### Special Section: Empire and the Great War

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Editor’s Note:

We are excited to present in the Spring issue of the World History Bulletin a special section focusing on the theme of “Empire and the Great War.” The section offers a compelling collection of essays that indicate in fresh ways how the “World War” impacted a set of other global structures like empire. This section of the Bulletin was guest-edited by Dhara Anjaria. I deeply appreciate the thoughtfulness and rich variety of the section, and I thank Dhara – and the contributors – for their hard work.

This issue also brings to a conclusion my five-year term as editor of the World History Bulletin. The entire experience has been a wonderful one, and I have nothing but the greatest respect and gratitude for the people I’ve worked with on this project since 2009. Please welcome my colleague here at Georgia State University, Denis Gainty, as the incoming editor.

As always, the Bulletin seeks to publish “short-form” essays on all aspects of historical scholarship including pedagogy, research, or theory. Topics may include the prehistoric, ancient, medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary periods. Articles may include model syllabi or assignments, if applicable. Or, if you would like to guest-edit a selection of essays on a particular theme, please contact Denis at dgainty@gsu.edu.

with all good wishes,

Jared Poley
Dear Colleagues,

It is such an honor to be sitting in The World History Association (WHA) Office here at Northeastern University. As an organization, we are experiencing our renaissance through our relocation and reexamining our trajectory toward the future. Through the WHA Officers and Executive Committee, ideas from the past and present are guiding us toward informed decisions that will create long-term benefits.

Boston has proven favorable to us. With the help of Heather Streets-Salter, we have found a fitting new home at Northeastern University. The first two months were a whirlwind of adaptation, establishing our physical presence in the Northeastern University office, and engaging continuing and lapsed members with an eye to future growth. Our membership efforts have generated positive results, as this year we have gained an additional 170 members compared with 2014. For those who have reconnected with us – welcome back!

My induction into The WHA has been filled with good moments. During the autumn, I attended a dinner meeting including WHA, New England Regional World History Association (NERWHA) and National Council for the Social Studies members. Since collaboration is vital to the road ahead, this induction was particularly helpful in forming a vision. Winston Welch and Jackie Wah have been invaluable in guiding the office forward. So many invested members of The WHA have provided background to our organization – our Executive Committee, Executive Council and past presidents and I feel indebted to these people for their feedback and commitment.

This March, we attended the NERWHA Spring Symposium here on the Northeastern campus. It was particularly meaningful as the day honored Patrick Manning’s vision in the field of World History. Meeting a variety of faculty, teachers and scholars who are connected to our association and mission was yet another opportunity for the office to stay active in the regional landscape.

Preparing our office for the 24th Annual Conference in Savannah brings many of us together in a meaningful way. We are working diligently to coordinate outstanding academic programming, memorable receptions and networking opportunities. Behind the scenes, planning has already begun for our 25th Annual Conference in Ghent, Belgium, marking the 100th year anniversary of World War I. Both conferences will continue the spirit of camaraderie of a WHA Conference in cities that offer scholars of history a backdrop of adventure and sightseeing related to the field.

Through a stroke of good fortune, we found a most qualified Northeastern student worker named Cathy Tripp. Although only a freshman, Cathy’s resume boasts accomplishments highlighting her dedication and high standards, as well as her academic interest in history. She has been invaluable in organizing our office and general office work, communicating with outside audiences, and taking on special projects, such as event items related to The WHA Savannah Conference. She is clearly a talented young woman with a promising future.

In the first year of the WHA Graduate Student Assistant role, Malcolm Purinton has been very involved with the transition and move from Hawaii to Boston. Since my beginnings in October, Malcolm has been instrumental in both the day-to-day workings of updating and developing new content for the WHA website while also planning local outreach to area colleges and universities. He has also taken on supportive roles in the organization and continues to follow through on conference planning for both the upcoming 2015 WHA conference in Savannah and the 2016 conference in Ghent while working with the local WHA affiliate, NERWHA, as a member of their Executive Committee. Although his official capacity with The WHA concludes at the end of the academic year, he will continue to remain a faithful member of our association. Malcolm looks forward to many years of involvement with the association in other capacities.

We have embarked together on a new journey that began in the Fall. Envisioning and implementing change is never an easy feat. From my windows here in Boston, the future of The WHA is bright. Craig Benjamin and Rick Warner have been positive for our association and together they are a tour de force who embody the definition of teamwork. Their efforts work well in conjunction with fellow officers, Maryanne Rhett and Carolyn Neel, and other members of the Executive Council, who are all equally committed and diligent. It remains my privilege to work for such exceptional scholars and professionals.

Ultimately, my objectives are serving The WHA to be best of my ability with an eye on new initiatives and helping to map out a direction for our future. Please contact me with your feedback that will keep us forging forward. We can be reached at 617-373-6818 or info@thewha.org.

Thank you for the opportunity to be part of The WHA!

Kerry Vieira
Admin Coordinator/Executive Director
Letter from the President of the World History Association

Craig Benjamin, Grand Valley State University

Dear Colleagues,

Twelve months ago I had the pleasure of writing to you all in the 2014 Spring Edition of the WHA Bulletin as incoming President of the WHA. I noted how proud and honored I was to assume the position, and how conscious I was of the great world historians who had preceded me in this office, and who had set such high standards in advancing the mission of the WHA. Now, twelve months later, I am even more conscious of the responsibilities my predecessors bore during their term of office, and how vital it must have been for all of them to be able to share these duties with a dedicated team. So I want to begin this message by thanking firstly our wonderful Administrative Coordinator/Executive Director Kerry Vieira. Kerry has worked tirelessly for the WHA since she started with us in October last year, and in the six months since she has accomplished an extraordinary amount. We now have a superbly organized office at Northeastern University where Kerry, our Graduate Assistant Malcolm Purinton, and our student worker Cathy Tripp, preside efficiently and energetically over the affairs of the WHA, professionally handling our finances, communications, members inquiries, conference planning and a host of other matters. Kerry and I have been in almost daily communication over the past six months, and as President I could not be more delighted with Kerry’s enormous contribution, and with how smoothly the transition from Hawaii to Boston has been handled.

I also want to thank my fellow officers – VP Rick Warner, Secretary (and Conference Program Committee Chair) Maryanne Rhett, and Treasurer Carolyn Neel – for their hard work and support; and of course all members of the Executive Council for their energetic and diligent attention to business. Collectively, our Secretariat in Boston and our elected representatives all over the world have constituted a formidable team with the drive and ability to carry the WHA through a major transition last year to our current position of “business as usual,” and the prospect of continuing stability and success in the years ahead.

Much of my attention has been taken up helping facilitate this transition of personnel and office. My focus has been on ensuring that our membership continues to grow, regular communication with current members (and a much larger list serve of former members) occurs, planning for our next two conferences is carried out meticulously, and that our finances become more stable. I am pleased to report great success on all fronts. At the time of writing our membership is running about 170 members ahead of this same time last year, and we have been conducting regular membership drives ever since Kerry began, with another push set to take place at the AP world history reading in June. Our finances are also in a much, much better position than they were a year ago, and with a 50% reduction in personnel costs our fiscal situation is set to become increasingly stable in the years ahead. VP Rick Warner is gearing up to spearhead a fundraising drive in the second half of this year, with the express aim of repaying the funds we had to ‘borrow’ from our endowment fund to facilitate the transition from Hawaii to Boston – thank you Rick!

Planning is also well advanced for our next two conferences. We have a terrific number of colleagues who have signed up to present papers and participate in roundtables at our 24th annual conference at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Savannah, June 30th to July 2nd. Maryanne has been doing sterling work in organizing the complex program, and Kerry and her team have done a great job in attracting many publishers and other sponsors to the conference. Registrations for the conference are also running considerably ahead of where they were at this time last year, so all of you attending the Savannah conference can count on a splendid event. We are delighted that our keynote speaker this year will be Professor Candice Goucher, and look forward to her address during the opening ceremony on Tuesday, June 30th. We are also eagerly anticipating the awarding of Pioneers of World History Awards to two colleagues who have made tremendous contributions to the field of world history research and teaching, at the closing ceremony and reception on Thursday, July 2nd.

A great deal of work has also been done on planning the 25th conference, to be held in Ghent, Belgium in July 2016. Here again Kerry and her team has done sterling work, in conjunction with our Belgian colleagues Torsten and Eric, and the WHA Program Committee under Paul Jentz, in making sure that all venue and hotel arrangements are in place. Ghent 2016 is certain to be another in the long line of wonderful international conferences the WHA has organized, and I know that many members are already gearing up to combine the Ghent conference with some European travel in the summer of 2016.

In other news, several WHA affiliates have staged very successful symposia over recent months, including a combined California and Northwest Affiliate gathering in Seattle at the end of February (at which VP Rick Warner represented the WHA with his usual aplomb); and a terrific New England Regional WHA Affiliate symposium held in Boston recently, that focused on the tremendous contribution Pat Manning has made to World History. Thanks to current EC members and Kerry Vieira for representing the WHA at this very successful event. I am also delighted to report that, thanks to the hard work of EC member James Diskant, a new partnership between the National Council for Social Studies and the WHA is in the process of being finalized. The EC also recently voted to make the WHA a signatory to the “Value of History” Statement, currently being promoted by the History Relevance Campaign.

This edition of the Bulletin will be the final edition edited by Jared Poley, and on behalf of the WHA I want to thank Jared for the wonderful job he has done over the past several years. Our partnership with the Southeast WHA Affiliate, and the History Department at Georgia State University, has been fruitful and immensely beneficial to all parties, and we look forward to continuing this arrangement into the future, with former WHA EC member Denis Gainty taking over from Jared Poley as new editor of the Bulletin. Welcome aboard Denis, and thank you for your willingness to serve the WHA in this important way!

In conclusion, after a challenging transitional year
in 2014 I am delighted to report that we are now very well established in our new Boston HQ, where the WHA is thriving. Thank you sincerely for your trust in me, and your continuing support for the Association, our splendid new Secretariat, and all the elected representatives whose duty it is to oversee operations. I know we can count on you to continue your membership of the WHA, to encourage your colleagues and students to also join, and to remain committed to this great community of world historians who are dedicated to improving the present and future of the planet through research, education and advocacy. See you in Savannah in June!

Sincerely,
Craig Benjamin, PhD.
President, the World History Association (2014/15)

Jerry Bentley Book Prize in World History

The American Historical Association invites donations to endow a Jerry Bentley Book Prize in World History, which will honor Professor Bentley’s tireless efforts to promote the field of world history, and his signal contributions to it, over a career tragically cut short by his recent death.

Over the past twenty years, the field of world history has developed into one of the most vibrant and energetic areas of the discipline—-with a growing volume of books and monographs published in the field, and an expanding presence in history departments and doctoral programs. Professor Bentley played an indispensable role in the development of the field. He began his career as a scholar of Renaissance Italy, but quickly became one of the leading figures in the world history movement of recent decades. He was the founding editor of the Journal of World History, and served as its editor from the first issue in 1990 until shortly before his death. He wrote one of the landmark works in the field in 1993, a study of cultural interactions within Eurasia entitled Old World Encounters. Through his work with the World History Association, the College Board Advanced Placement program, and his teaching at the University of Hawaii, he helped to elevate world history into a thriving field of both scholarship and pedagogy.

The Jerry Bentley Book Prize in World History will be awarded to the best book in each calendar year in the field of world history. Any book published in English dealing with global or world-scale history, with connections or comparisons across continents, in any period will be eligible. As with all of the book prizes that the American Historical Association awards, its elected Committee on Committees will choose members of a distinguished review panel to review all books submitted for the prize. Most books will be submitted by their publishers, but anyone can submit a book for consideration. The prize will be awarded at the AHA’s annual meeting in the first week of January, as part of the Association’s awards ceremony.

Donations can be submitted either online http://www.historians.org/donate/ or by check made out to the AHA and mailed to Bentley Prize c/o Robert B. Townsend, Deputy Director, American Historical Association, 400 A St., S.E., Washington, DC 20003. For further information, contact the fundraising co-chairs appointed by the AHA, Alan Karras (karras@berkeley.edu) or Merry Wiesner-Hanks (merrywh@uwm.edu); the prize committee also includes David Christian, Sharon Cohen, Karen Jolly, and Kerry Ward. All contributions are tax deductible.
An Empire of the Hejaz? An Examination of Sharif Hussein’s Pre-World War I Imperial Ambitions

James L. Bowden

The objective of this article is not to advocate nor partake of the role of apologist for any side of the extensive debate regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of imperialism in the Middle East. The intent is to add a new direction to the historiography of the consideration of either British or Arab understanding of the aftermath of World War I and the institution of the Mandate System.

This article will argue that if Sharif Hussein ibn Ali had been granted lands that were requested by him in a series of formal letters to British leaders in Egypt the region that briefly became known as the Kingdom of the Hejaz would have constituted an Arab based empire in the Middle East. This empire, and his requests, would not have been consistent with the ideal Pan-Arabism or of self-determination for those living in Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Thus it would have been as imperially invasive a regime as the British and French Mandates that were set up after the war.

The historiography of World War I in the Middle East is dominated by a preponderance of focus on the post-war political acts of the British and French while analysis of what post-World War I Arab moves may have been is relatively non-existent. The recent historiography has been almost, if not entirely, dominated by an anti-British and French anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist viewpoint that is post-modern in its approach and appears to be a native British reaction against its imperial past. This also manifests in an interpretative bias of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence in which many who have dealt with it overwhelmingly favor the Arab position against the British. The main argument is that the Mandate System set up following the war and the carving up of the Ottoman Empire resulting in smaller states represented an imposition of western civilization against the will of the native population. Indeed, in William Cleveland’s advance summary of the inter-war period in the Middle East he says that, “the Mandates were simply another name for imperial control….paying lip service to the widely publicized principle of self-determination.” This comment is largely representative of the broader historiography on this subject. However, lacking in this historiography has been discussion of what might have resulted had the Mandate System not been set up in the post-war Middle East. There has been no exploration as to what conflicts may have emerged as a result of a power vacuum and the absence of some form of governmental control. The potential for inter-tribal and multi-ethnic conflict in the post-World War I Middle East has not been thoroughly explored. One suspects it is because such arguments would undermine any notion of Pan-Arabism beyond an Arab intellectual elite and not extending to the common Arab person.

This pro-Arab bias has obscured the reality of what most likely would have transpired in the Middle East post-World War I and rejects the perspicuous interpretation that Hussein would have set up an empire of his own; equally disregarding of ethnic and religious minorities in the region as the French and British.

By looking at the evidence it emerges that in all likelihood an alternative empire would have imposed itself throughout the region. The native populations would have found themselves subject to an empire in some form, most likely Arabian based, and would have been denied “self-determination” equal to that as under the British, perhaps more, in reflection of the immediate predecessor Ottoman Empire.

Due to the anti-Western bias in the historiography it is hard to tease out the “what if” possibilities of the post-war era but it is not altogether impossible. William Cleveland, in his own work A History of the Modern Middle East provides much of the broader answers on this position when he labels Sharif Hussein an “ambitious ruler with dynastic pretensions.” In order for Hussein’s imperial ambitions and maneuvers to be clarified it is important to explore his role as Amir of Mecca within the Ottoman Empire, the correspondence that he carried out with the British Empire, and the events that transpired after the conflict. These all demonstrate a pattern of dynastic ambition and the quest for a political state dominating territory from Yemen to Syria, from Palestine to Mesopotamia--essentially the entire post-war Middle East.

The Role of the Amir of Mecca

Sharif Hussein ibn Ali was appointed as Amir of Mecca in 1908 by Abdul Hamid II. Hussein had lived in Istanbul for a decade along with his son, Abdullah, who was deputy of Mecca and represented it in the Turkish parliament. Peter Mansfield in A History of the Middle East refers to the region that Hussein oversaw as the “Kingdom of the Hejaz”. However, this language is misleading in its use, because Hussein’s role was not hereditary and no formal “kingdom” was envisioned for the area. A kingdom was established, but not until after the war and it only lasted from 1919-24. The Hejaz was an administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire and mainly served to administer the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The role of the Amir of Mecca was as a military governor and possessed significant autonomy in administering the region owing to its remoteness. The Ottoman government required the Amir to administer and ensure the safety of the Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, and other religious observances within his zone. This autonomy included the ability to maintain a small army and conducting political affairs with tribes or Bedouin groups.

According to Cleveland, and various sources, Sharif Hussein was already highly active in engaging the loyalty of local tribes and Bedouin groups upon assumption of the role. Indeed, as touched on above, even Cleveland called Hussein, “an ambitious dynast.” However, it became apparent closer to the outbreak of the war that Hussein was furthering these moves in a bid for a larger role, as an emperor rather than an administrator or king. Abdullah and Hussein claimed to have both been regularly connected to Euro-Turkish and Syrian intellectuals, secret societies, and bands of Arabs who expressed their discontent with Ottoman rule as a result of their position. However, there is no record of any correspondence between himself and those groups as well as any groups inside Mesopotamia and Palestine that reflect proposals towards becoming a united empire under his leadership. No records emerged in the extended post-war
negotiations between Hussein and Britain that could verify his claims. The only correspondence is in the form of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence.

The Turkish government became aware of these overtures and turned to Britain for independence from Istanbul. The Ottoman government had begun to consider its power by offering the role of Governor-General of Yemen; he refused the position and subsequently joined his father in the Hejaz. Hussein also adopted Islamic language and terms in his political quest. It is fairly clear that Hussein adopted this method of clothing his ambitions to rule all of the lands of Islam in the terms of Pan-Arabism. In his letters to Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, this language was particularly noticeable.

McMahon-Hussein Correspondence

The epicenter of the anti-British bias that has emerged has been the correspondence that took place between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon. The interpretation of the correspondence has depended on the post-war actions of both parties but with more criticism of the actions of Britain and France. However, this perspective has downplayed or simply ignored for political reasons Hussein’s own imperial ambitions as expressed in the correspondence.

In the correspondence we can observe Hussein working out an imperial agenda in fairly clear terms, especially in how much territory and how ethnically diverse this area was. Hussein was attempting to obtain the entire region of the Ottoman Middle East with the only exceptions being those places with large British populations, such as the Port of Aden. The letters are interesting on several levels and cannot be explored fully in this format, nonetheless it is important to note that the correspondence occurred over a three year period. The first period occurred just after the declaration of war by Britain and France on the Ottoman Empire in 1914. The letters continued on through March 1916, after the declaration of war by Britain and France on the Ottoman Empire occurred over a three year period. The first period occurred just after the declaration of war by Britain and France on the Ottoman Empire in 1914. The letters continued on through March 1916, after the declaration of war by Britain and France on the Ottoman Empire in 1914. The letters continued on through March 1916.

In letter no. 1, third paragraph, Hussein lays out his territorial requests by asking for “Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37th degree of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midhat, Jezerat, Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.” The request was predicated on his belief, stated in the first paragraph of the same letter that “the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice.”

In this initial letter to McMahon, Hussein also asks that England both “acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries” and at the same time, “approve the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate [Caliphate] of Islam.” Thereby England would be wholly responsible for dismantling the Ottoman Empire and then approving the creation of an empire under the auspices of Arab rule. This is not something the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial critics have effectively dealt with since Hussein would have been acknowledging that without British imperial support he could not create this Islamic empire. Another facet is that Hussein was adopting hyperbolic language when casting a broad and sweeping net and claiming that the whole of the Arab nation was not only in revolt but that it should essentially be given to him to set up his own Islamic Caliphate.

McMahon, in his reply letter no. 2, firmly rejected the predicated notion that all the Arabs were fighting for a freer life away from the Ottoman Empire. In the short letter he states that “we have learned, with surprise and regret, that some of the Arabs in those very parts, far from assisting us, are neglecting this their supreme opportunity and are lending their arms to the German and the Turk, to the new despoiler and the old oppressor.” McMahon’s response is confirmed by further witnesses; the book Hell in the Holy Land alludes to and describes in the latter portions the atrocities that Arabs on opposite sides of the war committed against each other. It appears that T. E. Lawrence sanctioned by fiat the abuse of prisoners, both Arab and Turkish, at the conclusion of some battles and Allenby’s final campaign. The indication is that Arab loyalties were split between Ottomans and the British offensive. Hussein once again tried to obscure this division and refers to strong Arab opinion in letter no. 3 by stating that “it is not I personally who am demanding of these limits which include only our race, but that they are the proposals of the people.” However, no correspondence appears to have been provided or has surfaced that demonstrates this unique and overwhelming unanimity of the Arab people. No documents have come to light that may have been exchanged between Arab leaders and Hussein and, if he did have approval, it most likely stemmed from local tribes and those on his periphery who would have had the most to gain such an alliance. The absence of letters affirming his position is a key historical problem for any anti-imperialist or anti-colonialist arguing that he had such backing. We simply cannot verify the accuracy of his claims. Hussein’s actions after the war also testify to a ruler who would resort to very unscrupulous methods in order to gain desired positions of authority.

In letter no. 3 Hussein continues to argue for the lands he has requested and states that “within these limits they have not included places inhabited by a foreign race. It is a vain show of words and titles.” Here Hussein rejects the claimed ethnic differences of Armenians, Kurds, Turks, Arabs, a number of foreigners from Europe or even the Americas in Jerusalem or in Baghdad and Basra. McMahon, an able statesman, rebuts Hussein’s assertion on this point in letter no. 4. He states that “the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab and should be excluded from the limits demanded[emphasis added].” This acknowledgement of regional and ethnic differences on the part of Britain was in this instance much more concrete than Hussein’s, an Arab who claimed on a number of instances within this limited correspondence to speak for the entire Arabic realm.

From the fifth letter onward Hussein shifted to the less ambitious
necessity for weapons, ammunition, and other supplies to initiate the rebellion within his administrative unit.

Post-War Fractures of the Middle East

There is one last major piece of evidence that Syrians, Mesopotamians, and Palestinians did not have Arab unification plans and Sharif Hussein would have imposed a model of imperial unification upon them. The evidence emerges from the post-World War I resolutions and conduct of the various polities that began to appear at the war’s conclusion. The areas such as Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, or Iraq, and even within Arabia itself began their own native independence movements and did not move to join together into a larger unit. Neither did any of Hussein’s son’s, Abdullah and Feisal, who were appointed leaders over the various Mandates, unite their Mandates to the Hejaz. 16

The desire for Syrian autonomy and local rule was amply demonstrated by the post-war situation in Damascus. Feisal, one of Hussein’s sons and the former deputy of Mecca, took over as leader of Syria and made no attempt to unite with his father’s Hejaz autonomous region. Later he was removed from this position and ultimately was accepted as the leader of Iraq, once again without any clear attempt to unite his Mandate with the Hejaz. The Mesopotamia people, under British rule, appear not to have launched a major move towards independence until the acceptance of Feisal. In Palestine there was a developing sense of self-determination and a noticeable rejection of the Hejaz for leadership despite the Hejaz forces having played a pivotal role in the British ability to end Ottoman resistance in Palestine.17

Sharif Hussein, however, continued seeking the position of Caliph of the former Ottoman Middle East. The current Caliph based in Istanbul was exiled and his position in the Turkish government eliminated. Hussein received the Caliph in the Hejaz for a brief visit but the title was not conveyed to Hussein. Hussein then proceeded to Palestine where he again attempted to assert a claim to this title. It was also in this time that Britain approached him with several diplomatic overtures to secure his signature on a treaty while offering substantial financial assistance. He rejected all of the offers and was quickly reduced in stature. Hussein’s pursuit of the Caliph title, his intransigence in the face of generous British offers of assistance, and failure to maintain his eastern borders point to a continued obsession to obtain the elusive goal of a restored Caliphate.18

These failures to unite the Mandates to the Hejaz, even considering that the leaders were Hussein’s sons, critically undermines any claim on his part to represent authoritatively the desires of the Arab people. However, this did not limit him from making broad demands for Middle East dominance. Hussein could not join with Iraq, Syria, or Transjordan all of which was connected by kinship and should historically invalidate the correspondence he undertook with the British.

This article has sought to demonstrate, in limited form, that the post-World War I circumstances could have resulted in an empire based in the Hejaz under the leadership of Sharif Hussein. The empire Britain would have allowed to take the place of the Ottoman Empire would have been as artificial and unique to the people of the region as the Mandates ultimately became. There is no evidence the anti-Western imperialist historiographers can produce that would argue an Arabic empire would have been any more representative of the people of the region or any better a solution to the disputes over land. The empire would have been highly ethnically distinct and upon any breakup of the empire the lines may have fallen approximate to those of the Mandates post-World War I and would have led to extensive conflict between disparate groups.

Sharif Hussein was given a significant role within the Ottoman Empire. However, Hussein’s ambitions made his role confining and increased his efforts for a larger realm. This ambition, imperialist in application and force, but by no means directly acknowledge as such, led Hussein to seek the assistance of the British Empire as the only means to obtain this goal. Hussein expressed this imperial ambition in his correspondence with British representatives in Egypt. In the letters, Hussein demonstrates that, having taken the pulse of Euro-Turkish intellectuals and various subversive groups in Syria, he interpreted these limited contacts as a broad mandate to rule the region, including those areas with which he had no formal correspondence or contact. It is also clear that Hussein was not able grasp, as well as McMahon did, the ethnic and religious diversity of the lands he was requesting.

1 William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East. 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 172. Charles D. Smith, “The Historiography of World War I and the Emergence of the Contemporary Middle East” in Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century. ed. Israel Gershoni, Amy Singer, and Y. Hakan Erdem (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 39-69. Smith mainly concentrates his historiographic focus on the earlier pro-imperialist British viewpoint that was more favorable to the Mandate System, which from reading a number of Arab related histories originating out of Britain, clearly is no longer the dominant historiographical tradition.
2 Williams, A History of the Middle East, 161.
4 Cleveland, History of the Modern Middle East, 161. Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, 149.
5 www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html
7 With the revolt being based in the Hejaz and through the mediation of Hussein and the reality that it did not spread much beyond the Hejaz the term “Arab Revolt” is significantly overly broad in its application to the movement.
8 Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, personal letter, July 14, 1915.
10 Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon, personal letters 7, 9, January 01, 1916 and February 18, 1916.
11 Sir Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein, personal letter,
William Barry served in the Eighth Brigade of the Australian Imperial Force (A.I.F.), 5th Division. Enlisting in 1915, Barry was one of many colonial soldiers who served during the First World War, including over four million men of color from the British, French and German Empires. Over the course of the war he saw service in Sri Lanka, Egypt and France. He was taken prisoner by the Germans during the Battle of Fromelles in July 1916. During his time as a soldier and as a prisoner of war, he met men from across the world – Russian, French, Indian, Irish, Sri Lankan and Australian. Barry is remarkable for the vivid diaries he kept of his experiences of serving and of imprisonment, now held at Imperial War Museums, London. The diaries demonstrate the dominant role played by encounters on Barry’s narrative; they are full of observations of the languages and cultures that he encountered during his arduous journey from enlistment to demobilization. This paper uses Barry’s encounters in his own words as a launch point to examining encounter as a method of reconceptualizing the colonial experience of war.

Barry’s is a mixed narrative: some encounters result in friendship, while others are tales of racism and discrimination. By focusing on personal encounters between different groups, a sanitized or glorified version of war is avoided. Just as Barry’s individual responses are complex, so too are interactions on a wider scale. Ann Laura Stoler has commented that “race is an inherent product of the colonial encounter, fundamental to an otherwise illegitimate access to property and power.” Stoler is writing in the context of the initial encounter during colonization, acknowledging both the awareness of racial difference during encounters and indeed the racism that occurred. However, encounter during the war might be seen on terms not completely devoid of an inherent racism but where it is less of an essential characteristic, taken outside the colonies to a different space. To employ Mary Louise Pratt’s term, though limited in her definition as necessarily a place of coercion, with a suggested absence of prior knowledge of the other, this moveable, flexible “contact zone” and the encounters that occurred within it, could provoke subtle and intricate responses.

One of Barry’s earlier encounters in Egypt, 1915, reflects some of the possibility of encounter between men of different races. The Australian men used to march down to the salt lakes connected by the Suez Canal and swim.

One day when having a swim, two companies of troops from Jamaica came down and it looked funny to see these fine bodied coloured men, for they were as black as coal, in the water with us chaps, and it wasn’t very long before we were the best of friends. Other days we would have a picnic as they called it. We would go over to one of the sweet water canals and lay under the shade of the trees, telling yarns or playing card till evening time and then we would come back to camp.

In this unfamiliar land, two distinct sets of men came together to share an experience and a friendship. Barry’s description creates a provocative visual image of white and black bodies mixing in the water. As established by Paul Fussell, soldiers bathing in groups are a familiar trope from First World War literature, particularly when observed by their officers. Fussell analyses this set piece, attributing its recurrence to the fact that “there’s hardly a better way of projecting poignantly the awful vulnerability of mere naked flesh.” The levels of poignancy are only furthered here by the racial differences between the men, white and black in a state of undress, the difference in skin color that had so many implications for their position within the racial hierarchy of empire so nakedly apparent. Barry admires the physique of his supposed imperial inferiors, “these fine bodied coloured men” and finds the racial difference and its physical intimacy an oddity but not problematic. This in itself could be seen as a racial trope, the sense of physical vitality of the “other” in contrast to the civilized body of the white colonizer. Yet, the white Australians do not observe the bodies of the black Jamaicans from afar but from equal footing in the water beside them. Even while both sets of soldiers were from the colonies, a racial differential operated between soldiers from the white settler colonies and those from the black native populations of colonized territories. In this account, the differential was breached.

There is a sense of this being a holiday, rather than happening within the context of conflict. The bond between the different troops as friends and equals contributes to this feeling of separation. Barry’s description of this encounter is idealized and nostalgic, full of an unexpected levity. This contributes to
the freedom of the encounter, its distance from the realities of both Empire and the War. Coming back to camp puts an abrupt end to the story. The account given lets us access not only the experience of Barry and his fellow Australians, but also that of the Jamaican soldiers. The personal encounters can reveal unseen dimensions and begin to illuminate areas of unrecovered history. However, the use of white writing about people of color must be considered carefully; the subaltern may speak but only on the terms of the colonizer. These men of color do not speak on their own terms within the encounter but Barry bears witness to the time they spent together in Egypt and reveals a side to the Jamaican war service that is not often considered.

Similar to the writing of A. E. Horner, a white padre serving with the British West Indies Regiment, who rather romantically described the friendships that developed between West Indian men and French civilians, Barry’s encounter allows the breadth of possibility of colonial encounters to be established. Horner writes of the West Indian men “telling them of their sunny home in broken French... earning for themselves the sobriquet which I have mentioned above, ’the friendly (or amiables) coloured soldiers’.”10 These encounters, albeit rendered idealistically are cited not to negate the racial discrimination suffered by the West Indian men during the war, but to add complexity to their stories.10 It allows the historian to consider the experience of these West Indian men in a different light from the official documents of the War Office and Colonial Office, deciding the role that black men were able to undertake during the war and where they would serve. Instead, the more personal elements of everyday existence and time away from the conflict in which conversation and friendship were allowed to develop come to light that were not restricted to those between the soldiers but which included civilians as well. The value in these anecdotes is in contributing to a reconceptualization of the war presented in official documents and a broader discourse of colonialism and racism, as well as in the detail and minuitiae they offer for personal histories.

William Barry’s extraordinary narrative also opens up the spaces in which men from the Empire and beyond would come into contact. Being taken prisoner by the German Army in 1916 did not end Barry’s encounters. The prisoner of war camp could be as equally a vivid space for encounter as the regular army camps and behind the lines.11 The men he met included a Hindu man from the 53rd Scinde Rifles who had been captured in 1914, who was nicknamed “Rajah” but whose real name was Madan Akhan.12 Barry and he developed a way of understanding each other, despite a lack of a common language. Barry also observes that Akhan was treated fairly by the Tommies.13 From him, Barry learned about the Muslim camp established by the Germans, which Akhan had been sent to, and how they attempted to turn the Indian soldiers against the British.14 The encounter was not just a source of companionship but also an exchange of information. The complexity of the treatment of men from different colonial backgrounds was made apparent to Barry through his interaction, not just through his own observations, though it seems to have more impact on his conception of the enemy and he “tricks” they had used. Barry accepted the structural circumstances that caused this difference of treatment and made no effort to reject this inequality on Akhan’s behalf.

Barry’s knowledge of the hierarchies of race operating in reality through the Empire was furthered in his friendship during his imprisonment with Ronald Ondatji from Ceylon, who had travelled to Britain to enlist as no “native” troops had been deployed from Ceylon.15 Barry is full of respect for the loyalty displayed by Ondatji, his commitment to the Empire, a very different response to the participation of men of color that many had. On their stop off in South Africa, civilian volunteers refused to serve the Maori men of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force with tea so their white counterparts had to bring it to them.16 Barry writes of Ondatji’s education at the Holy Trinity College at Kandy and the Ceylonese man’s sporting prowess. Ondatji had played against the M. A. Nobles Australian Eleven during the English tour. Clearly Ondatji was a man of education and physical strength, yet due to the restrictions established on the enlistment of men of color, he had had to travel to Britain to serve. Barry describes one evening when Ondatji got hold of some brandy distilled from plums “and it was very funny to see some of the capers he cut, especially when he was swinging my crutch about, hitting, as he thought, Noble for six.”17 The way that Barry presents Ondatji reflects a deep friendship existing between the men; he is a fully developed character in the narrative, someone with whom Barry shared moments of relief and intimacy within the confines of the prisoner of war camp.

This is not to present Barry as some unique fosterer of multicultural friendship; his narrative is mixed as previously established. As Ravi Ahuja has rightly argued, participants did not meet within the “contact zone” of colonial encounters without bringing with them their own intellectual baggage of preconceptions and prejudices.18 Barry frequently demonstrates racist behavior and attitudes: he enjoyed throwing potatoes at the Egyptian natives as just one example. What his narrative reveals is the nuance of colonial encounters and their complexity in reality, rather than in theory. Levels of contact and resulting intimacy depended on the individual circumstances and on the preconditions of the parties encountering each other. Nor does Barry’s narrative exist in isolation. Though his is a particularly well-travelled and vivid account that is unique to his particular war experience, many others were having similar encounters and interactions, facilitated by the mass mobilization and movements of war. Colonial experiences as witnessed through these encounters are not solely stories of relentless discrimination or degradation, nor could the encounters of war be considered the foundation of some idealized multiculturalism. Instead they serve to add tone and shadow to the experiences of war; moments created by it that existed only within its context, but which challenged existing structures of race and Empire.

While considering the experiences of minority groups solely through the eyes and words of white Dominion troops is potentially problematic, encounters were captured in many different forms: photographs, published memoirs, newspapers. The limits of archival collections in regards to the private papers of people of color during the war, many of whom came from predominantly oral traditions, necessitates the exploration of alternative points of access through interdisciplinary source material. By exploring the interactions between the men
mobilized for war, the civilian populations, and the various cities and sights they came to, the diverse nature of the experience of war (and Empire) becomes more visible, and the presence and experience of these unheard or understudied voices become more recognized. Not only can they become integrated into existing narratives, but begin to extend and form new stories of the war that move away from a Eurocentric focus.

Colonial encounters as a framework enhances the possibility of discovering the history of those whose records are absent from the archives. They also reveal the complexity and nuance in colonial experiences. As men and women from different parts of Empire came together, the fundamental structure of imperialism was challenged. For a hierarchy based on racism, the coming together of peoples like Barry and the Jamaicans or Indians or Sri Lankans he befriended was a potentially destabilizing moment. Imperial concepts were put to the test in the reality of war. Though all parties would have been imbriated within the discourses of empire, this did not stop a friendship occurring between individuals, regarding themselves as equals. Occasions like these should not be used to invalidate the racist discrimination and treatment that black and ethnic minorities received during the war. Rather, they reconceptualize the existing narratives to capture the depth and variety of experience.

2 Imperial War Museums [IWM], Documents.15006, Private Papers of William Barry
4 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes [London: Routledge, 1992], p. 6. She defines the “contact zone” as “the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict.”
5 Barry, p. 27.
8 Albert Egbert Horner was a British man who was based in the parish of St Matthew, Nassau, Bahamas between 1915-1919. From Clockford’s Clerical Directory [1932]. A. E. Horner, From the Islands of the Sea: Glimpses of a West Indian Battalion in France [Guardian Office, 1919], West Indian is used here to describe the nationality of these men; the British West Indies Regiment included men from Jamaica, the Bahamas and the other British West Indian colonies but no discrepancy is made between them.
11 Fellow members of the HERA project “Cultural Exchange in a Time of Global Conflict, Heike Liebau and Larissa Schmid, ZMO, Berlin are investigating colonial encounters at German prisoner of war camps.
12 IWM, Barry, p. 70.
13 Ibid.
14 Akhan is referring to the Halbmondlager or Half-Moon Camp in Zossen, near Berlin, where the German army attempted to turn Muslim soldiers fighting for Britain or France into jihadists loyal to Germany. Germany’s ally, the Ottoman Empire, had declared a jihad or holy war against Britain, France and Russia as enemies of Islam. See Heike Liebau in The World In World Wars. Experience, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia [Boston: Brill, 2010]
15 Barry p. 88. Ondatji’s regiment is not noted by Barry so it is not clear with whom he served or where he was taken prisoner. It does indicate the presence of men of colour within the British Army from diverse backgrounds. See also Stephen Bourne, Black Poppies: Britain’s Black Community and the Great War [London: History Press, 2014]
17 Barry, p. 88.
Maximum Advantage: Imperial Diplomacy and the United States, 1914 - 1917

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On 2 April 1917 President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany due to the “recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States.” In his address, Wilson went on to reference the now infamous Zimmerman Telegram to Mexico stating “…it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors….” The question that remains is why, after three and a half years of defending American neutrality, did the President end this policy? Another equally perplexing question concerns Germany’s decision to re-establish unrestricted submarine warfare and why it attempted to ally with Mexico. Was this the real reason for America’s entry into the European conflict? Few have tied American belligerency, and the period of American neutrality, to the established diplomatic tactics of British and German diplomats, but in fact, the long wait for America’s entrance into the First World War was a direct result of work done by British and German diplomats. Each belligerent sought something different from the United States. Both believed the key to ending the war on their terms, and therefore maintaining or expanding their empire, lay with the U.S. In order to understand the diplomatic maneuverings of the First World War in relation to the United States it is necessary to recognize that the diplomacy utilized by both Britain and Germany is one that was honed over time. As imperial nations, they were using diplomacy to force other nations to adjust their domestic and foreign policies. The diplomacy practiced on the United States during the First World War was simply an extension of these long established British and German diplomatic policies towards the U.S. That continuity of imperial diplomacy played a determining role in the American entry into the war, and is demonstrated in two ways. The first example is that of British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey and his ability to deflect U.S. complaints about the freedom of the seas and the blockade of German ports, Grey had the British Admiralty issue a depiction of the embodiment of the type of person with whom Americans wanted to do business. Grey’s approach was to use his skills as a diplomat to get what he wanted from the United States without jeopardizing the two countries’ budding friendship. A perfect example of this practice is his often quoted utterance that “The object of diplomacy…was to secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States.” The strategy Grey utilized was to press the U.S. as far as he dared without provoking retaliation. Grey’s method was time consuming, tending to draw disputes out over a long period of time. This allowed Britain to continue its actions while the United States formulated response after response to British questions instead of taking direct action. The fear of America breaking the blockade was real and therefore a source of strain on Anglo-American relations during the war.

Once the war had begun, Grey found it necessary to utilize these diplomatic tactics to change the focus of U.S. complaints from one of international legality, to a concern for American public opinion in order to keep the United States from effectively challenging Britain’s blockade of Germany. It was U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan who, at the outset, appealed to all belligerent nations to abide by the Declaration of London of 1909. A product of the 1908 London Conference, the Declaration of London was supposed to be an updated set of rules by which the signatory nations agreed to the conduct of Navies during war. In August 1914 America’s sole interest in the war was neutral rights and the freedom of the seas. The Declaration of London was seen by the United States as a means of ensuring those rights and American trade with all nations.

The British naval blockade of Germany placed British policy in conflict with American interests. Had it not been for the diplomatic actions of Foreign Secretary Grey, American insistence of freedoms of the seas could have seriously harmed British-American relations, and more germane to the issues of August 1914, it could have wrecked the British war effort. Understanding that the United States would balk at a British blockade of German ports, Grey had the British Admiralty issue orders to treat U.S. ships as friendly neutrals when encountering them at sea. In an attempt to appease the Wilson Administration, Grey then assured the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, that Britain would attempt to purchase “innocent contraband” in American ships instead of confiscating it. Grey also promised that “[all] due consideration [would] be given to American claimants.” This statement instilled a false sense during its period of neutrality followed the same patterns as those that had been formulated in previous decades.

To our first example: Sir Edward Grey’s ascension to British Foreign Minister in 1905 saw him continue the policy initiated by his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne, in 1896. Lansdowne’s position regarding the United States was to cultivate his American counterparts, setting the cornerstone for future dealings with the country. As historians C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill argue, “to seek accommodation and call it friendship.” While it has been popular to degrade Grey’s character and abilities he has been described as “wise and experienced in the ways of diplomacy…ideally suited to influence Americans…” a perfect example of this practice is his often quoted utterance that “The object of diplomacy…was to secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States.” The strategy Grey utilized was to press the U.S. as far as he dared without provoking retaliation. Grey’s method was time consuming, tending to draw disputes out over a long period of time. This allowed Britain to continue its actions while the United States formulated response after response to British questions instead of taking direct action. The fear of America breaking the blockade was real and therefore a source of strain on Anglo-American relations during the war.

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of security in both American businessmen and the Wilson administration that U.S. maritime commerce would not be severely interfered with while Britain conducted its strangulation of Germany. Because complaints from shipping companies, while numerous, were not flooding into the State Department, and Britain was purchasing perishable goods and agreeing to pay for losses incurred by their actions, Grey seemed to have been quite content.

The Secretary of State’s office was still adamantly in favor of the British. Grey had not had the right to detain neutral ships carrying material to neutral countries without direct proof that the cargo was intended for use as a belligerent’s military. Regardless of British assurances, the U.S. State Department deemed that the declarations to the Declaration of London as clear violations of long-standing international laws. State Department Councillor Robert Lansing, along with members of the Joint Neutrality Board, immediately began dissecting the British decision to find a legal basis – and therefore a legal rebuttal – for it in international law. Based on their findings Lansing recommended to President Wilson that the U.S. refuse to accept British actions on legal grounds, stating that British policy was so far out-of-bounds legally that it required America’s “unqualified refusal.”

Lansing drafted a letter that focused specifically on the illegality of Britain’s actions according to international law and established practices of both the United States and Great Britain. Deeming the letter a virtual act of war, Presidential Advisor Colonel Edward House rewrote it with input from the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. Focusing on the importance of public opinion in America – something the British had been concerned with since their declaration of war on 5 August – this new letter “threw away a good legal case.”

Despite Lansing’s complaints that he was “not satisfied with [the letter]” because too much had been left out, in its final form it addressed Britain’s contraband vessel and cargo policy. It also reiterated the United States’ disappointment that the Declaration of London had not been accepted in full and again called for the unmodified use of the Declaration’s language. It also outlined the United States’ problems concerning the British policy of independently deeming licit cargo illicit and confiscating vessels. The letter ended by criticizing Britain for her anti-neutral actions. Lansing’s note also made it clear that Wilson understood the reasoning behind the British position, and though the United States could not stand for violations of its commerce with neutral nations, it would not formally protest the matter. Upon receipt of the letter Grey noted his appreciation that Wilson had not formally protested the British offer, but that he refused to accept the Declaration of London without modification because parliament had never ratified it; therefore it did not legally bind Britain to follow it as written. Deftly, Grey declared that not one of the detained cargos had been confiscated. Each had, instead, been “sold at full value with no loss to the exporter.”

Grey’s statement forced the Wilson administration away from the claim that British practices on the high seas were harming American commerce. Even the most ardent supporter of neutral rights had to take into account that despite the fact that goods were not reaching their intended destination, shippers were receiving full value for their goods. Grey acted decisively to minimize discussion and maximize his diplomatic victory. He agreed to rescind the Order in Council of 20 August only to define twenty-one new items to be considered absolute contraband and another fifteen conditional contraband items on 9 October. For the next month Grey continued to turn down kindly, but forcefully, American requests to abide by the declaration without modification. Regardless of the fact that Grey had won the battle over the Declaration of London, he continued to lay the groundwork for favorable responses from those making United States foreign policy and the majority of American public opinion while not giving up the potential means of winning the war. The crux of the matter was that Britain’s list of contraband still interfered with the United States’ trade not only with the belligerent nations, but with all European nations. For the Wilson administration it was still about the freedom of the seas – the same issue over which the United States had been fighting with Britain since 1812. The British Foreign Office did not consider the continued debate over British interference with U.S. trade a failure. They had succeeded in turning the Wilson administration’s protests from a question of the legality of British actions to one of U.S. public opinion.

To be sure, Grey still had to work to guarantee that the majority of Americans favored supporting Britain in one way or another, but he now had the U.S. government focused on it as well. This seemingly insignificant victory for Britain’s diplomats loomed large as the war continued. With this change in focus, Grey now had more flexibility in administering the blockade because the focus would be on the impact on the American people and not on the legality of British actions. As long as the United States was committed to debate the merits of maritime rights, and licit and illicit goods on the grounds of public opinion, Grey would not have to seriously worry about the possibility of negative action by the American government. At this point in the war, debate and the appearance of negotiation ensured a benevolent and neutral United States.

Clearly, American interests rested not in the Declaration of London alone, but in the hindrance of trade by the British. A large part of the debate over illicit goods rested on the interference of American trade with other neutrals. The Royal Navy intercepted all ships traveling in the North Atlantic and, in particular, the North Sea. If vessels were found to be carrying items on either of the contraband lists, or items that Britain deemed could be transferred to Germany, they would be escorted to a British port and held over until a Prize Court could make a ruling on whether or not the cargo met the criteria of contraband.

At this point the problem became the U.S. protests over British definitions of licit and illicit goods and the effects of British policy on U.S. industrial output. Grey continued to hold the line and not allow anything through that would help Germany. When the Royal Navy stopped vessels carrying cargo to neutral countries, he simply claimed that the country had not given assurances not to re-export those goods on to Germany, thus stopping the problem of continuous voyage.

The U.S. Secretary of State’s office was being inundated with complaints from shipping companies about their vessels and cargo being held up in British ports either awaiting inspection or...
awaiting the decision of a British Prize Court. For the shipping companies, they were not only losing valuable time due to their ships being impounded by the British, they were also losing money as their cargo sat in the harbor. If the cargo was perishable, the company stood to lose money because it would simply rot while waiting for the Prize Court findings. Lansing beseeched Page to bring these matters to Grey’s attention. Page did speak with the Foreign Secretary on the subject, but Grey rebutted his complaints by noting that because neutral countries bordering Germany were receiving shipments of contraband that exceeded their normal pre-war imports, Britain was forced to detain these cargos until it was evident that the materials were not destined for Germany.17

Within the Wilson Administration, Grey’s answer was not satisfactory. The Secretary of State’s office was still adamant that Britain had no right to detain neutral ships carrying material to another neutral country without direct proof that the cargo was intended for a belligerent’s military. They also argued that Britain was detaining ships without full disclosure of the reason. The British maintained that because they did not have the manpower to search each ship at sea; they had to force these ships to port in order to perform a more thorough search.

In response to U.S. complaints, Grey issued a series of notes concerning each of the ships detained in British ports stating that the ships in question and their cargo had been put into prize court so that ship owners could prove the neutral destination of their cargo. Since 1900 British law had stated that the burden of proof regarding the destination of materials rested on the captor. But Grey, in negotiating with the United States, had taken the opportunity to quietly rescind the order and shift the burden of proof to the owner of the goods.

In forcing the owners of cargoes detained in British ports to prove the neutral nature of the goods, Grey put pressure on the United States to do something about the contraband items leaving U.S. industry and heading for Germany via a circuitous route. Despite U.S. complaints about detained ships and cargo, Grey managed to maintain his position, and appeased the United States. His ability to manage both of these feats is based on the knowledge of the number of ships leaving U.S. ports from the beginning of the war to the third of January 1915, only eight had been put into Prize Court.18 Additionally, of a total of nineteen hundred ships intercepted during this time frame, only thirty were even sent to port for further examination. Grey had the facts to dispel the complaints of the shipping companies, show that American commerce had not been overly burdened by British search and seizure methods and convince Wilson’s administration that next to no harm was being done to United States commerce. British diplomacy had maintained the blockade of Germany and retained U.S. support of Britain.

From the German point of view things were very similar. The idea of diplomatic maneuvering based on long standing practice that started with the European-centered policies of Otto von Bismarck. The idea being that all foreign policy must solidify Germany’s place in Europe first and foremost. Diplomacy was to be used to “exploit and moderate” European adversaries in order to strengthen Germany’s influence. German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman’s proposal of alliance to Mexico was the practice of European-centered policies being put to use against the United States.

In order to understand why an alliance with Mexico was an option for Germany, it is important to have a clearer understanding of the situation that Germany was in. On 7 February 1915, in a response to the British blockade of Germany, Chancellor Theobald Bethmann Hollweg attempted to solidify Germany’s place by issuing an official proclamation clearly outlining the illegality of Britain’s blockade. The proclamation pointed out that Germany’s use of the submarine against neutral shipping was a direct result of neutral nations either having the inability to, or consciously not forcing, Britain to end her blockade.19

Wilson’s response is now commonly known. On 10 February 1915, U.S Ambassador to Germany James Gerard was directed to pass on a note to Germany, which he dutifully delivered to on 12 February. The note reminded Germany that legally, belligerent rights were limited to visit and search of neutral ships unless a blockade was declared and effectively maintained. This was followed by statements proclaiming the use of submarines to be “unprecedented in naval warfare”, “indefensible violation of neutral rights” and that “the United States would…hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability.”20 This reaction came as a shock to the German leadership. German Chief of General Staff, Erich v. Falkenhayn, regarded the letter as a threat of war and the German Foreign Office began to work feverishly on its new policy towards the United States to prevent them from entering the war due to the use of the submarine.21

The first casualty of the submarine enforced war zone was recorded on 28 March 1915 when the German submarine U-28 sank the British ship Falaba off the Irish coast with the loss of 104 crew members and passengers, including one American. This was followed by an aerial attack on the U.S. ship Cushing on 29 April, and then on 1 May the American steamer Gulflight was torpedoed. All three of these attacks were overshadowed in a matter of days with the sinking of the Lusitania off the coast of Ireland on 7 May 1915.

When the British steamer Arabic was sunk three months later on 19 August 1915, the German Foreign Office and the U.S. Secretary of State’s office were still in negotiations over the sinking of the Lusitania. The question for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic would be if – despite earlier German assurances that neutral shipping would be spared from submarine attacks – the United States would continue with paper protests only. On 30 August 1915, two days before Germany issued its official statement regarding the sinking of the Arabic, Gerard was notified that Germany was preparing to express regret and offer reparations.22

As was then expected in the White House, on 1 September 1915, German Ambassador Bernstorff delivered the official German note that would become known as the “Arabic Pledge”. The note simply restated the instructions given to submarine commanders after the Lusitania was sunk: that liners would not be sunk without warning and without safety being provided for non-combatants provided the liners do not attempt to escape or resist.23

When the French steamer Sussex was sunk in the English Channel on 25 March 1916, a mere six months after the
American antagonism of Mexico clearly led to the maneuver based on long established Bismarckian traditions. Mexico could distract the United States long enough for victory. Long held beliefs in diplomacy. Zimmermann's calculation that and therefore the creation of an alliance based on Germany's guarantee victory led its leaders to gamble that anti-American. The growing German belief that the submarine was the very least, force the Entente to sue for peace on Germany's terms.

The reality of Zimmermann’s proposed alliance against the United States, if they were to join the war, was that of diplomatic necessity. The near seventy years of animosity between Mexico and the United States coupled with Mexican proposals for a war against America to regain lost territories led the German Foreign Office to believe that Carranza’s support was a safe bet. Add to the decision making process that once the decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare had been made and the date for its commencement set, Zimmermann was tasked with finding a way to prevent war with America. In theory, if Mexican forces had attacked the United States, Wilson would have been forced to resolve that issue, pulling men, money, and arms from the allies in order to defend America from a direct attack from Mexico, giving the German submarines time to starve England into submission and German armies time to wear down allied troops to the point that they sue for peace. An alliance with Mexico as a means of keeping the United States from sending troops to Europe fit Bismarckian diplomacy and seemingly met the needs of the German military.

That the United States joined the Entente in fighting against Germany does not preclude that Bethmann Hollweg and the rest of the diplomatic corps worked within their diplomatic belief pattern and successfully maintained American neutrality until April 1917. German diplomacy has to be considered successful, for despite the multitude of issues facing Germany, U.S. neutrality was maintained until April 1917, thereby extending the time the German military had to win the war. American intervention occurred only after German political and military leaders deemed that without the use of the submarine it could not fight another year. Clearly the attempt at an alliance with Mexico was a gamble, but it was a gamble based on Germany’s long standing diplomatic theory and it was employed in the hopes of simply distracting the United States from the war long enough to force a decision.

In the end, it was a multitude of events that led to American entry into the First World War. The German offer to Mexico, and the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare and the subsequent sinking of multiple U.S. flagged ships around the British Isles all played a role in Wilson’s decision to ask Congress for war. At the same time it is important to understand that British policy prevented the United States from retaliating against British violations of maritime law. This allowed the British to implement their military plans to starve Germany of the goods it needed to prosecute the war, while at the same time not drifting away from American friendship.

The policy of British and German diplomats was one that had been established decades before the first shots were fired in August 1914. Both Britain and Germany strove to maintain friendly relations with the United States, but only as long as it did not interfere with their efforts to win a decisive military
victory. In short, First World War diplomacy was an extension of long established British and German diplomatic policies towards the United States, and this continuity of diplomacy played a determining role in the American entry into the war.

British and German diplomats repeatedly outmaneuvered the United States: Sir Edward Grey’s decisions to work with the United States over the issues surrounding Britain’s blockade of Germany; Bethmann Hollweg’s attempt to allow the German submarine force to do as much damage to British shipping as it could without forcing a break with the United States; and Germany’s attempt to use Wilson’s Mexican policy to maintain U.S. neutrality. These instances illustrate the diplomatic success of both Britain and Germany in their respective attempts to gain the maximum advantage in attaining American acquiescence to their policies.

5 Grey to Spring Rice, 29 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 372/600.
8 Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson, 27 September 1914, United States Department of State / Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing papers, 1914-1920 (in two volumes) Volume I (1914-1920), pp. 247-248; Particular members included James Brown and Eugene Wambaugh.
9 Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson, 27 September 1914, United States Department of State / Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing papers, 1914-1920 (in two volumes) Volume I (1914-1920), pp. 247-248.
11 Lansing’s note was heavily edited by both President Wilson and Colonel Edward M. House.
16 Lansing did not argue this interruption of trade until it began affecting the U.S. market, at which point copper, rubber, and cotton were the main items of discussion.
18 Harris to Grey, 5 January 1914, Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 800/88, Admiralty # 260.
19 Memorandum of the German Government concerning retaliation against Great Britain’s illegal interference with trade between neutral and Germany, United States Department of State / Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement, The World War: Part II: Neutral Rights, pp. 96-97; Doerries, Imperial Challenge, p. 80.
20 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany (Gerard), 10 Feb. 1915, United States Department of State / Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement, The World War: Part II: Neutral Rights, pp. 98-100.
22 Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of
The Serbian Prisoners as Volunteers

Lee Chinyun

At the outbreak of World War I the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was a multinational empire, with an army of very diverse origins: Slovenes comprised 2.4 percent; Serbo-Croats, 9; Czechs, 12.9; Magyars, 23.1; and Germans, 25 percent. Nevertheless, few nationals complained at the prospect of enlisting. Their initial enthusiasm was not rewarded, however, and the Monarchy’s army was miserably defeated, with many captured. Several Austro-Slavic soldiers were taken captive by the Russians in Galicia. Those on the Balkan battlefields fared no better. On the contrary, the tenacity of the Serbians was beyond anyone’s expectations, and won the respect of the Allies. In the second half of 1914 the Battles of Cer and Kolubara were the first Allied victories. In spite of their successes, the Serbians lost at the Brusilov Offensive of June and July 1916. The POW population in Russia then stabilized at two million. On hearing the call of their Russian brethren, the captive Austro-Slavs changed their minds and their allegiance. They set up Serbian Volunteer Divisions to help the Russians, a decision inspired by the founding of Yugoslavia. By the end of August 1915, under the terms of the Russo-Serbian agreement, about 3,500 Serb volunteers were sent home. That door was soon shut, however, when, in October of that year, Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers.

Thanks to the efforts of Marko Cemović, the Serbian consul at Odessa, in January 1916 17,000 Serbs were organized into the First Volunteer Division around Kiev; in March of the same year Serbian officers arrived from Corfu, by way of England, to take command. On August 24, 1916 General Mihailo Jivković led them into battle against the Bulgarians at Karasina, the marshy area of Dobrudja; by the end they had lost three-quarters of their number. The campaign, however, had two positive results. It welded the Serbian Division into an organic unity, enhancing the men’s and the officers’ mutual respect; it also proved the reliability of the Division to their superiors. Dobrudja was, in fact, the only campaign carried out by Serbian Divisions under Russian supervision. Tsar Nicholas II therefore ordered the formation of a second Volunteer Division. The Second Serbian Volunteer Division was created in Odessa, after the battle of Dobrudja. Of the twenty thousand men in that Division, 11,169 had specified their nationality; there were 6,200 Serbs, 3,144 Croats, and 1,556 Slovenes; Czechs, the non-Yugoslav nationals, numbered 193. At the end of August 1916 the Czechoslovak
Legion was formed, and about a hundred Czechs left the Serbian Division to join it. Some, though, decided to stay. The Volunteer Divisions included multiple Slav ethnicities—Czechs, Slovenes, and Croatians—thus fulfilling the dream of Pan-Slavism.

Some POWs received special treatment. The following was documented by George P. Conger, who worked in Siberian prison camps for a year and a half as Y.M.C.A. Secretary.

(In World War I) Germany pays her Russian prisoners officers about 100 marks a month, and Russia pays her captive Germans about the same sum, or 50 Rubles. Out of this latter sum the prisoner officers in Siberia pay for their food and side purchases; their lodging is gladly furnished them without charge.

The story of Stephen Polyak is proof that these Balkan intelligentsia prisoners in Russia obtained a special position. Born on December 13, 1889, in northern Croatia, Stephen Polyak was educated at the Classical Gymnasium in Zagreb and at the University of Graz in Austria. The training he had begun in 1909 at the Medical School in Graz was interrupted by the outbreak of war. In the first three months, while attached to the Medical Corps of the Austro-Hungarian army, he participated in battles on the Russian front, but was captured, and interned at Kiev. Later he was employed as a physician in a Russian military hospital and in the Medical Corps of the Serbian Volunteer Divisions. Although the General Staff of the Russian army granted his request to return to Serbia, and issued him a special passport, he failed to reach it. He was, however, permitted to register at the Medical School of the New Russian University in Odessa, where, after two semesters, he received his MD degree in the fall of 1916. In 1928 he immigrated to the USA, and became a professor of neurology.

Disintegration and Removal

No sooner had the Divisions been created than they started to disintegrate. From the fall of 1915 Russia extensively employed POW labor. They worked in factories, farmhouses, and mines, and on construction sites. Many were killed by typhus. At the end of October 1916 they mutinied. According to Ivo Banac, 44 percent of the South Slav volunteer POWs then either deserted or withdrew from the corps. Eight thousand men left during the especially cold winter of 1916-17.

In March 1917 the Revolution occurred. In the summer of that year the Volunteer Corps shed about 20,000 of its members, reducing it to half of what it had been before the February Revolution. The October Revolution saw volunteers join units of the Red Army: Aleksa Dundić (born 1890s; died July 8, 1920), for example, a Croatian Communist with the First Division, was a prominent participant in October. He stayed in Russia after the war, ending his life in battle in Rovno, Ukraine.

After the Revolution, the future of the Serbian Divisions became problematic. On July 20, 1917, the Corfu Declaration was signed. Pressure grew for the Divisions to be removed to the Salonika front. The Czechoslovak Legion hoped for a transfer to France. Jivković approached George William Buchanan (1854-1924), the British ambassador in Petrograd, to ask for assistance in getting his divisions moved to Salonika. The Kerensky Government temporized, and pleaded lack of transport. Thanks to extreme efforts on the part of Elsie Inglis, a Scottish physician working in Russia, an order from London finally agreed that the Serbian Divisions should depart Russia as a priority. In early September 1917, the Second Division of three thousand sailed from Archangel, passed through Britain and, on December 5, arrived in Salonika; Polyak was among them. Part of the First Division left by the same route on November 13, on the last ships to leave the port before ice closed it. British ships carried the Serbian Divisions to the Salonika front, where they arrived in February 1918. Altogether there were about 12,500 volunteers from Russia and Yugoslavia. They were among the Allied forces involved in the breach of the Salonika front and in freeing their homeland in 1918.

Escape to Manchuria

Serbian captives scattered throughout Ukraine and escaped from Siberia to Manchuria. The Second Brigade was forced to leave Russia with the help of the Japanese, by way of the Manchuria Railway and Dairen. On the way they were joined by many Russian officers. A Russian Admiral, Kolchak, left with this brigade, and then went to America. In January 1918, fourteen Serbian captives pleaded for assistance in the Russian Consulate at Shenyang, which then asked the Chinese Government for free transportation (Manchuria was under the influence of the White Russians). The Chinese government rejected the Russians’ repeated requests to send the Serbian POWS back, and reiterated its protection of them, because China had been a signatory of the Hague Convention since 1907. For this reason the Chinese Government set up three POW camps in Manchuria, lodging 149 Serbian and Yugoslavian captives. There were the Jilin Camp (吉林, set up on October 23, 1916), the Longjiang Camp in Qiqlar (齊齊哈爾, on September 15, 1918), and the Hailun Camp (海倫, on March 9, 1917); the last two were in Heilongjiang Province. The Longjiang camp contained German and Austrian Bolshevist POWs who had fought with the Czech Legion in Siberia. In the Hailun Camp, Turkish Muslims, very possibly including Bosnians, were allowed to perform their religious rituals in one corner. Three Manchurian camps could receive assistance by telephone from the Dutch embassy in Beijing.

The Chinese Government provided food and drink, a living allowance (higher than the expenditures of an average Chinese family), and medical care. One POW Hospital was set up in Beijing for the more severely sick and wounded. Chinese support for Siberian POW camps started in the first year of the war. The American Red Cross sent supplies to the POWs by way of Manzholi railway station (滿州里). Urgently needed typhus vaccine came from Tianjin, and a German company, Arnhold & Karberg & Co. (瑞記洋行), donated 2,000 boots and other staples.

To Xinjiang

Some Serbians retreated through Central Asia to China. In 1920 Serbian Army Captain Ujizi (烏依奇) crossed the Russo-Chinese border with his soldiers, and escaped to Xinjiang (Chinese Turkistan). According to their own account, after being abandoned in Russia, without logistical support, they had no choice but to wait at Qoqek (Chöchek, or Tacheng 塔城)
War this camp accommodated 162 Austrian captives. After consulting with the Chinese foreign minister, on March 21 the Xingjian Province governor opened the door. The French embassy advanced them 200 taels. They required eight carts for travel from Qoqek to Anxi in 33 days, and 825 silver taels for accommodations and food, at the rate of one tael per day per person. In the early twentieth century Xinjiang was a distinctly peripheral Chinese possession. The two shorter routes from Xinjiang to Beijing, each taking 13 days – by rail and motor, respectively – were under Russian control, making them impractical since the Revolution.

The group included women, which means intermarriage existed between the Serbs and the Russians. The Monarchy had never approved of this international marriage. Austro-Hungarian census takers collected the names of several thousand POWs who had either married Russian women or intended to do so. They were very worried about these attachments, and regarded them as evidence of disloyalty on the part of the prisoners.

A year later two more Serb soldiers escaped to Xinjiang and, again, the French embassy handled the matter. Around 1917 the Chinese Government dealt with it by establishing a camp to give the Slavic captives asylum.

In Beijing

The last story we will consider here is that of the Austrian captives who were stationed in Beijing before World War I. After the Boxer Rebellion (1899), Austria dispatched a military force to protect the Austrian Accession in Tianjin, and a diplomat’s guard to do the same for the Austrian Consulate in Beijing. In addition, the Austrian Navy set sail for China. Upon China’s declaration of war with Austria on August 14, 1917, 138 Austrians, including 30 Serbian sailors, found themselves encircled at Wanshouxi camp, Xiyuan (西苑), a Qing royal temple. Forty Serbian sailors of the Austrian ship Elizabeth were interned elsewhere in Beijing. In fact, since arriving in China before the war, few of the captives had ever fought; indeed, they led a comfortable life, at least by comparison with the soldiers who were struggling to survive in the front trenches.

The facilities in the Beijing camps were better than those in Manchuria and Xinjiang. The prisoners played music, football, tennis, and other sports, and practiced acrobatics; they received mail regularly, drank in the bar, and were allowed to travel outside for three to four hours twice a week. At the end of the War this camp accommodated 162 Austrian captives.

The post war period saw new nations achieving independence from the Monarchy, confusing the Chinese Government, which felt it could no longer tell friend from foe. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to release captives under three conditions: the POW himself or herself had to claim freedom; his or her consulate or representative consulate had to approve; and they had to either leave China at once, or remain under the supervision of their consulate until their departure. Dutch, French, and Russian diplomats helped in assessing the POWs’ nationality—something of which not every POW, even, was sure. A Czech captive named Pilfusek, for example, surrendered his Czech nationality, and preferred to be an Austrian citizen under the new Republic.

Transportation home was a very uncertain affair. Three ports in East Asia yielded access to Europe: Vladivostok, Tianjin, and Shanghai. Some rushed north to Vladivostok from Shanghai, and some went in the reverse direction, depending on the availability of ships and space. On March 1920, 19 of the Serbian captives were released to Vladivostok to sail home, and the last group of prisoners returned in the summer of 1921.

It is of great interest that the only time the idea of Pan-Slavism prevailed among the Serbian Volunteer Corps in Russia was during the war, with all its extremities and pressures. The volunteers worked well together, and acquitted themselves bravely. That harmony, however, proved all too brief, dissolving at the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution. China dedicated six camps to helping Serbian Austrian POWs. The Beijing captives lived utterly beyond the repercussions of the war, and enjoyed a relaxed life. It is in this way, moreover, that Serb refugees are connected with the larger history of Eurasia.
Puerto Rican Soldiers in the First World War: Colonial Troops For A New Empire

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“Race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing, plastic process subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions.”

In 1917, Eduardo Curbelo, born in the coastal town of Ponce in southern Puerto Rico, enlisted to serve in the United States Army even though he had already two daughters, one of them my mother, not yet one year old. He became part of the Porto Rico Infantry Regiment and was sent for training to the Panama Canal Zone. What prompted him to sign up? What made him leave Porto Rico to feel it was their war too? Of course, we can speak of imperial coercion, but there is more to it than the obvious burden of subalternity.

Many years later my grandfather told me that it was out of a sense of duty combined with a sense of adventure that he signed up for the Army but he could not pinpoint which one moved him more. Although he was aware of the horrors of trench warfare, there were ideals to fight for, and also a vague feeling that war could bring some kind of change in his life. He did not get the chance to fight in Europe because the conflict ended as the Puerto Rican regiment was preparing to sail for France but nevertheless his life was transformed as an intense wave of modernization – both cultural and technological- precipitated by the war spread over the whole world.

German sociologist Georg Simmel believes that Europe embraced war in 1914 trying to find a social bond that has been lost amidst the momentous and often ruthless transformations of the 19th century. As “a prophetic wind” – in the words of another sociologist, Max Weber, - the roar of the August guns constituted a calling for many anxious to escape the multiple contradictions of modernity. Ironically, the Great War that caused the death of more than eight million people, solidified even more capitalist structural tenets, and nurtured mass consumerist culture through technologies tested during the conflict (such as propaganda).

The First World War appears in Puerto Rican historiography mostly as a far away event with no significant impact except for the increased militarization of the territory and the recruitment of the new American citizens into the US Armed Forces. I think that the first centennial of the Great War constitutes a good moment to go back to our own war “trenches”, that is, to assess how our country experienced the war, not just in a military or political sense, but also in everyday life and how during the entire 20th century war dictated destiny for Puerto Rico. Specially, how the conflict that ended in 1918 unveiled the limits and contradictions within our still emerging colonial relationship with the United States.

The War to End All Wars

War became one of the principal topics of public conversation in Puerto Rico as news of the general mobilizations of both the Central Powers and the Entente reached our country. Because the United States was not a belligerent power, La Correspondencia, the leading newspaper in the island,
continuously reminded its readers of President Wilson’s warnings of not to discuss anything related to the conflict and avoid any appearance of entanglement. 4 However, public opinion in Puerto Rico was decidedly on the side of the Entente. As in many countries in Latin America such as Argentina and Mexico, Puerto Rico experimented in the last decade of the 19th and beginnings of the 20th century a strong affinity with French cultural production and urban proposals. 5 The a francesamiento was particularly evident in architecture, literature, journalism and city planning. When the war broke out, it was seen as an aggression to French ideals of civilization.

Germans became the “despised Huns” and war was depicted as civilization’s crusade against barbaric hordes. Exactly one month before the start of hostilities, there had been public festivities in San Juan honoring the 125th anniversary of the Bastille. 6 War illuminated once more the epic and heroic character of France and many Puerto Ricans of French and Corsican descent volunteered to serve in the French Armed Forces when the General Consulate in San Juan posted on August 24 the general mobilization order. For many of those young men eager to step into battle, war was being fought to preserve the best ideals of humanity, to protect the land of the forefathers, symbolized by the courageous Marianne. 7 If Puerto Rico was their “little homeland,” France was “the historical and cultural motherland.” For Victor Véve, Carlos Bartolomei and Antonio Fantauzzi, and many others, war would be a rite of passage, for others, their final destiny. When an aspiring journalist named Luis Muñoz Marín, who in 1948 would become Puerto Rico’s first elected governor, asked a young peasant that has just arrived to San Juan from the countryside about his place of birth, the man answered: “In Jayuya, sir, but I am going to die in France.” 8

It is not surprising then that the first American shots in the conflict originated from one of the batteries of El Morro Castle in Puerto Rico. In March 21, 1915, Lt. Teófilo Marxuach, a Puerto Rican-born US officer, ordered fire upon the German merchant vessel Odenwald after its commander disobeyed neutrality dispositions during a stopover at the port of San Juan. The vessel was carrying munitions and other materials to supply German submarines roaming in the Atlantic. The German ship returned to port where it was confiscated and renamed as the USS Newport. The incident was denounced by Germany as a breach of the neutrality stand set up by the United States. 9

Puerto Ricans became American citizens by virtue of the Jones Act in 1917. The granting of citizenship after two decades of American dominion over the island acquires full significance with the almost simultaneous entry of the United States in the Great War and German geopolitical designs in the New World. By purchasing the Danish Virgin Islands in 1916, the US frustrated German ambitions to obtain territories in the Caribbean.

Once the war started in 1914, Puerto Rico’s strategic importance, especially as a naval base, increased. The imminent entry of the United States in the war provided an opportunity for the Puerto Rican majority political party (the autonomist Union party) to secure reformist gains from US Congress among them a popular-elected Senate, American citizenship, and the elimination of the anachronistic Executive Council (a remnant of the early colonial period). 10 In 1940, as another war loomed in the horizon, Puerto Rico was able again to gain political reforms benefiting from its strategic importance. 11

The Puerto Rican peasant that envisioned a glorious death in French battlefields and my grandfather were two of the many thousands that answered the call to arms in 1917. But they and their fellow recruits were unaware that the induction of Puerto Rican soldiers was far from epic. In a colonial setting such as Puerto Rico other wars were brewing. Wars that had to do with entrenched prejudice against the thousands of “inferior” and “colored” subjects, about to be incorporated into a military establishment still ruled by Jim Crow laws.

The World of Jim Crow

In every war in which this country has participated, Black Americans have had to fight for the right to fight. At the start of each war, military leaders questioned the abilities of Black Americans and finally accepted their participation under the pressure of necessity. 12

At the onset of World War I, the US military was racially organized by a strict segregation code. 13 In its 1896 landmark decision Plessy v. Ferguson, the US Supreme Court upheld the validity of the so-called Jim Crow laws under the doctrine of “separate but equal.” It is no coincidence that the most direct precedent for this doctrine is found in the Army Reorganization Act of 1866 in the early Reconstruction era that provided for separate black units in the US military organization chart.

By the end of the 19th century, a flurry of theories appeared to reinvigorate the claims of racial inferiority of African-Americans traditionally held during the slavery centuries. 14 These pseudo-scientific theories served as legitimate arguments to back the notion that African-American troops had to be confined to menial duties and not assigned to combat missions.

In an institution where many of its high-ranking officers were from the South, the assertion that “colored” units were inferior in mental capabilities and fighting spirit was part of the general military culture. At the time that the US entered into the war in 1917, there was almost unanimous opposition in the southern states to allow training or quartering facilities for “colored” troops. 15 One of the arguments most widely used was that the presence of Black units in southern districts would encourage racial disturbances and even foment treasonous behavior among disgruntled African American soldiers. In the summer of 1917, a group of soldiers from the 24th Infantry Regiment and local police clashed in the streets of Houston. In the aftermath of the disturbances, 19 soldiers were summarily hanged and 63 were convicted to life in prison. All of them were African Americans. 16

Just a few Black units were sent to Europe although leaders as W.E.B. DuBois pledged that victory over Germany would take precedence over the struggle against racism for the war’s duration. One of those units was the 369th Infantry Regiment from the state of New York. The unit had a famous military band led by one of the pioneers of Jazz music, James Reese Europe. 17

James Europe recruited 18 musicians during a trip he made to Puerto Rico, among them the highly talented Rafael Hernández who would later become the renowned author of some of the most popular Puerto Rican songs in the 20th century. After
the war Hernández penned a very exquisite ballad, *Oui, Madame*, in memory of his stay in France and as a reminder that romance can grow even against the backdrop of a cruel war.

Much to the disgust of the American command, French authorities did not comply with US requirements that segregation protocols prevalent in the US be observed on French soil. During their assignment in France, African Americans enjoyed the freedoms that white soldiers customarily had when they were placed under French command or on leave. However, the segregationist mentality was too ingrained in the military system. In the Victory Parade held in Paris in July 1919, the United States was the only country that did not include colonial or “colored” soldiers among its marching troops.

**Camp Las Casas**

The decision of the United States to enter the war presented another “racial” situation, as thousands of Puerto Rican recruits were now available for military duty. It was a complicated scenario: on the one hand, colonial, racial, cultural and linguistic vectors emphasized the “otherness” of the potential soldiers; on the other hand, the geopolitical importance of Puerto Rico and the need of manpower for a war effort whose future was still unpredictable, dictated flexibility and adjustments.

A few months after the US invasion in 1898 an infantry battalion made up of local elements had been organized; in 1908 the Puerto Rican unit increased to regiment capacity. According to General Guy V. Henry, the members of this regiment were “the best element of the population.” Of the 122 officers of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, 95 were Puerto Ricans, the majority (71) had been born between 1888 and 1898 and 53 were graduates from US universities. Many of them came from affluent families with political connections. They were part of the island’s economic, political and professional elite and enjoyed the privileges of college education and modern lifestyles.

The war changed everything. The Selective Service Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 76) was passed by the 65th United States Congress on May 18, 1917. All males aged 21 to 30 were required to register for a military service period of 12 months. The new law had the immediate effect of increasing the number of Puerto Rican units and also to democratize its composition. The need of training facilities for thousands of Puerto Rican males produced a logistics crisis but also fertilized a debate about the racial identity of the new recruits.

On August 16, 1917, Lt. Colonel Orval P. Townshend asked Roberto H. Todd, the mayor of San Juan, to look for a suitable site to establish a facility that would accommodate 7,800 trainees. He had just learned that South Carolina had refused to allow the Puerto Rican units to train in the state. The political authorities of South Carolina, including the influential senator Benjamin Tillman, suggested that Puerto Ricans would be better off training in Cuba as “Porto Rican negroes...were unused to the Southern view of the negro question.”

Arthur Yager, the governor of Puerto Rico at that time, was incensed. In a letter to General Frank McIntyre, the director of the US Bureau of Insular Affairs, Yager took aim against Tillman’s assertion that Puerto Rican troops were “colored” as it “touches the sensibilities of the White people here”. The governor admitted that there was a racial problem in Puerto Rico but not quite as acute as in the United States. He was of the opinion that the best alternative was to train the Puerto Ricans locally but in separate quarters, according to race.

Mayor Todd was a pragmatist; he saw South Carolina’s refusal as a business opportunity. His sales pitch for a training camp in the outskirts of San Juan included: a special water tariff, a guaranteed price for fresh meat, an extension of the railroad main line and a clean and healthy environment. In less than a month he convinced local businessmen, civic institutions and the governor to buy a special municipal bond issuance to improve the water works in San Juan. It was not a smooth ride for Todd. McIntyre was adamantly against the idea of a training site located in the territory. He convinced the War Department that it would be more effective to train the Puerto Rican recruits in an American milieu and in English. As for the racial situation, his plan was to train the “white” Puerto Ricans first and postpone the training of “colored” troops until next spring “by which time climatic conditions in the North will be more favorable.”

The popular belief that “colored” people could not endure cold climates was the perfect alibi for a racialized decision.

A desperate governor Yager pleaded with McIntyre to establish the training camp in Puerto Rico with a different racial twist:

Perhaps one-third of these men who will be accepted for service have never worn shoes in their lives; they wear nothing but a cotton shirt and cotton trousers and have nothing else to wear unless it is furnished them, and when gotten together they will look like a bunch of ragamuffins and tatterdemalions out of which an observer who doesn’t know the actual conditions here would think it utterly impossible to make soldiers. But we know the contrary is true, as has been abundantly proved by experience with the Porto Rico Regiment [already stationed in Panamá]. They are good material for soldiers in spite of their looks.

Mayor Todd added his own touch: he portrayed the potential trainees as noble savages or child-like men that would be overwhelmed by a strange environment in the United States. Most of them, Todd claimed, were of peasant stock and “naturally ignorant.” The cultural shock could impair the military objective.

Political expediency, military priorities and the continuous resistance of various states to accept Puerto Rican troops notwithstanding guarantees to its “whiteness”, finally caused the War Department to reverse their initial decision. On 14 February 1918, Commander Townshend announced that the new camp established in San Juan would be named Camp Las Casas in honor of the Spanish priest that fought for the rights of the indigenous population during the early conquest of the Americas. Some things remained the same: there would be separate dorm and dining facilities for “white” and “colored” trainees. A local newspaper designated Yager as “a decrepit racist from Kentucky” after the governor claimed that by building separate facilities he was deferring to a pre-existing color line in the island.
Centennial

In the spring of 2014, both houses of Congress approved bills to grant the Congressional Gold Medal of Honor to the 65th Infantry Regiment for their bravery during the Korean War. Surrounded by 65th veterans—most of them 80 years old or more—President Barack Obama signed the 65th Infantry Regiment Congressional Gold Medal legislation on June 10, 2014. The Borinqueneers (Borinquen is the Arawak Indians’s name for Puerto Rico), as the segregated Puerto Rican unit was known, saved the First Marine Division from annihilation by the Chinese back in December 1950 and arguably prevented a surprising defeat for the United Nations forces during the early stages of the Cold War. The Puerto Rican unit was following in the footsteps of other minority units such as the Nisei soldiers, the Navajo Code talkers and the Tuskegee Airmen that had been awarded long-awaited distinctions during the presidency of George W. Bush. For more than sixty years, 65th veterans, their families and Puerto Rico waited for that special roll call. War and remembrance did not fade away. Sadly, many of the soldiers that fought for barren hills and frozen rivers near the Chinese border passed away during that period.

It is altogether fitting that the congressional recognition for the Puerto Rican soldiers—although six decades late—comes as the world commemorates the first centennial of the First World War. Even though the congressional medal was granted for specific actions taken during the Korean War its deep significance touches all wars where Puerto Rican soldiers have fought under the US flag. As “colonial” troops the Puerto Ricans have not only fought and died at the front lines but also have withstood, with dignity and in many instances suppressed anger, a more pervasive enemy: racial and ethnic prejudice.

5. Enrique Vivoni and Silvia Álvarez Curbelo, Ilusión de Francia: Arquitectura y afrancesamiento en Puerto Rico (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico/Archivo de Arquitectura y Construcción de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1997).
18. For a comprehensive history of Puerto Rican units in the U.S. military, see Héctor Negroni, Historia Militar de Puerto Rico (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal Quito Centenario/Ediciones Siruela, 1992).
19. Paniagua, Reinaldo, Jr., Roll of Honor, (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Imprenta Cantero, Fernández and Co., 1918). The biographies of the Puerto Rican officers are included in pages 62 thru 77.
20. Archivo General de Puerto Rico (AGPR), Fondo Documentos Municipales (San Juan), Serie Proyectos 1881-1917, Legajo 104, Pieza 1, Comunicación del Alcalde al Consejo Municipal, August 13, 1917.
23. Archivo General de Puerto Rico (AGPR), Fondo Documentos Municipales (San Juan), Serie Proyectos 1881-1917, Legajo 104, Pieza 1, Carta de Roberto H. Todd al Alcalde de Ponce, 21 de agosto de 1917.
26. AGPR, Fondo Documentos Municipales (San Juan), Serie Proyectos 1881-1917, Legajo 104, Pieza 1, Carta de Roberto H. Todd al Alcalde de Ponce, 21 de noviembre 1917.
27. AGPR, Fondo Documentos Municipales (San Juan),
The Great War and a Colonial Landscape: Environmental History in German East Africa, 1914-16

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In the recent past, historians have begun to address the impact of warfare on the landscape, but as yet have not systematically studied the effect of the First World War on the environment - “The Global Environmental History of World War I” workshop this year at Georgetown notwithstanding.1 Although environmental history has been central to the study of East Africa since the late 1960s, the moment of the Great War has been underserved in this field.2 German East Africa was the locus of the War’s fiercest fighting on African soil, as well as a site of competing colonizations: the English Universities’ Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) and the German colonial state (DOA). This essay investigates the intersection of the perceptions of nature and the Great War’s impact on the environment within a colonial setting, from the perspectives of two diarists, one African and one European. Each man was witness to the War’s effects in the lower Pangani River Valley in the northeastern corner of the colony. These two authors’ memoirs give us a glimpse into the minds of “average” individuals and an understanding of how regular people brought an “armory” of expectations to their observations about a changing ecosystem.3

Since the 1870s, the UMCA (directing African labor) had been reshaping the landscape of what is today Tanzania, in accordance with their understanding of what the African environment was and what it should be. What the missionaries saw as a wilderness was a frontier of “redemptive possibilities,” a “moral canvas [that was] an arena in which to face physical obstacles that would lead to spiritual gains.”4 They believed that stewardship of East Africa’s soil, flora, and fauna was an ethical project, that exploiting the land more effectively (than Africans were currently) would benefit “mankind.”5 The reconfiguration of the terrain around the main mission stations of Magila and Korogwe spoke to these beliefs. Here the missionaries used African muscle to replicate metropolitan topographies, trying to actualize familiar cultural landscapes from home in miniature. Establishing Anglican spaces was a triumph, an advance that transformed the “hostile” landscape, disciplined converts’ minds and bodies, and supplanted indigenous sacred spaces. The UMCA repeatedly required the felling of trees and clearing bush from the Magila hilltop, a pattern that continued until the outbreak of the First World War.6 From the scant written records we have of African perceptions, even the catechist Acland Sahera thought by 1883 that a particular station “look[ed] dark and gloomy,” equating a resurgence of tropical vegetation with the loss of church participation.7 By 1914, there were almost five hundred communicants in the UMCA flock, and a few thousand other more peripheral participants to church activities, a number which waxed and waned with ecological difficulties, including those that coincided with the arrival of German agents partaking in the scramble for Africa.

From about 1888, German settlers, schemers, and colonial officials became co-conspirators in this process of compelling Africans to reconstruct the terrain of the lower Pangani Valley. Like the English, German imperial actors began to manage the DOA according to pre-existing concepts about the African landscape. Myths about the fruitfulness of tropical soils led to rapid and careless establishment of variously cropped plantations (with some state assistance in corralling local labor). A station for tropical botany was established at Amani in the highlands adjacent to the lower Pangani, introducing inter-tropical flora to the area. Scientific forestry officials began to try to “protect” the colony’s forests from their inhabitants, believing that the trees needed conservation in the face of “profligate native” usage.8 Toward the end of German rule, taking a cue from indigenous practice, forestry officials began arguing that controlled fires could be beneficial, eradicating the bush which hosted dangerous pests like the tsetse fly and ticks.9 (Some UMCA missionaries had long appreciated the role of seasonal burning in clearing the landscape.10)

When the First World War broke out, the lower Pangani Valley became immediately embroiled in the conflict. British troops attempted an amphibious landing that was repulsed, German settlers began to mobilize themselves and recruit new African soldiers, and these newly constituted forces raided across the border into the British colony just north. The lower Pangani Valley remained the Germans’ operational center for almost two years. By 1916, the surrender of all the other German colonies in Africa led to a major reallocation of global forces and a successful (and massive) Allied invasion in the upper Pangani Valley. The soldiers tasked with holding the DOA repeatedly engaged with and withdrew from British units, retreating down the Pangani River into the lower Valley, following the lines of the colony’s northern railway. By mid-1916, the DOA “Protective Force” abandoned the area, leaving the lower Pangani in Allied hands.

Two months into the war, the UMCA’s English missionaries had been arrested and transported to the center of the colony, but several African deacons remained behind to work, including Samwil Mwenyipembe, who kept a journal that has survived in the UMCA archives. After losing his superiors in the mission hierarchy, Mwenyipembe attempted to hold together the institution as a peripatetic pastor, performing the standard practices and rituals of teaching, baptizing, preaching, marrying, and dispensing medicines. Most significantly for the purposes...
here, he also tried to keep the churches, stations, farms, and their surrounding landscape orderly, entreating the remaining “Christians to weed the paths and keep the place[s] clean.”11 After African peasants’ fields were set alight in February 1915 “to keep off [wild] pigs,” local Germans and askaris [African soldiers] responded by accusing the residents of signaling British ships off-shore.12 The old conflict over landscape management between the colonial state and its subjects was reignited, the state’s argument repurposed by wartime conditions. When the area was fired again, askaris began to make arrests, and a number of UMCA “native clergy” were imprisoned or deported. According to Mwenyipembe, soon no one attended services.13 Several teachers hid in the forests for more than a year, though eventually a UMCA turncoat revealed them to the Germans. By 1915, the military began impressing local males into forced portage, making them carry matériel to railroad depots. Mwenyipembe wrote that “the district is like a wilderness,” as his landscape project fell apart, and men of all sorts fled the German employment (and the accompanying beatings).14 When a new round of impressment required bearing loads to Morogoro, a site about 150 miles away, the clergyman argued that this filled the people with despair, and made them lose their faith because they “dread[ed] dying away from their land and friends, and this has entered into their hearts throughout the country.”15 Here we might gain an insight into local conceptions of landscape at the time: perhaps this passage reveals the shallowness of the Anglicans’ intended spiritual transformation of the Valley, because the comforts of “home” had already been reduced by the war.

In addition to forced labor, German representatives had begun requisitioning agricultural goods from the Valley’s inhabitants early in 1915. They looted the food and wine from the Magila church, eventually stripping it bare, and their askaris plundered repeatedly from district farms.16 The harvest in July was good, but the remaining mission cattle were commandeered in July 1915 and non-Anglican African herds by the end of the year.17 “On account of the confusion, we could not do much. The country is in a very wretched state, the villages are almost empty of people, and in the roads you hardly meet anyone, it is like a dead land.”18 A paucity of rains compounded East Africans’ problems. The wartime pressures meant that few could afford to maintain a perimeter against the encroaching bush, and the consumption of reserve food sources, particularly that stored on the hoof, meant that livestock populations in the valley’s highlands shrank dangerously as a means of food security. The disappearance of the herds, the transfer of labor to wartime tasks, and the pillaging of grain fields meant that reforestation occurred in the Valley.

The Allied army that displaced German forces from the Pangani Valley was an imperial agglomeration, including over 40,000 men levied from other colonies and nearly 7,000 regional King’s African Rifles, although not all of these forces were in the field at once, and some were diverted to other theaters within DOA.19 Their inexorable advance was recorded by a number of participants, including a doctor who would later become a prolific author of fiction, Francis Brett Young. To him, East Africa was still a primordial landscape, for to reach the lower Pangani, he had to force his way “through dense thorn which had never yet been shadowed by man’s figure or penetrated by his violence since the beginning of the world.”20 Here, Young’s words echoed the discourse of “explorers” from decades earlier, even though his initial journey reversed the direction of travel, and followed the path worn by trade caravans for at least a century.

Like his fellow Englishmen, Young had certain expectations about a properly worked landscape when he arrived in the lower Pangani Valley:

“Here there is one great rubber estate which covers many miles, and it was the fresh green of the rubber plantations with their ordered uniformity which was so pleasing to our eyes, so different, so very different, from the endless ashen grey of the bush. Here too were trim native bundas, thrusting their pointed roofs above the paler green of the mealie-fields. And here was a red road, no uncertain track which might shortly lose itself in the bush, but one that ran straight forward, as with a gay confidence, into a country that was known and tamed and civilized.”

Despite the doctor’s appreciative view, the rubber estates in the colony were amply destructive, fly-by-night operations. The species transplanted matured relatively rapidly but produced a sub-standard latex.22 The global commodity prices for the product, which had been elevated in the first decade of the twentieth century, had collapsed right before the War. DOA rubber plantations had been abandoned by most investors by 1913, leaving acres and acres of them to go to seed.23 The loss of laborers to military obligations accelerated this process.

Less felicitous from Young’s perspective was the regrowth of the bush in the lower Valley, the process that Samwil Mwenyipembe had been unable to forestall. The army’s livestock began dying from “horse-sickness,” in some cases more than thirty head per day, and “the valley of the Pangani had already acquired the most sinister reputation for disease.”24 The “bush grew thicker ahead, and … it was swarming with tsetse-fly.”25 The lower Pangani was no longer as safe for flocks and herds as it once had been. As his company veered south, Young witnessed:

“[Thrice] in the course of our journey to Handeni … we fell in with most piteous convoys of horses and mules condemned for trypanosomiasis. … [M]any already bore that fatal swelling in the abdominal wall … wore on their necks a red veterinary ticket. [They were] driving them back to Korogwe to die just because it would be easier there to get rid of their poor wasted bodies.”26 Young recorded an eternally diseased and empty landscape as he expected, but the landscape he saw was the artifact of the last few decades, changes accelerated by the First World War.

We did not realise then … that the Pangani levels, for all their beauty—for all their bright skies, their golden grasses, and the warm south wind … were among the most pestilential regions in all Africa. That is why the Masai, those great herdsmen, have left the grasslands beside the stream unpastured, and why, that day and for
many days to come, we saw not so much as a single hut of reeds, far less a village.27

Before the collapse of local bush maintenance in the colonial period, herds of hundreds of cattle had been corralled on the river’s banks and islands. At the conclusion of the war, after the colony had been mandated to the British trust, the new government initiated compulsory labor to regularly burn tsetse habitat in the territory.28 (The British would also re-institute the enforcement of German colonial forestry laws that the war had disrupted.)

The occupation by Allied soldiers rather than German seemed to change little from the perspective of the inhabitants and the environment of the lower Pangani Valley. The impressment of bodies for porterage even increased, and a number of English UMCA missionaries came over from Zanzibar to expand the Carrier Corps in 1916; Samwil Mwenyipembe even participated in this round-up.29 The action was received about as well as German efforts: “But here also many … porters ran away from Korogwe and went back to their homes and many of them suffered from diarrhoea and coughs, on account of the dust, and the smell of the carcasses [sic] of dead horses.”30 The strain on food security increased, as tens of thousands of additional soldiers and bearers sojourned in the Valley. And yet, in the face of seemingly indisputable settlement, the power of pre-conceived notions of the African landscape held sway, as Francis Brett Young concluded that East Africa had always been empty:

[W]e shall not see … Pangani [again], for no man in his senses would visit … twice. This country without a soul … [T]he vast and somber vacuity of these tracts of rolling bush and plain over which the shadow of a man’s spirit had never moved before.31


2 East African environmental history appears prominently in the works of John Iliffe, Juhani Koponen, Roderick Neumann, James Giblin, and Steven Feierman, among others. A few exceptions cover some aspects of the First World War: Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge UP, 1979) addresses wartime epidemiology; Thaddeus Sunseri, Wielding the Ax: Scientific Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, c. 1820-2000 (Ohio UP, 2009) traces the war’s impact on forest management; Christopher Conte, Highland Sanctuary: Environmental History in Tanzania’s Usambara Mountains (Ohio UP, 2004) examines “ivory tower imperialism” during the conflict at a German botanical research station.


6 William Lowndes to Ted, letter of January 31, 1881, Rhodes House, UMCA Box A1-IV-A; Farler to Dear Professor, letter of May 30, 1880, Rhodes House, UMCA Box A1-VI-A.

7 Acland Sahera [to Reverend], letter of 10 April, 1883, Rhodes House, UMCA Box TC E18. Sahera was from elsewhere, not local, an intra-African transplant.

8 Sunseri, The Ax. Drayton, 236.

9 Tanzania National Archives (TNA) G8/508, Forst und Jagd Allgemein [General Forestry and Hunting].

10 Herbert Lister, “Kologwe,” Central Africa vol. 10 (1892), 5.


12 Mwenyipembe, 5 February, 1915.

13 Mwenyipembe, 13 March, 1915; 25 April, 1915.


15 Mwenyipembe, 9 December, 1915.

16 Mwenyipembe, 11 February, 1915; 18 February, 1915;

17 Mwenyipembe, 30 July, 1915; 31 December, 1915. Confirmed by Francis Brett Young: “Our lack of rations forced us to send messages to the surrounding villages asking for foodstuffs, mealie-meal, and cattle, to be sent into the camp for purchase at fair prices. The villagers came most readily, telling us that little had been left to them by the Germans, who had pillaged all their shambas and driven their cattle away. … I am inclined to think that they spoke the truth.”

18 Mwenyipembe, 11 June, 1916.

19 Iliffe, 243.

20 Young, 145.

21 Young, 190.

22 Iliffe, 146.

23 Conte, Highland Sanctuary, 99. Young remarked on seeing “wild sisal”—a transplanted cultigen native to Mexico—another result of failed colonial agriculture, Young, 55.

24 Young, 34; 80.

25 Young, 55.

26 Young, 261.

27 Young, 55.

28 Iliffe, 272.


31 Young, 263.
The Need to “Free” Africa from “German Oppression”:
British Propaganda from German East Africa, 1914-1918

Charlotte Miller

The fate of Germany’s colonies as the end of World War I approached was not a foregone conclusion. Instead, the issue was a topic of great debate. In regards to German East Africa, British politicians campaigned for control of the former German colony for strategic and economic reasons, but hoped to avoid committing to investment projects and alienating the United States as an ally. British politicians spread the message that the Germans had failed to be a “civilizing” influence on the continent, and made the case that the British would much more effectively achieve Western objectives in Africa.

Infamously, the British War Propaganda Bureau and press began publicizing German atrocities in Belgium within days of the German invasion in August of 1914. However, British reports of German atrocities were not limited to describing the actions of German soldiers in Belgium and France. There were also allegations of German atrocities in her African colonies and these claims became an important British tool for settling the fate of colonial holdings as the end of the war approached.

The British fought the Germans on several African fronts during the First World War. In East Africa, the British were joined by the Belgians and then the Portuguese in their fight against the Germans. While German atrocities in Southwest Africa were one focal point for the British critique of German colonial practices, the British also used evidence from their East African campaigns to bolster moral outrage against the Germans and build support for British claims to Germany’s colonies.

In August of 1914, the British began their East African operations against the Germans by shelling a communication station near Dar es Salaam, the capital city of German East Africa. The clashes between the British and Germans continued throughout the war, including German forays into British East Africa to the north, naval operations on the Great Lakes to the west, and the British blockade of German ports, including Tanga, on the Indian Ocean coast. For over a year, the British and Germans were at a stalemate, but the 1916 German surrender in German South West Africa allowed for renewed attention on East Africa. Thereafter, the fighting between the Allied and German sides continued until the German commander, General Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered in Portuguese East Africa thirteen days after Armistice Day in 1918.

Over the course of the more than four years of fighting, there were plenty of public accusations that the Germans and their askaris (African soldiers fighting for Germany) brutalized Europeans and Africans in East Africa. Of course, this paper focuses on accusations of German brutality, but recognizes, as did the former Governor of German East Africa, Heinrich Snee, that the accusers were not impartial. The Allies had an agenda and over the course of the war, accusations went both ways. However, this paper concentrates on how Britain and its allies used descriptions of alleged German crimes in East Africa to support the case that Germany deserved to lose her colonies.

One prominent British narrative accused German soldiers in East Africa of violating articles of the Hague Convention by killing wounded British soldiers. A 1914 White Paper was one result of these charges. The 1914 investigation into the fate of three wounded white British soldiers concluded that there was not enough evidence to prove that German troops “deliberately put to death” the Allied wounded. However, questions about the conduct of soldiers fighting for Germany in East Africa continued. Allegations that the Germans were committing similar abuses on European fronts lent credence to these on-going accusations.

As the Germans rounded up missionaries and non-German, white settlers, which they began doing more systematically in 1915, stories coming out of German East African claimed wrongful imprisonment and mistreatment of these Europeans. It is estimated that the Germans interned at most 200 Europeans, separating civilians from military prisoners, but often housing them in the same camps. Once they were released, the missionaries and white settlers condemned their treatment by Germans soldiers and African askaris.

Allied supporters used the testimony from missionaries and settlers to argue that the Germans had degraded the position of European settlers in the colonies and were also unnecessarily violent. They described a “striking contrast” between German and British practices in Africa. One French journalist Rene Puaux made the case that even in the first months of the war the Germans unlawfully imprisoned non-aligned missionaries. For example, Puaux described how the Germans coerced testimony from three Africans using “a hundred strokes each” to collaborate German allegations that British missionaries were guilty of signaling enemy troops and teaching Africans their underhanded techniques. The missionaries charged the Germans not only with unlawful imprisonment, but a host of other ills. More broadly, they made the case that they had not been accorded the respect they were due and that the Germans had even stooped to treating Europeans like Africans. Those interned had been distressed by their rough living circumstances, and by what Pesek phrases the “colonial order” being “turned upside down.”

A 1916 newspaper article in the Sydney Morning Herald quoted a newly released prisoner to express concerns with the German treatment of British missionaries. According to F. James Cooper, the Germans were mistreating “archdeacons, clergy, farm owners, managers of big firms, and plantation managers”[as...] “many people in good standing have had to work and were treated like native convicts.” According to the article, their indignities included first and foremost being “ordered about” by armed askari. They were also upset at being denied lights, soap, and their afternoon siestas, having their boots taken away at night to prevent escape, being kept in sheds without privacy, and being forced to make boot pegs and eat food that Africans would reject. The article details how Europeans were forced to perform what they said were the most menial of tasks, like cooking, cleaning, and sewing underwear for the Germans. They complained bitterly that these tasks were beneath them and undermined the authority of all Europeans in Africa. The article in the Sydney Morning Herald summarizes, “For Europeans to do such work under uncivilized natives, who were always armed and had orders to shoot if we refused to obey is too disgusting...”

Even more outrage seems to have derived from the perception that the Germans refused to protect interned European
women from men - particularly African men. In 1917, Reuters reported "Shocking Atrocities in German East Africa" in which "ladies" had been "compelled to carry out disgusting tasks in order to humiliate them in the eyes of the natives and undermine British prestige." The Reuters article explained that the Germans had deliberately exposed the British women to African eyes and assigned the women household duties that were not befitting of their respectable status. A 1918 report by the British Government Committee on Treatment by the Enemy of British Prisoners of War also bemoaned how European women had suffered a host of insults at the hands of the Germans and their askaris. As an example, the report criticized German Commander Dorrendorf claiming that he drunkenly broke into the women's sleeping quarters, yelled at them in public, and threatened to tie up a British woman from the Universities Mission to Central Africa (U.M.C.A.) to subdue her after she made repeated requests for a "native chair" before a journey. The report also complained that Dorrendorf permitted African askari to both command European women to complete certain tasks and "push them [around] at their pleasure" on the exercise yard. According to the report, the Germans, and in many of the described cases Dorrendorf in particular, were the cause of outrages against these women as the askari were fairly hesitant to interact with the European women. The report also tried to enrage its audience by exposing the harsh living conditions of the women, who were, for example, forced to use the same toilet facilities as the men. Additionally, it describes one occasion where European women were locked overnight in an iron shed with European men and two drunken African askari and throughout the night were subjected to the "unbearable, disgusting" conversations of African askari posted outside. More generally, the report claims that for months at a time, the European women were confined alongside the European men in conditions of "extreme misery." As lamented by the missionaries, Dorrendorf ignored attempts of the other European men to intervene on behalf of the European women. As construed by the missionaries in their testimony, the women's humiliations were a violation of what were supposed to be the shared cultural norms of white colonial society.

In the early 1900s, the presence of European women in the colonies presumed segregation of the races and the availability of "metropolitan amenities" to protect women's "more delicate sensibilities." The newspapers and government reports took it for granted that European women should be sheltered from contact with African men and have access to certain material comforts. In the minds of the missionaries and the wider intended audience of the published information, the Germans "humiliated" the missionary women, their families, and all Europeans by letting African soldiers see them and by imposing an uncomfortable environment of familiarity. Furthermore, in the setting of the camps, absent a white officer, the askari were the authority figures. According to the missionaries, white settlers, and the press, this German failure to maintain segregation and white authority threatened the entire "civilized" colonial hierarchy. The reports of these women's "shameful" experiences were used as evidence of "undisguised [German] brutality" to support British claims to Germany's African colonies.

Allied presses, and British soldiers and missionaries also charged the Germans with acting more brutally towards Africans than their Allied counterparts. The Germans were "bullies," according to the Allied sources; the same sources that applauded Allied military successes in East Africa and then awaited the dismantling of the German Empire. Rene Puaux compiled a long list of alleged German atrocities in East Africa, accusing the German soldiers of using African civilians as human shields in battle and with the enslavement of African civilians. Puaux also scorned what he alleged were common habits of German officials: the keeping of African concubines, the seduction of minors, and the practice of "unnatural [sex] acts." He implied that these practices were not common amongst other European colonial officials. Likewise, according to Lieutenant E. William Bovill, the Germans enslaved "younger [African] women" during World War I, using them as prostitutes "distributed" among their askari to reduce desertion rates. The sources assumed that this behavior was unique to German officers and categorized it as abhorrent. They offered it as further evidence that Germans had inherent moral failings that could not be overcome.

In addition, British missionaries took on the fight against German conscription, even as both sides used forced labor. J.H. Briggs equated German actions in East Africa with enslavement. He made this issue one of his rallying cries for British intervention suggesting that two decades earlier the British had successfully led a campaign to abolish slavery along the East African coast. Briggs declared that:

the arbitrary and brutal way in which it [military rule] was all carried out, practically reduced the country to a state of slavery. [...] Sometimes most of the adult male population of a district was engaged [...] This work was always under military discipline and supervised by soldiers who treated the natives cruelly. These latter were often chained together, when carrying their loads, after the old Arab style in the years before Africa was partitioned up into European Protectorates.

He further compared the Germans to slave traders of the 19th century, saying that not only would the Germans shoot or bayonet porters if they got sick or hungry, but the German also left bodies "by the roadside-a striking reversion to old Arab slavery methods." He portrayed the Germans as immoral, enslaving colonizers and argued that Germany should never be restored its African colonies. Briggs predicted that Africans, having been "freed from German oppression," would benefit from chivalrous British oversight. Some soldiers made similar comparisons. Bovill coupled his indictment of the Germans for the enslavement of Africans with complaints about their use of Prussian military standards. In his words Prussian traditions left a "damning record of unbridled barbarity [that] will be handed down through many generations of African natives..." According to the British colonial administrators, askari posed a threat to European settlers in neighboring colonies and they needed British guidance to demilitarize and re-tribalize them. Therefore, a vocal group called for the British to exercise authority over the former German territory in East Africa to ensure "a long era of freedom and progress," not the continuation of a depraved German system. The group assumed that the Germans did not understand the mechanisms of colonization and would bring
down the entire system.

Therefore, much of the British-controlled narrative coming out of East Africa during World War I focused on the alleged German killing of wounded British soldiers, German defilement of colonial hierarchies, and the German exploitation of Africans. Leading British, French, and Belgian politicians used these claims, plus the ideas that the Germans had mismanaged German East Africa financially and would pose a military threat if they had access to Indian Ocean ports, to argue against the reinstatement of Germany's colonies. With widespread publication of allegations, the public in Allied territories and some politicians boiled the issues down to a fight for "civilization." When settling boundaries after the war they articulated, similar to Belgian Prime Minister, Monsieur Renkin, that they had to choose between "two systems of colonization: the German system of domination and militarism aiming at the methodical exploitation of the Colony; the British system of civilization and guardianship over the natives, with the object of raising their conditions of life and improving new lands for the common good."36

7 Ibid.
9 European civilians and Allied soldiers held as prisoners-of-war were often kept at the same camps; however, Michael Pesek suggests that the Germans may have been “more lenient” towards British officers due to “a codex of military honor.” He also points out that the humanitarian focus of missionaries may have led them to feel more outrage at perceived mistreatment. Michael Pesek, “The Colonial Order Upside Down? British and Germans in East African Prisoner-of-War Camps During World War I” (Rodopi, 2010), 28-30, Academia.edu
12 Pesek, “The Colonial Order Upside Down?”
14 Ibid.
15 “Shocking Atrocities in German East Africa,” Dominion 11,1 (September 26, 1917): 5.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 13.
19 Ibid., 17.
20 Ibid., 12.
22 Great Britain, Government Committee, 30.
23 Ibid.
25 Ann Stoler and others have suggested that concubinage was fairly common, if not always officially sanctioned, in a number of colonies. Stoler, “Making Empire Respectable,” 634-660.
30 Ibid., 197.
31 Ibid., 199.
32 Bovill, “Notes from East Africa,” 282.
33 As just one example: Editorial Notes, Journal of the Royal African Society, 18,70 (Jan. 1919): 149.British report that the Germans had “detribalized” some Africans and “developed by the Germans into a distinct military caste, and taught to regard themselves as a race superior to, and apart from, the ordinary native of the country.” For the British this necessitated re-tribalization in the late 1920s through 1930s, which entailed sending African men back to their “tribal areas” to relearn their
The Dutch East Indies During the First World War and the Birth of Colonial Radio

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It is a well-known fact that communication technology was a vital part of the history of modern imperialism. In the late nineteenth century the telegraphy service of the Dutch empire depended on British submarine cables. It took a large crisis to convince the Dutch government to grant money to develop an independent connection via the wireless: that crisis was the First World War. This brings us to a topic that is often overlooked in historiography: the disruption of the lines of communication between the Netherlands and its most important colony, the Dutch East Indies. Although the Netherlands remained neutral during the First World War in the sense that it did not partake in the military conflict between the great powers in Europe – escaping the slaughter of the Western front and retaining its territorial integrity – the conflict had a significant impact on the colonial regime in the Indies because it was largely cut off from Europe when shipping and telegraphy largely came to a halt. The Netherlands, as a small power, could not change this situation on its own accord between 1914 and 1918 because it lacked a solid intercontinental infrastructure and depended on foreign networks to keep in contact with the colony in the East. Subsequently, the Dutch government started to invest in the construction of a wireless radio-connection in order to prevent blockades in the future. Therefore, the birth of the Dutch colonial radio-service in the 1920s must be seen as a direct result of the First World War.

This contribution highlights this history. I start by giving a short overview of the colonial lines of communication before and during the First World War. Then I describe how the radio connection between the Netherlands and the Indies came into being. Here I also pay attention to the symbolic meaning of the wireless. In the 1920s opinion-makers often referred to the situation during the First World War when the Dutch colonial regime in the Indonesian archipelago literally depended on a ‘thin red line’ – the British submarine cable that connected Asia and Europe. This was a traumatic experience indeed and it indicates that Dutch neutrality during the First World War was not as self-evident as might seem at first sight. Behind the seemingly calm image of the Netherlands as an island in an ocean of violence, there lurks a sea of contradictions connected to the complex status of the Netherlands as a small power in Europe with a huge colonial empire in Southeast Asia. On the one hand there was pride about the ‘great’ achievements of the Dutch in the East. On the other hand there were worries about threats to colonial rule both externally and internally – respectively colonial rivals and Indonesian nationalists. During the First World War, these ambivalent feelings led to a true colonial crisis in the Indies.

A Colony in Crisis

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries colonial expansion and technology were intertwined. In his classic study Daniel Headrick provides a fascinating overview of the inventions that the Western powers used as Tools of Empire.1 Like other Western empire-builders, the Dutch greatly profited from technological innovations in their conquest of the “outer islands” of the Indonesian archipelago between 1870 and 1910. New means of communication were vital for this colonial project. Steam-power facilitated a great increase in the transport of people, goods and information. More and more ships reached islands that had previous been isolated from the rest of the world. Big infrastructural projects, such as the construction of the Suez Canal, also had an impact. The route between Europe and Asia was shortened significantly by this waterway and the Netherlands profited fully of this improvement. Shipping to and from the Indonesian archipelago grew enormously and this strengthened the colonial regime.2 But the Dutch also worried. The navy of the Netherlands was much weaker than those of the great powers, particularly the British, who had a strong naval presence in the region. This made the Dutch East Indies, which was an island empire, vulnerable to invasions by rival colonial powers. Alarmed citizens and opinion-makers founded an organization, Onze Vloot (Our Fleet), that actively lobbied for the expansion of the navy. But this campaign did not have much of an impact. By international standards, the Dutch navy remained a minor force.

The Netherlands also lagged behind in the development of the most remarkable nineteenth century invention in communication technology: the telegraph. In the 1830s, experiments showed that messages could be transferred high-speed by transferring electrical shocks through wires. It proved difficult to construct the necessary infrastructure for this technology, and it took decades to develop a durable technique to sink telegraph-cables to the bottom of the seas to enable intercontinental contact. After 1870 the process accelerated. By 1900 the British had connected all the parts of their empire with telegraph cables: the all red line. This network enabled fast transfer of information: a message from India could reach London within thirty minutes, whereas a letter would take weeks. Some scholars have hailed this system as the “Victorian internet,” but this comparison goes too far as the telegraph-network did not enable a free flow of information to the same extent as the world-wide-web does nowadays.3 In fact, the all red line was a highly controlled media environment, operated by monopolists that charged high rates per word, which meant that many people could not even afford to send telegrams. Moreover, the British authorities kept a close watch on the telegraph-cables and

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cultural practices and rural morality under the supervision of their approved “tribal” leaders.
34 Puaux, The German Colonies, 36, 39.
installed stations at places where different lines came together. Censors there could stop all information that they considered to be unwanted.

Considering the telegraph-connection with the Indies, the Dutch completely depended on the British network. In the 1870s there had been no willingness amongst Dutch politicians and entrepreneurs to invest large amounts of money in constructing an independent cable to the Indies. Therefore, the government granted a concession to the British to connect the Indonesian archipelago to the all red route. Financially this was an efficient solution. But from a geopolitical point of view it was problematic because all Dutch messages to and from the colony in the East had to pass the British-controlled stations. In peacetime, this was no problem per se, but in times of war the situation could lead to communication-troubles. During the South African War (1899-1902), the Dutch were confronted with this problem for the first time. Although the Netherlands officially remained neutral, many people sympathized with the Boers in their war against the British. The British government controlled all telegraph lines in the warzone, but feared that couriers would travel from South Africa to the Indies to wire secret messages to Boer diplomats in Europe. Therefore British censors severely restricted telegrams coming from the archipelago: for example, it was forbidden to send coded messages. This situation came as a shock to the Dutch government that in 1905 made a deal with a German company to construct an alternative telegraph route to Shanghai, where it tapped into the American Pacific network. This alleviated the situation somewhat, but it did not address the main problem: the Netherlands depended on foreign powers for its colonial telegraph connection.

The problem became urgent again during the First World War. The British imposed many restrictions on the Netherlands to try to prevent Germany from being supplied with goods and information. There was a blockade of all Dutch ports (both in Europe and Asia) imposed by a British fleet, which stopped every vessel coming in and out of the harbors. The British compiled a list of goods they considered to be contraband and that they commandeered. Although the Dutch tried to find a modus vivendi, the authorities in The Hague and Batavia were powerless against these measures because they did not want (and were not able) to violate their neutrality towards Great Britain. In the Indies, the naval blockade led to severe economic problems as the trade volume (both import and export) dropped drastically. The result was that the income from colonial exports withered away, while food- and fuel-prizes became much higher as a result of scarcity. All across the archipelago the indigenous population suffered from the economic crisis, which led to increasing protests against colonial rule. In this tense atmosphere the call for independence became stronger and Indonesian nationalist organizations grew. Policymakers in Batavia worried about this situation and their anxiety was aggravated by the fact that the British blockade made all consultation with the government in the Hague impossible. The Royal Navy not only seized contraband, but also censored letters. In 1917 it even banned all Dutch ships from carrying mail. In addition, the telegraph lines came under strict British military control. At the start of the war, in 1914, the German lines in Asia were cut and so the Netherlands again depended on the all red line. And this cable-route was heavily censored. Although it was technically possible to transmit messages, it was always uncertain if the British would allow the telegraphs to come through or not. As a result of these censorship-measures, the authorities in Batavia did not receive any instructions from The Hague. The sense of being isolated caused Governor-General J.P. Graaf van Limburg Stirum to suffer from severe bouts of depression during the first years of his term of office (he started his tenure in 1916). His biographers contribute his despair in large part to the British blockades that had “cut off the umbilical cord between the motherland and the colony.” Also in the Netherlands the colonial communication crisis was considered to be a problem, as it threatened the very existence of the colonial empire in Southeast Asia. The situation forced the Dutch government to be more proactive in finding alternatives to the British telegraph lines.

The Birth of Dutch Colonial Radio

The quest for an independent telegraph connection resulted in the birth of colonial radio. Looking at the situation before the First World War, however, this was not as straightforward as it seems with hindsight. Although the Dutch colonial regime in the Indies did experiment with wireless telegraphy after the pioneering work of G. Marconi in the 1890s, radio-technology in the Indies was quite embryonic. In the 1910s several stations were set up near busy shipping routes in order to contact passing vessels. There even were plans for a network to facilitate radio-communication within the archipelago, but this proved to be complicated. Considering the rudimentary state of the Dutch technology, a direct radio-connection between the Netherland and the Indies, bridging a distance of approximately 12,000 kilometers, seemed impossible to many. As a result, the Dutch authorities did not invest much money in these radio-experiments. During the First World War, however, the official qualms melted away. In 1916 a colonial engineer on leave in the Netherlands, C.J. de Groot, obtained his PhD at the University of Delft with a thesis on long-wave transmissions in the tropics in which he presented the bold statement that a direct radio-connection between the Netherland and its colonies was “a political necessity and technically possible.” To his own surprise De Groot was invited by the minister of Colonies, who told him that the government was willing to grant him the substantial sum of fl. 5,000,000 to build a station in the Indies that would be capable of intercontinental radio traffic. In January 1917 De Groot arrived in the Indies, and managed to import a German Telefunken receiver and an American Poulsen transmitter.

De Groot believed that only long-wave technology was suitable to establish long distance radio connections. Such technology required large machines that could generate huge amounts of electricity. Hence, he devised a plan for a high-powered station. He found the ideal location for this structure at the Malabar gorge in the mountains surrounding the city Bandung in Java. This place was literally in the middle of nowhere (even the nearest road was ten kilometers away) which meant that there was virtually no interference. An army of Indonesian workers cleared the grounds of the lush bushwood that was growing there and chased away the wildlife (including panthers that roamed the area). Within a matter of months the first station was built. The most impressive feat of engineering was a huge antenna spanning
the full two-kilometer gorge.\[^{11}\] The Malabar station became a powerful symbol of colonial engineering and attracted many tourists who wanted to marvel at the wonders of Dutch radio technology from inside and outside the Indonesian archipelago.\[^{12}\]

The Malabar station was operational from the start, although it was not yet as powerful as De Groot wanted it to be and the connection was quite unstable. Early in 1917 the Malabar station was already receiving signals coming from Europe for several hours a day. In November, De Groot even succeeded in sending messages back on several occasions. In the Netherlands, however, no big radio-stations existed, so the ultimate goal of setting up a colonial radio-connection was not met. Frustrated with the lack of progress, De Groot sent a receiver to the Netherlands with instructions for the construction of a station in November 1918. In 1919 first contact was made via an improvisational antenna.\[^{13}\] But it was only in 1923 when a permanent station was finished at Kootwijk in the nature-reserve of the Hoge Veluwe—another desolated place. The main building of the Kootwijk station was an impressive concrete structure, resembling a cathedral, housing enormous turbines. In the meantime, De Groot had improved the power supply of the Malabar station. With these stations ready in the colonial center and periphery, it seemed the moment had come to inaugurate a regular radiotelegraphy service between the Indies and the Netherlands.

The date was set on 5 May 1923 and Governor-General Dirk Fock agreed to send the first telegram to officially start the telegraphy service. A few days before the occasion, there was a big explosion at Malabar that damaged the transmitter, but De Groot decided not to cancel the opening. Fock arrived according to schedule. He solemnly dictated a text that was to be wired to Queen Wilhelmina in the Netherlands. After a respectful greeting, he explicitly referred to the communication crisis of the First World War and emphasized the importance of an independent Dutch colonial radio-connection.\[^{14}\] Finally, the communication crisis of the First World War seemed to have been overcome. One gratifying bit of news was that in the Summer of 1927 the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) asked Philips to transmit its signals to the far-flung reaches of the British Empire because their own radio-stations were not capable of doing that. Although this situation did not last long, several Dutch opinion-makers noticed that the tables had turned: the British depended on the Dutch information network for a change. One paper referred to an editorial in the Daily Mail that compared the situation with the “Golden Age” of the Dutch mercantile empire in seventeenth century: back then Dutch ships ruled the seas, this time around Dutch engineers ruled the airwaves.\[^{15}\]

**Conclusion**

The euphoric reactions to the birth of Dutch colonial radio in 1927 cannot be understood without considering the context of the First World War. Although the Netherlands was not directly affected by military violence, the conflict did lead to a colonial crisis. The British blockade of naval routes and telegraph lines to the Indonesian archipelago brought to light the great deficiencies in the information infrastructure of the Dutch empire, which completely depended on British tools of empire in this respect. As a reaction, the Dutch government heavily invested in the development of wireless technology in order to set up and independent radio-connection with its colony in the East. This financial impulse facilitated the construction of the enormous stations at Malabar and Kootwijk that could generate enough power for long-wave frequencies. Eventually it became apparent that short-wave technology was far more efficient. Also in this field Dutch engineers, encouraged by the government and applauded by the press, fulfilled a pioneering role as they set up the first intercontinental telephone connection.

In addition to these concrete achievements, the psychological effects were considerable. The information blackout during the First World War had caused great insecurity amongst Dutch colonial officials, who felt isolated because of the growing unrest in the archipelago and the rise of Indonesian nationalism. The 1927 comments on colonial radio reveal an opposite image: the wireless would strengthen the ties between the Netherlands and the Indies and reinforce the unity of the Dutch empire. Such sentiments were widespread in the
The Anzac Myth: History and Collective Public Memory in Australia on the Centenary of World War I

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During the centenary of World War I from 2014 to 2018, many of the world’s countries—or at least those that participated in the conflict—will mourn the tragic sacrifices its respective soldiers and people made. Nowhere will these remembrances and celebrations be more important than in Australia, where its military contribution to the British war effort in Europe formed an intrinsic part of the country’s national identity. Australia’s most important campaign occurred on 25 April 1915, when the Anzacs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) landed ill-fatedly at Gallipoli and fought gallantly to their deaths against Turkish forces. Successive Australian politicians and early historians suggest that these brave Australian soldiers supposedly possessed a shared set of positive and commendable characteristics that were indicative of being a “true Australian,” including courage, charisma, larrakism and mateship. They also suggest that the failure of the Gallipoli campaign was actually because of the overwhelming strength of the enemy and strategic blunders by the British Empire.

Commemorating the Anzac campaign and legend of these soldiers, the Australian government declared 25 April a national holiday and encouraged dawn memorial services to be performed around the country on this day. These memorial services, however, are set to be taken to a new level this year. On the centenary of the Anzac campaign in 2015, the Australian government is reportedly set to spend an astronomical amount on celebrations, services and festivals. Military Fellow at the Lowy Institute of International Policy James Brown estimates that the Australian government will spend approximately $325 million during the centenary commemorations. This figure is more than twice what Britain is preparing to spend, even though approximately ten times more British soldiers were killed during the war than Australians. 1 Although there are no concrete answers to explain this massive discrepancy, Brown suggests in his 2014 book Anzac’s Lost Shadow that this might have happened because the truth about the Anzacs has been distorted over time in Australia. 2

How, then, did “Anzac” become so fundamental to Australia’s national identity while its truth became distorted? One possible answer lies in the context of Australia’s broader mainstream media in the Netherlands, which indicates that many people supported the Dutch colonial regime in Southeast Asia. In the Indies the situation was quite different. The tense situation during the First World War had released the spirit of anti-colonial nationalism, which would not be put back in the bottle. In the 1920s and 1930s a growing group of indigenous intellectuals agitated for independence. They saw radio as an important instrument to mobilize the mass of the Indonesians against the colonial regime. In this way the airwaves increasingly became a propagandistic battleground between conflicting views on Dutch colonial rule. This war of words climaxed during the decolonization war (1945–9). 3 Although after the colonial communication crisis of the First World War pro-colonial contemporaries considered radio to be an essential tool of empire, it certainly was not an uncontested one.

7 Ibidem, 408.
16 ‘De toespraak van H.M. de Koningin’, Het Vaderland, 2 June 1927.
national history. At the time of the Great War, Australia was still a fledgling country. The Australian state colonies only federated and formed an independent country in 1901, less than fifteen years before the start of the war. The Anzac Legend thereby became a means for the Australian government to unite the nation and impose a sense of national pride to its people while the country endured many war-time hardships.

Since then, the Anzac Legend has become an important political tool for successive Australian Prime Ministers to encourage support for subsequent military efforts. In the early 2000s Australian Prime Minister John Howard justified participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars through invoking the memory of Australian sacrifice in war, linked most prominently to the Anzacs. More recently, current Prime Minister Tony Abbott drew on the Anzac Legend to appeal to a common sense of national identity in all of the country’s military contributions. “Mateship, humor, and respect for an honorable foe,” Abbott said in an address on Anzac Day in 2014, “characterized the Australian soldier from that day to this: in World War II, Korea and Vietnam; in Iraq, Afghanistan and all the other places where Australians have served.”

As Brown argued recently, the problem from an academic perspective is that the Australian government and its people are either unaware or simply ignore many of the myths that historians have uncovered about the Anzacs. Peter Stanley, for instance, pointed out that the supposedly shared positive and commendable characteristics of the Anzac soldiers is perhaps one of the biggest myths. In his 2010 award winning book Bad Characters, Stanley draws on extensive historical research to provide clear evidence that many Anzac soldiers behaved badly in Gallipoli. He takes aim at the misrepresented concept of the typical larrikin Digger that has survived in Australian folklore through shocking accounts of soldiers that disobeyed, deserted and even murdered their fellow comrades. According to Stanley, Australian soldiers also took part in riots and strikes, while many had venereal diseases from frequent and inappropriate sexual activity.

Elsewhere, Stanley also suggests that the British Royal Navy were not to blame for the Anzacs landing at the wrong location in Gallipoli Cove. There was never a precise landing location, Stanley argues, and in fact the location where the Anzacs came ashore was beneficial compared to many other potential landing zones because the area was not heavily defended. He also points out that out of both fear and stubbornness Australian soldiers ignored British commands to move further up the Gallipoli shoreline and instead entrenched themselves nearer to the beach. Craig Stockings, a military historian at the University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy campus in Canberra, has also published a number of monographs supporting these claims. Stockings argues strongly against the British Navy’s responsibility for the Anzac’s fate, along with many other myths about the Anzacs in Gallipoli including their supposedly brave and commendable behavior.

Stanley and Stockings are not alone in their efforts to redefine Australia’s memory of the Anzacs. On the eve of the Anzac centenary, Jean Beaumont recently supported Stanley’s claims on the true nature of the Anzac soldiers in an interview for the Australian Broadcasting Network in August 2014, adding that the soldiers were not predominantly from the Australian countryside as the public is often told, nor were they overtly athletic. Earlier in 2014 Beaumont wrote Broken Nation, which offers a more holistic account of the Australian war effort. In addition to the Anzac’s military contribution in Europe and the Middle East, Beaumont explores the many stories about the effect of the war on Australia’s home front. So far as Australia’s military contribution and its connection to the Australian public was concerned, Beaumont suggests that instead of a new sense of national pride that the Anzacs installed, there was a new breed of imperial “loyalist” that appeared in Australia. It demanded the repression of dissent, the imprisonment of opponents and deportation of agitators and aliens, Bolsheviks, and Catholics, all in the name of ”loyalty to the British empire.” Other historians, such as Marilyn Lake, Henry Reynolds, Joy Damousi and Mark McKenna, take a similar, somewhat alternative approach to the Anzac memory. In the edited 2010 book What’s Wrong with Anzac, these historians argue that there is a noticeable militarisation of Australian history that marginalises other important social and cultural aspects.

These views have not gone unchallenged. Even in academic circles, there is no consensus on redefining the Anzac tradition in the wake of centenary celebrations. Controversial historian Mervyn Bendle suggests that it is unfair to place all the blame on the Anzac soldiers, whose military contributions were a “great and noble sacrifice.” In direct response to Brown, Stanley, Stockings and Beaumont’s views on the Anzacs and their legend, Bendle made his message clear in early 2014: “nearly a century ago Australians pledged, ’Lest we forget,’ and they should now be allowed to honor this centenary without constant sniping from obsessive academic leftists and disgruntled ex-officers.” Bendle’s comments, albeit mean-spirited and unnecessarily provocative, have some merit. Even if many of the Anzacs were not what the Australian public think they were, these soldiers still gave their lives for their country and should be remembered proudly if only for that reason. They also continue to serve as a symbol for Australian military sacrifices in other wars.

Looking at the Anzac controversy more broadly, another potential explanation for this selective history debate is that it is part of a larger problem in the retelling of Australian history. Namely, Australian politicians and military officers too often overlook the country’s shortcomings and atrocities and focus almost solely on its sacrifices and achievements. For example, alongside the long-standing debate between the history and the collective public memory of the Anzacs, there has been extensive public and academic debate over Australia’s remembrance of its harsh treatment of native Australian Aborigines from European settlement in 1788 to the contemporary period.

Whether or not Australia should take a “black arm band view of history”—as Geoffrey Blainey first described in 1993—and recognise its atrocities has not yet been addressed properly by Australian politicians. The only noticeable exception is Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s famous “Sorry” speech in 2008, where he apologised to native Aborigines for Australia’s very poor treatment of its native people since European settlement. Even then, one short public address is surely not enough to address all of Australia’s past misdeeds. Aside from early battle
In the end, Australia’s centenary commemorations for its involvement in World War I will not reflect properly the truth about the Anzacs. This is because successive Australian governments have over time used the Anzac Legend to spur a sense of national pride and duty over and above describing the actual reality of the Gallipoli campaign, but also because there is a broader problem in Australia over the way its history tends to be remembered selectively. While it is undoubtedly important to remember anything at all positive from war and respect those soldiers that have fought and died for their country, it is equally important that the truth is not abandoned entirely in the process. These issues considered, the interplay between the history and the collective public memory of the Anzacs in Australia is a fascinating example of the way experiences during World War I continue to play an important role in a country’s national consciousness. More broadly, it also raises further questions about the government’s role in dictating its own history.

5 Peter Stanley, Bad Characters: Sex, Crime, Mutiny, Murder and the Australian Imperial Force (Allen & Unwin, 2010).
6 Peter Stanley, Quinn’s Post: Anzac, Gallipoli (Allen & Unwin, 2005).
10 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds ed., What’s Wrong with Anzac? The Militarization of Australian History (UNSW Press, 2010).
Mourning, Memory, and Material Culture: Colonial Commemoration of the Missing on the Great War’s Western Front

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When the Great War ended with the signing of an armistice on November 11, 1918, life could not immediately resume a semblance of normalcy. Thousands of bodies had to be buried, memorials had to be erected, and societies worldwide were left reeling from the impact of this unprecedented conflict. Although the war impacted many countries, this article focuses on its ramifications for British colonies, because the conflict was a critical point in the history of the British Empire. It complicated the relationship between Britain and its dominions, leaving Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa navigating new aspects of their national identities and their connections to the metropole. Simultaneously, these countries also had to deal with internal divisions produced or exacerbated by the war, as well as pervasive grief over the colossal loss of life suffered.

A manifestation of this new stage in British-colonial relations was the creation of colonial memorials to the missing on the Western Front. One approach from which to consider this topic is the question: How do the forms and functions of these sites express or suppress colonial identities? However, the reality is more complex than this question implies. This article will argue that although it is tempting to view the relationship between colonial and imperial identity as a dichotomy, and thus the expression of one as a suppression of the other, affinities to Britain were often incorporated within, not repudiated by, the national identities newly asserted by the colonies. There was also tension and overlap between these three types of identity forged in the midst of the war: unifying national identity, identity based on shared experiences of the war’s personal impact, and factional identities based on internal divisions. Hence, there was no singular cohesive colonial identity for each of these memorials to reflect or suppress. To comprehend the various meanings ascribed to these sites, the memorials must be understood as sites of hybridity: they are intersections of multiple narratives, both personal and collective, and thus have been perceived through the lens of many differing identities over time.

Four sites will be used to illustrate these concepts. After an overview and analysis of each, this article will then address relevant components of the sociopolitical context from the mid-war period onwards, which shaped how people related to the monuments both collectively and as individuals. The first memorial in focus, Delville Wood, is the South African National Memorial, dedicated to all South African soldiers who fought in all theatres of the war.1 Villers-Bretonneux, the Australian National Memorial to the missing of the Western Front, carries the names of 10,762 soldiers.2 The Messines Ridge Memorial is one of seven dedicated to New Zealand’s missing, and commemorates 828 soldiers who died near Messines.3 Lastly, the Vimy Memorial is the national Canadian memorial, bearing 11,169 names of soldiers missing in France.4 These memorials’ locations are significant as wartime sites of great loss, great victory, or both, and the monuments themselves are testaments to personal and national achievement, sacrifice, and grief. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) is responsible for these sites, and this ongoing cooperation in commemoration reflects the close ties between Britain and its empire. These ties were more strongly binding in 1914: when Britain declared war on Germany, Britain’s dominions5 were automatically at war too, and were not consulted.6 However, colonial loyalty ran deep, and the declaration was generally met with enthusiasm.

Several factors combined to make WWI an unprecedented conflict, and this created a new era of war remembrance. WWI was the first conflict in which states were determined to commemorate every fallen soldier individually,7 especially since the majority of these men were civilian volunteers.8 Dan Todman has deemed this era the “beginning of history”:9 it has slipped beyond living memory, and yet its rise in materialism, record-keeping, and photography caused tangible artifacts of the war to be created on a vast scale, which, he argues, served to “back up the myths.”10 The “role of public institutions as repositories of memory”11 allowed for the preservation of these myths, and archaeological evidence of the conflict is also widespread. The ubiquity of war and bereavement resulting from the unparalleled scale of the conflict also added a public, shared dimension to private grief: thousands of individual tragedies created a collective trauma.12

At each site, colonial and imperial identities, and the relationships between them, can be extrapolated from the physical forms of the memorials and the circumstances of their construction. Three aspects of the Delville Wood memorial warrant particular attention as reflections of South African identities in relation to Britain. Firstly, the arch has a bilingual inscription in English and Afrikaans,13 reflecting the complicated history of British and Dutch colonialists in South Africa. Secondly, the memorial is unusual for bearing no names: unique among these four colonies, the missing of South Africa are commemorated individually by name on British memorials, instead of on their separate national memorial.14 Considering that parts of South Africa were fighting against the British only twelve years earlier in the Second Anglo-Boer War, this unusual decision calls particular attention to the question of South African agency vis-à-vis British control over decisions concerning colonial remembrance. Unfortunately, it is unclear how this commemorative choice was made. Thirdly, the arch is crowned by a sculpture of two men and a horse, created by British artist Alfred Turner.15 The official description states that the sculpture depicts Castor and Pollux “clasping hands in friendship” and that it is a “symbol of all the peoples of South Africa who are united in their determination to defend their common ideals”.16 Castor and Pollux were Greek mythological twins, and their twinship here presumably represents equality between the two ‘white races’ of South Africa. Conveniency omitted from the description is the fact that Castor and Pollux had different fathers, causing Pollux to be half-divine and Castor mortal. Approached with this knowledge in mind, the sculpture seems to privilege one of the South African white “races” over the other, and based on the circumstances it may be read as an assertion of British superiority.17 The demarcation between colonial and British identity is less distinct here, since Britishness is being portrayed as an integral part of South African identity, instead of as an opposing force to react against.
As with Delville Wood, characteristics of Australia’s memorial at Villers-Bretonneux express both colonial and imperial identities and the relationship between them. The Villers-Bretonneux memorial is composed of a 30-metre tower flanked by stone walls listing the missing, each ending with a pavilion. Although the site’s creation and upkeep suggest an intermingling of Australian and British agency as well as an inclusion of Britain in the projection of Australian national identity, its existence as a national memorial serves as tangible evidence for a separate Australian identity in remembrance.

The uniquely Australian experience of the war is reinforced with a plaque and maps pointing to other Australian battlefields and divisional memorials. Thus, we see in this memorial the assertion of a distinctly Australian identity in tandem with the maintenance of ties to Britain.

Less unified in message is the Messines Ridge memorial, with the names of 828 men who went missing while fighting in the area and is one of seven Western Front memorials to the missing of New Zealand. New Zealand does not have a single memorial at which all of its missing are commemorated together, and so this memorial presents an inherent contradiction between national unity and fragmentation, as well as demonstrating solidarity with British material forms of remembrance. It consists of a Cross of Sacrifice with a stone alcove at its base, and plaques encircling the base bear the names of the missing. Between the plaques hang the New Zealand coat of arms with the phrase “Onward”, marshaling a collective identity among the dead, and yet the names of the missing are listed according to military unit, many of which had geographic or ethnic origins (e.g. the Maori Battalion).

The cross ringed by these symbols of national New Zealander unity and fragmentation is, by contrast, a markedly British feature. This demonstrates New Zealand’s integration with the Commonwealth scheme of remembrance, and the incorporation of Britain within New Zealander identity. The Cross of Sacrifice is a feature of all CWGC cemeteries with over forty burials. Designed to represent the faith of the majority, it is a stone cross embedded with a bronze sword, mounted on an octagonal base which varies in size depending on the number of dead commemorated. The memorial is located at the entrance to the Messines Ridge British Cemetery, and the incorporation of the Cross within the memorial serves to anchor this site firmly within British and Commonwealth remembrance; the other three sites, while adjoining CWGC cemeteries, use physical separation to create a distinctly national space.

Of the four memorials analysed here, it is Canada’s monument, the Vimy memorial, which presents the strongest assertion of colonial identity. The Vimy memorial is the work of Walter Allward, a Canadian sculptor who won the design competition of the Canadian Battlefields Memorials Commission. Originally a competition to find a design that would be repeated at eight Canadian battlefields, the arresting nature and originality of Allward’s concept quickly gave rise to its selection for a single site, which would be Canada’s sole national war memorial. Positioned at the height of Vimy Ridge, the twin stone pylons tower 110 metres over the battlefield, surmounted on a massive base inscribed with the names of the missing. This memorial presents a strong Canadian identity: unique among the sites examined, Vimy has a guide program, in which Canadian university students interpret the memorial for visitors. Despite the fact that it is located in France and associated with the CWGC, Vimy is a Canadian National Historic Site and has been maintained solely by the Canadian government since 1938. The largest individual sculpture on the monument highlights specifically Canada’s sorrow: the 30-tonne Mother Canada mourning her fallen sons stands in perpetual grief overlooking the plain where they died.

However, alongside this striking representation of a distinct Canadian identity there is a multitude of allegorical sculptures, representing Canada’s shared identity with Britain and France based on common values and experiences. This demonstrates the degree to which the newly asserted Canadian identity was still proudly founded on its ties to Britain. The pylons are topped by anthropomorphized Peace and Justice, and other stone figures built into the monument embody Hope, Sacrifice, Charity, Faith, Honour, Knowledge, Truth, and ‘Bearing the Torch’. The triumphant idealism of these figures provides a counterpoint to a second type of figural sculpture in the memorial. This latter type represents a shared experience of loss and the requisite desire for peace: groups of sculptures depict ‘Sympathy for the Helpless’, ‘Mourning’, and ‘The Breaking of the Sword’, and silent cannons are draped in sculpted laurel and olive branches to symbolize victory and peace.

These memorials were designed to serve as perennial testaments to remembrance, fixed forever on landscapes that had been awash in horror. Despite their unchanging nature, the way that people understood them was not as static: each individual perception of these sites was shaped by an intersection of personal and collective narratives. It is to these narratives we must turn in order to gain an understanding of the aspects of identity through which conceptions of these sites were filtered.

A pervasive social issue extending from wartime into decades of aftermath was the search for meaning and justification of the war. At the beginning of the conflict, loyalty and debt to Britain were trumpeted as the colonies’ rationale for participating, but as the war dragged on the rhetoric of justification grew to encompass the defense of civilization and fundamental principles. From 1916-1918, after the initial surge of volunteers had faded, conscription became a pressing issue, and the catastrophic casualties suffered were used to justify the need for additional soldiers. More men were needed for victory, and if victory were not achieved then the losses already suffered would be in vain. This concept was powerfully reinforced by the poem In Flanders Fields, written by a Canadian and published in Britain in 1915. In the poem’s final stanza, the dead soldiers urge society to “take up our quarrel with the foe: to you from failing hands we throw the torch; be yours to hold it high. If ye break faith with us who die, we shall not sleep.”

This desperation to avoid a futile perception of the war continued after the victory in 1918. Grieving families had to be assured of the validity of their sons’ sacrifices, and memorial construction served as a means to legitimize individual grief; a strong, nearly all-encompassing societal respect for the bereaved prevented alternative critical views from becoming widespread. However, as mourning parents began to die in the 1930s, a dissenting narrative questioning the worth and purpose of these
sacrifices became more openly acknowledged. Today, futility rhetoric in connection with contemporary conflicts is perceived as highlighting the bravery of those who fought, not questioning the worth of their sacrifice.

Beginning with their dedications, these three memorials became pilgrimage destinations, within a broader trend of mass battlefield tourism in the 1920s-1930s. The distinction between ‘pilgrim’ and ‘tourist’ was generally defined (at least by the pilgrims) in terms of the war’s impact: pilgrims were those who had a connection to the site, either through battle experience or the loss of a loved one there. Veterans returned seeking closure, to relive happy memories of the war, to honour fallen comrades, or for any combination of these motives. Their motivations for traveling such great distances to these memorials would have shaped on a personal level the meaning they imbued the sites with. Mourners coming from such great distances wanted to feel connected to the places where their loved ones had died: as such, these sites preserved the battlefield landscape to a much greater degree than British memorials. The journeys undertaken by these identity groups served to reinforce individual identification with them, and to rehearse and perpetuate shared perceptions of the war. Memories are not static: they are shaped and altered over time through reinforcement and rehearsal, and these shared perceptions were those selective and constructed versions of memory which arose out of the plethora of individual experiences. The memorials had to be destinations worthy of this pilgrimage: sites somehow capable of evoking the carnage they had witnessed, despite the sanitized and purified nature of the white stone monuments that had replaced it.

Although unveilings and pilgrimages drew significant attendance from the colonies, the bleak truth remained that these sites would never be seen by most people to whom they were important. Instead, the memorials, and specifically the individual names carved in stone, lived large in people’s imaginations as fixed and tangible focuses for their grief. In her novel about the Vimy memorial’s construction, Jane Urquhart underscores how these names served as lodestones for personal mourning: “There is absolutely nothing like the carving of names. Nothing like committing to stone this record of someone who is utterly lost.” The distance between the memorials and the colonies developed an increased reliance and expectation of the people towards their governments in managing remembrance for them abroad. Stripped of personal agency by geographic separation, focus concomitantly turned inwards to local forms of remembrance, especially in Australia and New Zealand due to the extremity of their geographic separation.

Distance was only one aspect which helped to forge cohesive national identities during the war and its aftermath. Common loss — of life, innocence, a generation — created a shared experience which served as a fundamental aspect of each country’s identity. In Britain, loss remained the thematic standpoint from which the war was evaluated, but in the colonies this was tempered by a strong sense of achievement. The war was seen as a test successfully passed, inculcating the colonies with national pride in having proved their prowess and independence. These newfound identities were not reactions against Britain. Instead, the ability to have successfully aided Britain was seen as proof of colonial ability, and national unity did not negate loyalty to empire, but rather reduced the degree of subordination in the relationship. However, there was an element of superiority in the colonies’ belief that they produced better soldiers than Britain, and colonial soldiers were privileged and idealized to a greater extent than in Britain, where victimhood took precedence in the national narrative.

The memorial sites reflect the sense of national identity created by cohesive military success and loss. Delville Wood was the first major engagement of South African forces on the Western Front, and they held their position despite suffering incredible casualties. Villers-Bretonneux, Vimy, and Messines Ridge were all sites of stunning victories mainly achieved by Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand divisions respectively, occurring in 1917–1918 after the colonies had achieved greater military independence. The battle for Vimy Ridge, for example, was seen as a potent symbol of Canadian identity for its tactical success achieved by all four divisions of the Canadian Corps, fighting together for the first time and under Canadian command which only came about after considerable petitioning over the course of the war. The Australian Imperial Force was eventually able to achieve autonomy from British forces, although they were slower to do so.

National identity was also formulated through shared participation in a secular “cult of the war dead”. Termed this by scholars because of parallels with religious practices, it did not replace traditional religion but was a social phenomenon uniting the living in reverence of those who fell. The memorials and their battlefield locations were instinctively treated as sacred places, and the war dead were non-contentious symbols, guaranteed respect and admiration by virtually all segments of society. Even today these sites retain their aura of secular sacredness, as evidenced by the standards of behaviour they evoke (silence, respect, no running), their roles as sites of ritual (remembrance ceremonies) and their function as a depository for offerings of objects imbued with special meaning (wreaths, poppies, photographs, miniature flags).

Respect for soldiers and their sacrifices knit together national identity, but could not dissipate the tension between competing internal identities, as well as strong supranational identifications based on personal experiences of the war. Paradoxically, although the conflict strengthened national unity and independence, it also inflamed or created a multiplicity of identities which fragmented ideals of national unity. Competing veteran groups grappled for membership and control over how the war was remembered and interpreted by ex-servicemen; rival political groups appropriated soldier symbolism to advance their causes, especially during the union labour disputes of the 1930s. Loss or service, or the lack thereof, was used to commend or shame individuals, a trend especially prevalent in politics. Tension also arose over commemoration of South Africa’s dead, reflecting ongoing hostility between Afrikaners and Anglo-South Africans. The war sharply divided English and French Canada too: French immigration to Canada had mainly occurred in previous centuries, whereas British immigration was ongoing, and thus French Canadians claimed to be more loyal to Canada than British Canadians, whose obligations were split. This rift was especially evident in the conscription crisis, which resulted in the Military Service Act of 1917.
suffered comparable conscription turmoil, although divided along different societal lines. The Irish Catholic community and the powerful trade unions were especially against it, and such a considerable backlash was created that conscription was never introduced.71

Less contentious, but significantly impacting self-perceptions, were supranational identity groups that crossed national borders, and arose based on shared wartime experience. The concept of a ‘lost generation’ was prevalent,72 and although most soldiers did survive the war, they were ‘lost’ in another way, as their experiences often alienated them from the home front society. They felt that only other soldiers could understand the sorrows and joys of the war and how these affected their postwar lives.73 This group was accorded great respect as “the only legitimate interpreters of the war experience” and as a direct connection to the fallen.74 Another monolithic identity based on wartime experience instead of national allegiance was that of the bereaved: those who had had a loved one die in the war. These mourners were deeply connected to the sites of their loss, and were scornful of battlefield tourists, who they believed did not properly appreciate the significance of the ground they treaded.75 Their losses afforded them the authority to speak of sacrifice, and elevated them above those whose families had not been personally ravaged by the war.76 Generally, the bereaved were viewed as a separate group from soldiers, but these identities were not mutually exclusive, and it is important to recognize that many soldiers had also lost loved ones.

As these soldiers aged and the war became an event in the lives of parents and grandparents, these memorials remained as witnesses to successive generations’ interactions with the war and its legacy of remembrance. Although intended to be unchanging in form, they were located in a war zone during WWII, most notably resulting in extensive structural damage to Villers-Bretonneux.77 Time has also ravaged them, with varying degrees of restoration work undertaken in later decades.78 The motive to fund this work testifies to the important and symbolic place these sites still hold in national identity and memory, and restoration is a tangible bulwark in the fight to preserve the memory of this war against the inevitable fading that time instigates.

As time has passed, changes in memory and perceptions of the war from 1939 to the present have impacted how people perceived the war, remembrance, and the memorials themselves. As WWII erupted, it was realized with sinking hearts that WWI had not been the ‘war to end all wars’ after all, and this threw the sacrifices of the dead, and thus the consolation of the bereaved, into a very different light. Each generation since 191479 had a distinct set of shared experiences and learned narratives which shaped their relationship to the war; key factors were subsequent conflicts, the age of those who remembered WWI, and the gap between that cohort and the current generation.80 As time created distance between WWI and the present, individual experiences were to a degree subsumed within a more collective memory of the war,81 and yet there is still a fascination with individual deaths.82 Annual commemorative ceremonies at the memorial sites reflect the enduring importance of national remembrance, and the dates chosen demonstrate the unique national significance still attached to the battles these sites represent.83 As the 100th anniversary of WWI’s outbreak approaches, remembrance still has a strong presence within public awareness, and each future generation of these colonies will have their own perceptions of these sites shaped by a combination of collective memory and personal interactions with the war’s legacy.

In conclusion, these four memorials allow a complicated and nuanced view of colonial identities as shaped by the Great War, including their relationships to imperial identity. Not always a dichotomy, the colonies often incorporated elements of their British identity within their newfound national self-conceptions. However, behind this projected unity lay disjunctions in colonial identities caused by the war, either through differing experiences of it or based on internal divisions over war-related issues. In consequence, the memorials held varying meanings, reflecting different aspects of grief, experience, and memory for each person. To comprehend how they were perceived through time, we must understand these monuments as sites of hybridity, at which a mix of identities—personal and national, colonial and imperial—have intersected.

5 A Dominion was a former British colony that had been granted self-government but could not exercise independent foreign policy. Of the four dominions examined in this article, Canada received this status in 1867, Australia in 1901, New Zealand in 1907, and South Africa in 1910. Throughout this article, the terms ‘colony’ and ‘colonial’ will be used in reference to these dominions, for reasons of continuity and simplicity.
7 Wood and Swettenham, Silent Witnesses, 5; Bart Ziino, A Distant Grief: Australians, War Graves, and the Great War (Crawley, AUS: University of Western Australia Press, 2007), 3.
10 Todman, Great War; 71.
13 The full text of the inscription reads “To the Immortal Dead from South Africa, who at the call of duty made the Great Sacrifice on the battlefields of Africa, Asia and Europe and on the Sea, this memorial is dedicated in proud and grateful recognition by their countrymen. Their ideal is our legacy. Their sacrifice our inspiration” (in English and Afrikaans). “Delville Wood: The Memorial,” South African Commemorative Museum Trust, accessed July 2014.
16 Ibid. Even before its construction, South African authorities drew criticism for their choice of memorial site; only white Anglo-Dutch volunteers had fought at Delville Wood, and the selection of this location as a focus for national remembrance was seen as a dismissal of the sacrifices made by black South Africans, hundreds of whom had died at sea or been involved as Labour Corps auxiliaries in other areas (Bill Nasson,”Delville Wood and South African Great War Commemoration,” English Historical Review 119, no. 480 (February 2004): 58, 65).
20 Contrastingly, Australians missing in Belgium are commemorated along with the names of British forces on the Menin Gate memorial in Ypres.
22 “Messines Ridge (New Zealand) Memorial,” Belgian Heritage Register, accessed July 2014, https://inventaris.onroerendergoed.be/woi/relic/2012; Ward and Gibson, Courage Remembered, 155. The full text of this memorial’s inscription reads “Here are recorded the names of officers and men of New Zealand who fell in or near Messines in 1917 and 1918 and whose graves are known only to God”.
25 “The Monument- Design Competition,” Veterans Affairs Canada, accessed July 2014, http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/memorials/france/vimy/sg/04_monument/01_competition. For further detail on the design competition and site selection process, see Hucker, “Battle and Burial,” 95-98. The full text of this memorial’s inscription reads “To the valour of their countrymen in the Great War and in memory of their sixty thousand dead this monument is raised by the people of Canada” (in English and French).
28 The exception to this was the German occupation of the ridge in WWII; see Hucker, “Battle and Burial,” 104.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Brendon, Decline and Fall, 253; Hall, Commonwealth, 126; Jackson, Distant Drums, 8; W.F. Mandle, Going it Alone: Australia’s National Identity in the Twentieth Century (Ringwood,
34 The number of British-born colonial men who voluntarily enlisted in the initial stages of war was highly disproportionate to the colonies’ general populations. 50% of the men who joined the first surge of enlistment in Australia had been born in Britain (and British-born Australians ultimately accounted for 21% of the Australian Imperial Force); similarly, nearly 50% of South African volunteers had been born in Britain. 20% of enlistees in the New Zealand forces were British-born, and so were 66% of Canada’s initial contingent. See Nasson, “Delville Wood,” 63; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 51-52; Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 169.

35 Mark Connelly, The Great War, Memory and Ritual (London: Royal Historical Society, 2002), 1; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 79, 105; Todman, Great War, 129.


38 Todman, Great War, 18, 132, 152.

39 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 134, 173; Todman, Great War, 59; Vance, Death So Noble, 7; Ziino, Distant Grief, 8.

40 Todman, Great War, 121, 152.


42 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 46; Winter, “Tourism, Social Memory,” 615-616.

43 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 147; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 148.

44 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 37.


46 Foster, “Creating a Temenos,” 269, 274; Hucker, “Battle and Burial,” 101-103; Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 1; Schofield, Combat Archaeology, 45; Vance, Death So Noble, 60. For greater detail on this topic in relation to the Vimy Memorial, see Natalie Bull and David Panton, “Drafting the Vimy Charter for Conservation of Battlefield Terrain,” Association for Preservation Technology International Bulletin 31, no. 4, Managing Cultural Landscapes (2000): 5-11, which includes the full text of the charter.
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Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 6; Winter, Remembering War, 26; Ziino, Distant Grief, 2.


Sheftall, Altered Memories, 171-172; Ziino, Distant Grief, 131.

Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 202; Todman, Great War, 116; Vance, Death So Noble, 127.

Sheftall, Altered Memories, 167; Vance, Death So Noble, 231.

The former was notably the case for South African politician Percy FitzPatrick, who instigated the Delville Wood memorial (Nasson, “Delville Wood,” 65-66), while the latter was true for William Lyon Mackenzie King, Canadian prime minister for several terms in the 1920s-1940s (Vance, Death So Noble, 124).


Sheftall, Altered Memories, 97-98; Vance, Death So Noble, 10.

Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 183; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 92-97.

Brendon, Decline and Fall, 273-274; Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 183; Luckins, Gates of Memory, 63; Mandle, Going it Alone, 17-21; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 67, 74, 111-112, 114, 117-118.

Mandle, Going it Alone, 22; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 32; Vance, Death So Noble, 241; Winter, Remembering War, 154.

Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 169; Vance, Death So Noble, 127; Ziino, Distant Grief, 7.

Vance, Death So Noble, 223.

Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 7; Winter, “Tourism, Social Memory,” 616.

62 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 6; Winter, Remembering War, 26; Ziino, Distant Grief, 2.


64 Sheftall, Altered Memories, 171-172; Ziino, Distant Grief, 131.

65 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 202; Todman, Great War, 116; Vance, Death So Noble, 127.

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67 The former was notably the case for South African politician Percy FitzPatrick, who instigated the Delville Wood memorial (Nasson, “Delville Wood,” 65-66), while the latter was true for William Lyon Mackenzie King, Canadian prime minister for several terms in the 1920s-1940s (Vance, Death So Noble, 124).


69 Sheftall, Altered Memories, 97-98; Vance, Death So Noble, 10.

70 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 183; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 92-97.

71 Brendon, Decline and Fall, 273-274; Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 183; Luckins, Gates of Memory, 63; Mandle, Going it Alone, 17-21; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 67, 74, 111-112, 114, 117-118.

72 Mandle, Going it Alone, 22; Sheftall, Altered Memories, 32; Vance, Death So Noble, 241; Winter, Remembering War, 154.

73 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 169; Vance, Death So Noble, 127; Ziino, Distant Grief, 7.

74 Vance, Death So Noble, 223.

75 Lloyd, Battlefield Tourism, 7; Winter, “Tourism, Social Memory,” 616.

76 Vance, Death So Noble, 125. Although people of both genders shared the losses of their loved ones, the historical association between women and mourning created the popularly dominant perception of the mourner as mother or widow; see Luckins, Gates of Memory, 16, and Ziino, Distant Grief, 27.


79 Dan Todman has identified 5 distinct generations from 1914 onwards: see Todman, Great War, 224-226.


81 Ziino, Distant Grief, 132.

82 Todman, Great War, 68.

83 The main ceremonies at Villers-Bretonneux and Messines Ridge are on ANZAC Day (April 25th), a holiday honouring Australian and New Zealand soldiers which falls on the anniversary of both the Gallipoli landings (1915) and the capture of Villers-Bretonneux (1918). At Vimy, April 9th, the day Vimy Ridge was won during the Battle of Arras in 1917, is the primary occasion for ceremony. At Delville Wood, annual commemorations fall in mid-July to coincide with the South Africans’ fight to maintain this location in 1916.

40
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