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World History Association 15th Annual Conference, June 22-25, 2006, Long Beach (CA)

Institutes and Workshops in AP World History
Greetings. This issue of the World History Bulletin includes several outstanding articles, including an expanded and combined Teaching Forum and Issue Focus. The expanded section contains three new essays on various aspects of Africa and world history: “Going Global, Part I: A Reconnaissance into the Role of Africanists in the Evolution of World History,” by Trevor Getz and Esperanza Brizuela-Garcia; “Imagining Africa in World History: Perspectives and Problems,” by WHA past-president David Northrup; and “The World and Africa: World-Systems Theories and the Erasure of East Africa from World History,” by Jesse Benjamin. Also included in the collection is our A Look Back essay, “Integrating African History into the World History Course: Some Transregional Patterns,” by Craig A. Lockard. There are two book reviews on African topics included in the section, as well as two Mini-Essays on African History: “Nationalism in German East Africa, 1900-1945,” by Alex Zukas; and “Ashanti-British Relations, 1826-1902,” by Dawne Curry. My thanks to Dr. Jonathan Reynolds, who served as Guest Editor for this issue of the Bulletin.

As noted in the Fall 2005 issue of the Bulletin, we have moved to an April and November publication schedule. As such, the deadlines for the submission of materials to be included in the Bulletin has been moved to February 1st and September 15th.

Finally, a reminder that the World History Association has lined up its Annual Conference for 2006, 2007, and 2008. We will be meeting in Long Beach, Milwaukee, and London, respectively. Please plan to join us!
Dear Colleagues,

It is my great pleasure to write this, my first message as your president. I am honored and excited as I begin my two-year term of office and look forward to the opportunities that lie ahead of us. I consider myself fortunate indeed to lead the WHA at this time. My predecessors in this office have led the creation of a stable and active organization supported by a part-time executive director and an assistant in our office in Hawaii. We produce two publications, a first-rate professional journal and an excellent bulletin that includes a teaching forum and a selection of articles as well as shares news, announcements, and information. Our organization holds outstanding annual conferences, such as the one last June at Al-Akhawayn University in Morocco. Al Andrea and his hard-working Conferences Committee are already planning well into the future. Our upcoming conference in Long Beach, California in June promises a variety of exciting offerings, and just this past week I signed the contract for our conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in June, 2007. Planning is in process for the following conference in London in 2008 and for possible sites for 2009. With these and other solid achievements as a foundation, I have identified three priorities to begin my work. With your help I seek to build on the WHA’s impressive accomplishments to date.

First, to improve communication I have asked Jacqueline Swansinger and Jonathan Reynolds to undertake a review of our website with the aim of upgrading and expanding it. The website is an essential tool for communicating with our members, potential members, and others seeking information about the WHA. To strengthen our web presence and increase our visibility, the Executive Council voted at the January meeting to formally align the WHA with World History Connected, an on-line journal devoted to the scholarship of teaching. With a projected 175,000 readers and a high rate of sustained visits, World History Connected will inform a large number of readers from around the world about the existence and work of the WHA.

Second, I want to follow through with our commitment to a strong research agenda. Pat Manning, working with members of the Research Committee, has agreed to lead the way in developing and implementing a research symposium. Scholars will have the opportunity to share new research in our field and collaborate on setting new directions. As the articles in our journal attest, we have a growing and exciting body of research in world history.

Third, I plan to focus on membership, placing special emphasis on increasing the number of international members among us. Our stronger web presence will be an important part of efforts to grow and sustain our membership. I will appoint co-chairs for the Membership Committee, one person for higher education professionals and independent scholars, and one for high school teachers. The WHA stands out as the organization of historians that most extensively and successfully effects collaboration among higher education professionals, high school teachers, and independent scholars. We serve as a model for other professional organizations, and I am proud to say that the WHA is a home for all of us.

In addition to the above, I plan to work closely with Robert White, our executive director, to serve members more effectively and efficiently. Rob and I have been in frequent contact; he has been most helpful as I have continued to learn about the functioning of our Hawaii office. I am also grateful for the wise counsel of other WHA members who have helped me immeasurably.

Other important initiatives for future emphasis include increasing the involvement, not just the numbers, of international members; strengthening our efforts to improve teaching; supporting our affiliates; and increasing our collaboration with other professional organizations. In all of the work before us I ask for your involvement; this organization that represents and serves us so well is the result of years of the dedication, creativity, determination, and hard work of its members. Please join me in the work ahead. See you in Long Beach for a wonderful conference!

Sincerely,

Michele Forman
The World History Bulletin is seeking quality essays for inclusion in upcoming issues.

**Fall 2006 Issue**: Central Theme: Latin America in World History. **Deadline**: 15 September 2006. **Guest Editor**: Richard Weiner

**Spring 2007 Issue**: Central Theme: Religion and World History. **Deadline**: 1 February 2007. **Guest Editor**: Joel Tishken

Essays and classroom activities are also sought which deal with any aspect of the teaching of world history. Interested parties should direct their inquiries to Micheal Tarver, WHB Editor, at either bulletin@thewha.org or (479) 968-0265. International submissions are especially encouraged. Submission guidelines are available online at: http://lfa.atu.edu/ssphil/WHB.pdf

ABC-CLIO, the world’s leading publisher of history reference books, is producing a twenty-one volume World History Encyclopedia and is currently looking for prospective contributors. The work will be arranged thematically within historical eras, rather than listed alphabetically. Anyone interested in contributing should email the publisher at cneel@abc-clio.com with an attached C.V. The publisher asks that applicants clearly indicate areas of interest and expertise in their transmittal message. For more information, contact Carolyn Neel, Project Editor - World History Encyclopedia, ABC-CLIO, PO Box 1911, Santa Barbara, CA 93116. Telephone (800) 368-6868.

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WHB Focus Issue & Teaching Forum

“Africa in World History”

Jonathan T. Reynolds
Guest Editor

When Fields Collide: Africa and the Even Newer World History

In the past few years, there has been a flurry of attention to the topic of “Africa in World History.” In 2003, Prentice Hall released a textbook entitled Africa in World History. Shortly afterwards, the African Studies Association Executive Board saw fit to sponsor two roundtables on the subject of “Globalizing Africa: Placing Africa in World History” and identified them as being “of special interest” to Africanists. In 2004, both the H-World and H-Africa listserves saw extensive (and occasionally heated) exchanges on the topic, and the journals Historically Speaking and World History Connected each hosted special forums on the subject. Also in 2004, the Ohio University Press announced the launching of a series entitled “Africa in World History” and identified them as being “of special interest” to Africanists.

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In 2005, the World History Association held their annual conference at Al Akhawayn University, Morocco, with “Africa in World History” sharing the masthead with “the Mediterranean in World History” as the conference theme. Finally, the current year (2006) will see the publication of this focus issue of the World History Bulletin on the subject, and the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association will be built around the theme of “(Re)Thinking Africa and the World: Internal Reflections, External Responses.”

All of this attention represents quite a change in fortune for a continent that, only a few short decades ago, was generally dismissed as lying “outside” of the historical world. What could possibly account for such a dramatic shift in the relationship between Africa and world history? The answer, perhaps, lies in the fact that the practice of history, just like the world that historians seek to describe and explain, is always in motion. Indeed, a number of substantial developments in both African and world history seem to have acted to facilitate a particularly fertile exchange of ideas. On the African history side, the field has recently grown beyond its early physical confinement at a handful research-intensive universities. Now, even second and third-tier teaching institutions generally consider it necessary to have at least one or maybe even two Africanists on staff – many of whom not only seek to make African history relevant to a host of students with little or no connection to the continent, but who also find themselves teaching world history surveys. Placing African events and developments in a wider historical context is a logical response to such a situation. Quite to the contrary, world history developed first and foremost as a teaching field. However, as an increasing number of world historians have sought to develop their field’s legitimacy as a discipline worthy of not only pedagogy, but also scholarship, many have found in African history a methodological and interdisciplinary diversity useful also to world history. Thus, Africanists and world historians may have been heading in different directions, but they seem to have managed a meeting of minds, all the same.

The recent synergy between Africanists and world historians also represents a near-seismic (though still ongoing) shift in each field’s self-identity. African studies, as David Northrup eloquently discussed in his 2005 WHA presidential address reproduced below, has long been built around the assumption that there is something uniquely “African” about what has happened within the physical boundaries of the African continent. Notably, the logical extension of such a perspective is that influences from outside Africa are inherently undesirable because they threatened to dilute that “Africanity.” While this assumption might at first seem obvious, deeper reflection reveals that it also suffers from a degree of “essentialism” that has become increasingly distasteful to many scholars. Notably, as many Africanists have become involved in teaching world history, quite a few have found their notions of African exceptionalism (and unity) challenged. Conversely, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the scholarly record of Africanists (and other “non-Western” area studies specialists) has forced world history to move away from its early racial and methodological biases, and accept that there is more to world history than lauding the inevitable rise of the West. Thus, the increasingly syncritic relationship between African and world history has helped scholars in these fields both to critically examine some of their most cherished assumptions and paradigms, and to look to the wider world for a new sense of context, comparison, and meaning. I, for one, see this shift as a good thing. Others, particularly those whose scholarship and self-identity are more closely intertwined, likely will not.

The interaction between African and world history has, of course, been more of a process than an event. Early on, there was simply an effort to insert some “appropriate” degree of African history into the world history narrative. Unfortunately, this laudable desire all-too-often took the form of rather ham-fisted “meanwhile in Africa” chapters in world history textbooks. However, recent years have seen a shift to a
world history that is both more interested in connections and more thematic, which in turn has led African issues and themes to appear more as threads in the world history fabric than as patches in the world history quilt.

Perhaps, if all goes well, in a few years or decades scholars will look back and argue that Africa not only came to get its due in world history, but also played a role as a sort of catalyst for a more complete globalization of world history. Certainly Africa is well placed to play such a role. Could any other region of the world be more obviously a part of world history and yet have been so viciously excluded? Today at least, for all but the most stubborn, the historical record clearly shows that Africa was not only very much a part of the historical world, but an active participant in many, if not all, of the “grand narratives” of world history. Thus, the emergence of African history, and the growing incorporation of that history into world history, have helped to point up just how painfully narrow (dare I say wrong?) our earlier models of world history were. More so, this shift has helped us in the ongoing movement towards a more complete and complex picture of world history. As new paradigms and frameworks are constructed to help us better incorporate information and methodologies from other “area studies” regions into world history, the field will continue to develop, and will almost certainly be the better for it.

The articles which make up this Focus Issue of the World History Bulletin eloquently address many of the fascinating ways that African and world history have been and are interacting. Craig A. Lockard’s prescient piece from 1993/1994 provides us with a glimpse into the early efforts to provide a more textured appraisal of Africa in world history. Trevor Getz’s and Esperanza Brizuela-García’s creative article offers a unique insight into the forces that have led many Africanists to become active in world history. In a remarkably personal way, David Northrup’s article to the WHA gives an insight into how stepping out of one’s area of specialization and into world history forces even the most accomplished of scholars to question their assumptions and cognitive frameworks. Finally, Jesse Benjamin’s examination of the place (or lack thereof) of the East African Coast in world systems analysis highlights the tensions between paradigmatic systems which are deeply rooted in particular centrisms – whether Western or African.

Kudos to the WHA and WHB Editor H. Micheal Tarver for so embracing the issue of Africa in world history and bringing us this fascinating collection of essays.

Jonathan T. Reynolds
Northern Kentucky University

2. These two panels were chaired by Jonathan T. Reynolds and Erik Gilbert, and featured presentations and insightful commentary by Kathleen Ramage-Smythe, John E. Mason, Andrew E. Barnes, Iris Berger, Alfred Andrea, Joseph C. Miller, Edward A. Alpers, Janet Ewald, Indrani Chatterjee, and Paul Finkelman. The author would like to extend his thanks to Joseph C. Miller for his help in organizing the panels and gaining ASA sponsorship for them.
3. The Ohio University Press series is edited by Joseph C. Miller and David Robinson.

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Going Global, Part I: A Reconnaissance into the Role of Africanists in the Evolution of World History

Trevor Getz
San Francisco State University
Esperanza Brizuela-García
Montclair State University

Both African studies and World History are recent and somewhat kindred developments within the academy.1 Thus, historiographers have been able to trace the evolution of these two young fields with reasonable accuracy. Patrick Manning’s *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*, for example, is a compendious analysis of the origins and growth of World History. In the first chapters of the volume, Manning, a leading practitioner of World History, not only sets out to define the field but also to develop a virtual genealogy of world historians. In subsequent chapters, Manning identifies core institutions, journals, professional associations, and movements both within and outside the academy that have contributed to the evolution of World History.

Yet, while Manning is unarguably one of the leading world historians of our time, like almost all of his colleagues, he did not receive a PhD from a World History program. Rather, he is a convert from regional history. By training, Manning is an Africanist, and he does not try to hide the role his background in African studies has played in his own development as a world historian. In *Navigating World History*, for example, he suggests that “the history of Africa as a useful model for world historians” for several reasons.2 In the first place, African studies expanded rapidly in the last quarter of the twentieth century from a position of relative neglect, and is now widely accepted as a major regional specialization. Manning suggests that world historians hoping to overcome a similar neglect emulate the processes and strategies employed by Africanists. Perhaps more importantly, however, Manning suggests that the field of African Studies possesses exceptional attributes that should inform World History. These include the uniquely-interdisciplinary approach of the African studies community and its inclusivity; as evinced by its study of micro-regions side-by-side with regional and even global analyses. Manning’s vision of World History is of a field similarly globalized, inclusive, and interdisciplinary.

All of this could, perhaps be dismissed as the biased perspective of a regionalist-turned-generalist, were it not for wider evidence of the disproportionate role of Africanists in World History. This article represents a reconnaissance into that role. Both of the variables in this equation are relatively well defined. *Africanists* are formally trained academics in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities who graduated from Africa-centered programs or - in the case of mature scholars trained prior to the widespread development of formal programs dealing with Africa – whose early work was pioneering in African studies fields. *World History* is defined as the study of the relationships, exchanges, and links among human societies including the role of ecosystems/organisms, commerce and economy, culture, social institutions, politics, war and conquest, inventions and technologies, and ideas. It is also the term for an evolving epistemology that takes into account perspectives and world views from outside the Western professional historical tradition. Even by maintaining these strict definitions, we still emerge with an impressive list of names, many of them major players in World History. A preliminary list includes Ross E. Dunn, Walter Rodney, John Thornton, Michael Gómez, Joseph Miller, Immanuel Wallerstein, Patrick Manning, Philip D. Curtin, David Northrup, Erik Gilbert, and Jonathan Reynolds. Any knowledgeable scholar would, we believe, agree that the contribution of these scholars to the developing field of World History is significant.

Africanists arguably make a deep pedagogical contribution to the field as well. Preliminary evidence suggests that historians of Africa teach a significant proportion of history survey courses that are global in scope.3 This may in part be because of lingering associations between ‘third world’ regions, such as Africa and Asia, and early World History courses, because Europeanists and Americans continue to teach Western Civilization or American History surveys, or even, in part, because Africanists’ courses of study tend to be, at a greater detail, generalized at the undergraduate level than some other specialists. Jonathan Reynolds, for example, came to World History as a result of being required to teach freshman surveys. However, as an undergraduate, he had taken classes in Asian and Latin American History, and majored in anthropology and ancient Mediterranean civilizations. He is co-author of the important textbook *Africa and World History*, for example, came to World History MA before moving on to do his PhD on the Swahili Coast within the context of the Indian Ocean World, and is now the lead instructor in the
Global History MA at Arkansas State University. The global orientation of Gilbert’s and Reynolds’ generation was made possible by programs developed by an earlier generation, especially the Program in Comparative Tropical History at the University of Madison, Wisconsin. The program’s founder, Philip Curtin, has written about its development in his new autobiography On the Fringes of History. Curtin, had as an undergraduate, been trained exclusively in Western History and has completed a doctorate on Jamaican history. He then migrated into both African and non-Western History at about the same time in the mid-1950s. By 1959, Curtin had seized the opportunity to develop a course of study in non-western history. The curriculum was initially comparative, dealing with tropical America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. Curtin recruited a number of important Africanists, including the musicologist Alan Merriam and the anthropologist Jan Vansina. Both interdisciplinary and – for the time – startlingly global, this program brought both Africa and the world to numerous graduate students, and encouraged interaction among scholars of different fields and regions of study. It is impossible to understand the development of World History except in the context of its epistemological and historiographical development, and Africanists have for various reasons played important roles in that process. Yet, some critics suggest that they have a potentially even greater role to play in introducing to World History the historical narratives, world views, and epistemologies of Africans. To date, they have not yet embraced that role. While the place of Africa in the history of the world has been explored to the degree that its treatment begins to assume certain essentialist characteristics in textbooks and polemical studies alike, the role of Africanists in World Historiography has been the focus of only very few treatments. This article represents a foray into this subject. We will begin by looking at four broad topics: two themes addressed by both African Studies and World History (the movement of peoples and underdevelopment) and two methodological questions (periodization and interdisciplinarity). We hope that the questions we raise will elicit responses from Africanists and non-Africanists alike. These responses will then inform our ongoing analysis of the personal, intellectual, institutional, methodological, and topical contributions of Africanists to World History. The movement of peoples Along with the diffusion of ideas and technology, the spread of species, and the exchange of commodities around the globe, the migration of peoples is a central theme in World History. It is also a story in which Africa occupies a unique place as the birthplace of humanity, from where the globe was populated. Africanists-turned-world-historians frequently depict the peopling of Africa and the rest of the world as a single story, with Africans playing the role of “the frontiersmen of mankind… link[ing] the earliest human beings to their living descendents in a single story.” The populating of Africa is, in fact, a far older story than the peopling of the rest of the world.
globe, and one that has been successively pushed back as new techniques have brought to light evidence of very early human migrations. It is also a topic upon which Africanists focused a great deal of attention as far back as the pioneering work of Jan Vansina and Roland Olivier in the 1960s. Vansina (an anthropologist based in the US, Belgium, and the Congo) and Olivier (an historian based in Britain) debated the settlement of Africa’s diverse and often challenging environments, and the discourse has since expanded to draw in historians, archaeologists, linguists, and anthropologists working on populations across Africa. Beyond merely forming a constituent narrative, their work is significant for World History important in two ways. The first, described below, is the interdisciplinary and non-documentary nature of the research. The second is the sophistication of the modeling of the processes of diffusion, invention, and adaptation – processes that are at the core of World History.

The so-called “Bantu migration” is an especially-featured progression in this study of the peopling of Africa. Africanists like Oliver, Vansina, and Christopher Ehret, as well as globalists like Jared Diamond, have variously ascribed the development of iron-wielding Bantu-speaking populations to processes of conquest, migration, and diffusion. The classical view is that the Bantu were conquerors, defeating non-iron-using foragers and occupying their territory. Jared Diamond has even compared the spread of Bantu-speakers from ancestral homelands in the Cameroons region across and down the trunk of Africa, to the European conquest of the Americas. Some extreme revisionists, however, suggest that people may not have moved at all, but rather, that the spread of Bantu languages and culture merely accompanied the diffusion of technologies of cultivation, pastoralism, pottery, and metallurgy from Bantu-speaking areas. It was partly to resolve this debate that Africanists turned to linguistic analysis, archaeology, and oral history, while anthropologists like Vansina began to challenge historians’ periodization. By integrating various methodologies, these scholars developed highly-sophisticated models for periods that predate written history and account for the development of technologies, cultural and social systems, and even, states. Recent studies by Vansina in West-Central Africa and by African historian Christopher Ehret, uncover processes of active development, diffusion, migration, and invention, that worked concurrently and together in the development of sedentary, segmented states and societies. These texts clearly reveal Vansina and Ehret as masters of the techniques necessary for investigating pre-literate periods and relevant to other region of the world. Yet, the extent to which researchers studying particularly—early periods of history in other regions actually have studied and adopted methods pioneered by these Africanists, remains to be assessed.

There are clearer connections, however, between Africanists who have explored the movement of Africans to other continents, and the evolving field of World History. This is especially true of the involuntary migration of the intercontinental slave trades, of which the Atlantic slave trade has received the most attention. The expanding discourse on this topic from an African perspective has had major global implications. Certainly, on even the most superficial level, research on the Atlantic slave trade has had a central place in the development of the study of the Atlantic world as a component of World History. More recently, the less well-developed research on the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean slave trades has informed the evolving studies of these regions. Studies of these commercial networks have variously depicted Africans as victims, agents, and commodities. These perspectives demonstrate Africanists’ evolving challenges to the Eurocentric master narrative of World History. The depiction of Africans as victims—either as slaves or as members of societies that have suffered slavery—helped to undermine historiographic positivism and to expose the price paid for Western ‘progress’. The portrayal of Africans as agents—both in participating or opposing the slave trade, and as immigrants to the Americas—undermined the notion that the fates of non-Europeans in the modern world was merely a product of European initiatives. Finally, the quantification of Africans as commodities led to the development of what is arguably the largest—organized set of intercontinental economic data prior to the twentieth century, the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database. Indeed, Philip Curtin parlayed his seminal work on the Atlantic slave trade, starting with the 1969 text The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, into studies of global commerce such as the equally important and groundbreaking 1984 study Cross-Cultural Trade in World History. More recently, Africanists like Sandra E. Greene have begun to represent the slave trade in the terms of African participants, victims, and survivors. This historical contextualization is distinctly African, yet it has important lessons for World History in the development of a much richer tapestry of meanings and understandings of cross-societal interactions.

The study of the Atlantic slave trade also forged very real institutional and professional contacts between Africanists and specialists of other regions, and the interdisciplinary nature of African studies played a highly-significant role in this. Perhaps most productive has been the evolving debate over the development of African-American cultures, and the cultural contributions of Africans to societies in the Americas. The initial research on this topic was carried out by US and, to a lesser extent, Latin American and Caribbean anthropologists. Their work focused most on the question of whether African cultural traits were ‘retained’ or had ‘survived’ in the Americas. Africanists responded by suggesting that many of these scholars had failed to develop a sophisticated enough understanding of the African context from which slaves brought to the Americas came. They suggested that Africanists needed to look beyond the notion of cultural survival to a more dynamic model that saw peoples of African descent as cultural innovators and syncretists, combining various African traditions and ideas learned in the Americas. Chief contributions to this debate include John Thornton’s Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, and Islamicist Michael A. Gómez’ Exchanging our Country Marks.

Such studies form just a small segment of the proliferating body of work that deal with the topics of slavery, enslavement, abolition, and emancipation at a global or, at least, intercontinental scope. Perhaps no other topic has enjoyed as comprehensive a partnership between specialists of different regions and from different disciplines. Indeed, it is possible to argue that collaboration in Slavery Studies has acted as a model for other World History topics. Perhaps the most significant institutions are Joe Miller’s annually-updated slave trade bibliography, the comparative/global journal Slavery and Abolition, and a well-attended conference in Avignon that often results in the publication of a text with a global scope. In each of these endeavors, Africanists have played a leading role. Moreover, many of the most significant cross-cultural works have been written or edited by Africanists. These include Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage, and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia, edited by Martin Klein, Suzanne Miers’ Slavery in the Twentieth Century, and From Chains to Bonds, edited by Doudou Diène. The way in which pioneering studies by Africanists such as Klein, Claude Meillassoux, and Paul Lovejoy, have informed the work of the new crop of theorists studying slavery and un-free labor as a global phenomenon, is a topic that deserves further investigation.

Underdevelopment, colonialism, and Africa

The study of slavery and the slave trade in African and global history also has broad implications for the current debate over underdevelopment, colonialism, and world-systems. Development studies and dependency were not, of course, the creation of Africanists alone. Nevertheless, their contributions have been significant and, at times, rather specific.

The struggle to achieve intellectual, political, and economic independence in the postwar era forms the main context from which Africanists’ contributions to global dependency studies have emerged. Scholars have especially labored to explain the apparent failure of African states to attain economic parity and empowerment despite achieving sovereignty. In conjunction with such important dissident scholars of other regions, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, a wide spectrum of Africanists have sought to problematize the perceived ‘African’ and ‘third-world’ conditions of poverty and
dependency. While some lines of inquiry focused on internal conditions, as early as the 1960s, some theorists developed sophisticated understandings of the global context as a key factor in Africa’s development. One of the most far-reaching early studies of this nature was Walter Rodney’s *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Rodney posited that African History “cannot be fully comprehended without first deepening our knowledge of the world at large, and yet the true picture of the complexities of the development of man and society can only be drawn after intensive study of the long-neglected African continent.”

Thus, he argued, African underdevelopment must be viewed as resulting from wider trends, including the Atlantic slave trade and the industrialization of Europe. This thesis - influenced both by the work of Eric Williams on the industrial revolution in Britain, and by the burgeoning study of the slave trade of which he was part - opened a gateway to a more global understanding of the causes of seemingly-internal events and situations. Although even nineteenth century abolitionists and former slaves had chronicled the deleterious effects of the slave trade upon African development, it was *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* that presented this argument as a coherent thesis to the academic community. Subsequently, any serious historiographical work on the development of development studies on a global level had to examine both Rodney’s work and that of critics such as C.C. Wrigley. It is also significant to note that the globalization of the study of *underdevelopment* in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere seems to have preceded the globalization of the study of *development* in Western Europe by historians like Andre Gunder Frank and Kenneth Pomeranz, who have come to argue that it was not something special to Europe, but rather Europe’s position within global networks, that led to the ‘rise of the West’.

One Africanist who read Rodney’s work closely was Immanuel Wallerstein, a historian of decolonization in Africa engaged *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* extensively in his African Studies Association (ASA) address of 1973. Wallerstein, a fellow Africanist by training, identified Rodney as a forefather of the study of “capitalism as a world-system.” This world-systems theory, which has become Wallerstein’s lifework, arose largely from his own early work focused on decolonization in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. In a short autobiographical account, he has written about the role his research and experiences in Africa played in his formulation of world-systems theory: “I credit my African studies with modern Western imaginings that make up our reality.”

Miller in fact argues that, while Africanists may have succeeded in inserting Africa, as a place, into World History narratives, they have failed to help their fellow historians understand how Africans understand that history. If Africa has perhaps begun to force its way in from the periphery - as is evinced by the special ‘Africa and World History’ issues in journals such as this one – Africans have yet to be accorded the role of partners in those projects. Instead, Miller asserts, they are usually depicted either as essentially “foils for modern preoccupations with racial categorization or other forms of domination”, or alternately as masters of “literacy, science, statecraft, and so on long before Europeans misused these techniques in the modern era to dominate Africa and the rest of the world.” Miller largely blames Africanists for these essentialist interpretations, writing in a response to an e-mail questionnaire that “Africanists are the worst offenders, because they are the most capable of changing the situation.” Both Wallerstein’s celebration of his Africanist roots and Miller’s critique of Africanists’ contributions to World History, demonstrate the necessity of investigating the impact of Africans and African perspectives on Africanists, and in exploring the Africanists’ role as cultural translators.

**Africa and the Boundaries of History**

Thus the potential for Africanist contributions to a new World History goes beyond the recovery and redefinition of historical themes such as human movement and development. In a variety of ways, African Historiography has pushed the boundaries of historical thinking. In doing so, historians of Africa have ideally positioned themselves to offer significant contributions to historical theory that can have a transformative effect on fields such as World History. Although the impact of African Historiography on historical thought is still to be felt, here, we would like to suggest a couple of ways in which this influence can have a positive effect on World History and historiography at large.

The first of these relates to an old historical problem: periodization. Periodization is arguably one of the most formidable tasks facing scholars engaged in the writing of World History. In the words of William A. Green, “Periodization is rooted in historical theory. It reflects our priorities, our values, and our understanding of the forces of continuity and change.” Thus, the question of periodization is one that should force us to rethink some of the most fundamental aspects of historical thinking and writing.

Africanists have especially challenged a fundamental element of the periodization of World History, namely the distinction between History and prehistory. Traditionally, the conventional boundary for historians has traditionally been the advent of writing. Anything that happened before belonged to the study of prehistory, and was mostly left to paleontologists, archaeologists, and physical anthropologists. The study of non-literary societies, such as Africa’s, has thrown into question this fast distinction, effectively highlighting for historians the question of the borders of history.

Clearly, this issue is epistemologically significant. The division between history and prehistory reveals some of the most fundamental elements of modern historical thought and practice. The first of these refers to the methodological limitations of the field. When post-enlightenment Western professional historians first identified their methods and objects at the end of the nineteenth century, their work was mainly characterized by the analysis of documents. The justification for this was that the systematic study of history required an empirical foundation, and the documents provided the basis for a more “scientific” examination of the past. Thus, the distinc-
tion between history and prehistory was presented as a way of defining an important rule of historica
practice if there were no documents, writing history was impossible. At a more philosophical level, the prehistory/history divide was founded on a teleological and decidedly progressive master narrative of history. Although it may seem to mark the beginning of history, it implicitly signals to its theoretical end: the achievement of civilization. Writing was used as the primary marker to identify societies that had entered the road towards civilization and found themselves at different stages of the process to achieve it. Peoples that had notveloped systems of writing were not part of this selective group and were left outside the confines of history. The distinction between history and prehistory, therefore, defined both the epistemological and the ontological boundaries of historical practice. By questioning this first point of periodization—the prehistory/history divide—historians of Africa have called into question significant aspects of the accepted theory of history.

The teleological nature of the periodization of World History hardly needs to be overstated. As William Green points out, most attempts to produce a periodization of World History have followed a “progressive, evolutionary, materialist theory of change.” Most of them have asked the question “how do people become civilized?” A teleological narrative may help provide unity to the intrinsically complex task of writing World History. However, the notion of civilization, as it has been commonly understood, has failed to incorporate the historical experiences of numerous societies, and has created the idea that some communities are closer to the accepted view of civilization than others. This may be the reasoning behind Green’s comments when he states: “The balance being struck by most writers of World History seems to me a correct one. Peoples who functioned at great distance from the mainstream should not be ignored; neither should they serve as major elements in the presentation or periodization of World History.” Statements like these reveal how deeply entrenched is the idea that there is an unproblematic notion of “the mainstream,” and how this constitutes a powerful way of defining the teleologies that guide World History’s periodizations.

Africanist historians have not yet challenged the teleological nature of historical writing. However, their work could allow them to question the accepted notion of “civilization” as the major guiding principle in the understanding of our shared human experience. Consider, for example, Patrick Manning’s dual critique of a World-History model proposed by Jerry Bentley in the article: “Cross-cultural interaction and the periodization of World History.” Here, the author proposes a global periodization focused on the concept of cultural interaction, rather than on the notion of civilization. Manning praises Bentley’s attempt, particularly for his aim at producing a non-teleological narrative:

…he offers a narrative of periodic expansion in scale and of transformation in character of cross-cultural interactions. The latter point is worth underscoring: if Bentley’s interpretation focused mainly on expressions of the scale of cross-cultural contacts, we would have yet another narrative of progress. Instead, he sidesteps a linear interpretation of World History by emphasizing successive changes in the character of cross-cultural interactions along with their growing magnitude. However, despite Manning’s approval on the area of teleology, he has important objections to Bentley’s model, objections that reveal much of his Africanist background. First, Manning says, it is important to:

- identify the type and character of interactions. Historians, in adopting such terms as ‘interaction’ and ‘diffusion’, have set them into distinct and competing analytical and philosophical systems, and thus, their meanings become quite variable. For guidance in characterizing interactions in the past, World historians need to be aware of the development of World-historical debate and its relationship to broader trends in analytical modeling, from romanticism and positivism through systems analysis and post-modernism

One could argue that it is precisely Manning’s sensitivity to Africanists’ engagement in the nature of human interaction, together with their well-groomed suspicion for terms that are often taken for granted by Europeanists and Americanists, which translates into his concern about the lack of conceptualization of the notion of interaction in Bentley’s model. Manning also made a second critique that addressed the issue of “culture”. He rightly reminds historians that scholars’ – and especially historians’ - understanding of this term are far from unambiguous. A periodization based on cultural interaction requires a serious engagement in debates about the nature and definition of culture. In the words of Manning: “Historians speaking of ‘cultural interaction’ need to know that they cannot get very far without acknowledging the contested and problematic nature of the term” – a precondition already accepted by African historians who work in the multidisciplinary world of African Studies in close contact with anthropologists and cultural geographers. “Indeed, one may hope that by involving themselves in the study and conceptualization of cross-cultural interactions, historians will be able not only to survive the debate, but also contribute significantly to its clarification.”

Manning’s engagement in this model of periodization is one example of the kinds of issues that historians of Africa can bring to the table. In the words of Miller, “The future lies in learning to use the same language of process and broad periodization to talk about all regions of the world –not the phenomenologies, specific manifestations, but the processes through which many people have pursued similar strategies”. Thus, the contribution of Africanist history is not about finding ways in which Africa can be fitted into pre-existent periodizations and historical narratives, but about challenging the underlying theory of history and progress that engendered them in the first place. By blurring the boundaries between history and prehistory or by demanding greater reflections on notions such as interaction and culture, Africanist historians can give the first step into what should be the process of rethinking the epistemological boundaries of our discipline, and establishing the foundations for a new theory of history.

A good explanation for why Africanist historians have been able to question the pre-established limits of historical thinking is that they have been forced to transcend the boundaries of their own disciplinary practice. Joseph Miller has addressed this point to a mixed audience in his AHA presidential address, rightly pointing out how African historians:

…in relying, faut de mieux, on mythological oral traditions, reified languages, mute archaeological artefacts, and … ethnographic descriptions, …tested multiple limits of how they thought as historians.

Few fields of historical writing have been so deeply committed to interdisciplinary practice as African History. Without debate and dialogue with archaeologists, linguists, anthropologists, historians have been able to transcend the boundaries of their own disciplinary practice. Joseph Miller has addressed this point to a mixed audience in his AHA presidential address, rightly pointing out how African historians:

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discipline that has had the most significant epistemological and ontological impact on African Historiography. Although the interaction between the two fields has been plagued with tension, this may well originate, as Bernard Cohn points out, from the fact that both disciplines are preoccupied with “otherness.” The recognition of this common object has produced a dialectical relationship between historians and anthropologists regarding the study of Africa. This relationship has effectively blurred the limits between History and Anthropology and, has produced what could be one of the most important historiographical discussions in the twentieth century for its epistemological implications: namely the debate on oral traditions.  

Historians in general have had an ambivalent attitude towards interdisciplinary practice; worried that it would create more fragmentation in an already broad historical field. Our argument, however, is that interdisciplinarity can provide innovative areas of inquiry that will push the boundaries of our own discipline. Since our objective is to challenge the theory of history that underpins traditional World History narratives, Africanists will do well by tapping into their own interdisciplinary experiences to provide some much needed leadership in this process.  

Conclusions  
This is not intended to be an exhaustive examination of the engagement of Africanist historians in the writing of World History. However, it represents a first attempt at tracing and assessing that involvement and emphasizing the potential of future empirical and theoretical discussions between Africanists and World historians.  

As the first part of this essay illustrated, there has been a significant and valuable engagement of the part of Africanist historians in the writing of World History. This has been encouraged by the position of Africanist historians as teachers of World History, and exemplified by their contributions to the study of human migration and underdevelopment, both important topics in World History. However, we would argue, Africanists can still make further inroads by using their experiences in pushing the boundaries of historical practice to their work in World History. It is not enough to point out the deficiencies of Eurocentric narratives; it is necessary to produce new epistemologies that can produce more universal accounts of past human experience.  

Ultimately, our goal is to reflect not just on the role that Africanists have played in the development of the field, or in the promise of their continued participation; we want to encourage serious reflection on what we expect World History to become, and what the best are avenues to achieve it. Africanist historians have much to contribute to both discussions.

ENDNOTES


3 We are currently in the process of assembling quantititative data.

4 Reynolds, Jonathan T., and Erik Gilbert, Africa in World History, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003. The authors would like to thank both Gilbert and Reynolds to their responses to an e-mail questionnaire.


8 An argument for the value of the work of Vansina and other interdisciplinary Africanists was made by Joe Miller as part of his American Historical Association (AHA) presidential address in 1998. Miller, Joseph C., History and Africa/Africa and History, AHA presidential address, January 8, 1999. Permanent URL: http://www.historians.org/info/AHA_History/jcmiller.htm.


12 One of the most important of these texts is Mintz, Sidney W., and Richard Price, The Birth of African-American Cultural Anthropology: A Perspective, Boston: Beacon Press, 1976.


19 Frank, of course, was an early contributor to the study of underdevelopment, specifically in Latin America.


23 Miller, Joseph C., draft 4/14/04 of “Beyond Blacks, Bondage, and Blame: Why a Multi-Centric World History Needs Africa”, 9 March 2005. We are grateful to Professor Miller for sharing this draft.

24 E-mail response of 22 January 2006.


28 Ibid.: 110


31 Ibid.: 777.

32 Ibid.: 779.

33 E-mail response of 22 January 2006.


WHA Vision Statement
With an enlarged and further diversified membership, professional administration from its Headquarters, and funding adequate for its expanded role, the WHA will improve services for its members, expand outreach and professional development programs for secondary and college instruction in world history, stimulate research and publication on world history, and further internationalize its scholarly activities.
INTEGRATING AFRICAN HISTORY INTO THE WORLD HISTORY COURSE: SOME TRANSREGIONAL PATTERNS

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University of Wisconsin – Green Bay

African immigrants have been in direct contact for over 400 years. Indeed, at the time of the American Revolution, 20 percent of Americans were from Africa. The ancestors of the average African-American family in the United States today arrived by the late eighteenth century, whereas the average white American family can only trace their roots in this continent back to the late nineteenth century, a striking refutation to the notion that the U.S. should be seen essentially as a Europe-derived society.

Much of what Americans think of as their own music, speech, style, cuisine, and art originated in, or was heavily influenced by, African immigrant communities.

Africans brought a rich cultural heritage to the New World, including proverbs, aphorisms, and folk tales that entered America’s oral and written tradition. Many African terms enrich American English, including the Western African “OK.” Most varieties of American popular music have some African-American origins or connections, including blues, jazz, soul, reggae, bluegrass, and rock. Indeed, great musicians like Duke Ellington and Louis Armstrong drew directly on African rhythms and melodies. Art historians have long noted how African sculpture and masks influenced Picasso, Matisse, Modigliani, and other master of the Western art tradition. Cartoons, from the Road Runner to Disney characters, were clearly influenced by African figure caricature. It is too often forgotten that the U.S. owes much of its power and wealth to black labor, slave or free, and that Americans make heavy use of raw materials exported from Africa, from chocolate and cola to chrome and oil.

Yet, most Americans know little about Africa. The media images of the continent have long been misleading and stereotyped, from King Solomon’s Mines and The African Queen of an earlier era to Tarzan and the Phantom of today’s comic strips, not to mention the ethnocentric jungle rides at Disneyland. More dangerously, the notion of “Darkest Africa” and “heathens” remains fixed in the U.S. imagination, and reinforced by news reports of “tribal” conflicts, AIDS epidemics, and “barbarous” African leaders like Idi Amin and Bokassa.

It is sobering to note that the U.S. media do not refer to “tribalism” in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet republics, Canada, or Northern Ireland; nor do they note that Idi Amin was just as atypical of African leaders as Serbia’s ruthless president Milosevic is of European leaders. As Bohannan and Curtin argue, “only after we strip away the pervasive web of myth about Africa can the reality of Africa emerge.”

A major contributor to American misperceptions is the way world history has been taught – or not taught – in U.S. schools for many decades. For much of this century the core non-U.S. history course in both secondary and higher education was some version of Western celebrations, with an emphasis on the rise of Western Europe and its antecedents in the Near East. As many critics have noted, this amounted all too often to a view of the “mainstream” of history as essentially “American history pushed back through time,” as Philip Curtin phrased it. In this scenario, civilization arose in the ancient Near East, passed through southern Europe (Greece and Rome) to northernmost Europe, and then across the Atlantic to North America. Hence, it provided a distorted view of history, denying most non-Western civilization any real relevance. The Eurocentric view of history undoubtedly exaggerated Europe’s role in world history (at least before 1500) and conveyed the misleading impression that European history existed in some sort of vacuum, underplaying the role of imported ideas, technologies, and the like in the rise of the West. Indeed, there was a pronounced contempt for African history, exemplified by the classic statement of Hugh Trevor-Roper that this history only amounted to “the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in the picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe.”

Africa, then, had no history, or at least none worth nothing until the arrival of the more “advanced” Europeans introduced dynamism into Africa.

Even world maps used in the U.S. distorted reality to conform to the American world-view; the notorious (but still much utilized) Mercator projection greatly exaggerated the size of Europe (a dubious “continent”) and North America while diminishing the actual size of Africa (no to mention southern Asia). Maps never reflect a neutral reality; they subtly shape perception of the world. Hence, for many years, what passed for historical writing on Africa mostly revolved around the anecdotes of Western individuals and governments. Only in the 1960s did this situation begin to change substantially; decolonization and the independence of most African nations, not to mention the burgeoning civil rights movements in the U.S., forced a reappraisal of African history by Western scholars less influenced by social Darwinism, racism and the ideological assumptions of colonialism. By the 1970s the academic study of African history had grown far more sophisticated and knowledge of indigenous historical patterns grew apace. But this growing knowledge base, and the more sympathetic treatment it encompassed, was very slow to permeate into the secondary schools, or for that matter into history department curricula and the emerging course on world history/ civilizations that began to develop in the late 1960s. The majority of college world history courses remained for the most part “Eurocentric,” with Western civilization as the heart, supplemented by some attention to
other “great traditions,” especially China and India. Depending on the course or text, Africa, the Middle East (after the Egyptians, Sumerians, and Hebrews), Southeast Asia and Latin America were accorded sparse or negligible treatment.9

Perhaps due to that lacuna a bitter reaction to the old Eurocentric history emerged in the late 1980s known as Afrocentrism. The assumptions of leading Afrocentric scholars provided a mirror image to the old Eurocentric school, indeed in its most extreme form dismissed the older history as essentially a lie designed to perpetuate the power of whites and denigrate non-whites. In the Afrocentric view Africa, not the West, was the fountainhead of civilization, and a whole new way of conceptualizing world history must be developed. In their critique of the ideological assumptions of Eurocentric approaches and their claims for the significance of African history, the Afrocentric scholars offer some valid points, even if many historians of world and African history have been making some of the same arguments for several decades.10

But, like the more rigid adherents to Eurocentrism who reflexively dismiss challenges without acknowledging the evidence, some of the Afrocentric scholars go well beyond the available sources and historical evidence in their zeal to forge a new paradigm. Rather few of the Afrocentrics have academic credentials on the subjects about which they propound, leading most historians of African and world history to dismiss many of their arguments (such as the absurd notion of “Ice People” and “Sun People” propounded by Leonard Jeffries) as propaganda rather than scholarship. Historians have rather easily demolished many of the claims in the Portland African-American Baseline Essays, which oversimplify ancient Egyptian society, are based mostly on outdated and generally discredited sources from early in the century, promote the dubious notion that African mariners established the Olmec civilization of ancient Mexico, and offer scientific theories with little or no empirical evidence.11

But we need not accept the more extreme arguments of some of the Afrocentrists in order to be able to integrate African history into world history and demonstrate the authenticity of African history. For historians of African and world history have long been making a good case for both the essential importance of Africa in its own right and as a critical component of world history. What is needed is not a Euro or Afrocentric history but rather a “human rainbow” or globalcentric history. It is important for teachers to understand that Africa was not isolated from world history; rather, many African peoples were very much tied to what Marshall Hodgson termed the “Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex”: A common zone of interaction beginning with the dawn of civilization and encompassing Eastern Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Western Asia, southern Europe, north and northwestern Africa, and Eastern Africa.12 In the remainder of this essay I will briefly outline six themes that will suggest how Africa can be integrated into courses on world history.

1. The People of the World from Africa

The first long chapter in the human past began in Africa.13 There is a scientific consensus that, absent any recent contradictory evidence, the ancestors of Homo sapiens sapien (modern humans) evolved exclusively in eastern and southern Africa between five million and one million years ago. Archaeological discoveries seem to point to several states in this evolution, even if there is a controversy about the various species and their relationships. These early hominids demonstrated increasing specialization in survival activities, with men increasingly hunters and females increasingly gatherers; the latter was probably more crucial for food provision but in any case cooperation between the sexes and group members was the key to survival. About 1.6 million years ago Homo erectus (“upright human”) evolved in east Africa; by about 1 million years ago some of them were migrating out of Africa, carrying with them primitive tools, more sophisticated hunting skills, and an ability to adapt to new environments (including knowledge of fire). Over the next 800,000 years or so Homo erectus occupied northern Africa, Europe, southern Asia, and China, as evidenced by the fossils later termed “Peking Man” and “Java Man.” Although there is considerable debate about their identity and the nature of the migration, this can certainly be considered the first great migration in human history, a migration corresponding to climatic change with the ebb and flow of the Ice Ages as well as the periodic drying out of the Sahara region.

At this point the story becomes more complicated and controversial. Homo sapiens sapien clearly descended from Homo erectus but there is much debate about the mechanisms. Some scholars postulate that the evolution of Homo erectus into Homo sapiens occurred in different parts of the Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex simultaneously, perhaps 70,000 years ago, with frequent contact and interbreeding between various groups so that genes spread widely throughout the hominid pool and perpetuated a single species even if there were pronounced (but essentially superficial) differences in skin color, eye shape, and the like. This is sometimes termed the “candelabra model” of evolution.14 An alternative approach is provided by scholars supporting what might be called the “Eve model.” In this scenario Homo erectus evolved into Homo sapiens only in east Africa, and then spread throughout the Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex, displacing and ultimately dooming Homo erectus. The physical differences that were perceived as distinct “races” emerged later. The evidence for the “Eve” model includes the fact that (so far anyway) the earliest Homo sapiens remains have been found in east Africa (from 100-200,000 years ago). More controversial is the study of genetic codes, especially the mutation history of mitochondrial DNA; these studies postulate a common “mother” (or “Eve”) to all present-day Homo sapiens who lived in east Africa some 200,000 years ago.15

Recently the genetic studies have come under serious attack which has compromised their credibility; but the notion of Homo sapiens deriving from Africa has by no means been discarded as one of the possibilities.16 If accurate, it would suggest a second great migration out of Africa, through Asia to Australia and the Americas. Certainly, regardless of how they evolved, there is evidence of Homo sapiens in Southeast Asia and Australia by some 40,000 years ago. Traditionally the first migrations across the Bering Straits to North America and beyond were dated at around 12,000 years ago, but some recent (and still controversial) discoveries as far south as Chile suggest human settlement as far back as 35,000 years ago. Ultimately then, Africa was the source for human societies which gradually developed more sophisticated ways of life before some of them moved to the continents. All Homo sapiens constitute one species who can interbreed, communicate, and trade with each other. Close genetical links between peoples do not always correspond with observable physical differences, which is why many anthropologists
reject the concept of fixed “races” entirely; there has been too much genetic intermixing. Essentially we are all cousins whose antecedents can be traced ultimately to Africa.

2. Egypt as a Gateway to Africa, Asia and Europe

Recently there has been a major historical controversy as to whether ancient Egypt should be seen as essentially a European/Near Eastern civilization (the forerunner of Western civilization) or rather as an African civilization populated mostly by black Africans who then sprinkled the evolving European culture (including Greece) with African ideas and influences (the idea of Black Athena). In other words, the controversy revolves around the debate between Eurocentrism (a strong force among Western classicists) and (in various permutations) Afrocentrism. Generally most specialists on world or African history would probably take an intermediate view, seeing Egypt as very much a mixed civilization with roots in, and ultimately varying degrees of influence on, Africa, Europe, and Western Asia, in other words the “gateway” to north, south, east and west. Egypt (the upper Nile valley and delta) was populated over the ages by people from the south, the west, the northeast, and later even the north; emphasizing one source at the expense of the others is misleading. Inflated Afrocentric claims for advanced Egyptian technology such as gliders cannot be substantiated; but the reality of Egypt was remarkable enough that it does not need exaggeration.

Study of the art left by the ancient Egyptians suggests that some pharaohs were light-skinned and some dark, no doubt reflecting the racial mixture of the society. The Nile River runs deep into Africa and certainly was a highway for people and ideas, including quite probably the notion of divine kingship that underpinned Egyptian royalty. Some historians speculate that early Egyptian civilization may have received major boosts from the migration of Saharan peoples (of various skin hues) into the Nile as the once heavily populated region dried out. Invaders and settlers (probably in small numbers) from the Near East also arrived at various times; later Hellenistic Greeks brought their blood and ideas. It is quite possible that the people of the Nile delta (Lower Egypt) had lighter skins that the people of the hill-framed valley south of Cairo (Upper Egypt); the two regions were quite distinct although united under one kingship. Very likely the Egyptian populations included peoples of Semitic, Berber, Hamitic (Ethiopian-Somali) and Nubian (black) origins.

The Egyptians had long connections with black Africans to the south; well-established trade networks reached the black peoples of the middle Nile and beyond the Congo basin in the south and the Ethiopian plateau to the southeast. In fact, Egypt was a crossroads of trade, with probable connections to the Berber peoples of Libya and Algeria to the west, the Hamitic peoples to the west along the Red Sea, the Semitic peoples to the northeast as far as Syria, and the Caucasian peoples of southeastern Europe. From the south came ivory, ebony, animal skins, gold and later iron, exchanged for furniture, silver, tools, paper, and linen, among other commodities. At various times the Egyptians controlled places as far afield as Palestine and Nubia; periodically Egypt itself would be conquered or dominated by outsiders, including Libyans, Nubians, Persians, Macedonian Greeks, and finally Romans.

For African history it is important to understand the connection between Egypt and the black Africans of Nubia (roughly present-day northern Sudan). The civilization of Kush arose in Nubia as a major trading terminus; later, as caravan routes linked Kush with Niger basin, the Congo basin, and the Ethiopian highlands, it would provide goods from central, southwestern and southern Africa to the peoples of the Mediterranean region as well as the Red Sea region. Some Kushite goods were transshipped to India and China; Chinese copper vessels have been found at Meroe. Long a colony of Egypt, the Kushites succeeded in conquering Egypt for a time in the eighth century B.C.E. before being pushed out by the Assyrians. From 600-100 B.C.E. Kush became a major African producer of iron, with the capital of Meroe sometimes termed the “Pittsburgh of ancient Africa.” Iron technology, originated in the Middle East, may have passed through Egypt to Kush, which had many sources of iron ore; from Kush it may have permeated into other parts of black Africa although some historians postulate an independent development of iron making. It is clear then that both Egypt and its related civilization of Kush, linking the peoples of Africa and the Mediterranean, played central political and economic roles in the larger Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex. Many African states should be seen as successors to these civilizations and some African peoples trace their political ancestry back to that region.

3. Islam and Global Commerce in West Africa

The rise of the great kingdoms of the Sudanic region of West Africa is closely linked to the expansion of both global religion, Islam, and a global commerce that linked southwestern and central Africa with North Africa, the Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East. Between the eighth and fifteenth centuries Islam expanded out of its Arabian heartland to become the dominant religion in North Africa, parts of West Africa, Iberia, Western Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, the archipelago realm of Southeast Asia, and the East African coast, with spurs to Muslim minorities in locations as far afield as China and the Balkans. Hence was created Darul Islam (the “Abode of Islam”), an interlinked Islamic world stretching from Morocco to Indonesia and joined by both a common faith and trade connections. Ibn Battuta, the great fourteenth-century Moroccan traveler, spent years touring the length and breadth of Darul Islam, as far as the coastal ports of China. One of his last trips was to the kingdom of Mali in West Africa, on the southwestern fringe of Darul Islam but linked to the Afro-Eurasian Historical Complex through the Muslim-dominated trans-Saharan trade routes that ultimately reached as far as the South China Sea.

Beginning in the ninth century C.E. Islam filtered down the trade routes across the Sahara, carried peacefully by merchants, teachers, and mystics in much the same way it had arrived in the islands of Indonesia. Islam tapped into camel caravan routes that had existed for centuries. Indeed, it was likely trade between West and North Africa that prompted the formation of the early states such as Ghana, which was flourishing by the eighth century C.E. For generations kola nuts, palm oil and especially gold from the Guinea coast to the south had been traded northward for salt, dates, textiles and horses. The Sahel (the vast grasslands just south of the Sahara also know as the Sudan) had become the terminus between north and south. By the tenth century Ghana’s rulers, at their pinnacle of power, had converted to Islam, adding a new dimension to West African life even if it took many centuries
for Islam to permeate throughout, and reconfigure some of the sociocultural values of the population. Sudanic civilization became very mixed, demonstrating absorptive qualities and the ability to tolerate varied patterns of belief and lifestyle. As was so common in the world, not least in Africa, the societies that evolved combined external influences and local genius.24

Ghana was the first of the great empires and kingdoms that rose and fell in the Sahel over the next half millennium, the best-known of which were Mali and Songhai. All had Muslim rulers (but only partly Muslim populations) and also derived some of their economic rewards from taxation to the caravan trade. The famous pilgrimage to Mecca of the Mali ruler Mansa Musa, taking with him thousands of retainers, in the fourteenth century exemplified the wealth and power of his state. It was said that he spent so much money in Cairo that the Egyptian currency was devalued.25 These kinds of international connections enticed many visitors and sojourners to the Sudan, including poets, architects, teachers and traders from places like Spain and Egypt. Islamic universities were established, most famously at Timbuktu in the fourteenth century; its faculty and student body were drawn from many lands. Eventually the Sudanic style of state, influenced by the world beyond, would become a model for kingdoms to the south and southeast in the forest zone.

As trade expanded, slaves became more permanent as a commodity to be shipped north, where they were sold in North Africa and (to some extent) Iberia. The black slaves filled various niches as domestic servants, laborers, soldiers, and even administrators; over 700 years perhaps 2-4 million slaves were transported northward on the trans-Saharan caravans, a significant figure but small-scale compared to the numbers that would eventually be taken across the Atlantic by Western nations over a 400-year period.26 Nonetheless, this trans-Saharan slave trade acquainted West Europeans, most especially the Portuguese, with the prospects of eventually procuring slaves directly in West Africa, one of the spurs to Portuguese exploration down the West African coast in the fifteenth century. Hence, the caravan trade and expansion of Islam brought many West Africans into closer communication with the peoples of the larger world and generated more sophisticated civilization; but they also ultimately contributed to enticing rapacious Westerners to explore the “mysterious” lands to the south.

4. The East African City States and World Trade27

The expansion of both Islam and global commerce also integrated another African region, the East African coast, into Darul Islam and the wider world. The coast stretching from present-day Somalia down to central Mozambique was a cultural melting pot, where a unique hybrid society emerged as a result of the evolution of a great trading system linking East Africa with varied societies of the Indian Ocean and beyond. For at least 2000 years the coastal peoples of East Africa have been in constant contact with seafaring folk from Arabia, Persia, India, Southeast Asia, and even China, a confluence that generated a fascinating mosaic of various cultures, languages, religions, and economics. The prevailing wind patterns facilitated sailing up and down the coast. Not surprisingly then, ancient Phoenicians visited the area, and trade with Greece and Rome flourished. Indonesian seafarers visited the coast for a millennium beginning around 200 B.C.E., bringing with them various tropical plants (bananas, coconuts, yams) which proved well adapted and spread throughout tropical Africa, and also settling the island of Madagascar. Later Arabs would come to dominate the coastal trade, seeking ivory, shells, skins, gold, and copper from what the called the “Land of Zanj” (“Land of blacks”).

The major permutations occurred when Bantu-speakers began settling along the coast in the first millennium C.E. Bantus and Arabs intermixed in the coastal cities that developed along the coast such as Mogadishu, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Kilwa, and Sofala; they were soon joined by small numbers of settlers from Arabia, Persia, and India. Although Bantus remained numerically dominant there was much intermarriage and cultural fusion; the result was the evolution of a new people, language and culture known as Swahili, essentially a mix of Bantu and Arab Islamic with many cultural features similar to other Islamic hybrid peoples around the Indian Ocean realm. The Swahili language became not only a venue for powerful literature but also the lingua franca of the coastal zone, later permeating deeper into east and central Africa as far as the Congo basin. Islam became dominant along the coast but in a flexible form that accommodated many local realities and customs. The Swahili settlements became independent states, with no political uniformity but domination by influential trading families; interregional and international trade was their main activity.28

The “Golden Age” of the coast commenced around the ninth century and reached its peak from the twelfth-fifteenth centuries. Ships from Arabia, Persia, and India regularly visited the coast; Ibn Battuta traveled south as far as Kilwa. In the early fifteenth century peaceful Chinese trading fleets arrived, the largest expedition in history before the expansion of the West. The various foreign traders brought pottery, Chinese porcelain, glass beads, and Indian cotton, trading them for iron, ivory and slaves. Slaves from East Africa were sent to Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Western India; the magnitude of the trade is unclear, perhaps 1-2 million before it was terminated in the nineteenth century.29 The East African city states were an integral part of the greatest trading network of the pre-modern world, the Great Indian Ocean Maritime Trading Route that was generally dominated by seafaring Muslims (Arabs and Indians) and linked China in the east through Southeast Asia to India, Persia, the Arab societies, southeastern Europe, and East Africa.30

By about 1000 C.E. trade networks into the interior expanded, a situation facilitated by the discovery of gold in the plateau of Zimbabwe. The Shona people developed a great kingdom in Zimbabwe from the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries, with their prosperity based on mining gold, copper, and iron. Soon they were trading these minerals to the Arab and Swahili traders down from the Zambezi River at Sofala, turning this coastal port into a major designation of merchants seeking to export gold around the Indian Ocean basin; Zimbabwe flourished from the trade. But the wealth of the East African coast, not to mention the products that flowed northward and westward along the Indian Ocean trading networks, would prove a terrible temptation to Europeans who were, in the 1400s, developing the naval and military capability to seize and dominate the trading systems, in the process devastating and destroying the Swahili city states.

5. Africa and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade31

One study has contended that “modern race relations have their origins in, and cannot be understood apart from, the global
expansion of Europe that began in the fifteenth century,” which forged an unequal relationship between white and nonwhite peoples while also creating “a global distribution of power and privilege along the lines of color.” Contemporary racism and the exploitation of black peoples have their origins in early Western relations with tropical Africa. The most prominent factor in this situation was the trans-Atlantic slave trade which developed beginning in the sixteenth century. Slavery had existed in many African societies just as it had worldwide, and some black slaves had long been transported along the caravan and sea routes to North African and the Middle East just as Caucasian slaves had for centuries been dispatched from the Black Sea region to southwestern Europe. But the economic evolution of the newly discovered lands of the New World, especially the introduction of sugar planting, created a tremendous market for labor that could not be filled by free labor. Soon ships from various European nations (first Portuguese, then English, Spanish, French, Dutch, Danish, and American) began procuring slaves in West Africa and shipping them across the Atlantic to meet the limitless demands of the new plantation economies.

Profits from the slave trade soured along with the volume of slaves, and the West African coast from Senegal down to Angola was soon dotted with European forts to obtain, store, and ship slaves. Europeans traded cotton goods, guns, iron, rum and tobacco for slaves, often with the cooperation of local African chiefs but sometimes acquiring slaves by force, as exemplified by the Portuguese conquest of the great and prosperous kingdom of the Kongo and their ruthless depredation in Angola. The total number of Africans involved in the slave trade is a matter of great debate among historians, but most sources point to something on the order of 9-12 million Africans landed in the Americas over four centuries. But for every slave sold at auction several had died in storage or on the notoriously over crowded, disease-ridden slave ships. Estimates of the total number of Africans originally enslaved who either died or survived the various legs of the journey run as high as 50 million. Westerners invented many rationalizations to support the trade, including the notion that Africans were subhuman savages unworthy of civilized treatment; the heritage of that dehumanization can be easily seen today. The slavers, the cooperating African chiefs, the plantation owners, shipbuilders, and other groups linked to the trade directly or indirectly were all reluctant to abandon a lucrative source of profit.

The slaves transported across the Atlantic became largely a plantation labor force. Unlike slavery in traditional African societies these New World slaves had few if any legal or customary rights; they were simply treated as cost items in the production processes, to be bought and sold at the whim of the owners, their lives on plantation governed by the imperative of the marketplace. Slave owners sought maximum profit regardless of human consequences since the markets for sugar and other plantation crops expanded constantly. Other perhaps than subtle passive resistance or conceivably escape to the remote interior, African slaves had little choice but to tolerate the situation; the myriad of slave revolts were brutally crushed.

The impact of the slave trade on Africa is the subject of much historical debate, with varying balance sheets being offered. Clearly the negative consequences varied from region to region, group to group. Without a doubt coastal regions of West and Central Africa did succumb to chronic warfare, “an enslave your neighbor or be enslaved” syndrome. European guns made the region a vast battleground. Some people, among them Kongoese, Ibos, and Yorubas, were disproportionately transported, their societies badly disrupted. Some districts were badly depopulated. But the degree of African complicity in the tragedy is disputed. Traditional interregional trade was clearly hampered; external trade was lubricated mostly by the Western desire for slaves. Conservative historians argue that the trade facilitated the diffusion of new food crops (corn, peanuts), that some African states developed a highly dynamic commercial orientation, and that Africa quickly recovered demographically from the population losses. And yet, the heritage of racism made Africans and their descendants in the New World a permanent underclass, treated with contempt; learned Western intellectuals once argued (and some apparently still do) that Africans were naturally inferior in intelligence. Africa came to be seen as a continent in desperate need of Christianity and Western tutelage, setting the stage for, and justifying, the later colonialism of the continent.

But the greatest impact on the African slave trade was to more forcibly link black Africa to the larger world, especially to the Americas. The triangular trade saw the movement of slaves from Africa to the New World, where they grew sugar, cotton, and tobacco for shipment to Europe; the lucrative proceeds would then purchase guns, rum, textiles, and other commodities for shipment to Africa to obtain more slaves. Perhaps more than any other commodity, sugar (grown by African slaves) generated the European drive for empire and also facilitated the transition to an industrial economy in Britain. African culture influence and population came to be especially predominant in the slavery-defined plantation zone” stretching from Virginia southward through the West Indies to northern Brazil and the Pacific coast of Colombia. A substantial percentage of all people of African descent, probably at least one-third by 1800, live today in the Western Hemisphere. They constitute most of the population of countries like Jamaica, Barbados, and Haiti, half of the population of countries like Trinidad, Belize, and Guyana, and substantial minorities in countries like Brazil (37%), Cuba (27%), Panama (30%), Venezuela (10%), and the U.S. (11%).

The African diaspora left its imprint in the New World. Some slaves escaped from plantations and set up African-type maroon communities in the interior of places like Jamaica and Surinam. Many African descendants showed a tendency to synthesize Western and African customs, creating hybrid religions (Haitian voodoo, Cuban santeria), music, and sometimes even language (the Gullah dialect of the Georgia Sea Islands). African words enriched the English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese patois, in some cases substantially. And yet everywhere African Americans faced discrimination or racism long after slavery ended. Some freed slaves returned eventually to West Africa, becoming important segments of the urban population in states like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria; some of their descendants became nationalistic proponents or even presidents. All of these patterns created what might be called an “Atlantic System that spanned Western and central Africa, the U.S. South, the Caribbean basin, and northern and eastern coastal zones of South America, defined by a particular sort of economic activity, some shared sociocultural traits, and the numerical promience of Africans. Ultimately then, as Manning argues, African slavery was linked
in some way to most of the major developments of modern world history, including the industrial revolution, the rise of capitalism, the scientific revolution, rapid population growth in the Americas, and the expansion of colonialism.\text{42}

6. Africa and the Global Order of Colonialism\text{43}

Between 1500 and 1914, and particularly between 1870 and 1914, that portion of the globe now called the “Third World was conquered or impacted by Western nations and divided up into colonies or spheres of influence, in the process brought into an emerging world economic system dominated by the West. These societies were then categorized as “backward” or “underdeveloped”; lubricated by the ethnocentric pretensions of social Darwinism, Westerners took the innate inequality of peoples and societies for granted while the imperatives of capitalism spurred Western businessmen (and their supporting governments) to seek new resources and markets in the tropical world. And yet, the wealth gap between Europe and the more sophisticated Third World societies (including some in Africa) was small or even nonexistent in 1500; by 1914 it had grown wide indeed and continues to grow.

Many scholars believe that “underdevelopment” and “development” are two sides of the same coin; the imperialism of the Western powers transferred wealth from the “periphery” (Third World) to the “core” (the colonizing powers) for investment in their own productive capacity while locking their colonies into dependency based on extractive economies and labor exploitation. Hence, it is argued, first the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the colonialism contributed to the underdevelopment of Africa by draining away the most productive sector of the population and then imposing a new kind of economic system discouraging diversified, multifaceted growth, rendering many of the former colonies economically vulnerable today.\text{44}

For Africa the most common form of Western imperialism was colonialism, that is direct political control.\text{45} While a few areas such as Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa became Western colonies in the era of the slave trade, the fullblown scramble for Africa would only commence with the end of the slave trade and the onset of the industrial revolution in Europe which greatly accelerated the need for natural resources that could be processed into industrial or commercial products as well as new markets to consume these goods. Soon European traders were obtaining African products such as peanuts, palm oil, gold, timber, and cotton; but the Westerners encountered impediments to their activities, not the least of them an emerging African mercantile class that competed with them.

Economic factors, combined with European political rivalries, and a powerful industrial technology (including weapons) soon combined to generate a more forward and ruthless policy of incorporating African territories. By World War I the great European powers had divided up the African continent between them, paving the way for full-scale economic penetration and incorporation of Africa into the world-system. Conquest was achieved peacefully if possible (through deceptive treaties, bribery, divide and rule, and the like), by ruthless force if necessary (such as the notorious punitive expeditions in Kenya which slaughtered many uncooperative villages in the imposition of the “Pax Britannica”). There were many episodes of resistance (such as Samory Toure in the western Sudan and the British wars with Ashante) as well as rebellions which punctuated colonial rule (such as the Maji Maji in Tanganyika and the Ibo women’s protests in Nigeria).

The impact of colonialism in Africa had many parallels to other regions such as Southeast Asia. Politically it created artificial countries as European colonizers drew up boundaries that ignored traditional ethnic relationships, dividing some ethnic group and joining some incompatible or historically antagonistic societies together; this created a basis for later political instability. Christian missionaries accompanied European bureaucrats and businessmen, setting up schools and clinics but also denigrating African culture and promoting Westernization; Christian converts often became divorced from their traditional cultures and communities but were never accorded equality in the racist colonial system. In some colonies (such as Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and South Africa) many European settlers arrived, obtaining the most fertile land for themselves and establishing strongly discriminatory laws and customs to restrict African civil and economic rights.

Colonial economic policies tended to undermine African society in various ways. In the quest for revenues colonial governments imposed taxation policies that promoted a shift from subsistence food growing to cash crop farming and mineral exploitation; hence many Africans became involved in growing crops like cotton, cocoa, rubber, and palm oil or mining copper, gold, oil, chrome, cobalt, and diamonds for the world market; their livelihoods now became subject to the chronic fluctuations in the world price for their commodities, determined largely by the whims of Western consumers and corporations. If economic incentives did not work authorities and planters sometimes resorted to forced labor, most notoriously in the Belgian Congo where perhaps half of the population died from overwork or brutality over a twenty-year period. Much land was turned over to Western-owned plantations and Western companies owned most of the mines. Many African men were recruited or forced to migrate to other districts or colonies for mining or industrial labor, establishing a permanent pattern of short or long-term labor migration. Many of the major cash crops that dominated African lives were not indigenous; for example, peanuts and rubber were brought from South America. Colonial governments imported Asians to build railroads, work on sugar plantations, or become middle-level retail traders; soon Indians had become the commercial middle class of East Africa and the Lebanese of West Africa, increasing the pluralistic nature of the society.

Gradually Africans came to be integrated into the world economy as producers of raw materials and consumers of Western food and consumer goods. Many colonies became economic “monocultures,” dependent on the export of one or two major commodities (copper from Zambia, cocoa from Ghana, peanuts from Senegal, cotton from Sudan, etc.). Conservative historians argue that colonialism increased the productive capacity of the land and constructed an economic infrastructure.\text{46} This is true but the question must be asked as to the purpose and ultimate beneficiaries of these policies that globalized the African economies. Whether colonialism stimulated modern development or retarded and distorted is one of the central questions of modern African history as it is of South and Southeast Asian history. The end of colonialism (for most, in the 1960s) has not in most cases dramatically transformed the economic structure and prospects of the African nations or the essential structure of the world economy in which they are enmeshed. The rise of nationalism and the consequent wave of decolonization and lib-
eration constitute another phase in the globaliztion of African history and politics that deserves a more extensive treatment than can be mounted here.47

Conclusions
African history then must be seen not only as an authentic and dynamic saga of indigenous African development but also as integrated into larger global processes. Historian Ronald Segal has argued that: Africa has its own rich sweep of events, outside those which European conquest and settlement have recorded. The era of European dominance is short even within the margin of human history. Long before, in the evolution of man himself, Africa has helped shape history. And while the centers of European culture flourished, decayed, and sprouted in their turn, empires in Africa rose, ruled, resisted, and succumbed. Scholars studied and disputed in Timbuktu and Paris, and what the Italians accomplished with pigment, the artists of Benin achieved with bronze. The cultures were different, but only on the horizontal. The vertical, the separation into superior and inferior, was a product of conquest.48

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African history was an integral part of world history and needs to be studied as such.

ENDNOTES

1 From the album Shadow Man (EMI CL 90411, 1998).
4 Wiley and Crofts, Africa, p. 3.
10 For example, Basil Davidson has been promoting much more sympathetic reading of African history for four decades. His classic work, The Lost Cities of Africa (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), still stands up well and provides a highly readable introduction to an Afrocentric history linked to the wider world.
18 For classroom purposes, a useful film that brilliantly and effectively covers much of the ground discussed in this selection is Episode 1: “Different But Equal,” in Basils Davidson’s history see Richard Eaton, Islamic History as Globaly History (Washington D.C.: American Historical Association, 1991).
22 The second half of Davidson’s “Caravans of Gold” provides and exciting picture of the East African trading cities and Zimbabwe.
24 Stearns, World Civilizations, p. 323. But see the books by Lovejoy and Austen cited above for much larger estimates.
26 The first part of Episode 5: “The Bible and the Gun” in Davidson’s Africa has a brief analysis of the slave trade.
31 The debate began over 30 years ago, with Davidson (in African Slave Trade) arguing for the negative consequences and J.D. Fage and Roland Oliver suggesting that it may have at least brought some limited benefits to certain parts of West Africa. See their A Short History of Africa (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966). Since then many historians have joined the fray on one or another side. For recent accounts see, e.g., Manning, Slavery and African Life; Curtin, African History, pp. 227-248.
33 A good brief overview of the formation of the Atlantic System can be found in Philip Curtin, The Tropical Atlantic in

On this point see especially Sidney Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (Baltimore: Penguin, 1985).


Episodes 6: “The Magnificent African Cake” in Davidson’s Africa series provides a very judicious overview of colonialism in Africa. The “Exploitation” episode in the Ali Mazrui series, The Africans, offers a great deal of stimulating if controversial material that should prompt animated class discussion.


Episodes 7 and 8 in the Davidson series, not to mention many of the segments in the Ali Mazrui series, are useful for discussing 20th century Africa.

“Editorial Foreword,” in Fage and Oliver, Short History of Africa, pp. 9-10.


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There can be no doubt that Africans have played important roles in world history. Africa was the birthplace of humankind, the ancestral homeland of all people, and the site of important early domestications of plants and animals. Ancient Egypt was one of the very earliest ancient civilizations and had a strong influence on the lands of the eastern Mediterranean and North America. Africans were among the earliest converts to Christianity and to Islam and today Africans are numerically important Muslim and Christian adherents. Africans were major players in the commerce of the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic. In recent years several Africans have won Nobel prizes for their contributions to peace and literature and have been chosen as secretaries general of the United Nations. On a sadder note, tropical Africa is also the birthplace of HIV/AIDS and home to the largest number of infected persons, as well home to recent brutal wars and genocides. Africa is home to many of the world’s poorest people—tragic circumstances that make the continent the focus of global concern.

Despite these contributions, there are many issues to be resolved in trying to make appropriate generalizations about Africa in world history. First, is there a common pan-African history that embraces all parts of the continent and does this history hold together chronologically, so that one can trace a common thread through the lives of King Tut, Augustine of Hippo, Ibn Battuta, Leo Africanus, James Africanus Horton, and Nelson Mandela? Second, if one responds in the affirmative, what is this common history based on?

In seeking to answer such questions, one is aided by the fortunate fact that the topic of Africa in world history has recently been the subject of a number of thoughtful papers and essays. At the African Studies Association’s annual meeting in Boston in late 2003, the ASA’s Board of Directors sponsored two panels on this topic. In 2004, the WHA’s on-line publication World History Connected featured a series of essays on Teaching Africa in World History in 2004, and the Historical Society’s publication Historically Speaking featured a lively exchange of views on the subject. Finally, the WHA’s 2005 conference in Morocco featured Africa in world history as one of its themes.

The forum on Africa in world history that appeared in Historically Speaking was structured around a central essay by the distinguished historian of Africa, Joseph C. Miller of the University of Virginia. Miller proposed that it was possible to identify a “communal ethos” in Africa in the early modern period and as an example of this he suggested that most black Africans viewed the exploitation of the Atlantic slave trade as the work of evil magic or “witchcraft.” The various scholars who commented on Miller’s essay were generally appreciative of his effort to identify a popular ethos, a broad common African point of view regarding the continent’s place in history. However, a number questioned the validity of such a proposition. The distinguished pioneer in world history, William H. McNeill, wondered how historians could “hope to know what really happened among Africans in general and common folk in particular” in that period and described Miller’s proposal as a “caricature of reality.” However, McNeill did acknowledge that a “caricature” was much more appealing than a blank slate.

McNeill and others also felt that Miller’s “Africa” suffered from overgeneralization, privileging his own area of research in West-Central Africa, but not adequately taking into account the diversity of views and experiences in other parts of the continent. Northeastern University’s Patrick Manning wondered whether in seeking to place Africa in world history Miller hadn’t come too close to making the continent “a single place” with a single point of view, what he called “a civilization-wide unifying principle.” Jonathan T. Reynolds, co-author of Africa in World History, was “uncomfortable” with Miller’s stress on Africans’ uniqueness compared to other peoples.

In the World History Connected forum, Reynolds’s co-author, Eric Gilbert, similarly warned of the dangers of “treating Africa as a coherent place, a sort of nation writ large.”

I tend to agree with these criticisms. However desirable it may be to know the mind of Africa, such a quest has little chance of success in pre-modern times when few Africans were able to record their thoughts. Of course, some writings exist, but, while my own efforts to highlight pre-colonial Africa thinking in Africa’s Discovery of Europe brought to light individual perspectives that were authentic and diverse, they also tended to be elite and eccentric rather than normative, and transformed by the experience of European contacts rather than pristine. Like McNeill, I am also uncomfortable with presenting a slate that, if not entirely blank, is mostly so. I think we need to be cautious in talking about a common African experience, but, like most students of African history, I am reluctant to reject the proposition that in some contexts there has been a common African historical experience. Certainly the growth of African Area studies in the past fifty years is built on such premise. The multivolume UNESCO and Cambridge histories of Africa (as well as other works) demonstrate that common African threads can be traced meaningfully over time, though they also highlight enormous regional differences.

Among scholars writing about Africa there is great ambivalence about how to balance the continent’s unity and diversity. A striking example of this ambivalence can be found in the work of the distinguished Belgian anthropologist Jacques Maquet. In 1972 Maquet published English translations of two small books on African culture he had written in the 1960s. The first, called Civilizations of Black Africa, divided sub-Saharan Africans into six ecologically distinct culture areas based on differences in geography and ways of life but also pointed out the great diversity within these groupings. The second volume, called Africartography, argued that black Africans possessed broad cultural unity, based partly on their historical isolation and struggle with nature for survival and partly on their experiences of European exploitation and racism. Maquet acknowledged the tension between these two approaches but argued that they reflected different frames of reference. Of the two, I suspect Civilizations of Black Africa might be more appealing to Africanists, while Africartography might have a greater appeal to world historians seeking a simple formula that would encompass the con-
tinent. As a specialist in both areas, I am attracted by both approaches.

But I also think a more subtle analysis is needed to probe Africa’s cultural unity. Three issues crop up immediately. First, which meaning of Africa should be used? Both Maquet and Miller equate Africa with sub-Saharan Africa, black Africa. By implication the lands of North Africa are separate world, distinguished by their greater and earlier involvement with the Mediterranean and their early incorporation into the Islamic world. The Middle Eastern Studies Association and most area studies programs include North Africa as part of their field of study.

A second difficult issue is how to define cultural commonalities and differences. Many of the characteristics Maquet details for Africanity are broadly human traits: struggling for a making a living, living on little, migrating, borrowing, being ruled and exploited, etc. The problem of identifying clear cultural boundaries was brought home to me vividly when I went to Honolulu to attend the WHA convention in 1993. It was my first visit to the islands and, arriving early, I used my first day to tour the wonderful Polynesian displays at the Bishop Museum. Many of the artistic motifs seemed oddly familiar, suggestive of African artistic forms. As I pondered this, a voice from the gallery above me exclaimed, “Gosh, these sure look African!” I looked up to discover two other historians of Africa, who had also arrived early for the conference, pondering the same conundrum. No scholar suggests that there is a cultural link between Africa and the Pacific, but the story does suggest that the subjective judgment of what is intrinsically African may reflect broader human sensibilities and the limits of certain technologies and media.

This last point suggests a third issue to ponder: whose point of view defines Africa? The rest of this essay explores these issues.

The Unity of Africa?

As was suggested above, scholars have taken quite different positions on African cultural unity and how much of the continent it includes. Bill Freund may serve to illustrate one end of the spectrum. He argues that the supposed cultural unity of black Africa rests on racist European assumptions. Striped of these outdated theories, he suggests:

There is no foreordained African cultural oneness that has been convincingly defined that suggests otherwise. The broadest themes of African history do reflect continent-wide developments precisely because they are themes that belong to the basic stock of social and economic developments of mankind elsewhere.

Others have argued that a common African cultural heritage emerged from the continent’s early history. The long millennia of early human development in Africa may have been instrumental in creating a common culture, but as yet the evidence of cultural (as opposed to biological) unity is very limited. Anthropologist Igor Kopytoff has suggested that an “ancestral ‘hearth’ of African culture” was incubated in the period from about 5000 to 2500 B.C.E. in the then fertile Saharan-Sahelian band where most of the continent’s population was then concentrated. As this region grew drier, these populations moved out to the south, as well as to the Nile Valley and to North Africa, spreading common practices and ideas. The subsequent dispersal of peoples further southward, such as the often-cited Bantu migrations, spread “the ancestral pan-African culture patterns” to the rest of the continent. An important later phase of this was the Bantu migratory dispersal through the tropical rain forest and to regions to the southern cone. The formative nature of the latter phase has led historian Christopher Ehret to refer to the last millennium BCE as Africa’s “classical age.”

The validity of such learned arguments in a particular historical context, however, does enable them to overcome the problem that the dominant trend in most of Africa during these millennia was toward the erosion of cultural unity. Centuries of dispersal, migration, and subsequent isolation produced profound cultural divergences, which can most easily be illustrated by the enormous proliferation of African languages. A second problem is that continental and global historians rarely define cultural unity and common history on the basis of such folk cultures but rather on the basis of a pervasive elite culture. These elite overlays (often imposed by conquest) are usually called “civilizations,” but because that term tends to be used in contrast to primitive barbarism, I prefer to speak of great traditions instead. Although the study of great traditions is important and rewarding in world history, a near exclusive emphasis on them leads to the omission or misrepresentation of areas of the world that avoided imperial conquests and exploitation.

The distinctiveness of North African history, compared to the rest of the continent lies in the early and pervasive influence of a number of imperial great traditions. Although there is good evidence of underlying folk customs and traditions that united people on both sides of the Sahara, historians recount North African history primarily in terms of the region’s incorporation into the great empires and imperial traditions that overlay (and partly absorbed) popular culture: from the ancient Egypt, Hellenistic, and Roman empires through the early Islamic empires. This is in keeping with the near exclusive attention world historians are also inclined to give to imperial traditions in China, India, and elsewhere in Eurasia.

Many of the difficulties of incorporating sub-Saharan Africa into world history derive from a failure to recognize this pattern. From a global perspective what is strikingly different for most Africans living south of the Sahara before about 1000 C.E. (and much later in many places) is the absence of a great tradition associated with the elite culture of enduring empires. This is why the region lacked written records and why it displays so much political and cultural diversity.

Why has this distinctive feature of sub-Saharan Africa’s history has been neglected by recent historians of Africa and of the world? In part this is a reaction to the older tradition of Western (and Islamic) history that stigmatized sub-Saharan Africa for the absence of an elite history and the other trappings of “civilization.” Historians have rightly rejected this prejudicial judgment and the view of history as the story of progress, whether divinely guided or not. But in practice it has also been common to downplay the significance of this difference. Thus, sub-Saharan Africa is rightly celebrated for its oral literature and arts, vernacular architecture, sophisticated decentralized trading systems, and political institutions at a variety of levels, but without acknowledging that these “achievements” occurred in a different structural context from places where norms tended to be defined by canonical norms of a great tradition.

I think Africanists and world historians need to face up to this distinction, not sweep it under the carpet. Sub-Saharan Africa challenges world history is to recognize that the great tradition model is not the only model or even the most pervasive one in most periods of history, great traditions are thin veneers. While as a practical matter one cannot include in a world history narrative the details of various common folk and their folk cultures, one needs to acknowledge that significant global development came from below as well as from above. This insight works in sub-Saharan Africa, but it was not the only place. Modern globalization studies rightly contrast global/local inputs.

In addition, it is important to recognize that while great traditions are not essential, they can be very useful. Africans have clearly appreciated the advantages brought by their incorporation into such larger worlds. The spread of Islam is a major example. After the Arab conquest, the subsequent conversion of North Africa and the spread of Muslim ways into sub-Saharan Africa were gradual and largely peaceful process, involving the use of political advisors, the conversion of merchants and later rulers, the spread of literacy (initially in Arabic but later in the vernacular). As David Robinson points out in his excellent little book Muslin Societies in African History, the Islamization of Africa was accompanied by the Africanization of Islam – a reminder of a theme of interaction of great and folk traditions in world history generally.

By 1800 much of Africa lay within the Muslim world and Islamic beliefs and traditions were spreading. In 1800 or even 1850 it would have seemed inevitable to a neutral observer that the rest of Africa would eventually be absorbed into the great tradition of Islam. But, as is well known, European influences, which had been spreading slowly and very largely peacefully along coastal Atlantic and southern Africa, suddenly advanced in a violent rush as European
imperialists reduced the continent to their dominion. The long-term significance of this European conquest has been the establishment of a second great tradition in Africa, not just in the non-Muslim parts of the continent but everywhere. Indeed, it is becoming obvious that the perverseness of Western tradition has grown notably stronger in Africa since the end of colonial rule.

Of course, the Westernization of Africa has also been accompanied by the Africanization of Western culture. One sees this in new forms of Christianity that Africans devised but equally in the infusion of traditional Western denominations that Africans joined with African spiritual vitality. If one starts in North Africa and moves south, one passes from states where over 90 percent of the population is Muslim to gradually lower percentages. If one starts in South Africa and moves north, one moves from societies that are 90 percent Christian to gradually lower numbers. Somewhere in the middle there are states like Nigeria where the percentages are similar.

Nigeria also illustrates another aspect of the Western great tradition. After the US and UK, Nigeria has the third largest number of English speakers of any country in the world. This phenomenon partly resulted from colonial rule (though a few Nigerians were speaking and writing in English before the colonial period), but it is much more the product of the decisions by independent Nigerian governments to promote universal education (of a Western curriculum) in English and to use English as the national language. Nigeria has also produced prize-winning writers nearly all of whom use that national language—even in the Muslim north. This has not led to the extinction of local languages, though the spread of Islam and Christianity have certainly affected folk traditions and been affected by the spread of Islam and Christianity have certainled to the extinction of local languages, though they have nearly all of whom use that national language—nearly in the Muslim north. This has not led to the extinction of local languages, though the spread of Islam and Christianity have certainly affected folk traditions and been affected by them. For the last century or so the difficulty of writing the history of sub-Saharan Africa in terms of the area’s engagement with great traditions disappears, even though that remains an invalid reason for ignoring popular culture.

**Whose Africa?**

It is no secret that Africa was named and invented as a continent by outsiders. In antiquity and for centuries afterwards African identity existed only in the minds of outsiders. Under the conditions of isolation existing within the continent any pan-African identity was devoid of meaning. The spread of Islam unified African Muslims and promoted contacts among them, but it does not seem to have promoted a pan-African identity. Rather converts were drawn into membership in a pan-Islamic world. Possibly encounters among African pilgrims led to a common African identity among Muslims—a topic meriting further investigation. Possibly people from various parts of the continent held in slavery in the Middle East came to prize their common Africanness, but the evidence seems to meager to say.

Rather, the first recorded examples of self-identified Africans come from the diaspora created by the Atlantic slave trade. Between 1750 and 1850 growing numbers of individuals began to refer to themselves as Africans. Nearly all were outside of Africa or outside their natal homelands, in the case of liberated Africans in Sierra Leone and elsewhere. Nearly all were pushed in that direction by forces of discrimination and color prejudice by Westerners. As is well known, a new stage of pan-Africanism began to flourish in the West Indies and North America in early twentieth century among people of African descent recently liberated from slavery but still struggling against dominant forces of inequality. Only from the 1940s does one see pan-Africanism establishing itself within the continent, where it was important in the so-called “nationalist” movements. After independence Pan-Africanism was fundamental in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity and the newer African Union. In both cases the meaning of “African” included people on both sides of the Sahara.

This suggests an interesting parallel: world history’s growth also dates from the late twentieth century and reflects similar (though not identical) circumstances. The study of world history is heavily concentrated in North America (though it is spreading). The concern about Africa’s place in world history inevitably reflects the sensibilities of the African diaspora and the desire to address the injustices of slavery and discrimination. Thus, the study of African history as a unit and the study of world history are both products of contemporary points of view derive from particular historical tracks.

Both Pan-Africanism and world history have imposed a conception of common experience that, if not actually contrary to the historical record, is contrary to the perception of reality in earlier times. So in a very real sense Africans and African history and world history employ conceptual frameworks that are fundamentally alien to the past. In asking how Africa is to be understood in world history we are asking a question that is very presentist, both in its identification of Africa and of an interactive world. It is a question that few Africans before recent times would have found intelligible and those few who surely have interpreted it through the different lenses of Islamic or Christian worldviews. Yet in so doing we are continuing a tradition of historians who have regularly used longer trajectories to uncover meanings in the past that were unknown to those who inhabited those ages.

For Africans (as for the rest of the world) most of history has been a process of differentiation and growing diversity. If there is a common cultural underlying all African societies as most students of the continent would like to believe, it is still true that the movement was away from it or in devising multiple variations on it: comprehending diversity in unity is the puzzle of modern African studies. However, the spreading forces of convergence gradually drew Africans into the wider orbits of Islam and Western culture. The contemporary forces of globalization have sped and spread this coming together. Looking at modern Africa, the Tanzanian political scientist Ali Mazrui celebrated the continent’s triple heritage. In his 8-part television series he used himself to illustrate that heritage: an African, a Muslim from a learned Swahili family, and a Western educated professor with a lyrical and elegant command of English. Thus Africa’s histories have worked to make a single African history meaningful to modern Africans.

In conclusion, Africa’s place in world history is a topic for thoughtful discussion not a subject for pontification. Africa’s complexities and commonalities admit of many (simultaneous) perspectives. Africa’s long history makes the continent the ancestral home of all humans as well as a place that has been interactive with other continents. The place of the continent in world history may look different from each of the external continents and different still from various points of view within the continent. Africa specialists may be inclined to see a bounded experience, whether from a Pan-African point of view or from the assumptions of an area studies perspective. World historians, on the other hand, may instinctively prioritize interactive experiences. There is no right and wrong in this, but, as Eric Gilbert, has written, “When Africanists say that Africa is not represented in world history, what they really mean is that they are uncomfortable with the analytical lens that world historians use.”

It is notable that many scholars trained in African history have also become world historians. Having attempted to find common meaning in Africa’s diversity, perhaps we find it easier to find meaning in the entire human experience. My own studies of Africa, by forcing me to confront popular as well as elite experiences, has continuously informed my understanding of the larger human experience. I feel deeply the insight of a second century B.C.E. North African playwright, Publius Terentius Afer: “Homo sum. Nihil mihi humanis alienum est (I am human. Nothing of the human experience is foreign to me).”

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“The World and Africa”: World-Systems Theories and the Erasure of East Africa from World History

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World historical and world systems narratives have increased in both frequency and quality in recent decades. This essay seeks to examine how some of these emerging models have or have not incorporated Africa or various parts of the African continent into their models. An immense amount of local knowledge is produced in the world’s various regions, through local universities, research institutions, and grant-funded explorations. However, as this information is synthesized into more general texts and texts more available to the lay reader or general Western audiences, much of the detail and nuance of local scholarship is lost. In this essay, I look at the case of East Africa, an area which has undergone a considerable revolt against colonial biases since the 1960s that has changed much of the discourse in the field, especially the notion that Africans were not capable of the examples of civilization that were in obvious evidence throughout the region. Since this reorientation, against the denigration of local agency, some Western scholars have begun to argue that a reverse bias is taking shape, in which external forces are negated, and only nationalist African achievements are valorized. By reviewing several of the most popular, as well as most critical and acclaimed scholars of world historical scholarship, I hope to demonstrate that the colonial biases of African negation [physical, historical, discursive] have not been as definitively swept aside as most would like to think, but instead continue to appear within the critical texts of even those scholars working to counter such biases. The numerous implications that arise from this investigation are both discursive and epistemological, and bear deeper consideration.

In this essay I look at what world historical analyses say about Africa, how Africa is incorporated into their schemas, what role the Continent and its societies are seen as playing, what the depth of historical investigation is, and which interpretive perspectives are privileged. I proceed then, with a close reading, from an East African perspective, of four leading world historical scholars from different disciplines, whose works have, to differing degrees, contributed to the very grounds of our contemporary historical understanding: Fernand Braudel, Andre Gunder Frank, Janet Abu-Lughod, and Eric Wolf. We will see that these authors take up debates with Western scholars, but ignore almost altogether important African and Pan-African contributions and debates that challenge the conventional historical record as well as aspects of the underlying Western epistemology itself. I focus on, but do not limit myself to East Africa, because I think it is a neglected but representative case whose broad outlines of era- sure and inclusion will be reminiscent of, but not identical to, other regions of the African continent.

I proceed below with some of the most powerful generalists of world history, a major Annales School historian, two major contributors to world systems debates, and an anthropologist writing world history — thus providing examples spanning twenty-five years and the four disciplines of history, sociology, anthropology, and the amalgam: world-systems theory. In each case, I focus on a particular major and influential text by the author, and look specifically at the position of Africa, or parts of the continent, in their analyses. All of these authors have included Africa to some degree in their work, although with the exception of Wolf, this is more in theory or terminology than the empirical core of their work. Each of the authors, at their time of writing, missed the bulk of relevant historical materials and debates on Africa and, therefore, failed to adequately place the continent or its parts within their broader projects.

I have chosen these authors in large part because, all faults aside, they provide necessary theoretical tools for the (re-)formulation of East African historiography that I undertake and participate in here and elsewhere. I begin with Braudel, because his writings were the earliest. In this way, we may see how the changing terms of academic discourse reveal discontinuities as well as continuities in the representations of Africa in world history.

Fernand Braudel’s major contributions to historiography over a period of several decades were both theoretical and empirical. I focus here on Braudel’s treatment of Africa, only briefly engaging his larger corpus of work. While scholars have criticized Braudel’s treatment and dismissal of Africa, most acknowledge his theoretical contributions, such as his notions of the long durée and his analysis of material civilizations. Some might protest that it is unfair to scrutinize Braudel on Africa, since that was not the core of his project, but it is precisely the peripheral role that Africa occupies in his work which helps to define his core project — the effacement of Africa is what makes Europe seem so central. Once again, discursive representations are relations, negation at one extreme means presence at the other. As Jacques Depelchin recently put it,

Braudel’s ideological slants do not appear until he ventures into geographical and historical areas outside his area of specialization, France and Western Europe. The excuse that Braudel was writing on matters about which he knew little only sidesteps the nature of the problem, which is how power relations are reproduced, generation after generation, through the production and reproduction of historical knowledge (1999: 159).

Many are familiar with Braudel’s problemat- ic and frankly racist statements concerning Africa, wherein distinctions between colonial sources and his own colonial exposition become deeply blurred. In Volume III of his magisterial Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, The Perspective of the World (1992[1979]), only 11 of his 650 pages are devoted directly to Africa. Speaking of West Africa’s shores as “mostly unhealthy,” he goes on to say of the “black people of the Congo,” that: “All in all, these were suppliers and customers whom it was easy to dupe, easy-going, sometimes lazy, “taking each day as it comes” (pp. 431-432). African economies were to Braudel “still primitive,” and one of his major goals, encapsulated in the section’s title: ‘Black Africa: Collaborator as well as Victim’? is to show that “Black Africans” share responsibility for the slave trade, and blame cannot fall “only” on Europeans.

It has to be said that if there was a traffic in human beings in Africa, it was undoubtedly because the Europeans desired and dictated it. But it is also true that Africa had already developed this bad habit long before the Europeans arrived, sending slaves to Islam, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Slavery was endemic in Africa, part of the structure of everyday life, within a social framework we can only wish we knew better. (pp. 435)

Such equalizations of entirely incommensurate social practices within the singular terminology of “slavery” are not only misleading but also endemic to much of Western historiography and its popular discourses. Rather than highlighting the distinctly brutal nature of Atlantic chattel slavery and its lack of relation to previous social practices of debt peonage and subordination in African societies and elsewhere, this uniquely violent set of social practices is universalized, so that Europe seems to be just another participant in events that were already taking place and would have no doubt continued to do so whether or not it had become involved. This should be an indication of the dangers inherent to an approach which constantly seeks to find “the middle path,” to see “both sides” of every issue, as if symmetry existed around all social issues, as opposed to the sort of asymmetries of power which critical scholars should be working to expose. Speaking of another of Braudel’s works, Depelchin similarly uncovered a [perhaps unintentional] ideological objective at play in his work: “Grammaire des Civilisations can be seen as Braudel’s translation of the French desire to continue to be seen as selfless civilizers,” (1999: 160).

Further underscoring his distinction between advanced “civilization” and a backward Africa, Braudel states: “Curiously, no black explorers
ever undertook any of the voyages across either the desert or the ocean that lay on their doorstep,” and a few lines later: “In these first encounters, the blacks did not even imagine that the whites lived or had any existence outside their boats” (1992: 434). However, African explorations and trade across both the Sahara and the Atlantic are well known, although the latter is less well accepted as yet in mainstream academia or popular Western discourses. Furthermore, both Abu-Lughod (1989) and Tibbets (1981), whose work she draws heavily upon, have shown that boats were common on African coasts, circumnavigating toward the west as far as North West Africa, even if they originated in East Africa, Arabia, and South Asia. While boats in this trade did not originate in Europe, African and Asian vessels did reach what later became Europe, but generally found it commercially uninteresting.

I want to focus here on Braudel’s even shorter (three paragraphs) treatment of East Africa. He begins the chapter by separating “White” from “Black Africa,” determined to focus on the latter, a move quite common then and still widespread today, albeit under the newer terminological guise of “sub-Saharan.” Feierman (1995: 43-45) recently critiqued this usage at length showing that it rests on assumptions of racial essences, and ultimately on the idea that only whiteness provides a society with the qualities of civilization and historical-motive force, whereas “black” cultures are represented as passive and inert. Having divided north (“White”) Africa from sub-Saharan (“Black”) Africa, Braudel proceeds to dismiss the significance of East Africa to his discussion with the following statement:

“Negroes” transshipped to Europe were “degenerate.” The ports of Malindi and Mombasa north of Mozambique were all but deserted and the few Portuguese families still residing there were “more barbarian than civilized”; their trade consisted of “the dispatch to Europe of a few degenerate Negroes, most of whom are good for nothing.” The message thus conveyed to the Russian government, which was looking for international outlets, was that this was not a promising spot. So we shall not lose a great deal by leaving aside the “Indian” side of southern Africa; its great days were by now over (pp. 430-431).

This speaks for itself. Source criticism is supposed to be a central element of critical historiography, so one has to wonder why and on what basis Braudel could assert that “we can on the whole accept the pessimistic conclusion” reached by this particular author in the late eighteenth century. The gold trade did not end, but ultimately expanded during the colonial period a century later. Malindi and Mombasa were not then and really never were deserted [except briefly in earlier centuries after destructive Portuguese raids], and thrive today in contradistinction to the report’s claims. Does Braudel expect the reader to “accept the pessimistic conclusion” that the “Negroes” transshipped to Europe were “degenerate” and “good for nothing”? Finally, his last statement is doubly problematic. He expects us to dismiss East Africa because “its great days were by now over,” which is itself not true. Yet, this is, not coincidentally, the only place where he acknowledges a “great” past in the region, just as the dismissal is complete. Perhaps this is somehow internally logical because this past was supposedly “Indian.”

These criticisms are not intended to slight the accomplishments of this great historian, but to call attention to the sorts of erasures that can be manifested in such broad and synthetic works. As Feierman points out, “Fernand Braudel, the great leader of the second-generation Annales historians, opened up the boundaries of historical space in a way that made it easier to understand Africa in world history,” (1995: 42). However, this promise has yet to be fully realized either in the subsequent works of Braudel himself or in the works of most Braudelian, third generation Annales scholars. This ‘opening up,’ of which Feierman speaks, is significant of course only in the already circumscribed field of Western and colonial discourse, which is hegemonic, but certainly not universal. We might even ask why Braudel did not partake of the, by then well-developed, Ibadan School’s contributions, and later the Dar tradition of historiography, coming out of Dar es Salaam? These sources were certainly available to him.

Delpelchin (1999), in a recent essay, went considerably further than Feierman in his critique of Braudel, and the discursive tendencies that he represents. Braudel’s apparent disissions of Africa function as affirmations of Europe, and he makes this explicit at several points in his work. This [unconscious?] relationality mirrors closely the “African presence” that Toni Morrison refers to in her brilliant essay, Playing in the Dark (1992), in which she maps a consistent literary and discursive racial relationality at the heart of U.S. literature and culture. Or as Delpelchin put it, at a somewhat more prosaic level of analysis, “By the time Europe took possession of colonial territories in Africa, they were no longer two separate entities. By then European economic wealth and political power were, at least in part, the result of Europe’s exploitation of the African continent” (op. cit.: 164).

Delpelchin’s critique of Braudel is a device to enter into critiques of Africanist historiography and Western historiography more generally. His aim is to uncover unconscious ideological investments that perpetuate contemporary structures of knowledge and power. His goal is to tackle the problem Edward Said posed, of unsettling the axiomatic discourses that govern our age by listening to the voices at the periphery of the system. Elsewhere in my own research, I have juxtaposed the hegemonic academic voices of Braudel, or Wolf, Abu-Lughod, and others discussed below, with those of Pan-African scholars, activists and ordinary people, and found that an entirely different orientation emerges, that was already well-established long before the world-historical writings reviewed here were ever published. In the first half of the twentieth century, scholars such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Carter G. Woodson, C. L. R. James, Drusilla Houston, and John Jackson had already rejected the colonial Arab-bias that said all accomplishments in East Africa were due to Arab influence, and had begun to explore what, in fact, were Africa’s and East Africa’s contributions to world history. What emerges, among other things, from this juxtapositioning, is that entirely different discursive and epistemological foundations based largely on race and racial identity or location, lay at the root of the differences in these scholarly communities. Of course, what Maghan Keita refers to as the hegemonic epistemology of the West (2000), rarely if ever engaged the largely extra-institu-

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tional Pan-African scholarship alluded to above, thus contributing to what I call an apartheid struc-
ture of knowledge in the West. In East Africa, African agency was finally asserted in the post-
colonial context of the 1960s and is now general-
ly accepted in the West, but the genealogy of this academic production is never, to my knowledge,
tied African and Pan-African scholars writing both before and after the Second World War. As
such, most Western scholarship continues to
strictly separate academics from activists or
socially-engaged historical figures in African
resistance movements. As Depelchin put it, in
more general, Jamesian terms:
It is doubtful that historians such as Braudel
and Feierman would acknowledge that, despite
the almost two centuries separating them, figures
such as Toussaint L'Ouverture and Patrice
Lumumba had in fact posed similar questions
concerning the histories of their people (op. cit.:
172-3).
As such, we can see that scholars such as
Braudel not only erased Africa from the historical
record, but also contributed to the discursive er-
asure of African and Pan-African scholarship, sim-
ply in their politics of citation and discursive
engagement. Writing mainly from the 50s to the
80s, encompassing the end of the period of High
Colonialism in Africa, it might not be surprising
to see Braudel partaking of well-established colo-
nial myths about Africa, or generally leaving
Africa at or beyond the very periphery of world
civilizations and histories. The same cannot be
said of the next three scholars reviewed, for they
were trained and/or wrote during the moment of
decolonization and global upheaval that charac-
terized the 1950s and especially the 1960s.
In discussing Andre Gunder Frank, I am not
concerned here with his earlier, well-known work
on dependency theory,11 but instead, with his
more recent work on a five thousand year world
system centered in Asia, in which European dom-
ninance and the capitalist mode of production are
but peripheral, recent (nineteenth century), and
possibly epiphenomenal aspects (Frank 1990,
1997, 1998; Frank and Gills 1993). I focus here
on the unpublished manuscript that he circulated
through Giovanni Arrighi to the Binghamton
University community. The version we read,
etitled East and West: Global Economy in the
Asian Age (1997), was slightly revised and later
published as Reorient: Global Economy in the
Asian Age (1998).
The titles of these works encapsulate his cen-
tral point, and one of my main objections.
Namely, the fact that while radically decentering
Europe in a generally productive if provocative
manner, Frank fails to redress, and therefore, inti-
mately colludes in the ongoing erasure of Africa
within the world system. Unlike most authors
who address world systems, Frank extends his
theorization backward in time further than almost
any other mainstream scholar has dared to. In so
doing, he illustrates the newness of capitalism
while, against his own previous positions, still
adopting Wolf’s dating of its inception at 1800.
Unfortunately, by centering Asia, he also
extends the erasure of African history further
back in time than most scholars have ventured.12
Ultimately, one is left feeling that his decentering
of Europe by centering Asia may recenter the
Eurocentric process of centering itself, rather
than suggesting multiple centers, collaborations,
mutual interests and support, or complexity
between and amidst regions, as is suggested by
Abu-Lughod for the pre-capitalist era.
The main attraction in his work is his radical
questioning of temporalizations of world-system
cal social and economic relations. His is the
only work of the four reviewed here, which pro-
vides an adequately broad framework for the
antiquesty of East African history that, contrary to
its widespread erasure, is among the richest and
oldest in the world. He raises numerous other
points of theoretical significance — such as the
provocative idea that Europe used its “American
money [silver, etc.] to buy itself a ticket on the
Asian train,” (p. 10) rather than the presumed sig-
nificance of the Atlantic in Europe’s rise to capi-
talist predominance — but these are not the con-
cern of this chapter.13
As for Africa, while at times he incorporates
the continent into his formulations and terminol-
y, as when he adopts Toynbee’s term “Afrasia,”
In general, his focus on Asia, and specifically
China, tends to eclipse almost entirely events in
Africa and their historical significance to the
world. One brief mention is made of the flow of
West Africa gold into the world system through
Cairo, but nothing more. “East African trade,” he
concludes, following the main bias of colonial
historiography, “as already stated in the Periplus
of the Erythrean Sea in Roman times, was pre-
dominantly oriented northward to the Fertile
Crescent and eastward across the Indian Ocean”
(chapter 2, pp. 15). This colonial reading of this
ancient text allows him to see East Africa as
peripheral to world centers of those times, and is
used to justify his exclusion of East Africa from
almost the entirety of his lengthy work. In work
elsewhere,14 I have discussed the general unrelia-
bility of the Periplus, and showed that multiple
readings of most important passages are possible.
It is a limited text, coming from a particular per-
spective and context, omitting much that its
author and her/his sources did not know, or did
not wish to popularize. Was East African trade
really oriented toward the author’s home areas, or
was that just a whimsical reflection of desire, a
lack of geopolitical knowledge, or a focus exclu-
sively on his local business pursuits?
I argue not only that Rome and the Fertile
Crescent may have been oriented toward East
Africa15 (or that they were all oriented toward
each other, without a clear dependency or uni-
directional flow as regards power, money, bene-
fit, and culture), but also that East Africa, partic-
ularly two thousand years ago, was oriented in
numerous other directions as well. The southern
Swahili coast, including Madagascar and the off-
shore islands, were a center in themselves, and
were also part of a cultural and economic flow
between present-day Indonesia (and environs)
and southern Africa, even before the Roman
empire (Shepherd 1982, 1984, Wilding 1987,
Allen 1993). Beyond this, the even more neglect-
ed dimension of East African orientation is its
connections with the interior regions of the con-
nent, which have been falsely and pervasively
imagined in colonial historiography as somehow
artificially cut off from the coast, the Indian
Ocean, the rest of the interior regions of Africa,
and the worlds beyond.16
There is another point in Frank’s work that is
of major significance to our discussion here.
Frank insists that:
The ‘world economy and system’ of
which Europe was the ‘Core’ in the
sense that Braudel (1992), Wallerstein
(1974), and others including Frank
(1967, 1978) [conceptualized it], was
itself only a minor and for a long time
still quite marginal part of the real
world economy as a whole (chapter 1,
p. 4).
Such a generalized decentering of Europe in
world history, particularly from the point of view
of a longer time frame, suggests much for particu-
lar historical moments and their interpretations.
On the next page, Frank concludes that: “in no
way were sixteenth-century Portugal, the seven-
teenth-century Netherlands or eighteenth-century
Britain ‘hegemonic’ in world economic terms.
Nor in political ones. None of the above!” (pp.
5).
This radical insight is crucial for and exam-
plary of most of Africa and Asia from the fif-
teenth to the eighteenth centuries, and goes
against the assumption by many other historiog-
rappers that Europe has been central since the fif-
teenth or sixteenth centuries, or in some cases
even further back, since Rome and Greece. Some
of the most important and critical scholarship
lapses into the former assumptions (Abu-Lughod
1989, 1993, discussed below), while others lapse
further, into erasure of Africa and more systemat-
ic centerings of Europe (Braudel 1981, 1992;
Biermann and Campbell 1989).17 As significant
and insightful as the work of these and other
scholars may be, they too often buy into the
assumption, either directly or by implication, that
upon rounding the Cape of Good Hope under
Vasco da Gama in 1498, the Portuguese immedi-
ately ushered in a period of uninterrupted
European hegemony over East Africa and the
Indian Ocean.18 This aspect of Frank’s theory is
very useful then, in arguing that capitalist or other
externally based hegemonies did not arise on
[parts of the] East African coast until the nine-
teenth century. Scholars in several disciplines
have argued that East Africa was not implicated
in externally-based hegemonies (European, Arab,
or South Asian) until relatively late in the modern
era (Salim 1973, Wallerstein 1978, 1989, Cooper
Janet Abu-Lughod, in *Before European Hegemony* (1989), contributed what many right-fully regard as the major work on pre-European world-systemic organization, focusing on the thirteenth century — the thirteenth century, because of the lull at this juncture which was partially responsible for Europe’s subsequent and gradual conquest of the world’s systems. Like Frank, she includes Africa in what amounts to her own, brilliant theoretical reconstruction, but then proceeds in the body of her work to eclipse Africa both in actual coverage of the continent generally, and in several major specific omissions.

Abu-Lughod does go into more of the history of the African territories and their connections to world economies and cultures than had either Braudel or Frank. However, in several respects she too omits African history in her model. On the one hand, I point out places where she failed to incorporate African cultural and economic centers into her archipelagos of the world system (Timbuktu, Mali, Songhay; other West African cities, states and empires; Axum; Sudan; Central Africa; Swahili and Eastern Africa; the Southern Swahili of Madagascar, the Comoros, Mozambique, and adjacent islands). On the other hand, there are also instances where it is the way itself in which African history is incorporated into the narrative that erases and flattens history, such as when she refers to African cities as “Arab” (Abu Lughod 1989: 243).

Her scholarship has had a major influence on my thinking, and is bristling with theoretical insights and provocative hypotheses in need of further investigation. The critique that follows is, therefore, respectfully intended to contribute in an Abu-Lughodian fashion to spatially and temporally extending and even reorienting her thesis of thirteenth-century world systemic interactions. Abu-Lughod consistently omits East Africa from her work and her model of the world, even though the region asserts itself several times throughout her work, always on the periphery and fleetingly. Ultimately, these slippages lead her back into the Eurocentrism her work otherwise so boldly confronts.

In many respects, and particularly in certain sections, her work might be said to center Islamic Arabia too much, even though some of this is due to the time frame of her study.19 The tension that orientes Abu-Lughod’s understanding of ancient world systems is between Europe and Asia, and this is referred to repeatedly. I would suggest, instead, that this is attempting to place Europe backward in time before its actual existence, and ignores Frank’s suggestion, that “Europe” such as it was at this time [not a coherent or self-imagined entity], was deeply peripheral to the rest of the world. Abu-Lughod does acknowledge this European marginality in her introduction and elsewhere, but then contradicts it, seeming to suggest that the continuous tension and relation orienting the ancient world was between Europe and Asia, from Roman times to the fifteenth century. Why were the major tensions not internal to Asia, between and or among its three major circuits? More germane to this chapter, why was Africa not seen as being central to the ancient world, and should we not speak of African and Asian relations of many varied and changing sorts, and even as the forces that were central in driving and defining ancient world connections for several millennia, perhaps all the way into the nineteenth century?

As intimated above, throughout her work she continually reinforces the assumption — never demonstrated — that the Portuguese gained immediate dominance throughout the Indian Ocean almost immediately upon their arrival there in 1498, ushering in the seamless age of European hegemony from that time presumably until now.20 Since the arrival of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean is one of the primary points marking the end of her study, it seems that this may have lead Abu-Lughod to over-explain the Portuguese. Her work is constructed as a response against world-systems theories that center Europe by starting with the rise of Europe, implying, therefore, that Europe was the only civilizing capable of world systems. Therefore, she demonstrates a pre-European world system in the thirteenth century, with variably ancient roots, and is then left to explain why Europe rose *when* and *how* it did. This may contribute to explaining, at least in part, why the automatic assumption of power by the Portuguese became so necessary.21 They were to have been filling a vacuum left by the decline or collapse, from internal pressures, of the previous world systems.

In the introduction, Abu-Lughod reveals the important position taken by Tibbets (1981), that much like Columbus in the Atlantic, Vasco da Gama had not really “discovered” East Africa and India. Instead, Africans and Asians had, in fact, already sailed in the reverse direction and “discovered” or connected the long way to the Mediterranean and North Atlantic (Abu Lughod 1989: 19).22 However, in the next paragraph, she begins: “Nevertheless, Arab and Indian vessels proved no match for the Portuguese ‘men-of-war’ that appeared in their waters in the early 1500s.” (ibid.) This point is far from the truth, as I detail below. However, I do agree when Abu-Lughod then argues that Portuguese expansion into the Indian Ocean was an important element in the rise of the West, pushing the dates back further than either Braudel or Wallerstein, and ultimately focusing on the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries as a period of transition in which: “geopolitical factors within the rest of the world system created an opportunity without which Europe’s rise would have been unlikely” (1989: 20).

Further on, making a brilliant point about a “shift to the south” in Asian trade routes, — from Persian Gulf to Red Sea routes — she states: “The shift to the south reshaped the world system that persisted into the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and that, once the Portuguese made their end run around Africa, ultimately was transformed into a Eurocentered one” (pp. 147). Yet, we must ask: why are we to assume that the world system in the Indian, Arabian, and East African regions was instantly subject to the Eurocentered world at this point, or even that the world was yet anywhere European centered? Yes, genocides and their accompanying influxes of capital into Europe had begun, but when exactly did Europe emerge as the new center of a new capitalist system? Interestingly also, her southern hypothesis correlates precisely with events on the East African coast as far south as Madagascar and Mozambique.

Salim (1992) speaks of the “Golden Age” or efflorescence of trade and wealth from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, which corresponds in part to the increased trade that this southern shift, to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, might have brought to East Africa, via Omani, Swahili, Somali, and Indian merchants. He also recounts the trade in Kilwa, centered on the lucrative Sofala gold mines, “which it had wrested from Mogadishu in the late 1200s or early 1300s” (p. 750).23 What this indicates is that East Africa and the rest of the world system that Abu-Lughod describes were not only connected, but may have been mutually determining in a multi-directional relationship. East Africa, affected by numerous other relations with the interior regions of the continent, may have boomed when other regions did not, and even spread wealth and prosperity outward. In this period, its efflorescence *did*, in fact, correspond with events throughout the wider world system. These relations could and should be traced out for earlier periods as well, as scholars such as Wilding (1987) have already begun to do.

Nevertheless, in the time period under her consideration, Abu-Lughod speaks of “an enormous vacuum” in world-systemic power that the Portuguese later “filled with their own brute firepower” (1989: 259). This “vacuum of power” is later also referred to more generally as a “vacuum of power in the Indian Ocean” (1989: 361). Abu-Lughod also speaks of the “sudden and frightening appearance at the end of fifteenth century,” of the Portuguese (1989: 272). These facts are contradicted in writings by scholars of East African historiography, such as Salim (1973, 1992), Sheriff (1976, 1981), Allen (1976, 1993), and Wilding (1987), the latter of whom in particular highlights the incessant inability of European boats to maneuver against the *dhows*, *majahazi*, and *maingalawa* of the East African coast. The local, Indonesian, and Arab vessels had no keel and exceptionally little draught, and were thus capable of accessing extremely shallow regions. Coupled with superior local tidal and geographic knowledge, and the ability of [lateen rigged] *dhows* to run downwind [in open waters] with almost double the sail area and thus speed of typical Western vessels, East African craft were constrained only in the tightness with which they could tack, and in their onboard cannon firepower.

Several years before Abu-Lughod, Eric Wolf
contributed his *Europe and the People Without History* (1982), a richly synthetic historiography aimed at countering Eurocentric world histories. Yet, amidst his sensitive and rich account, there are major slippages into colonial historiographic practices and myths of exactly the same type he successfully seeks to avoid otherwise. It is perhaps more significant that Africa and its histories are still being profoundly and passingly erased even in some of the most successful and progressive mainstream and generalist literature, than the fact that outwardly colonial perspectives themselves are published and cited in contemporary times.

Like Abu-Lughod, but several years earlier, Wolf identifies three major trading and contact routes across the Old World, the third of which “involved portage across the Isthmus of Suez and maritime transport through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to East Africa and India beyond” (p. 31). This third route is most important to my consideration of East Africa’s place within world-systemic cultural and economic forces. However, in description of these routes, as in the title of the book, Europe is still at the center of history, of the world, of motive force itself. As in Abu-Lughod, trade traverses the Old World in three major routes only to converge on Europe. Never is the possibility of “South-South” trade raised, the idea of India and Africa for example trading without concern for peripheral Europe.

Wolf begins his placement of East Africa admirably by locating it in a “network of overland routes and sea-lanes” from well before 1400. A good cultural anthropologist, Wolf also astutely goes against the prevailing notion that the East African coast was entirely cut off from the interior or regions. Unfortunately, he retains the prevalent notion of colonial and Arab-Omani (nineteenth-century) historiographies that interpret all coastal settlement and commerce as Arabian in nature, and/or otherwise externally based. Coastal entrepots are called “Arab trading posts” and are seen as going back, as such, until at least the tenth century, while Zanzibar is also seen as settled by “Arabs” rather than or in addition to Africans (pp. 41-42). The interior is framed as Bantu-speaking, and “the Bantu migration” theory is briefly revisited. Some have critiqued this version of Bantu expansion theory because it implies that the majority of “sub-Saharan” Africans were themselves recent arrivals and, therefore, that colonial displacements were not that unfounded. My issue here concerns his omission of numerous pastoralist and specialist populations (“hunter-gatherers,” iron smelters, well diggers, etc.), which is all the more remarkable due to the fact that elsewhere Wolf is among the most admirable of world historians in correcting agricultural/civilo-centric biases.

A further irony is reproduced in the next page, where Wolf discusses the ruins of Great Zimbabwe and the gold-mining and trading societies that existed between the Limpopo and Zambezi Rivers. Concerning the book’s title, *Europe and the People Without History*, scholars have wondered if this work restored the latter’s history or naturalized its absence, and most agree that while expanding the boundaries of world history, the perspectival centering of Europe is nevertheless reinforced. For example, Wolf asserts a new relationality to world history and anthropology, and concludes: “Nor can one understand Europe without a grasp of the role Africa played in its development and expansion,” (p. 231). However, the copper and gold mining map illustration on p. 43 is entitled “Prehistoric mining in eastern Africa” and one is left to wonder why this was “pre-historic. This is the sort of slippage that holds back the broader reconstructive attempts of Wolf’s immense work.

There can be no question that Wolf incorporates African specificities into his conception of world history more than most other scholars, particularly those reviewed here. The problem is in the different ways in which this incorporation takes place, and the fact that it does not always go far enough. Most of his material is derived from colonial sources which had, by that time, started to come under sustained (mostly African) critique for their biases. This is the more ironic given that Wolf is straightforward in stating that “a history written by slavers and their beneficiaries has long obliterated the African past, portraying Africans as savages whom only the Europeans brought into the light of civilization” (p. 229). Yet, he does not ground the rewriting of colonial histories “written by slavers and their beneficiaries” in African social agency and movements, nor in African and anti-colonial scholarship. Contrary to Wolf, I suggest that movements for formal political decolonization of African nations in the Fifties and Sixties coincided with the resurgence of a vast movement still working to decolonize African historiography and knowledge itself.

To his credit, Wolf does not assume Portuguese dominance in the Indian Ocean after 1498, and even posits Portuguese dependence on East African gold for its mercantilist enterprises in the spice trade elsewhere in Asia, (p. 44). Yet, his discussion of ivory and the escalation of its use for luxury and industrial products in the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries bears no citation, failing to note the works of Du Bois (1965[1946]) or Sheriff (1976, 1987) in this regard. Instead, Wolf characterizes “the Asian seas” as “the domain of hegemonic Islam,” which helps explain why he continually reverts to seeing East African ports as Arab outposts and trading posts, (pp. 233-234).

Similarly, this allows Wolf’s subsequent discussion and assessment of the spice trade as a purely Asian and not African phenomenon, an error and erasure common to much of Western scholarship. James de vere Allen’s (1993) provocative thesis regarding cinnamon and frankincense trades from and/or through East Africa to world markets from antiquity until the rise of Europe, has yet to be engaged by historians. The centrality of Zanzibar in world clove and other spice production is, of course, well known, but often this offshore island is still seen as an extension of Asia rather than part of Africa’s productive base. Wolf’s explanation of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Portuguese competition with Venice for dominance in the spice trade, centering on pepper, ginger and other spices, returns to a centering of globally peripheral agencies in his narrative.

Wolf’s slippages, in his otherwise brilliant intervention, are finally underscored in the end map (pp. 506-507), which shows shaded “Core Areas” as “Regions of Growth and Civilization,” in “The Old World.” Mediterranean (North African and southern European), Indian, Chinese, and Southeast Asian regions are shaded in as “core regions” and the entirety of Africa is excluded, other than the coastal Mediterranean strip. This map reveals that although Wolf includes West African gold-trading civilizations in his analysis, as well as Great Zimbabwe, and numerous East African polities, these still slip back off the map of civilized and core areas. In this regard, Wolf’s work can be seen as an historical piece, beginning a movement away from Eurocentric perspectives, but which is ultimately still unable to fully extricate itself from this web of discourses.

Conclusions
A few general conclusions may be drawn from the preceding analysis. First, in constructing world historical narratives, scholars must guard against the very Eurocentrism they so often overtly resist. The centering of Europe and its epistemology can happen at many levels, some of them unintended and unconscious, yet nonetheless, very real in their discursive and political effects. Second, we see here a warning against complacency within progressive scholarship to these sorts of issues. Walter Rodney called our attention to this in one of his lesser known essays, ironically delivered as a speech at the Braudel Center at SUNY Binghamton shortly before his assassination in Guyana (1981). In his essay, Rodney analyzed the subtle and discursive ways in which Marxist and other progressive or liberal historiographic accounts of Guyanese history shared many assumptions with the very colonial historiographies they openly opposed and attempted to differentiate themselves from. Another issue which emerges in this context is the fact that many non-Western, or African-Diasporic/Pan-African [thus marginalized] scholars did not make many of the mistakes exhibited in contemporaneous and later world systems scholarship, a point I explore in greater depth elsewhere. This also suggests connections between the production of knowledge and the subjectivity or lived experiences of those producing it. This suggests a [largely] hidden racial component in Western theoretical formulations, or as Maghan Keita recently put it, a divergence between hegemonic and marginal epistemologies (2000). I would argue that the rewriting of
African history and world history with greater appreciation of African sources and Pan-African perspectives, and attentive to the residual effects of colonialism in the discourses and epistemologies of modernity may in fact have a destabilizing effect on hegemonic thought structures throughout-the-world, especially in the West, where a notion of Africa as inferior still seems discursively necessary to the formation of [superior] Western subjectivities and identities. It is my hope that this essay has made a contribution in that general direction.

ENDNOTES

1. This is the general perspective of M. N. Pearson (1998), for example, as well as Biermann and Campbell (1989) before him, who make much the same argument.

2. Before going ahead with the critique of his later work, it should be acknowledged that in his earlier work on the Mediterranean (1972), he credits West Africa as the source of the world’s gold supply, even though this is played down. See also A. G. Hopkins (1973), and E. W. Bovill (1932, 1938).

3. Thanks to Kelvin Santiago for pointing out that this formulation relates directly to an entire genre of seeing Africa as the “white man’s grave” as revealed in C. Miller (1985) and Pratfingher (1988). The overt racism of the succeeding passage needs no comment. It is a well-known structure of racism throughout the modern era to use tropes of disease and illness for racialized subjects, whether Jews as the internal Other of Europe, or Africans and the Tropics themselves as places of disease and danger for white men outside Europe.

4. The tendency to universalize different types of servitude under the label of slavery, in such a way that it equates and, therefore, diminishes the brutal uniqueness of European chattel slavery, has been critiqued by many scholars. The following is an excerpt from Du Bois writing in 1946, who quotes Napoleon Bonaparte at length showing that this distinction was made by Europeans themselves in the early nineteenth century, and probably openly used by them: “Slavery has never been in the African. The customs in this respect have remained the same as in the Holy Scriptures; the servant marries with the master. In Europe, on the contrary, were the imprint of the seal of slavery remained always in the last rank...” (1965/1946: 193-194). Thirty years earlier, Du Bois had stated: “When we speak of modern African slavery we think of modern slavery as a survival of ancient slavery. But it was not such. In the early years of the nineteenth century, the two were absolute. Modern African slavery was the beginning of the modern labor problem... Modern world commerce, modern imperialism, the modern factory system and the modern labor problem began with the African slave trade.” (1917: 653).

5. This argument logically leads, by extension, to the other end (female) of the African chattel slavery, namely its abolition, and mention should be made of the way in which Europe is further recuperated in many discourses, such as the one we see here in Braudel, so that it appears as if Europe and Europeans were the only ones to civilizations or nations across flippan
discussions of Eastern Africa on a regular basis, in what seems to fol-

7. While studying East African history and constantly scouring sources for information, one comes across flippant dis-

10. More work remains to be done on this later genera-
tion of scholars and the residual limitations of their perspec-
tives, some of which are unfortunately in keeping with the bias-
s of Braudel, particularly the contributions of Chaurin, Chaudhuri (1989), and Campion (1990). Some of this criticism is aimed at看見

11. A number of African and Africanist scholars not only contributed to, but also helped define dependency theory throughout the Seventies, including Rodney (1972), Brett (1973), Leys (1975), Shivji (1976), and Siball (1976).

12. Actually, most Western scholars, by starting African history at the onset of European contact, also erased Africa infi-
nitely from the past. Here we go back to the world history o-

ter over five thousand years, and ignoring Africa in doing so, Fran
era acknowledges, in a more specific way than others have.


16. Actually, most Western scholars, by starting African history at the onset of European contact, also erased Africa infi-
nitely from the past. Here we go back to the world history o-

ter over five thousand years, and ignoring Africa in doing so, Fran
era acknowledges, in a more specific way than others have.

18. Eric Wolf (1982) is unusual among these authors, in that he does not do this, but rather assumes a more modern Portuguese hegemony with an equally problematic if widespread notion of “Islamic hegemony”, which I critique below.

20. It should be noted that Immanuel Wallerstein, anoth-
er prominent world systems theorist and one of its primary interlocutors, does not fall into this trap, stating: “The modes of trade in the Indian Ocean arena did not seem to change very much in the period between 1500 and 1800. The intrusion first of the Portuguese and later of the Dutch further eroded the world-systemic structure of the Indian Ocean trade that existed earlier...” (1972: 16). This then serves later as a driving force that acted on an empty world, when, in fact, its quick growth and certain of its forms also grew out of extant world systems and cultures, particularly in regions surrounding Mecca and Medina. This is why, following Frank and others, a longer approach is impor-
tant, so that events of the last millennium may be situated in their larger contexts. Importantly, many regions where instanta-
aneous Islamic contact [during or right after the life of the Prophet Muhammad] and even dominance is now claimed, has has not been claimed for centuries, were in fact independent of Islam for most of its first millennium of existence, and these are recent reinterpretations. On the other hand, where Islam or sim-
ply its adherents did in fact spread so quickly throughout the world in the seventh century, this attests to the preexistence of world systems of contacts before the new world was born. It allows us to imagine a new culture to mobilize. Islam’s rapid rise, itself, then attests to and traces the existence of more ancient world systems and contacts, and should not be our beginning point in questions of world systems.

21. This phenomenon of colonial historiography [assum-
ing automatic Portuguese hegemony in East Africa] is also widespread, taken as by a given number of scholars, particular-
ly those not familiar with the details of coastal historiography, and thus further explains the context for Abu Lugho’s approach.

22. Tibbetts is actually representing the widely-known

23. More about this will be presented below. Salim, in
this article (1992), contributes to a vast body of literature which

25
presents the more complex picture of Portuguese attempts to gain and hold footholds in East Africa, its general failure, as well as the constantly shifting alliances Portugal made with Malindi and Mombasa, or Kilwa and Sofala in order to hold them. He also echoes Abu-Lughod’s reference to Muslim circumnavigation of Africa, in that the Maghribi the Portuguese had learnt that Arab Muslims had travelled by sea to Eastern Africa and that Africa could therefore be circumvented, the Muslims checkmated and their commerce taken over.  

24 In another context, colonial America, Vine Deloria (1997) has recently confronted the Biermann Straights migration hypothesis of American settlement on almost exactly the same grounds, claiming that there is no scientifically-validated evidence to support this myth, which is so pervasive for obviously ideologically-logical reasons of similarly white-settler colonial provenance.  

25 On this bias, from Biblical until modern times, see Horowitz and Little (1987).  

26 Extensive use is made, for example, of H. Nevsile Chittick’s work and that of G. S. Freeman-Greene, Robert Rotberg, Roland Oliver, and J. D. Fage. (pp. 396-7).  

27 “When the Portuguese attempted to expand their beachhead in China by force in 1521, they were decisively ______.  

The World in the Age of Philip II: Capitalism: 15th-18th Century


West and East: Global Economy in the Asian Age, unpublished manuscript shared with professor Arrighi and his class at SUNY Binghampton, Spring 1997. [Later published as Reorient, below]  


Horton, Mark. “Closing the Corridor: Archaeological and Architectural Evidence for Emerging Swahili Regional Autonomy,” in David J. Parkin (ed.), Continuit  


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BOOK REVIEWS on African History


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A lament that repeatedly comes across in contemporary policy studies on higher education is that top professors in almost all disciplines spend too much time doing research on increasingly narrow, specialized topics, denying to the undergraduate student and the general reader the benefit of their erudition regarding the broader themes of their disciplines. Such is not the case of Robert Collins, Professor Emeritus of African History at the University of California at Santa Barbara and a distinguished expert on the history of the Southern Sudan. Collins’ wide variety of publications, including this Short History, stands as proof of his capacity to write insightfully—over a career spanning more than forty-five years—on general as well as highly specialized topics.

Professor Collins established his reputation with The Southern Sudan 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control (1962), his revised Yale PhD dissertation, and reaffirmed it with Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1936 (1983). Alone or with collaborators, Collins has also written or compiled a number of volumes intended for undergraduate survey courses in African history, particularly his Problems in African History: The Precolonial Centuries, now in its third edition.

Professor Collins must have had his “Problems...” book in mind when structuring the present volume. He presents the history of Africa coherently—from the dawn of humankind to the present—in only 232 pages, alternating between detailed descriptions of key issues, followed by broad generalizations that lead to more rounds of detailed descriptions, and then more generalizations. This recurring pattern begins with a short Introduction and runs through six chapters covering (i) “Prehistoric Africa”; (ii) “Ancient and Medieval Africa”; (iii) “Islam, Trade, and States”; (iv) “Europeans, Slavery, and the Slave Trade”; (v) “European Conquest and Colonization of Sub-Saharan Africa”; and (vi) “Independent Africa.”

The Introduction and Chapter 1 argue strongly for the legitimacy of historical writing about non-literate peoples. Deftly employed techniques of oral tradition gathering and interpretation, Collins argues, along with use of the written record, when available, and the inputs of anthropology, archaeology, and linguistics will reveal the rich cultural heritage of Africans and its evolution over time. Africa, adds Collins, is the mother both of continents and of humanity. He familiarizes the reader with the geography, the climate, and the main physical features of the continent and concludes the chapter with a brief description of the origins of animal husbandry, agriculture, and iron smelting in Africa. Regarding the latter, Collins cites the probable Anatolian origins of iron smelting while specifying that “there is evidence from East and West Africa of independent development of iron working” (17).

Chapter 2 is particularly detailed with regard to the histories of ancient Egypt and Kush, referring to the latter as the “corridor to Africa” (25). Collins is careful to point out the separateness of Egypt and Kush/Nubia, particularly from a linguistic point of view, but also their history of penetration. At the same time, he underlines the African-ness of Egypt.

In Chapter 3, the longest chapter, Collins outlines the rise and fall of representative and mostly first generation African state-systems. He begins with the western Sudanic states of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and Kanem-Bornu and then shifts over to the Swahili city-states of the East African coast, stressing the formative roles of agriculture, long-distance trade, and Islam. Surprisingly, he makes no mention of the Hausa states in this context. He compares the Niger Delta trading states with the Swahili city-states. Next, in rapid succession, Collins describes the origins of Cwezi, Hima, and Bito state-building activities in the interior of East Africa and state-formation in the West African forest zone, underlining the origins of Oyo, Benin, and Ashanti. Then, shifting back to South Central Africa, he introduces the Luba, the Lunda, and the Lozi state formations, as well as Kongo, Ndongo, Mapungubwe, Zimbabwe, and Mutapa.

Chapter 4 concentrates on the Portuguese, the first (modern) Europeans to involve themselves in Sub-Saharan Africa. Collins evokes the importance of the early Portuguese exploration expeditions and the Portuguese importation into Africa of such American food crops as cassava and Indian corn, the adoption of which initiated Africa’s first “green revolution.” Because the Portuguese also inaugurated the Atlantic slave trade, Collins devotes the rest of this chapter to a comprehensive examination both of slavery in Africa and of the slave trade from Africa to Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Indian Ocean islands, and within Africa itself.

In Chapter 5, Collins explains the sudden late Nineteenth Century European partition of Africa and imposition of colonial rule throughout the continent as the result of the decisive convergence of a set of disparate trends and events. These included the Eighteenth Century Evangelical movement in Great Britain, the gathering British-led European crusade against slavery, and the contradictions of European stimulated “legitimate commerce” in Nineteenth Century Africa, European technological and medical advances, the colonial greediness of King Leopold II of Belgium, and late Nineteenth Century European power politics. Collins explains the equally sudden collapse of colonial rule with reference to the devastating effects in Europe of the two Twentieth Century world wars, the educational and material advances resulting from colonialism in parts of Africa, and the opposition of the Africans themselves to colonial rule—often expressed in the rhetoric of European nationalism. Collins views South African apartheid as a form of internal colonialism that did not end until after 1990.

Although the final chapter on post-colonial Africa must, per force, evoke the problems of poverty, economic stagnation, mismanagement, military coups d’état, civil wars, ethnic cleansing, environmental degradation, and neo-colonialism, Collins ends on a note of optimism evoking “more than twenty” African countries that “have quietly and purposefully improved the lives of their citizens” (231).

Professor Collins has written an extremely perceptive introduction to the principal themes of African history. Africa: A Short History will serve as an excellent basic textbook for use in the sorts of one-semester surveys of African history and civilization that are frequently offered in American community colleges and in the lower division general education components of many four-year colleges. It should, however, be supplemented with a volume of collateral readings of the kind that Collins and his collaborators have themselves produced, plus a few Internet links. Students wishing to read further will find many of the standard works on African history listed in the “Selected Readings” section that concludes the volume.

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“…every city is unique. Is there any point in generalizing about African cities...?" This thought opens the concluding chapter of The History of African Cities South of the Sahara. Perhaps no one today is better qualified to answer the question than Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, the doyenne of African urban history, as no single researcher has visited more African cities than she. The resulting historical survey, first published in 1993, is now available in English translation. The text has been updated and the bibliography augmented to include major English titles: both fundamental sources and recent research.

The author begins by addressing the perennially thorny issue of what constitutes a city, a question of importance to geographers, sociologists and archaeologists as well as to historians. Are archaeological sites the remains of rural or urban settlements? Which of the “villages” and “camps” encountered in African historical sources should be considered as towns and cities? Coquery-Vidrovitch argues that, with few exceptions, cities are part of all of Africa’s history: “there are forms of urbanization adapted to each era and every set of socioeconomic features.” Moreover, the imposition of colonial rule in no way marks the great rupture postulated in classical Africanist historiography. With colonization, cities and urbanization changed, but Africans have never been “strangers to the city.”

One of Coquery-Vidrovitch’s propositions, the use of the adjective “ancient” to designate Africa’s pre-colonial cities, has significant repercussions for methodology and for the teaching of African history generally. While she does not make the argument explicitly, what is implied is that researchers approach historic African cities with the same methods used for the study of ancient cities elsewhere, in the classical world for instance, with due consideration given to archaeology and legends. In particular, based on an analysis of the terms used to designate urban settlements in various African languages, the author proposes that ancient African cities were polities; many of the terms designate at the same time the settlement, its citizens and/or the political system.

All things considered, these conceptions approach that of the city-state, or polis, of ancient Greece. This new conception of the African political system is shared by a number of other researchers, Jean Schmitz and Tarikhu Farrar in particular.

Theoretical issues aside, Coquery-Vidrovitch is at pains to emphasize the great complexity of the phenomenon under study. While the book is about cities, it is also about urbanization as a process, a political, economic, social and cultural process. The author proposes a periodization of urbanization on the continent (ancient, Islamic contact, European contact, colonization), rather than a typology of cities. The nineteenth century urban revolution, which is one of her own contributions to the field, is given great coverage. This may also be due in part to the proportionately larger number of textual sources for this period as compared to earlier ones.

The organization of the book is not linear; within the broad periodization adopted, cities from one end of the continent to the other are invoked as needed. Case studies are used throughout in order to illustrate the issues under discussion. Population estimates of historic cities are given wherever available, with due consideration for the often uncertain nature of these figures.

Both the political and economic contexts of urbanization are emphasized. Types of states and state structures are discussed and it is seen how pastoral as well as agrarian activities have sustained urban populations. Local craft production and trade routes are also seen as constants of urbanization across the continent. Moreover, this urbanization process is situated within a much wider global process, that of the transition from tributary systems to insertion within the mercantile capitalist system. This insertion, it is argued, occurred long before the imposition of colonial rule in the late nineteenth century and it had already partially transformed cities and urbanization.

Yet macro-level political economy is not the whole story. In Africa as elsewhere the city is seen as a “cultural mediator.” The themes of cosmopolitanism, creolization, encounters, exchanges, synthesis, and the diffusion of ideas, know-how and modes of production run through the book. At the micro, or local, scale this is developed, among other ways, through a discussion of architecture, building materials and techniques, and urban design.

Coquery-Vidrovitch’s historical survey of urbanization in Africa constitutes a welcome contribution to the urban history curriculum as up until now sub-Saharan Africa has rarely made an appearance. Indeed, the existence of cities in Africa south of the Sahara prior to colonization is mostly dismissed in the classic works on urban history by Mumford and Bairoch. Only recently, after a couple of conferences brought together several hundred researchers of the phenomenon, has Africa’s urban history been the object of academic publication in English. Significantly, it is Catherine Coquery-Vodrovitch who wrote the introduction to both of these edited volumes (Africa’s Urban Past, ed. Anderson and Rathbome, 2000; and African Urban Spaces in Historical Perspective, ed. Salm and Fafola, 2005).

The History of African Cities South of the Sahara has been selected for a Choice award for outstanding academic titles by the Association of College and Research Libraries.
exclusively from the Tutsi ethnic group (about one-tenth of the population) who ruled over the mainly peasant-farming Hutu, from whom they exacted taxes and labor services.

Uprisings against the German intruders were common before 1900. The major revolts were the Abushiri’s uprising (1888-1890), the Uziguza revolt (1890), the Nguru revolt (1891), the Nyamwezi rebellions (1892-1894), and the Hehe resistance (1891-1898). These uprisings were not based on a sense of shared ethnicity or nationality, but rather on multiple grievances against the new German rulers: new taxes, disrespect for Islam, disregard for sovereign African polities, and generally brutal behavior. While the Nyamwezi and Hehe were ethnically-based and highly-organized African states, they had no rituals, myths, or institutions creating a national allegiance. In their campaigns and punitive expeditions, German commanders exploited the rivalries between ethnic groups and used them to pit certain groups against others, rewarding them with money, land, or privileges. Paramount chiefs who acknowledged German suzerainty were confirmed in office and ruled as representatives of the German government whereas in Burundi, Rwanda, and Bukoba German government representatives became “residents” (advisors) to the kings who kept control over the administration of their state. The main task of the chiefs outside the kingdoms was to collect a hut tax, organize a workforce for German plantations, and muster workers for road construction projects or the cultivation of new crops. The collection of taxes after 1900 resulted in a dramatic deterioration in the living conditions of the rural populations, who could only meet their tax obligations by selling off assets (mostly livestock) or working at back-breaking jobs.

While the uprisings in the colony between 1900 and 1905 were often confined to single ethnic groups organized into autonomous states, while reasserting their traditional independence against German claims to suzerainty, the Maji Maji uprising that began in the Rufiji River Valley in July 1905, was a new form of resistance to colonial rule: it was mass movement of protest against the hut tax, forced labor on roads and plantations, and autocratic local officials that spread swiftly across dozens of ethnic groups in the southern third of the colony. Using religious rather than national belief as a unifying force, Bantu-speakers attacked not only Germans and other Europeans, but also Arab, Indian, and Swahili traders and government agents who had infiltrated their lands under the aegis of German sovereignty. The uprising began among the Matumbi, a stateless people without a traditional structure of centralized leadership, to regain their independence and to resist the forced cultivation of cotton. The Matumbi rubbed holy water (maji) from the prophet Kinjikitile onto their bodies (which they believed made them invulnerable to German bullets) and then destroyed German plantations and forts. Within weeks, the Ngindo, Makonde, Ngoni, and other groups joined the revolt, but the Hehe and many of the groups who resisted the Germans in the 1890s did not. By July 1907, the revolt was put down in a scorched-earth policy that devastated the southern half of the colony and depopulated large areas of it. An estimated 300,000 Bantu-speaking Africans were killed.

Other rebellions followed (e.g., the Turu Rebellion of 1908, the Chagga uprising of 1909), but none of the anti-colonial uprisings from 1889 to 1914 were framed within the language and ideas of nationalism. Instead, they were local movements of resistance to direct exploitation and to German cultural, political, and economic incursions. Germans were, in fact, reluctant to educate native Africans in more than the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic needed for working in the colonial economy, for fear that education would make Africans presumptuous, give them notions of equality with Europeans, and give them a common language (German) which could unite them across linguistic and ethnic lines against the German Reich and create a modern nationalist movement. In the belief that the power of Europeans was based on their literacy and numeracy, starting in 1907, local chiefs and sultans set up schools to educate Africans, and while these independent schools often aimed to improve African’s positions in the colonial hierarchy, they also educated future national leaders.

Tanganyikan nationalists, in the process of creating national myths and the process of nationalism in the 1950s and later, argued that the Maji-Maji rebellion was the first inkling of Tanganyikan nationalism. Later historians have challenged this view, claiming that the rebellion was not a unified “Tanganyikan” or “Tanzanian” movement, but rather a series of revolts conducted by a large number of ethnic groups or “nations.” Tanzanian nationalism, and the imagined community it created, did not cross the historical horizon until the late 1940s. It certainly did not exist in German East Africa: what did exist was based on their literacy and numeracy, starting in 1907, local chiefs and sultans set up schools to educate Africans, and while these independent schools often aimed to improve African’s positions in the colonial hierarchy, they also educated future national leaders.

Bibliography


Ashanti-British Relations, 1826-1902

Dawne Curry
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

The 1900 Ashanti Rebellion was the culminating war between the British and the Ashanti over land and control of Ghana’s coastal region. This rebellion, which was led by Yaa Asantewa, the Queen Mother of Edweso, had a long sustained history, whose roots can be traced back to the early nineteenth century. Then, most of the Gold Coast’s fortresses were under British control. British territorial reign included the area where the Ashanti (who form part of the Twi speaking people of the Akan in present day Ghana) lived, and enjoyed a relatively peaceful relations with the Dutch in the central part of the country, some 300 kilometers from the coast.

The Ashanti Confederacy, which was a major state from 1570 to 1900, was ruled under paramount chiefs called Asantehene. These chief supervised an area abundantly rich in gold deposits. Besides the trade in gold, the Ashanti participated in slave-trafficking. The Ashanti captured human chattel that they obtained from neighboring nations, either through raids or through bartering, which they then sold to European slave traders. Because the Ashanti focused principally on the selling of slaves, they neglected other enterprises such as agricultural production and cloth manufacturing. Then, with the banning of slave trading in the 1850s, which the Ashanti did independently of the British and other European powers, the Ashanti further weakened their economy because they no longer had their main revenue generator, slaves, to sustain their state’s economic growth. The Ashanti’s prominence and stature in the region similarly declined. The Ashanti’s weakened state captured the attention of their former European allies, the British, who viewed the Ashanti’s vulnerability as an opportunity to further their geopolitical aims. These aims included controlling the land that the Ashanti inhabited and creating a European colony over the entire coastal region.

The Ashanti were one of the few African nations which offered the British serious and recalcitrant resistance. British presence presented a geopolitical problem for the Ashanti, who viewed the intrusion of colonial forces as an infringement upon their sovereign rights, and therefore wanted to expel the British from their territory. In 1826, the Ashanti Army launched an offensive attack against the British along the coast. During this encounter, the Ashanti suffered major casualties and had to retreat from the coastal plains near Accra, because the superior fire power of the British and the Danish had militarily overwhelmed them. With the Ashanti defeated and the Europeans having a tactical advantage, the two warring factions signed a peace treaty in 1831. That treaty did not end the Ashanti’s woes.
The British were relentless in their pursuit of pacifying the entire central area as they signed a political agreement, referred to as the Bond of 1844, with a confederation of Fante states. That agreement not only extended protection to the signatory states, but also allowed the British to have authority over them. With Britain purchasing all the territory once owned by Denmark and the Netherlands, it became the sole European country exercising influence over the indigenous people. The Ashanti, who felt further threatened by Britain’s systematic consolidation of power and territorial ownership, launched an invasion in 1873. The British responded by dispatching an expeditionary force to the Ashanti territory, where they captured the capital, Kumasi, and then razed the villages and administrative center. Fearing further retribution, the Ashanti retreated.

That short-lived invasion led to the Ashanti signing yet another treaty with the British. The treaty’s stipulations were as follows. The Ashanti agreed to recognize British sovereignty over the entire coastal region, to pay war-reparation costs, and to renounce authority over all territories which resided under British protection. In return, the Ashanti received Britain’s pledge about the coastal area. Following this treaty, the British immediately proclaimed the coastal territories as the Gold Coast Colony, and then moved their administrative headquarters from the Cape Coast to Accra.

In the subsequent years, tension between the Ashanti and the British mounted. The Ashanti soon lost their autonomy when the British attacked and occupied their territory, and then proclaimed it a protectorate. British officials captured several Ashanti elders, including King Premph, and imprisoned and exiled them to the Seychelles, a small island nation situated on the Indian Ocean. The British were not satisfied with this military gain, they wanted to possess the Golden Stool, the supreme symbol of Ashanti prominence and nationhood, and demanded its surrender on 28 March 1900. British officials dispatched Captain C. H. Armitage to find the golden stool, bring it back, and place the symbolic artifact under British custody. Visits to several villages produced no results, and when Armitage found the homesteads populated only by children, as the parents were hiding, he bound and beat them. Armitage meted out the same reprisal to the parents when they surfaced from their hideaways. All of these occurrences instigated the 1900 Ashanti rebellion known as the Yaa Asantewaa War for Independence.

Under the leadership of Yaa Asantewaa, who served as the military tactician and spiritual guide, the Ashante held a meeting to galvanize the Army and prepare for war. Yaa Asantewaa motivated the Army with these inspiring and provocative words:

Is it true that the bravery of the Ashanti is no more? If you men of Ashanti will not go forward, then we will. We the women will.

I shall call upon my fellow women. We will fight the white men.

We will fight Till the last of us falls in the battle fields.

With this call to arms, the Ashanti, who used musketeers, bowmen, and spearmen, laid siege to the British mission at the fort of Kumasi, where the British governor and his entourage took refuge. The Ashanti occupied the fort for three months. The British responded by sending 1,400 troops and additional artillery to quell the rebellion. When the revolt ended in 1901, the British captured and exiled Yaa Asantewaa and fifteen of her closest advisors. The last Ashanti rebellion resulted in the formal annexation of the Ashanti empire as a British possession on 1 January 1902.

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Kenneth Banks
NEH Fellow
American Antiquarian Society

With the rise of World History as standard introductory or advanced thematic courses, there has also emerged a veritable armada of supporting literature to allow a deeper plunge into subjects the larger texts cover quickly or superficially. Race and Empire, by accomplished British and Pacific imperial scholar Jane Samson, is a welcome addition that should make more than a ripple in these dense waters.

The text is divided into four uneven parts. The brief Introduction alerts students to the problems of defining race, although sadly does not subject the equally treacherous term ‘empire’ to the same light. The second section, the backbone of the book, is an ‘Analysis’ of four chronologically chapters of European imperial development covering the immediate background and first century of transatlantic and Indian ocean contact, the rise of modern empires to 1820, European transplantation to 1880, and, bucking traditional chronological demarcations, ‘high’ imperialism, which is carried right through until the independence and partition of India in 1947–48. Within each period, Samson smartly treats the racial dimensions of imperial policies and social relations thematically. The writing style is simple but not simplistic, and peppered with poignant quotes, such as one English official in pre-Amritsar India who foresaw the decline of the British Empire if its Indian overlords allowed the Bengali Baboo to discuss his own schools and drains (85). Samson is at her best when examining the intellectual underpinnings of imperial racial ideology, such as the ‘The Rise of Anthropology’ in the early 19th century, or explaining the tortured maze of inter-European racism in a section tellingly entitled with the question ‘White Supremacy?’ Part Three is a short, difficult chapter that tries to chart the outcomes of decolonization and the legacy of European imperialism, without quite doing either, and Part Four gathers together 26 short primary source documents, all keyed to relevant sections of the text. Framing these sections are several useful addenda, including several sparse maps, a useful timeline, and a ‘Who’s Who’ of major figures.

A simple but effective thematic thread unifies the book: the ongoing conflict between the Christian-inspired ‘universalist’ impulse of gathering non-Europeans under self-styled, benign guidance, in stark contrast to the reckless demonizing that brutalized relations with non-Europeans around the globe. Samson refers to this conflict almost fluidly as “brothering and othering.” But, using this tension as a kind of lens, Samson is able to pointedly and consistently keep the focus on the dilemmas of imperial constructions of racial identity. For example, the study of philology in the 19th century generated intense interest in notions of a superior Aryan race (of which Europeans were the ‘pinnacle’) on the one hand, yet that on the other produced equally intense anxiety since the Aryan homeland lay in faraway, decadent India (44). Another real strength of the book is placing American and Canadian westward expansion and its concomitant indigenous degradation or outright conquest into the larger narrative of 19th century imperial expansion. In a section on “Miscegenation as Contamination,” for example, Samson describes the fear over intermarriage with a large Hispanic population as the dominant theme in the debate over whether to incorporate occupied Mexico in the aftermath of the Mexican-American War (63), a precept that still comes as a surprise to American undergraduates.

Despite such excellent work, there remain several drawbacks to the use of the text in the classroom. The author regrettfully left out the Russian Empire on the grounds of space limitations; fair enough. But also absent are the Ottoman, Chinese, Asante, and Japanese imperial domains, to name some of the more prominent, for the same reason. Such absences underscore the Western European and especially British imperial framework Samson is working within, and suggests at the very least that the book should be re-titled. The relative de-emphasis of the racially-motivated dismemberment of the Chinese Empire by the Western European imperial powers and the U.S. over the course of the 19th century is particularly regrettable, given the soaring interest among students in China. In addition, the secondary material outside the British Empire is in some cases annoyingly sparse. For example, in the case of French imperial pretensions in North America, Samson relies heavily on Olive Dickason’s Myth of the Savage, but did not cite, or apparently consult, the works of James Axtell, Denys Delage, Richard White, or most recently, Guillaume Aubert. Studies in Transatlantic Slavery and research on the Atlantic World, two subfields that have contributed important work on race within imperial contexts (John Thornton’s Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800 [1998] and David Eltis’ The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas [1999] come readily to mind) are also conspicuous by their absence. Such gaps serve students poorly, especially at the upper undergraduate or graduate level, where updated reading lists are essential. Finally, this reviewer finds the documents too short. Most are barely a page; and while they are about as representative as one might hope, it is unclear how they might serve for any substantive classroom discussion, debate, or for in-class writing exercises. The very brevity tends to render the issues superficial, and thereby undercut the complexity of the imperialism-racism ‘nexus’ which Samson has so skillfully presented.

With these caveats in mind, Race and Empire offers a quick but intelligent discussion of a very complex set of issues. One hopes that Pearson-Longman will allow Samson to outfit a second edition to navigate the turbulent historical swells where race and empire collide.


Sam Gelens
Horace Mann School

Each of these volumes represents an attempt to grapple in relatively short space with two current and crucial issues. While their publishers most likely intend them for both the high school and college markets, these books might work best, beyond of course the specific topics expressed in their titles, as supplementary texts in high school electives on, for example, international politics and modern southwest Asian history. The readings are generally short and an instructor could combine them easily with other materials. Additionally, these books are not readers in the conventional sense, i.e. they contain excerpts which, for the most part, are from recent journalistic pieces and are not collections of primary-source documents. Historical depth has been sacrificed to a degree for “presentism” and contemporary relevance. Whether they can serve as stand-alone texts will be a decision which the
individual instructor will have to make.

Part of a series which already includes readers on censorship, eating disorders, and learning disabilities, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* is composed of four chapters: Chapter 1: the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict; Chapter 2: Arab and Israeli approaches to the conflict; Chapter 3: living with the Arab-Israeli conflict; and Chapter 4: proposals for creating peace between Israel and Palestine. The majority of the readings are by westerners, Americans in particular, and some of the authors are very well-known and their arguments familiar, e.g. Henry Kissinger and Edward Said. This book works hard to be fair-minded and succeeds in most cases. In Chapter 2, for example, the readings deal with terrorism and extremism on both sides and will hopefully elicit thoughtful discussion. Chapter 3 takes the reader down to ground level, so to speak, with its excerpts on the experience of both Israeli and Palestinian families. Chapter 4 is of course now to some degree dated but does raise issues which yet bedevil the conflict.

In a book of such short length, there are the inevitable lacunae: the crucially important Ottoman background to the conflict is barely touched; at no point do any of the articles address the much-ignored problem of the 800,000 Jews of Muslim countries who became refugees after 1948; the Islamist factor is really not addressed at all; and there is no mention of how the conflict is treated in Palestinian and Israeli school texts. But, effectively supplemented, this book is one palatable path into an emotionally-charged and hotly-debated contemporary issue, and includes a useful glossary, chronology, organizations to contact, and a bibliography of books and articles.

*The Challenge of Terrorism* is one in a series of seventeen volumes published thus far which deal with such topics as the Great Depression, Irish Americans, Japanese-American internment, and the Vietnam War. The book is divided as follows: Introduction: Episodes of Terrorism, 1963-1995 (which uses photographs and excerpts from news stories to review major episodes of terrorism during the later 20th century); Part I: September 11, 2001; Part II: Examining Terrorism; Part III: Responding as a Nation; and Part IV: Responding as Individuals. In addition, there is a chronology of terrorism since the end of World War Two and five small, black and white maps.

While the book’s chronological parameters limit its effectiveness, e.g. important, trend-setting instances of terrorism in India and Pakistan (before 1947-1948), and Algeria (1954-1962) get no coverage, its brief excerpts explore nonetheless a very diverse range of topics any number of which could be highlighted for more in-depth examination. Among these are a profile of a terrorist (Muhammad Atta of 9/11), types of responses to terrorism, bioterrorism, helping children understand, and memorials to the victims.

A discussion of terrorism in the movies would have been a welcome addition, for films such as “The Battle of Algiers” (1966) can teach a great deal which printed sources cannot. The book is also thin on how states respond to terrorism. In this regard, it might be very profitable for students to read the recent (2005) English translation of General Paul Aussaresses’s *The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture* and reflect on its relevance, say, for example, to the Bush administration’s behavior.

Whatever flaws each of these readers have, instructors will find them useful, especially if they supplement them with other materials which enrich and broaden the topics they seek to elucidate.

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**WHA Student Paper Prize (Undergraduate and Graduate Divisions)**

The World History Association and Phi Alpha Theta History Society, Inc. are accepting submissions for their annual co-sponsored Student Paper Prizes in world history. Two awards in the amount of $200 will be granted for the best undergraduate and graduate-level world history paper composed during the current academic year. Abstracts of the winning papers are also published in the World History Bulletin. To qualify, students must be members of EITHER the WHA or Phi Alpha Theta and must have composed the paper while enrolled at an accredited college or university during the current school year. Papers must be no longer than thirty (30) type-written, double-spaced pages of text, exclusive of title page, endnotes and bibliography. Submissions for the 2005 award must be postmarked by August 15, 2006. For more information, please visit the WHA website at www.thewha.org or contact Professor Alfred J. Andrea at the Department of History, The University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405-0164, aandrea@uvm.edu

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Minutes of the Executive Council

Philadelphia, American Historical Association, January 5, 2006
Marriott, Rm 408
Open: 3:10 pm

Members present: Ken Curtis, Robert White, Jonathan Reynolds, Al Andrea, Ralph Crozier, David Northrup, Linda Black, Deb Johnston, Jerry Bentley, John Voll, Adam McKeon, John Meyers, Laura O’Connell, Ane Lintvedt, Roger Beck, Marc Gilbert, Avi Black, Bob Bain, Anand Yang, Pat Manning

David Northrup moderated this last meeting of his term.

David opened by thanking those members of the executive council who were attending their last meeting and passing the baton to the new members. A special thanks was extended to Deb Johnston, who represented those who were leaving us, for her frequent and extensive service in many different capacities. A few ground rules were enumerated to clarify procedures for both new and old council members. Deb, representing departing members, votes until the end of this session. John Reynolds, serving in a replacement capacity and finishing an incomplete term has a vote for this session, all new members are welcome to speak but do not have a vote until the next council meeting.

The Texas affiliate (WHAT) is having a meeting in late Feb on Africa and world history. A web search for TheWHAT.org will find the conference and the CFP.

Conference Committee Report

Al Andrea, chair of the conference committee, reported on the work of the committee.

CSU at Long Beach in 2006 – The details regarding this conference were included in the package sent to council members.

Milwaukee in 2007 – The contract with University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee is being forwarded by Merry Wiesner-Hanks and will make its way to Michele Forman for signature next month.

London in 2008 is moving a little slower, but still looks good. Following the conclusion of the Milwaukee contract, Al Andrea will devote more time to finalizing the details. He mentioned that he is also discussing possibilities for a potential 2009 site. Details will be offered at next council meeting.

Members asked if the London conference was slow due to loss of direct connections, Al responded no difficulty had occurred, the Queen Mary site is looking strong, and they are excited. They presently are working on discussions with Prentice Hall for subvention of that conference.

No further questions were raised. Dave Northrup congratulated Al on this strong achievement. This is the best position the WHA has ever held regarding conference planning. Jonathan seconded that comment, as did members of the council.

Further discussion focused on the Long Beach conference. It is expected that the registration will be up on the web by the end of next month. If there are any other questions, please contact Robert White (www.thewha.org). Kerrie Ward is assembling the program and bringing together paper proposals. The deadline is January 10. More papers are expected within the week.

Executive Director’s Report

This report covers the period from July to Dec 05. Four major items have been the focus of WHA headquarters during these six months.

The first item is the successful completion of the 2005 WHA conference in Morocco. Our final count was 137 registered participants, 14 non-registered, and 86 who attended the post conference tours. The conference produced $14,500 of revenue.

The WHA web site is finally fully controlled by this organization; the relationship with Duomo Media has been severed. The next phase is to recruit a designer to develop or update the web site.

This item led to discussion from the council members, which evinced their urgency to move beyond this bottleneck. The web site needs concentrated attention and the executive director is busy handling too many other items to focus exclusively on its development. The council needs to devote some energy to this matter. The conclusion was a motion to charge Jonathan Reynolds and Jacky Swansinger in conjunction with Robert White to develop a web site plan, create a budget, and offer firm proposals as soon as possible, but no later than the June meeting. This was voted unanimously.

The finance committee has not convened as often as necessary. A good deal of time has passed as the WHA centralizing accounts from our previous multiple state base to the headquarters site. However, the next challenge remains the matter of reporting on finances in a clear and consistent manner. WHA has built a relationship with Allan Arakaki, a CPA in Hawaii. We need to explore the possibility of obtaining quarterly reports and reporting transparently through the financial committee and to the council on finances. David Northrup presented some categories and charts that he believed would be useful in developing this pattern.

The fourth item requiring the time of the executive director are home office operations. Office operations were hindered by the resignation of Kristy Ringor, HQ’s administrative assistant. This has required a search for a replacement. An ad was placed in late November and the pool will be examined carefully in the first two weeks of January. There is every expectation that this hire will occur quickly. Achievements have included the WHA elections and continued efforts to recruit members.

The executive director was pleased to announce that membership appeared to be strong; 250 applications were received in the last week.

Discussion of the report centered on creating greater efficiencies at headquarters. There ranged from electronic ballots to a better web site. Also covered were the need to organize more efficiently, the loss of Kristy Ringor and explanations for her resignation, difficulties encountered while working through Hawaii University’s personnel procedures, and the need for clear procedures. Ralph Crozier reminded the council that Kieko Matteson, just prior to her departure, had created a procedure manual and perhaps it was time to return to that document.

Financial committee report

David Northrup pointed out that one of the difficulties of the organization has been a lack of consistency in financial reporting and inherent complications due to our calendar. We need to move our financial reports to a timelier schedule. Presently we report in early January based on information collected until December 31. If the WHA were to move to a financial year closing on September 30, we could have time to create the reports needed for policy development. The purpose of these reports is both to know the financial health of the organization and to create policy and plan for the future. Recommendation is that the council agrees to a change of date, that is a basic format be agreed upon and that the debate be concluded.

A wide-ranging discussion ensued. Suggestions included asking Mr. Arakaki to do both the audit and the quarterly reports, and discovering the costs involved in this request. The issue of officer liability was also raised, the council asked Linda Black to investigate the question. Roger seconded the idea of moving towards a September 30 year-end. The question of financial oversight was the biggest issue that ran through the discussion.

David Northrup presented the reporting forms he brought for consideration of council and suggested they might become standard. He added that the executive director must report to the finance committee and set up standard time frames. There is also a need for timely presentation of the endowment report.

Fund Raising Committee

Al Andrea reported on the fund raising committee. He is presently working on initiatives to bring Asian scholars to Long Beach. One foundation is the Freeman Foundation; another possibility is soliciting the Chinese government in Beijing, which might be interested in developing some funding. Suggestions were offered: public service office that might be willing to spend money to bring scholars to conferences; lifetime memberships could be used to bring in more money; etc.
Proposal 1: Request for Funding to digitize the World History Bulletin.

A proposal to digitize the World History Bulletin for $400 was presented by Micheal Tarver and approved unanimously.


The World History Network is an independent, nonprofit corporation, chartered in Massachusetts in 2004 and granted non-profit 501c3 status by the U.S. government.

The purpose of the WHN is: “the principal purposes of the Corporation shall be (i) to advance research, conceptualization, and institutional support for the academic field of world history, encompassing studies of the past that analyze global patterns of historical interaction over a full range of time and space, topical coverage and interdisciplinary exchange; (ii) to nurture worldwide ties among individual scholars, disciplines, universities, and other institutions that desire to participate in world-historical research; (iii) to affiliate with relevant organizations of historians and other scholarly institutions in order to advance the study of world history; (iv) to prepare and promote a research agenda in world history, seek funding for research on high-priority projects, and encourage design and implementation of large-scale projects of data collection and analysis in world history; (v) to serve as host of research projects, resources, and institutions in world history; and (vi) to provide active support for curriculum development, teaching, and communication among teachers in the field of world history.”

The proposal requests affiliation in order to assist the WHA in strengthening efforts in research. The WHN proposes to support and collaborate with the WHA’s program for research.

Discussion focused on the nature of WHN activities and whether a greater emphasis on research would create an impression of secondary citizenship for secondary teachers who are members of the organization. The officers of the WHN are well known for their strong commitment to secondary education, to research and to inclusiveness. The council engaged in some discussion of the advantages of a closed conference and its ability to generate conclusions and action; these results could then be brought to open conferences, such as the WHA or AHA and lead to further development.

Another issue debated: Is there a danger that research driven scholars participate in WHN and undercut the nexus of teaching and pedagogy and development? The answer focused on the importance of affiliation and its ability to allow both sides to work together even if one is more research driven than the other. It is the interplay between the two concepts that will lead to original work in both areas.

Motion to approve the affiliation and that a committee be formed to appoint people to the WHN steering committee was passed unanimously.

Proposal 3: Request from Heidi Roupp to fund some expenses of World History Connected

World History Connected is the field’s only journal devoted to the scholarship of teaching. Since its launch in November 2003, World History Connected (WHC) has been the subject of more than 90 million searches, including hits from 120 countries, and a projected readership of over 175,000 visitors or individuals who select eight or more choices within the website during a visit.

WHC proposes that the World History Association become a financial sponsor of the journal. A financial relationship will result in planning and closer integration between the two organizations, enabling both to work on common goals and to enjoy mutual benefits of integration. This proposal asks the WHA to support the WHC with an annual budget of $6,500 to cover the cost of course release time for one co-editor ($6000) and the costs of annual membership in the History Cooperative ($500).

Discussion: This is a fairly standard expense and the membership costs are very reasonable. Does this money cover only one specific co-editor or is this for the position? What is the equity concern raised by this funding for the World History Bulletin? What future do we see for the WHB and WHC? Will World History Connected facilitate membership for the WHA?

David concluded the discussion by pointing out that this was a very long proposal with some written inconsistencies, therefore we will not vote on its present language. It will need to be examined more carefully in the near future. However, can we vote to fund this position for the next three years with continued conversation?

A motion was approved to authorize funding for three years, to work out the exact details and to request membership promotion on WHC as part of the agreement. Passed unanimously.

Nominating Committee: Elections

The council needs to vote on members of the nominating committee. These nominations are made by the president and voted by the council. A quick look indicates that membership is strongly geographically biased towards California; it would be good to have greater Eastern representation. Two terms are currently expiring: Maggie Favretti (chair) and Heidi Roupp. Continuing members include: Kenneth Pomeranz (1/08) UC-Irvine and Bob Bain (1/08) University of Michigan; and Ken Curtis (1/07) CSU, Long Beach and Monty Armstrong (1/07) Cerritos HS. We need everyone to consider members who might wish to serve in this capacity.

President proposes two nominations: Consider nominations: Linda Black and David (?) as two new nominees. [Maggie Favretti and Michele Forman arrived at that moment.] Michele held the vote and the two nominees were unanimously approved.

New business

The College Board has decided to revise old examinations as part of their policy to raise standards; they are moving towards a best scholarship practice from their prior standards. They will be holding meetings to discuss this issue shortly. They are trying to assess whether or not the exams need to be revised and gathering names of people to serve on these committees.

Marc Gilbert stated that Church History will begin soliciting articles on other churches besides Christianity. Bob Bain raised the issue of the national history standards that will be assessed in 2010. Mary Corvo at NAAHA is responsible for setting assessing standards for world history. Anand will bring information regarding joining American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) at the next meeting.

Don’t forget the WHA Annual Conference at Long Beach, press the flesh, and bring everyone to southern California!

Motion to adjourn. 6:10 pm

World History Association
Business Meeting

AHA Philadelphia
January 6, 2006
Rm 302 Marriott

Meeting commenced at 5:05 pm; 17 people attending

Michele Forman opened the meeting as new president of the WHA

“I find myself equal parts excited and terrified as I open this business meeting of the WHA. I’m excited because I found a home here and mentors to aid me develop as a world historian. Terrified because I want to do a good job and this is such an exciting and awesome responsibility. However, I know that I am among friends and that you are willing to help me as we work together to sustain the efforts of the WHA and its membership.”

Michele’s first public action was to thank the members who were leaving the executive council: Steve Gosch, Deb Johnston and Bob Bain – “we all appreciate your work and commitment;” and welcome the new council members: Jenn Linden, Adam McKeown, Laura O’Connell and Jonathan Reynolds.

President’s Report

One of the big agenda items passed by the
executive council this session was proposal to offer funding for the WHC or World History Connected. This support will extend over the next three years, consists of $6,500 for a course release for one co-editor ($6000) and an annual membership fee for WHC to join the History Cooperative ($500). In exchange, the WHA will obtain higher visibility and connection to a larger potential membership and a chance to work out a written contract to support this effort. Presently, this is an agreement in principle; we need to be more attentive to all the details over the next few months. A written report of these activities will come to the executive board in June.

The program deadline for the WHA annual conference at CSU – Long Beach in Southern California will be flexible as we put together the final panels. The focus for annual conference in Long Beach is America in the world, and teaching world history. Thomas Bender will be one of the keynote speakers and this will continue the conversation begun at the OAH about America in world history.

Report of Executive Director

Accomplishments over the past six months include better communication, improving the web site, the Moroccan conference and holding the WHA elections.

The Conference in Morocco netted $14,500 in revenue. 127 participants registered, and 86 joined in the conference tours.

The web site is now under the full control of the WHA; the next step is to decide how the web site could be more useful to the organization and to create a new profile. Headquarters will work with a new committee consisting of Jacky Swansinger and Jonathan Reynolds to develop a plan, establish a cost structure and obtain proposals.

Database membership is growing, but we are still working on making the information in that database more user-friendly. Our finances are in good order, but we need to become more transparent in our reporting to the membership.

Areas of Focus: Kristy Ringor resigned in November, the office needs an administrative assistant and that will be the first issue upon Robert White’s return to Hawaii. Membership remains an area of need. This past year some good efforts were made to encourage membership at the AP reading and at conferences, we need to work harder and more efficiently to repeat this effort in 2006. WHA also needs to be more connected with the affiliates and develop better communication between the organizations. Our present membership, December 2005, is 1240; this breaks down into 110 students, 160 new professionals and 1017 members. New professionals are new to the field of world history, defined as less than 5 years in their present field. We have 16 life memberships.

Discussion arose regarding the decision to fund the WHC when the World History Bulletin remains under funded. The editor of the WHB pointed out that equity did not appear to exist based on this decision. Response from officers and proponents indicated that the WHC had 90 million searches from 120 countries and 175,000 individuals made eight or more choices on line. This audience indicated that the WHA could not deny such a large audience. Marc Gilbert pointed out that the WHB presented for members who were already in the WHA, while the WHC was for outsiders who still did not know about the WHA and its work.

Report on Conferences

The 2006 conference will be at CSU – Long Beach this June. In 2007, the WHA will hold its annual conference at University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee; the details are in the final stages and the contract should be signed in February. In 2008, the WHA expects to be in London at Queen Mary’s College for its annual conference. Al Andrea has concluded a great deal of work with these three sites and the WHA thanks him for his gargantuan efforts.

Financial Committee

There will be a change in the nature of WHA financial reporting. The new end of year will occur on September 30. This will enable the executive director, the treasurer and the financial committee to pull together the end of year reports for sharing at the AHA meeting. There is a need for greater transparency and consistency in the manner of reporting. This new date should facilitate that process. Outgoing president David Northrup has formulated some reporting forms that might be used to ease the reporting process and answer the most frequently asked questions of members.

Fund Raising Committee

It has been a little slow, but intends to kick back into high gear beginning this February. Al Andrea chairs this committee, and members who understand fund raising have joined him. Three large efforts include the Kresge foundation, and an outreach initiative to bring in Chinese scholars. Suggestions from the audience included: Henry Luce Foundation, Center for Global Foundation, the Gates Foundation, the Chinese Government and the McCormick Foundation.

Prize Essay

There were only three submissions. However due to conversations between Al Andrea and Charles Cavaliere (senior history editor for Pearson Prentice Hall) the prize money will be doubled. We need to publicize this prize much more thoroughly and encourage students to apply.

Addendum to President’s Report

Two proposals were accepted by the executive council yesterday afternoon. One was a $400 payment to digitize the WHB and enable it to be on the WHA web site. The second was an agreement to recognize the World History Network as an affiliate of the WHA.

Old Business/New Business

Deadline for WHB spring issue is February 1. The journal of Church History has decided to open its articles to other churches beyond Christianity. World Historians should look for a call for papers. Motion to adjourn. Passed unanimously. 6:00 pm 23 people dismissed at the end of the meeting.

WHA Book Prize

Composition of the Committee: Three WHA members, preferably representing a cross-section of geographic, temporal, and methodological approaches. Committee is selected by the WHA President, subject to approval by the WHA Executive Council. There are no fixed terms. For current committee members, see below.

What are we looking for? New scholarly studies of history from a global perspective; i.e. thematic in a transregional context or else overtly comparative, that make a significant contribution to the field of world history. Anthologies may be nominated, but single or dual-authored works are preferred. For past award winners, see below.

Who can nominate? Authors, publishers, WHA members, or other interested parties may nominate books published in the current calendar year. Nominations should be sent to the Chair of the committee.

Award amount: The award is currently $500. Formal bestowal of the check is made at the WHA annual meeting, normally held in June.

Deadline: Nominations must be received by October to allow time for juror evaluations. Works published after that month will be placed in the following year’s pool of candidates. The committee should make its selection by November/December of the award year.

The Mid-Atlantic World History Association (MAWHA) will hold its 10th annual fall conference at East Stroudsburg University in Pennsylvania on Friday, Oct. 13, and Saturday, Oct. 14, 2006. Please visit the MAWHA website for details later in the spring at: www.mawha.org
WORLD HISTORY CONFERENCE -- CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY at LONG BEACH, 22-25 June 2006
"Teaching World History" and "The Americas in World History"

The 15th Annual World History Association Conference will be held at California State University at Long Beach with registration and hospitality beginning at 3:00 PM Thursday, 22 June, and running until 7:30 PM. Sessions begin Friday morning, 23 June, and run to 1:00 PM on Sunday, 25 June 2006. The preliminary program is available for viewing at http://conference.thewha.org/draft_program.pdf. The conference's dual themes are "Teaching World History," and "The Americas in World History." Conference keynote speakers are Tom Laichas of Crossroads School for Arts and Sciences, who will deliver the address "From Camel House to School House: Event and Lesson in World History," and Thomas Bender, professor of History at New York University, who will speak on "Global History and the Making of the United States." Meridians, Sources in World History, Mesolore: Exploring Mesoamerican Culture. Faculty at CSULB are currently planning a pre-conference teacher workshop on Teaching World History, which will take place all day on 22 June.

On-line registration for both the conference and the workshop is now available at http://register.thewha.org. Persons who are not currently members of the WHA but who plan to attend the conference can also join the WHA at this website, thereby saving themselves $50 in conference fees. An early registration savings of $10 is also offered to all who register before 1 May. WHA members who register before 1 May pay $110; non-members pay $160. A steeply reduced conference fee of $35 is also offered to all matriculating students (with proper ID). For anyone who cannot attend the entire conference, one-day, half-price passes are available for Friday or Saturday (Sunday is free for day-pass holders). Accompanying spouses and companions who desire to attend only the conference's evening receptions can purchase a special badge at $20.

The conference fee includes hospitality on the afternoon of 22 June, three continental breakfasts, five additional refreshment services, and two evening receptions. Plans are also being made to include a luncheon.

The Local Arrangements Committee (LAC) has secured off-campus rooms at special rates at two hotels: The Marriott Renaissance Hotel ($149 per night) and the Holiday Inn Long Beach Airport ($89 per night with upgraded larger rooms available at a higher rate for larger families). The Marriott Renaissance is an executive-level hotel located in the heart of downtown, amidst fine restaurants, tourist attractions, nightlife, and shopping and about five miles from campus. Connection with the CSULB campus is through an inexpensive and direct bus system or by car. The Holiday Inn, which is also about five miles from campus, has shuttle service from and to the airport and occasional shuttle service to the campus but should be used only by persons with autos. Currently the Sales Manager of the Holiday Inn is exploring the possibility of securing a special auto-rental rate from Enterprise for all conferees, not just those staying at the Holiday Inn. The Holiday Inn should be the hotel of choice for conferees with accompanying families. Parking is free at the Holiday Inn and costs $12 per day at the Renaissance. Conferees who desire to reserve rooms at these reduced rates must contact the hotels directly and identify themselves as WHA conference participants. Rooms at this special rate are available from 20 June through 25 June. Information regarding accommodations and links to the hotels can be found on the conference registration form at register.thewha.org. The Committees Conference urges those who plan to stay at the Renaissance to make their reservations early; only 25 rooms have been reserved there.

Additionally, the LAC has secured 42 on-campus rooms at the quiet and attractive International House, each of which comes with FULL BOARD (i.e. 3 daily meals in the university cafeteria) and free on-campus parking. Because the daily rate is so low--$55 per person for a double and $85 per person for a single--and because the number of reserved rooms is limited due to competing summer programs on campus, conferees who desire to take advantage of this extraordinary deal are urged to 1) double up by sharing a room with a colleague and 2) reserve a room as soon as possible. Reservation and payment for campus housing MUST be made at the time of conference registration and on the conference registration form on the WHA website.
“THE AMERICAS IN WORLD HISTORY” AND “TEACHING WORLD HISTORY”
PRE-CONFERENCE TEACHING SEMINAR
THURSDAY JUNE 22, 2006

8:00-8:30 Continental Breakfast and Registration

8:30-9:30 “What Is World History?” (Professor Ken Curtis & Professor Tim Keirm, California State University Long Beach)

9:30-9:45 Break

9:45-12:15 “Using Multiple Sources in the World History Classroom”
  - Working with The Human Record (Professor A. J. Andrea, University of Vermont)
  - Working with Discovering the Global Past (Professor Merry Wiesner-Hanks, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)

12:15-1:15 Lunch Break

1:15-2:30 “Integrating the Americas into the Teaching of World History” (Dr. Tom Laichas, Crossroads School for Arts and Sciences)

2:30-2:45 Break

2:45-4:00 “A Shopper’s Guide to the World History Conference” (Professor Ken Curtis & Professor Tim Keirm, California State University Long Beach)

WHA Conference Registration and Hospitality Service:
3:30-7:30 Beverages (beer and wine after 6:00 PM) and snacks courtesy of ABC-Clio.

This one-day pre-conference workshop anticipates the 15th Annual World History Conference at California State University Long Beach that runs from Friday morning through Sunday morning of June 23-25. In association with the World History Association and the California History Social Science Project at CSULB, this workshop is designed for K-12 teachers attending the conference. Participants will receive teaching materials and resources relevant to each presentation. The pre-conference workshop fee is $40 and registration (along with that for the conference) is done electronically at http://register.thewha.org. For more information about the pre-conference workshop contact Tim Keirm at timkeirm@csulb.edu.
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The 16th Annual Conference will be held at The University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

June 28-July 1, 2007

World History Connected, Inc., an official publication of the WHA, presents innovative classroom-ready scholarship, keeps readers up to date on the latest research and debates, presents the best in learning and teaching methods and practices, offers readers rich teaching resources, and reports on exemplary teaching. WHC is free, articles may be downloaded for classroom use. Link to our site: http://www.worldhistoryconnected.org or through our new mirrored site in the History Cooperative archive at http://www.historycooperative.org.
Research Agenda Symposium, November 2006

Research in World History: Connections and Globalizations

The World History Network and the World History Association seek proposals for participation in a Research Agenda Symposium (John Hancock Conference Center, Boston, November 10-12, 2006). Up to 40 participants worldwide will be selected for a meeting intended to develop a consensus statement on priorities in world-historical research, with a focus on the theme of Research in World History: Connections and Globalizations. Conference fee of $250 includes conference materials, meals, and receptions. Travel costs may be covered, depending on availability of funding, especially for participants from outside the U.S. Applicants should submit, by 1 June 2006, a statement of up to 1000 words proposing priorities in world-historical research, and a curriculum vitae of up to two pages. Invitations will be issued to selected participants by 30 June 2006. The conference committee will select up to 40 participants, based on the strength and interest of initial proposals, but also with attention to balance by national origin, gender, age, and disciplinary focus. Details are available from the World History Network, www.worldhistorynetwork.org.
Membership in the World History Association can be achieved by mailing your name, address, and institutional affiliation, along with the applicable membership amount listed below. The WHA accepts Visa, MasterCard, and Discover (please include the type of card and expiration date) or check payable to the WHA.

- Regular Membership $60 per year
- Two-Year Membership $110
- Three-Year Membership $155
- Students/Independent Scholars $30/year
- New Professionals $45/year
- Life Membership $1200

Mail to: The World History Association, Sakamaki Hall A203, 2530 Dole Street, University of Hawai`i, Honolulu, HI 96822, U.S.A. Email: thewha@hawaii.edu

WHA dues are payable on a yearly basis. During each year, members will receive two issues of the Journal of World History and two issues of the World History Bulletin. Memberships run on a calendar year. Applications received before September 1 will receive that current year’s publications. Applications received after September 1 will begin membership the following January unless otherwise requested. If your address has changed since the last issue of the World History Bulletin, please send notification to the WHA Headquarters.

The World History Bulletin appears in April and December.