. Given the increasing amounts of land required for the soil-depleting tobacco, the colonists’ success placed them on a direct course for conflict with the Algonquins, and just like the second and third wars that occurred on the Cape, the second Anglo-Algonquin war resulted from expanding colonial encroachment and direct competition for natural resources.

With Powhatan’s death in 1618, his younger brother, Opechancanough, assumed leadership. Facing the loss of his lands and culture, Opechancanough decided to attack the colony in an effort to regain his empire. Feigning a trading visit, the Native Americans surprised the settlers and killed 347 out of the 1,240 colonists in what would be called the Massacre of 1622. English reaction was swift, relentless, and included atrocities. In May of 1623, “Captain William Tucker concluded peace negotiations with a Powhatan village by proposing a toast with a drink laced with poison prepared by Dr. John Potts; 200 Powhatans died instantly and another 50 [were] slaughtered.”

While the English had not developed family ties or warm alliances with their indigenous neighbors, the Massacre of 1622 significantly and permanently changed the colonists’ cultural perspective toward the indigenous people around them. According to Vaughn, “During the next decade, the colony waged total war. Before the massacre, it had distinguished between friendly and unfriendly tribes; now it viewed all natives as foes.”

Though the colonists had attacked the Native Americans when they felt threatened by Powhatan’s embargo, after 1622, the colonists no longer viewed themselves and Native Americans as sharing much in the way of a common humanity, and they increasingly viewed both Native and Black Americans as being ethnic and racial “others.” In 1651, the colonists institutionalized ethnic segregation, by establishing Virginia’s first Indian Reservation. In 1661, the colonists institutionalized race-based, chattel slavery by passing a law making the status of the mother the determining factor for the slave or free status of a child. In 1676, Benjamin Thompson observed, “the Indians … were [emphasis added] inexorably heathen, savage, and demonic - ‘Monsters shapt and fac’d like men.’” In the same year, thousands of colonists joined Nathaniel Bacon in a rebellion to force the Royal Governor into giving them their “headright” lands and pushing more Native Americans off their ancestral lands.

Both the English and the Dutch began their settlements expecting to establish profitable, interdependent trading relationships with the indigenous inhabitants surrounding their colonies. When each encountered significant trading issues arising from fundamental cultural differences, the resulting wars reinforced the settlers’ initial fears about the local inhabitants and diminished their faith in the complete efficacy of trade. Driven by their capitalist economic views, both colonies adjusted their busi-
ness plans and adopted more aggressive colonial development strategies. When their successes placed them in direct competition for resources with indigenous communities, both the Dutch and the English became engaged in a cycle in which native resistance was met with decisive suppression, native populations were supplanted or dispossessed, and the resulting spoils were used to produce even greater economic growth. Within this framework, the colonists' cultural perspectives began to fundamentally change within the first generation.

Like the Afrikaners on the Cape, many of the Jamestown colonists were not members of the upper classes in England, and their emigration gave them opportunities to dramatically improve their status in life by starting businesses and acquiring land. As a result, both the Cape and Jamestown colonists participated in a massive transfer of capital at the expense of another people. These opportunities for new wealth, privilege, and freedom, provided the colonists with significant incentives to take action and develop rationalizations that would preserve their new wealth and status. By substituting race with class, the colonists were able to achieve these goals while preserving the vast majority of their early modern cultural perspective. As a result, changes that occurred during the earliest years of colonial development in Jamestown and Cape Town, laid the foundation for large and independent white middle classes, as well as systems for race-based subjugation on both continents for centuries to come.

NOTES:

6 John Smith, “Instructions by way of advice, for the intended Voyage to Virginia,” First Hand Accounts of Virginia, 1575-1705. Virtual Jamestown.
8 I have chosen to use the gender neutral Khoena. The term Khoena includes both the Bushman or San and the Khoi or Hottentot populations.
15 John White, “THE TRUE PICTURES AND FASHIONS OF THE PEOPLE IN THAT PARTE OF AMERICA NOW CALLED VIRGINIA, DISCOVERED BY ENGLISHMEN.” by John White(?), 1584 & 1588. Section III. “A weroan or great Lorde of Virginia. THE Princes of Virginia are attyred in suche manner.” Translated out of Latin into English by RICHARD HACKLIVIT. Virtual Jamestown: First Hand Accounts by Date.
16 Philip M. Amadas and Arthur M. Barlowe, “The first voyage made to the coasts of America, with two barks, where in were Captaines M. Philip Amadas , and M. Arthur Barlowe , who discovered part of the Countrye now called Virginia, Anno 1584. Written by one of the said Captaine , and sent to sir Walter Raleigh knight, at whose charge and direction, the said voyage was set forth.” Translated from Latin by Richard Hakluyt Originally published by MacLehose and Sons. Glasgow 1584. Virtual Jamestown: First Hand Accounts of Virginia, 1575-1705. Jamestown Recovery Project. 2000. <http://www.virtualjamestown.org/thaccounts_date.html>. (10 April 2004).
18 MacKinnon, The Making of South Africa, 6-10. MacKinnon explains that the Khoi measured economy and culture. As such, cattle formed the basis of both the Khoi economy and culture.
19 Julia C. Wells, “Eva’s Men: Gender and Power: How Eva Came to the Dutch. 1652-74” Journal of African History, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1998): 417-437 JSTOR 4 (August 2004). Wells provides a detailed discussion about Krotoa’s life. P. 417-437 Krotoa was the ward of Aushumato, “Harry,” who served as the “postal official” for the Dutch prior to 1652. She was also the sister-in-law of the Chief of the Goringaicaon, Krotoa, or Eva as she was called by the Dutch, served as Jan Van Riebeeck’s maid, became a translator for the Dutch, married Danish surgeon Pieter van Meerhoff, and died an alleged alcoholic prostitute.
20 Frue many of the Jamestown colonists were not members of the upper classes in England, and their emigration gave them opportunities to dramatically improve their status in life by starting businesses and acquiring land. As a result, both the Cape and Jamestown colonists participated in a massive transfer of capital at the expense of another people. These opportunities for new wealth, privilege, and freedom, provided the colonists with significant incentives to take action and develop rationalizations that would preserve their new wealth and status. By substituting race with class, the colonists were able to achieve these goals while preserving the vast majority of their early modern cultural perspective. As a result, changes that occurred during the earliest years of colonial development in Jamestown and Cape Town, laid the foundation for large and independent white middle classes, as well as systems for race-based subjugation on both continents for centuries to come.
17th English century society, nobility was almost operationally defined as never having to do any type of manual labor, laying the foundation for class conflicts within the colony; and, these conflicts were further complicated by the lack of women available to do the kinds of tasks that the men did not have the skills to do and felt themselves above doing.

38 Virginia Bernhard, “Men, Women and Children.” 609. Textbooks typically place the Jamestown residents at 400-500 settlers during the Starving Time in 1609-1610; however, Virginia Bernhard makes a compelling case for the initial number to have been closer to 300-350 with only 60 surviving.


40 James West Davidson, et. al., Nation of Nations: A Concise Narrative of the American Republic, Volume One: To 1877. Third Edition. (New York: MacGraw Hill 2002), 38. The “head-right” system was designed to attract more settlers to the colony. Those already at the colony received 100 acres and new settlers received 50 acres. Anyone who paid the passage of someone else, immediately received 50 acres.


47 “Virtual Jamestown Timeline.”


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Agriculture and Agricultural Civilization of the Yellow River Drainage Basin

by Professor Wang Shoukuan

(College of History and Culture, Lanzhou University, Gansu, China)

The Yellow River is the second largest river in China. It loops north, bends south, and flows east for 5464 kilometers, via Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan and Shandong, all together nine provinces and autonomous regions. It runs into the Gulf of Bohai, in the shape of the Chinese character “ji (几),” draining a basin of more than 750,000 square kilometers and boasting more than 30 branches. As of late 2002, it nourished 317.36 million people accounting for 24.7% of the total Chinese population (about 1.28 billion). The Yellow River got its name from its ochre-colored water because it picks up a lot of dirt along the way as it runs through the loess plateau.

The Yellow River, the mother river of China, is the cradle of Chinese nationality. For countless generations, the Chinese people generated, multiply and develop in this drainage basin where the glorious and magnificent music is performed.

The Xihoudou Man, Lantian Man, and Dali Man, who lived in present-day Shaanxi and Shanxi provinces from 150 to 30 million years ago as well as the Peking Man constituted the remote ancestors of Chinese nationality.

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The Neolithic Age sites, from 10,000 to 3700 years ago, can be found everywhere along the river. Among them, representative culture sites are the Shandong Longshan Culture, Henan Yangshao Culture, Shaanxi Bampo Culture, Gansu Majiayao Culture and so on.

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The Yellow River Basin is one of the earliest places where agriculture emerged in China. Some other archaeological sites, such as the earthen of Hebei Cishan (about 8000 years ago) and the sacrificial pit where 50 thousand kilograms of Setaria italica (粟) were found, and the massive charcoal of rice in Shaanxi Longgang (about 7000 years ago), provide the best proof that the Yellow River was one of the two points of origin of Chinese agricultural civilization. Moreover, the legend of Shennong indicates that the central plains had broken away from primitive cultivation and evolved into the use of the hoe. Legend has it that Hou Ji (Lord of millet), the ancestor of Zhou, who was the official in charge of farming during the Yao and Shun periods, was the earliest man to grow millet (稷).
传说时代的伏羲氏（甘肃天水一带）、神农氏（陕西宝鸡一带）创造发明了原始畜牧业和原始农业，拉开了黄河文明发展的序幕。在距今一万多年前的山西怀仁县鹅毛口石器制造厂遗址，出土了许多石锄、石斧、石镰等农业生产工具，说明，当时黄河流域的原始农业已经产生。黄河流域土质松软肥沃，灌溉方便，是当地最早产生农业的原因。从考古发掘看，距今8000年左右的河北磁山遗址的窖穴或祭祀坑中发现数量达十万吨之巨的粟（Setaria italica）粒的炭化物，在距今7000多年的陕西龙岗遗址中发现大量水稻炭化遗物，都雄辩地证明黄河流域是中国两大农业文明的产生地之一。而炎帝神农氏的传说则表明，在距今四千五六百年前，中原地区的农业已经摆脱了原始生荒耕作制，进入锄耕阶段。周人的始祖后稷，在尧舜时任农官，传说是最早种稷的人。

From the Shang and Zhou Dynasties until the Warring States (Zhangou) period, agricultural cultivation progressed through the introduction of cattle plowing and the invention of bronze and iron farm tools, which allowed for large-scale tilling and cultivation. In addition, more species of farm crops were being grown, including Setaria italica (粟), millet (稷), rice, wheat, grain (粟), vegetable, melon, fruit, and so on. At the beginning of the Warring States, Li Kui of the Wei state estimated that the annual output of Setaria italica was 1.5 dan (about 41 kilograms) per mou (about 1/3 acre), roughly 123 kilograms per acre (about 666.7 square meters). If one family cultivated 100 mou, the output would be enough to feed a family of 5 for half a year. According to research, the annual output of Chinese agriculture had scarcely changed in the last 2000 years. Therefore, when facing the stress of overpopulation, one solution was to expand the tillage and intensive cultivation to fulfill the demand for food.

商周至战国，黄河流域农业生产得到较大发展，牛耕从发明到推广，农具由木石到青铜再到铁，进行了规模较大的垦殖和耕作，农作物品种增加，主要有栗（小米）、稷（谷子）、稻、麦、菽、蔬菜瓜果等。战国初，魏国李悝估计，单位面积的产量，一般一亩地（约当今1/3亩）产粟一石半（约合今41公斤），即今制一亩（约合666.7平方米）产123公斤，一户人家种地百亩所产粮食，够全家5口一年半食用。据研究，此后2000多年，中国农业的单产一直在这个数字上徘徊。面临人口不断増加的压力，主要以精耕细作和扩大耕地面积，来解决对粮食的需求。

During the Qin Dynasty, the Emperor Qinshihuang advocated the importance of agriculture. He declared “To champion agriculture and eliminate business. Dark face is synonym of wealth.” In other words, he decided that agriculture was more important than business, and that agriculture would make people rich. He ordered that the men work the fields and the women embrace sericulture (silkworm breeding) according to the cycles of nature so that all cultivation might proliferate. The ancient Chinese society followed this policy from then on.

秦始皇实行重农政策，宣称：“上农除末，黔首是富。”要求农民们男耕女织，勤劳农事，按时耕作、收获，使诸产繁殖。以后，中国古代社会一直在重农的旗帜下运行。

It was during the Han Dynasty, that the major farm tools for intensive large-scale cultivation, such as the plow, animal-drawn seed plow, and so on, were invented. The Emperor Han Wu started to open up the wastelands, by stationing troops or forcing the migration of peasants into those areas, in order to promote cattle production in the Western and Northern areas, as well as to promote agriculture in the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River.

大田从事精耕细作的主要农业器具，如整地用的犁、播种用的耧等，在汉代都已发明。自汉武帝开始，用屯田和移民垦地的方法，将农业区向西部和北部的畜牧区推进，推动了黄河中上游地区农业的发展。

The Yellow River not only irrigates but also frequently overruns the farmland. According to statistics, from Pre-Qin until 1949 A.D., the river’s levees in the lower reaches were breached 1590 times, and its course changed 26 times during the course of 2500 years. Therefore, many water-powered engineering projects were built in the Yellow River to make it beneficial rather than harmful. For instance, Da Yu stopped the river from flooding and Boyi invented a technique for making wells. During the Three Dynasties, the square fields, canalized both horizontally and vertically, constituted the earliest known irrigation and drainage system. After the Springs and Autumns and the Warring States Period, an increasing number of large-scale irrigation projects were completed. For example, Ximenbao, the county magistrate of Wei, made twelve waterways to draw the Zhang Water to irrigate the farmland in Ye county (邺，今河北临漳)，
In addition, the Wei dug a canal, which became the earliest part of the Great Gulf, between the Yellow River and the Putian dam, was channeled for irrigation purposes. A plumb named Zhengguo constructed the 300-li (174 km) long Zhengguo Channel which irrigated about 4 million mu in Qin state. Other than the Wei and the Qin, many states also built levee-lined canals to prevent flooding and protect farmland, as well as to expand inland.

Yellow water in the Yellow River also sometimes caused floods. According to statistics, from the first Qin to the 12th century, Yellow River floods occurred 1,590 times, destroying 26 cities. To prevent flood damage, people began to build water management projects. The flood-control project was the earliest water management project. The water management projects not only prevented floods but also provided water for irrigation. Before the Qin, water management projects were primarily defensive, but after the Qin, they became more focused on irrigation.

Throughout history, much of the river management efforts had been devoted to building water-powered engineering projects. In the modern times, other that irrigation, the Yellow River plays a more important role in the Chinese social and economic development than ever before, with many huge dams which generated electricity, allocated water resources, and prevented flooding.

Latter dynasties, including the legend of the Three and Five Emperors (三皇五帝) until the Xia, Shang, Zhou, Qin, Han, Cao Wei, Xi Jin, Sui, Tang, Xi Xia and Northern Song, founded their capital near the central course of the Yellow River. For the past 4000 years, it has been the center of China in political, economic, and cultural matters. In other words, the Yellow River nourishes the Chinese nationality and cultivates the 5000-year-long agricultural civilization of the Yellow River. History shows that the Yellow River civilization is synonymous with Chinese civilization.

From the 4th millennium B.C., the regions of the Yellow River, including the Shang and Zhou, were the political, economic, and cultural centers of China. The Yellow River has shaped Chinese civilization and provided the foundation for Chinese culture.

Chinese characters as the carriers of Chinese civilization, originated from the symbols on the pottery of the Dawenkou, Yangshao, Banpo, and Dadiwan sites. The prominent features of Chinese characters—balanced and squared, symbolize the Chinese nationality’s traits of calmness, reliability, and solemnity. The Chinese characters base themselves on the commonly used language of the Yellow River basin, expressing both sound and meaning, giving birth to numerous vocabularies and dialects. Over thousands of years, a powerful culture emerged from this mutual character system, uniting many Chinese nationalities.

Han characters are the carriers of Chinese civilization, and the earliest Han characters were used as symbols on pottery and metal objects from the Dawenkou, Longshan, and Banpo cultures. These characters were simplified from earlier, more complex scripts. Han characters are characterized by their simplicity and elegance, reflecting the cultural values of the Han dynasty. The Han dynasty was the first to develop a unified national language and writing system, which has remained the standard for Chinese writing ever since.

For the sake of guiding agricultural production according to nature, the ancients continued to perfect astronomy and the calendar, making these the most advanced subjects in ancient China. Both astronomy and the calendar germinated as early as the Neolithic Age, and a rudimentary calendar was established in the Legendary Age. The Xia calendar combines the astronomical phenomena with the seasons, providing the most effective guidance to agricultural production. The historical literature from the Pre-Qin periods shows the earliest records of the Halley Comet and the meteor shower of the Tian Qin constellation. The ancient Chinese continued to perfect and improve the precision of the Chinese traditional calendar since the Han Dynasty.

为了指导农业生产，古人不断完善天文学和历法学，使其成为中国古代最发达的学科之一。早在新石器时代就有天文历法的萌芽。传说时代已经有了最初的历法。夏朝时制定的历法，将天象和物候揉合在一起，对农业生产起到了重要指导作用。先秦的历史文献中，有世界上关于天琴星
农业劳动的艰辛和收获的不可预见性，造成中华民族艰苦奋斗、不屈不挠的斗争精神。战国时的著作《列子·汤问》记载了愚公移山的传说，说，居住在今河南省北部的一位年近 90 的老人愚公，率领自己的子孙，世世代代挖山不止，终于将挡在他家前边的太行山和王屋山移走。这个故事，成为中国人民不懈努力、追求胜利的精神榜样。

Separate and laggard small-scale farming cried for the experience and wisdom of the elders, as well as for a supplemental labor force. Therefore, farming resulted in the conventions of respecting the elders and caring for the young. The most fundamental social structure in ancient China, the patriarchal clan system, based on kinship and on the wife’s eldest son as the legal inheritor, emerged from the above mentioned tradition.

分散落后的小农经济迫切需要年长者的经验、智慧以及劳动力的补充，由此，形成中华民族敬老爱幼的传统，并在此基础上出现了以血缘关系为纽带，以嫡长子继承制为特征的宗法制度，成为古代中国最基本的社会结构。

Water-powered engineering and the effective control the Yellow River, as well as the requisite large-scale labor force, led to the creation of a powerful regime. Thus the regimes of Xia, Shang, and Zhou emerged in the Yellow River basin, and later, highly centralized dynasties also appeared, such as the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing. One of the primary missions of these regimes was to organize the population for large-scale water management projects, in order to conserve water and prevent flooding. By doing so, they remedied the limitations of a small-scale, sporadic peasant economy, hence assuring the continuation of a developing society.

黄河的治理和农田水利建设，需要越来越多的人的协作，它呼应着强大政权力量的诞生。由此，黄河流域在中国古代最早出现了夏商周政权，以后又出现了汉唐宋元明清等高度集权的朝代。这些政权有一个最基本的任务，就是组织民众进行大规模的水利建设和治水救灾，弥补了一家一户小农经济力量分散的缺陷，保证了社会的持续发展。

Under the condition of small-scale peasant economy, the basis of surviving and progressing was the harmony between nature and human beings. The classic work, Zhou Yi, written 3000 years ago, brought forward the idea that the harmonious relationships among heaven, earth, and human beings comprised the basis of Chinese philosophy. More specifically, that the relationship between the Monarchs and nature represents virtue, between the sun and moon represents brightness, between the four seasons represents the order [of nature], and between the ghosts and gods represents good and ill fortune.

在小农经济的条件下，人与自然（天地）的和谐是人们生存和发展的基础。三千年前产生的经典作品《周易》，提出“夫人与天地合其德，与日月合其明，与四时合其序，与鬼神合其吉凶”的天、地、人的和合关系，成为中国文化的哲学基础。

Because of the fact that small-scale farming depended mostly on climate and favorable geographical location, the ancients worshipped the heaven and the earth. Therefore, the activity of sacrificing to the heaven and the earth became the most important and grand ceremony in ancient China, with every family offering the memorial tablet of the heaven, earth, monarch, relative, and teacher, and every regime offering the Temple of Heaven and Earth and holding a large-scale sacrifice on schedule, in the hopes of ensuring a prosperous state, a peaceful people, and a plentiful harvest.

小农经济的条件，从而造成了古人对天的敬畏和对地的尊崇，祭拜天地的活动是中国古代最重要的国之大典。每家每户都供有“天地君亲师”的牌位，每个政权都有天坛、地坛，按
Nature nurses the human being, but the human being is the cleverest being on earth. The Confucianism, with its core content of humanity (ren, 仁), was ordered to be the single honourable teaching and had an enormous influence in shaping the politics, ideas, etiquette, and customs of ancient China, as well as the Chinese national character.

天地养育了人，人是万物之灵，以人（仁）为核心内容的儒家思想在古代被定为独尊的学说，对中国古代的政治、思想、礼俗和中华民族的民族性格的形成，有着巨大的影响。

China has been a diverse ethnic nation-state since time immemorial. The economy of the agricultural civilization of the Yellow and the Yangtze Rivers’ drainage basins, and the nomadic civilization of the peripheral grasslands, complement each other to form an intimate relationship. All the nationalities live together in peace and cannot be separated from one another.

中国自古以来就是一个多民族国家，黄河流域、长江流域的农业文明与周边各地的游牧草原文明，长期以来，经济互补，关系密切，各族人民之间友好相处，谁也离不开谁。

The autarkic of the small-scale peasant economy determines the Chinese nationality’s longing for friendship and its resistance to impingement. The Great Wall, founded in succession by the Warring States, the Qin, and the Han dynasties, is the historic witness of Chinese self-defense. In the latter stages of 2nd century B.C., the former Han Emperor Wu ordered Zhangqian Western Regions to look for companionship, thus opening the way for all the nationalities of the central plains and Western Regions to come-and-go in amity.

So we can say that all of these Chinese nationalities form the characteristically rich and colorful agricultural civilization of the Yellow River drainage basin.

自给自足的小农经济决定了中国人民渴望友谊，反抗侵犯。秦国秦汉时期修建的万里长城，是中国人民自我防卫的历史见证。公元前2世纪后期，西汉张骞奉汉武帝之命前往西域寻求友谊，从而开通了中原各族与西域各族的友好往来，以后，中国人民就和世界各国人民建立了友好往来的关系。

以上内容，构成了丰富多彩、独具特色的黄河流域农耕文明。

Address: 12F, No. 203, the second subsection of Lanzhou University, Gansu, China. E-mail: wangsk@lzu.edu.cn

作者通讯地址：中国 甘肃 兰州大学二分部 12 号楼 203 室 电子信箱: wangsk@lzu.edu.cn
The following is a list of the Endorsed AP Summer Institutes for World History. The dates listed are the beginning and ending dates of the Institute. Please consult the link listed above for the contact information of the various institutes:

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AZ Paradise Valley Community College 7/25/05 7/28/05
CA Notre Dame de Namur University 6/20/05 6/24/05
CA University of San Diego 7/10/05 7/15/05
CA California State University, Sacramento 7/18/05 7/22/05
CA Cal State San Marcos 7/25/05 7/29/05
CA Palos Verdes Peninsula High School 8/8/05 8/12/05
CO University of Denver 6/20/05 6/24/05
CT Taft School 6/27/05 7/1/05
CT Taft School 7/18/05 7/22/05
CT Taft School 7/25/05 7/29/05
DE Virden Conference Center 8/1/05 8/4/05
FL Community School of Naples 6/13/05 6/17/05
FL University of South Florida 6/20/05 6/24/05
FL Florida International University 6/27/05 7/1/05
FL University of Central Florida 6/27/05 7/1/05
GA Kennesaw State University 6/20/05 6/24/05
GA Oglethorpe University 7/18/05 7/22/05
HI Punahou School 8/1/05 8/5/05
IA The University of Iowa Advanced Placement Teacher Training Institute 7/11/05 7/15/05
IN Butler University 7/11/05 7/15/05
KY Western Kentucky University 6/26/05 7/1/05
KY Morehead State University 7/11/05 7/15/05
LA Xavier University of Louisiana 7/17/05 7/22/05
MA Fitchburg State College 7/18/05 7/22/05
MD Goucher College 6/27/05 7/1/05
MD University of Maryland, Baltimore County 8/1/05 8/5/05
MI Oakland University–Pawley Hall 7/17/05 7/22/05
MI The Leelanau School 7/24/05 7/29/05
MN Carleton College 6/19/05 6/24/05
MO Truman State University 7/25/05 7/29/05
MO International Education Consortium 8/1/05 8/5/05
MS Millsaps College 7/10/05 7/15/05
MT Montana State University 7/11/05 7/15/05
NC University of North Carolina at Charlotte 6/27/05 7/1/05
NE Lincoln North Star High School 6/21/05 6/25/05
NM University of New Mexico–Albuquerque 6/20/05 6/24/05
NY Rochester Collaborative/SUNY Brockport 6/27/05 6/30/05
NY Fordham University 7/18/05 7/22/05
NY The American Forum for Global Education 7/18/05 7/22/05
NY Manhattan College 8/1/05 8/5/05
NY The American Forum for Global Education 8/1/05 8/5/05
NY The American Forum for Global Education 8/8/05 8/12/05
OK The University of Tulsa 6/27/05 7/1/05
OK The University of Tulsa 7/11/05 7/15/05
PA LaSalle University 7/25/05 7/29/05
PA Penn State University–Abington 8/8/05 8/12/05
TX Southern Methodist Univ., Legacy Campus 6/13/05 6/17/05
TX Rice University 6/20/05 6/24/05
TX The University of Texas at Arlington 6/20/05 6/24/05
TX University of Texas at Tyler 6/27/05 7/1/05
TX Texas Lutheran University 7/11/05 7/15/05
TX Rice University 7/18/05 7/22/05
TX Texas Christian University 7/18/05 7/22/05
TX Texas Christian University 7/18/05 7/22/05
TX Texas Christian University 7/18/05 7/22/05
TX Rice University 7/25/05 7/29/05
TX The University of Texas at Austin 7/25/05 7/29/05
TX University of Texas at Dallas 7/25/05 7/29/05
UT University of Utah 8/8/05 8/12/05
VA George Mason University 7/11/05 7/15/05
VA College of William and Mary 8/1/05 8/5/05
VT St. Johnsbury Academy 7/31/05 8/5/05
WA Sammamish High School 6/27/05 6/30/05
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WI Lawrence University 7/10/05 7/15/05
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The seventeenth annual meeting of the Southeast World History Association will take place on the campus of the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia. The conference will begin on Friday afternoon, 14 October 2005, and will conclude on Sunday morning, 16 October. “What’s New and What Works in the Teaching and Research of World History,” is the conference theme, and our keynote speaker is Heidi Roupp. We are seeking proposals from teachers and researchers throughout the Southeast and beyond. We invite you to send us your paper proposals by 15 August 2005. Please send your proposal (about 250 words in length) to Dr. Tom Davis via email davistw@vmi.edu or via regular mail, Department of History, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA 24450
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