Special Section: The World from Latin America

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Dear Colleagues,

It is with great pleasure that I offer this edition of the *World History Bulletin* focusing on the ways we might better include Latin America in world history teaching and scholarship. Suzanne Litrel has curated an exciting collection of essay related the theme of this issue of the *Bulletin*, and she has my profound gratitude for the work she has put into shaping the intellectual currents of our field.

We look forward to future issues of the *Bulletin* looking at “1968 in a Global Context.” If you would like to propose a theme for a special issue in the future, please feel free to contact me with your ideas!

with all good wishes,

Jared Poley
The Best in World History

The World Reimagined
Americans and Human Rights in the Twentieth Century
Mark Philip Bradley
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY

GLOBAL AND INTERNATIONAL HISTORY
Latin America and the First World War
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From The Executive Director

This issue of the World History Bulletin focusing on Latin America will certainly be educational. While many of you hold expertise in Latin America, my own knowledge stems from eating the food (as highlighted at this year’s XK Cooking World History event) and reading the region’s great fiction writers. Most important, this issue has been edited carefully by Suzanne Litrel and Jared Poley, who have been much more involved with the World History Bulletin since Denis Gainty’s untimely passing. On behalf of the WHA, I would like to offer sincere thanks to these fine historians who moved from contributors to this effort to active editors.

As soon as the first autumn leaf is spotted in Boston, our office is in full activity mode. Among the projects now in progress are the 27th Annual WHA Conference in Milwaukee, the WHA Giving Tuesday Campaign, the World History Online Library, and the WHA Reception at AHA Annual Meeting. Last week, the call for papers (CFPs) for the 2018 conference posted to our website, so we look forward to receiving proposals from you soon. The deadline for these submissions is Thursday, November 30. For the third year, we invite more members to join us for WHA Giving Tuesday on Tuesday, November 28. Details are forthcoming, but—simply put—it’s our way of sharing generously with a chosen charity, as well as supporting our own endeavors with additional funds. An exciting new digital project in the planning stages is the World History On-line Library. Through our office and under the leadership of vice-president Merry Wiesner-Hanks, the WHA—along with George Mason University—are developing this future Web site, which promises to be a vital resource. For our members attending the AHA Annual Meeting in D.C. in early January, watch for an announcement about the WHA Reception. This reception offers a great opportunity, accompanied by food and drink, for our community to gather in the new year.

More specific information about our Milwaukee 2018 Conference will be posted on our website by November 1. There are many reasons for excitement about this event, including a significant fee reduction for members registering early, reduced-rate residence hall housing, conference scholarships, and tours and special events, including the Milwaukee Public Museum and the Pabst Mansion. Most important, the twin themes of the Anthropocene and Material Culture ensure that our curiosity will be well fed. Beyond Milwaukee, our 28th Annual Conference will be held under the palm trees in Puerto Rico, June 27–29, 2019.

We are thrilled to welcome our newest graduate student assistant to the WHA. Thanasis Kinias is a third-year Ph.D. student in Northeastern University’s World History program working on the British Empire, and he is a participant in Northeastern’s Digital Humanities Certificate program. His dissertation, under the direction of Prof. Heather Streets-Salter, is on the racial geography of the British Empire, c. 1870–1918, and the tension between, on the one hand, the time–space compression afforded by new transport and communication technology, and, on the other, the increasingly rigid distinction of “white man’s countries” from the rest of the empire’s colonies, with Queensland and Mauritius serving as examples of sugar plantation colonies on the two sides of the imperial color line. He is also a participant in the Oceanic Exchanges digital project studying the transnational reprinting of newspaper articles in the nineteenth century, along with other digital humanities collaborations.

Thanasis received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history from Arizona State University, the latter focusing on modern French history. After completing his master’s degree, he taught the world history surveys at Chandler–Gilbert Community College in suburban Phoenix, where he discovered a deep love for world history teaching. His other research and teaching interests include the history of books and text, Islam and French national identity, and maritime history. Outside the academy, Thanasis’s eclectic professional experience has included both education and information technology work, from teaching English as a foreign language in Egypt to systems administration in rural Colorado.

While our office dedicates significant time to planning for Milwaukee, there are other important objectives that are being explored and fulfilled. In the spring, our webmaster worked to modernize the design of our Web site, and this fall, we plan further improvements to design and performance. This past weekend, Thanasis and I participated in the New England Regional World History Association executive council meeting, keeping us abreast of the issues faced by our regional affiliate associations. This November, I will again convene with my fellow association directors from across the country to keep the WHA current and bring a wealth of ideas back to our office. This meeting will be generously subsidized through ACLS and our host city, Fort Worth, making it financially accessible to the WHA.

As we continue to work to improve things for our members, our office received positive feedback when we saw many of you in Boston. We always welcome your ideas and visions and can be reached at info@thewha.org or 617-373-6818.

Happy Autumn!

Kerry Vieira
Administrative Coordinator/Executive Director
World History Association
Letter from the President of the World History Association
Richard Warner, Wabash College

Good Colleagues,

I am pleased to offer this, my final message as President of the World History Association, by way of our excellent Bulletin. We are so pleased with the leadership of Jared Poley and his staff, and are grateful for the connection with Georgia State University, a rising star in World History graduate education. As we have noted recently, we continue to be grief-stricken by the untimely passing of longtime WHB editor Denis Gainty, whose contributions to this publication and world history generally were significant.

Over the past four years, the first two of which I served as Vice President and the past two as President, the World History has undergone significant change. Mostly for the better, I hope! The other officers and our Executive Council deserve most of the credit for these positive developments. Due to difficult economic circumstances, we began the process of moving our headquarters some four years ago under the guidance of President Craig Benjamin. The Hawaii office was no longer sustainable, and to be honest if we had stayed a few more years we might have bankrupted the organization. After a thorough vetting process, we moved our headquarters to Northeastern University in Boston, hired Kerry Vieira as our Director, and have benefited handsomely from the work of NU graduate students and our alliance with Heather Streets-Salter. Thanks to the generosity of our membership, we have managed to replace the many thousands of dollars that were borrowed from our Endowment. Thanks also to the shepherding of these funds by Carter Findley, I can announce that our Endowment should top $100,000 by year’s end, slightly higher than it was four years ago. Our operating financial situation is equally strong, and we have been able to cut conference fees as a result.

Improvements have also been made to our governance practices. We have professionalized our bookkeeping and accounting systems, and our Treasurer now produces quarterly reports for the Executive Council. The Council now takes a more active role in conducting our elections, while the role of the Nominating Committee is limited to soliciting nominations and passing them on to the EC. Over the past two years our EC meetings have largely consisted of working sessions around particular topics, and we have moved to a system of written committee reports to make more effective use of our time. At the Ghent meeting the EC discussed ways to strengthen our outreach in Teaching and Research, which resulted in the creation of the new Research Committee, currently headed up by Laura Mitchell. At the Boston meeting we focused our energies on how to continue our work to diversify our organization’s membership and governance. We decided to focus more intently on developing our community college sector, since this would result in a variety of positive outcomes in terms of diversity writ large.

As I pass into the ranks of “past presidents,” allow me to express my sincere thanks to everyone who has worked so hard to build our organization. Our membership continues to grow, our programs are increasing, and I do believe that our impact on the discipline of world history is increasingly felt. As a team we have greeted numerous challenges over the past four years, and though there have been some difficult times I can honestly say that I have truly enjoyed working with you all. There is yet more to do, of course, but I have total confidence in president-elect Merry Wiesner-Hanks, the rest of the officers and EC, and most especially the ever-present Kerry Vieira whose compassion, wisdom, and perseverance are truly legendary. Thank you so much…. And I hope to cook for you all once again!

Cheers,

Rick Warner
Wabash College
Introduction: The World from Latin America
Suzanne Marie Litrel, Georgia State University

The work of historians, writes Inga Clendinnen, “is, if coolly considered, rather less than reasonable.” The ethnohistorian likens the historian’s quest to that of the fictitious whaler Ahab, who pursued his quarry to the end of his days. Clendinnen’s own body of work includes her investigation of the Mexica, or Aztec life—murky work, indeed, given the challenge (and lack) of source material.

She might as well have been writing on Latin America in world history. It’s been more than a decade since the Hispanic American Historical Review (HAHR) grappled with the “uneasy place of Latin American history in world history curriculums and textbooks.” Some world history survey courses still either begin or end at 1500 C.E.; at the secondary school level, Global History and Advanced Placement World History courses offered over two years have often done the same. The result? A Latin America that can still be described as “inhabiting a space [in world history] that is not so much insignificant as it is simply strange.”

Can l’Ameríque latine, “a modern twist,” perhaps, “on an old imperial idea” ever fit in? This edition of the World History Bulletin—“The World from Latin America”—might help redirect discussion on how to insert “the odd region out” of a global narrative. We encourage a close listen, instead, to contemporary sources and current scholars. These voices—past and present—offer new directions in research and instruction.

Here, agency turns up in expected stories and places, providing fresh perspective on worn gendered and imperial narratives. For instance, Alyson Poska’s “Peninsular Women, Migration, and the Creation of the Spanish Empire” takes on the traditional tale of the “missing” peninsular woman in the early years of conquest. Included among sixteenth century Iberian emigrants, she argues, were widows, midwives, and evangelizers, all “primary transmitters of culture” to next generation of American Spanish. Sharika Crawford’s “From Turtle Soup to Turtle Disputes: Maritime Boundaries and Commodity Networks in Caribbean Nicaragua, 1901-1916” employs incident analysis to reveal Nicaraguan pushback against unlawful Caymanian fishing in national waters. This essay also investigates the luxury commodity chain of green turtles to consider the construction of maritime territorial boundaries and use of state power.

Even prior to the nineteenth century, efforts of elites met their match in subaltern institutions. This is by no means a story unique to Latin America and as such offers much to the comparative world historian. For instance, Eric Palladini’s historiographical essay re-casts the subaltern from the monolithic indigenous who were passive prey to Iberian whims, to an active, purposeful group which met their own community’s needs. His “Time, Institutions, and the Subaltern in Latin American Economic History” presses the argument to consider the connection between change and continuity in subaltern institutions and Latin America’s economic performance. Indeed, nineteenth century financial considerations were one of many reasons literacy proponents did not meet hoped-for success with indigenous schoolchildren. In his “Endangered Liberty: Schooling, Literacy, and the Idea of Progress in Nineteenth-Century Mexico,” E. Mark Moreno examines literacy in reading and writing as central to notions of state formation and transatlantic ideology “beyond warfare” to explain why a top-down approach, imported from across the Atlantic failed to take hold.

The essays above are well-suited to be folded into lessons or lectures, either as case studies or to spark general discussion. However, Kit Wainer’s “Teaching Latin American History Using a Document Based Question” shifts in-class responsibility from the instructor to the students. In this hands-on focus on Latin-American nationalism, students sift through primary sources to examine to the goals of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas and Argentine president Juan Perón. While this exercise was crafted with advanced high school students in mind, it should also spark discussion in undergraduate sections of up to forty students.

The last three essays seek to recast discussion of Latin America in world history by highlighting transnational exchange at the institutional and individual level. Stella Krepp and Alexandre Moreli’s “Defying Ideas and Structures: Writing Global History from Latin America” takes on the problem of Latin America’s insertion into global history by calling on greater transnational cooperation between scholars. Such communication could break through barriers, they argue, posed by language, funding, and instruction. “A True Liberation”: Braudel, The Mediterranean, and Stories of Dutch Brazil” provides one such example. This essay explores how Fernand Braudel’s “Brazilian years” (the 1930s) proved to be a game-changer for Braudel as an educator and as a researcher. Years later, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II proved to be a “true liberation” for generations of Brazilian historians in search of a broader, more global approach to their work. Finally, in their “Finding Footprints of the Operation Condor: Cooperation Between Brazil and Uruguay in Communist Matters Before the Seventies” Roberto Baptista Junior and Roberto García pivot discussion of anti-communist activities away from U.S. intervention and towards agency of Southern Cone nations during the repression of the 1970s. This begins, they argue, not with the Cuban revolution and through U.S. interference, but with cooperation (and, at times, antagonism) between Brazil and Uruguay from the 1930s.

World history is a method, a process, and a point of view; it is a calling, and a mission. But is Latin America in world history a “quixotic” venture, as Clendinnen has described her own work, as elusive as Ahab’s whale? “We will never catch him, and don’t much want to,” she writes, “it is our own limitations of thought, of understandings, of imagination that we test…” The essays offered here, however, push past such challenges to reveal the local in the global—and the world, in this case, from Latin America.

3 Until quite recently, this was standard practice in New York. At the state level, the latest curricular iterations of Global History have pushed periodization from prehistory to 1750 C.E. (9th grade) and 1750-present (10th grade). For reference, please see
Peninsular Women, Migration, and the Creation of the Spanish Empire
Allyson Poska, University of Mary Washington

The traditional account of the Spanish conquest and settlement of the Americas, and especially the racial mixing that accompanied it, has been predicated on the idea that peninsular women failed to emigrate in significant numbers during the first century of Spanish contact. According to that narrative, heady with their victory and without the tempering presence of wives and mothers, Spanish men expressed both their uncontrolled sexual urges and their lust for political domination by engaging in sex first with indigenous women and later enslaved African women. However, women's historians have clearly demonstrated that from 1493 on, peninsular women of all races and statuses made the transatlantic journey both alone and accompanied by men. Indeed, over the past few decades, scholars have dedicated considerable time and energy to the study of these emigrant women and their impact on early Spanish settlement, both as individuals and in groups. Yet, that scholarship has not altered the basic narrative of the Spanish conquest and settlement, and in most Latin American and World history textbooks, the Spanish introduction of dogs plays a larger role than the participation of Spanish women. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that in their role as cultural transmitters, peninsular women were central to the creation of the Spanish empire.

One reason that peninsular women have been excluded from the traditional narrative is that despite the fact that women regularly made the Atlantic crossing, the Spanish Crown constantly reasserted the need for peninsular women in new settlements, mostly through royal decrees that prohibited married men from remaining in the Americas without their wives. These decrees had multiple purposes. On the peninsular side, authorities attempted to ensure that untrustworthy men did not use emigration as a mechanism to abandon families and legal responsibilities, while in the Americas those same decrees promoted the idea that the establishment of successful settlements required the presence of growing numbers of peninsular women. Crown efforts seem to have had the desired effect. The numbers of women emigrating from Spain to the Americas began small but grew consistently over the course of the sixteenth century. In the first decades after Columbus's first contact (1493-1519), women made up a meager 5.6 percent of those travelling to the Caribbean, yet, by 1514, Spanish women lived in all but one of Hispaniola's fledgling settlements. After the conquest of Tierra Firma (Mexico) in 1519, that number rose to 6.3 percent and by the middle of the century, the proportion of female migrants jumped to 16 percent. During the next two decades, women made up 28.5 percent of migrants, and almost all of that increase came in single women. Women made up about one quarter of the emigrants during the last quarter of the sixteenth century (1579-1600), and in the period 1598-1621, the last for which extensive data is available, women and girls made up at least one third of transatlantic migrants. Although their numbers never reached 50 percent, the proportion of peninsular women emigrating to the Americas during that first century was never insignificant.

Although the Crown reiterated the requirement that men bring their wives to the Americas, in the first two decades of Spanish settlement, the majority of women who emigrated were already wives and mothers, either of men who had already settled in the Caribbean, or of new migrants with whom they made the journey. By 1514 married women made up at least 15.5 percent of the Spanish population of Santo Domingo and by 1528, the majority of Spanish men in Santo Domingo headed households complete with wives and children. The same was true in other early Spanish settlements. By 1530, half of Spanish men in San Juan, Puerto Rico lived with Spanish wives, as did half the Spanish men in Puebla, Mexico in 1534. Although some women, like Ana Garcia, the wife of the tradesman Juan Garcia, brought children with them to Santo Domingo from Spain in 1513, babies came quickly in the new settlements. A fine model of maternity, the first Viceroy’s wife, Maria de Toledo, bore four daughters during her first five years in Santo Domingo. The importance of these women and their daughters cannot be underestimated. They were the primary transmitters of Spanish culture to both the next generation of Spaniards, as well as to the indigenous and enslaved populations. To the extent possible, they set up Spanish households, outfitting their homes with Spanish furniture, wearing Spanish clothing, and cooking local products in a style reminiscent of their local foodways. Establishing households and having babies may not be as sexy as the stories of swashbuckling conquistadors, but these were the foundations for the success of the Spanish empire.

Unmarried peninsular women also emigrated to the...
Americas in substantial numbers during the first century of contact. When Elvira García came to Santo Domingo with her brother and sister-in-law in 1511, she was not the first nor the only single woman to make a new life in the Americas. Many, like Mari Jiménez, travelled with family members, but other single women came to the Americas to work as servants in the entourages of wealthier men and women or in later decades left their homes on the peninsula hoping to find employment in the homes of wealthy colonial families. Some of these adventurous women made the journey alone quite early. Among others, Catalina de Guadalcanal emigrated to Santo Domingo in 1511 to be a servant and one woman known only as Francisca, came to Santo Domingo as the servant of Hernando Alonso in 1517. This dribble of single women crossing the ocean soon became a wave. Indeed, even at the point at which family migration became the norm, during the single women “boom” of 1560 to 1579, there were hundreds of women like Marina de los Angeles who asked permission to go to New Spain, or Inés del Nuño who went to Honduras, both to work as servants. These emigrant women were formative in the establishment of colonial sexual norms. Generally, the narrative of the early conquest and settlement features white men engaging in both coerced and consensual sex with indigenous women; however, although single women from the peninsula may have preferred white sexual and marital partners, at least from time to time (and probably much more often than we know) they had relationships with non-white men. The most famous early cases involved Spanish women who married Indian men, usually from the highest levels of native society, including a son and a grandson of Moctezuma and three married Indian men, usually from the highest levels of native society. By 1540, the number of women engaging in intermarriage peaked at 15 percent and fell to around 11 percent. During these critical years, the Spanish Crown had a strategic interest in allowing widowed women to emigrate, even though most of them would neither remarry nor have more children. First, the Crown was determined to reinforce family bonds in the Americas and there is nothing like a family matriarch to maintain the loyalties within a household. Young Spanish men had a reputation for sexual infidelity and desertion when they reached the colonies and a mother-in-law was a strong antidote to any potential misbehavior. Second, widows were an integral part of bringing Spanish ways to the new settlements. They had life experiences like bearing children, managing employees, midwifery skills, and the ability to manage in crises that would help their own families, aid in the construction of Spanish communities, and even serve as examples to indigenous women.

Peninsular widows played an important role in the first century of contact, both because of their strong legal and financial status, as well as the authority that they exercised in the family. In the first two decades after the conquest of Mexico (1520-1539) 6 percent of female emigrants were widows and then increased to around 11 percent. During these critical years, the Spanish Crown had a strategic interest in allowing widowed women to emigrate, even though most of them would neither remarry nor have more children. First, the Crown was determined to reinforce family bonds in the Americas and there is nothing like a family matriarch to maintain the loyalties within a household. Young Spanish men had a reputation for sexual infidelity and desertion when they reached the colonies and a mother-in-law was a strong antidote to any potential misbehavior. Second, widows were an integral part of bringing Spanish ways to the new settlements. They had life experiences like bearing children, managing employees, midwifery skills, and the ability to manage in crises that would help their own families, aid in the construction of Spanish communities, and even serve as examples to indigenous women.

Some of these peninsular widows were the heads of large emigrating extended households. In 1559, Catalina Bernal, a widow from Xerez de la Frontera, emigrated with her two daughters, a son-in-law, and a granddaughter. Francisca de Carrera took her two sisters, seven children, a male servant, a white female servant, and a black servant to Peru. Dona María de Toledo, a widow from Seville, also took her two children and five servants to go live in Peru. These women were comfortable leaving their homes and lives on the peninsula because they were emigrating along with their loved ones and support staff. They carried with them the skills, money, and status that they had in Spain and they used that foundation to establish strong, successful households across the Americas.

Peninsular women of all races and marital statuses used their skills and financial acumen to help establish the new colonial economy, as they immediately saw new opportunities to own property and run businesses. One of the earliest notarial records in New Spain is a legal permission for Francisca de Valdivieso to rent and cultivate an orchard and by 1527 Leonor de Sanabria was making a living by renting out a home inherited by her now deceased husband. Over the next few decades, women came across the ocean just to expand their businesses.
In 1566, Francisca Díaz from Talavera de la Reina asked for permission to go to the Americas. She described herself as a midwife and noted that she had already been to Mexico, and she had been quite successful in her oficio. Now she wanted to return to Mexico and take her 15-year-old son Andrés to marry him off. She also wanted to take with her some merchandise worth 500 pesos and “three persons who serve me,” including a slave named Ana. Francisca was clearly capitalizing on her reputation to start some new business, and based on her experience, the opportunities were better in the Americas than in Castile.

Finally, as Jacqueline Holler and others have clearly demonstrated, peninsular women were enthusiastic participants in the early evangelization of the Americas. In the first years after the conquest of Mexico, both the Crown and Cortés were eager to ensure the Christianization of the large population of the former Aztec empire. To ensure morality and provide examples for the new converts, authorities sought out peninsular women to come to the Americas and establish schools. As early as 1528, a widow, Catalina de Bustamante established a school to instruct 300 indigenous women and girls in Christianity. Similarly, in 1531, Elena Medrano, her niece, and two other women came to Mexico from Seville to set up a school for indigenous girls. In 1534, the bishop of Mexico, Zumárraga returned to Mexico from Spain along with eight women, six beatas (pious laywomen) and two married women who brought their families along, to staff a new school for Indian girls. Peninsular women expressed remarkable passion for these efforts, with many applying to the Council of the Indies for permission to emigrate in order to bring Christianity to native peoples. Women were important enough to the evangelization process that Zumárraga even considered sending religious women into all the Indian villages of New Spain. What makes these efforts more interesting is that these women’s efforts were supported directly by the Empress María, Charles V’s regent in Spain.

Notwithstanding their absence from the historical narrative, peninsular women were central to the creation of the Spanish empire. The eagerness with which women of all races and statuses “answered the call” to come to the Americas indicates both their thirst for adventure and new opportunities, as well as their willingness to participate in the imperial project. Moreover, these women represented the diversity of early modern Spanish society, as many poor white and black women, mulatas, and mestizas also left their homes on the peninsula to act as agents of the empire. Certainly, the presence of peninsular women did not stop the exploitation of non-white women across the Americas; however, the inclusion of peninsular women in the narrative moves us beyond a tale of masculinity triumphant and reminds us that conquest and domination was not solely the domain of men, but also wives, maids, and mothers-in-law.


3 Boyd-Bowman, Patterns of Spanish Emigration, 49 and 72.


7 Vilma Benzo de Ferrer, Pasajeros a La Española, 1492-1530 (Santo Domingo: n.p. 2000), 152.


9 Benzo de Ferrer, Pasajeros a La Española, 155.

10 Benzo de Ferrer, Pasajeros a La Española, 202.

11 Benzo de Ferrer, Pasajeros a La Española, 173 and 140.

12 Luis Romera Iruela and Maria del Carmen Galbis Diez, eds. Catálogo de pasajeros a Indias durante los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, vol.5 tomo II (Sevilla: Ministerio de Cultura, 1980), 610 and 736 at archive.org


15 Benzo de Ferrer, Pasajeros a La Española, 195.

16 Archivo General de Indias, Contratación, 5225B, n.33.

17 Iruela and Galbis Diez, Catálogo de pasajeros, vol.5 tomo II, 613 at archive.org

18 http://firstblacks.org/spn/manuscripts/fb-primary-069-manuscript/commentary/

19 For more on these transatlantic families, see Jane E. Mangan, Transatlantic Obligations: Creating Bonds of Family in Conquest-Era Peru and Spain (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
From Turtle Soup to Turtle Disputes: Maritime Boundaries and Commodity Networks in Caribbean Nicaragua, 1904-1916

Sharika Crawford, United States Naval Academy

In early 1905, an Australian newspaper reported alarming news. London had “not a single live turtle at market.” The reporter wondered whether the Lord Mayor of London or British countrywide aldermen could sponsor their lavish banquets for prominent officials and affluent constituents without the decadent dish of turtle soup (see Figure 1). Without an immediate shipment of green turtles harvested in the Caribbean waters around Nicaragua or the Gulf of Mexico later transported to West Indian ports in Jamaica, St. Kitts, or St. Vincent bound for England, many fretted about the prospects of diners left with no option but to eat “mock turtle soup.”

The shortage in green turtles, however, had a clear explanation. The year before in spring of 1904, Nicaraguan authorities accused British turtle hunters from the Cayman Islands with unlawfully fishing turtle in territorial waters. They detained captains and crew of five turtle hunting schooners and seized their catches. The result: no turtle steak or soup for English epicures.

Using the 1904 case of the detention of the Caymanian vessels involved in the Nicaraguan turtle fishery, I tell a story that links Latin America, the Caribbean, the United States, and the British Empire through the luxury commodity chain of green turtles (Chelonia mydas). The recent “transnational turn” has amplified global entanglements through an examination of the circulation of goods, ideas, and people across spatial configurations. By adopting a microhistorical approach, this study situates the maritime world at the center of the narratives of territorial struggles in the region. In doing so, the essay argues that in the years 1904 to 1916 Nicaraguan authorities robustly defended British challenges of their efforts to counter nationalization of the seascape. This is particularly revealing as historians continually emphasize the rising dominance of the United States and decline of British interest in this same period. The history of “Nicaraguan” sea turtles hunted by West Indian fishermen and consumed by English diners throughout the British Empire allows us to extend our view of the role of Latin American marine commodities in the world economy. Moreover, by focusing on turtle hunting disputes, we learn how important Spanish American nation-builders viewed the management of these ecologically mobile commodities in constructing maritime territorial boundaries and deploying the use of state power.

The Incident

During the month of March in 1904, armed Nicaraguan authorities from Cape Gracias port set out to find and detain suspected turtle poachers at the offshore Miskitos Cays in...
Caymanian fishermen along with their turtle catches departed the hunting ground on one of the five schooners. Some Nicaraguan soldiers remained at Mosquito Cay to guard the other four vessels. At the port of Cape Gracias, authorities accused and then convicted them “of clandestine fishing.” Authorities charged them with not procuring in advance permits to hunt sea turtles in Nicaraguan waters, which violated The Fishery Law of 1903. More importantly, Nicaraguan officials argued that the Caymanian turtlemen had defrauded the government of revenue generated from them hunting marine resources in national waters. As a result, the court exacted payment for fishing permits and tariffs on caught turtle as well as prison terms for the captains; the government only demanded the crew pay fees for the fishing permits.

News of the incident quickly reached Grand Cayman. Commissioner Fred Sanguinetti managed to alert the colonial secretary of the seizure and treatment of Caymanian turtle hunters by Nicaraguan authorities. The detention of the men and loss of their income occurred at a terrible time. “I feel constrained to add that matters were bad enough with the people of this Island as a consequence of the cyclones of August last, but the seizure of the vessels and consequent loss of the larger portion of the season’s turtle catch, has brought very many families face to face with actual want,” admitted the commissioner. The concerns regarding “brutal treatment” of British subjects at the hands of foreign authorities sufficiently alarmed British officials to trigger the colonial secretary to send out a gunboat to investigate.

**The Dispute**

Accompanied by his Spanish interpreter Mr. T.P Thompson, Captain Herbert Lyon of the HMS Retribution, a part of the West Indies squadron, arrived to Cape Gracias. There, he reviewed evidence collected against the captains and crew of the five Caymanian schooners as well as met with Commandant Gonzalez. He even studied the chart where Nicaraguan authorities indicated the seizure of the British vessels. Afterwards Lyon concluded that “the Nicaraguans had been guilty of a gross act of piracy.” He examined the chart that indicated the location where Caymanians hunted turtle. It was three miles beyond the Mosquito Cay. Thus, Lyon reasoned that they had not violated Nicaraguan territorial sovereignty. The British naval captain argued that Caymanian turtlemen respected the three mile territorial limit whereby territorial sovereignty only extended three miles from terrestrial possessions. It was an international policy widely accepted as part of the freedom of the seas principle. In his assessment, Nicaraguans had grossly overstepped and violated this policy. Lyon passed along this position to Minister Edward Thornton who then demanded the turtle hunters’ immediate release and revocation of all penalties and fees.

Violation of freedom of the seas concerned British officials who had long subscribed to this principle. Since the 1609 publication *Mare Liberum* or *The Free Seas*, several European nations followed Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’ argument that the sea was free and open to all. Coastal empires or nations, he conceded, had only limited jurisdiction over the littoral and nearby maritime space as a means of defense. While this line was used to defend Dutch interest in the Indian Ocean, his position gained a following. By the nineteenth century, the principle was
widely adopted and the British were its largest champions. The de facto policy had helped them to justify British expansion and domination over maritime trade. With this incident, Nicaraguan authorities challenged this common principle—the freedom of the seas—and threatened to ruin “an honest, respectable, sober, hardworking class of men and British Subjects.” They were also challenging the entire British maritime enterprise in the Caribbean.

Nicaraguan authorities refused to retract their position with regards to maritime territorial limits in the Caribbean. In a letter to British Consul Edward Thornton, Minister of Foreign Affairs Adolfo Altamirano explained to him how Article 593 of the Civil Code permitted the Nicaraguan state to extend jurisdiction not one but four marine leagues (or three to twelve nautical miles) from the country’s shores. The objective was clear. It allowed the government of Nicaragua to “watch over the coasts, insure her fiscal income, and guarantee the integrity of her territory.” Moreover, Altamirano insisted that the state had a right to regulate fisheries and navigation of those waters. “The Authorities charged with the vigilance of the coast are invested with the necessary powers to capture and punish those who infringe [upon] the laws.” In no uncertain terms, Nicaraguans had demanded that the British subjects not only respect their territorial claims over this maritime space as well as their right to earn an income from it. Caymanian turtle hunters, however, rebuked Nicaraguan claims of territorial sovereignty over the Caribbean waters surrounding the Miskitos Cays.

To preserve access to the rich turtle grounds, Caymanian turtlemen insisted that these banks and cays had not belonged to Nicaragua. In fact, they had informally claimed these spots of land as British territories since they alone claimed to have occupied, developed, and harvested resources from and near them. Veteran turtle hunters claimed decades-long experiences out at the Miskitos Cays. Octogenarian “master mariner” Daniel Feurtado had hunted turtle in the area since 1855. Sexagenarian John Jennett recalled how he had traveled out there since he was “a waiting child.” He regularly visited Morrison Cay to “split wood at local water and to fry up oil. It is a sandy split in the ground and a wash at high water.” A few other turtle hunters in their fifties like Robert W. Bodden, John Aaron Conolly, and William A. Bodden claimed to have neither seen a Nicaraguan flag nor people with the exception of Miskitu Indians out at the cays. On this latter point, it is unclear whether Caymanians understood that the Mosquito Kingdom had lost its autonomy and formed a part of Nicaragua since 1860. Despite their insistence that Nicaraguan authorities neither held nor enforced territorial sovereignty over the Miskitos Cays, evidence suggests that Caymanian turtlemen simply refused to recognize it. By the 1880s, Nicaraguan officials made their presence known at the Miskitos Cays demanding payment for hunting and harvesting sea turtles in national waters; a policy that Caymanians reluctantly and sporadically obeyed.

While some British officials like the governor of Jamaica proved receptive toward Caymanian claims, British counterparts in Central America lacked the political will to boldly question Nicaraguan claims. “A misunderstanding has arisen in consequence of a confusion in terms & the Gov’t appear to think that we dispute their jurisdiction over all the islands of the Atlantic coast,” reported the British minister in Central America. Thornton had other concerns and appeared unwilling to allow the turtle dispute to jeopardize relations with Nicaragua. The British Colonial Office worked to negotiate an agreement with the Nicaraguan government over easing or increasing Caymanian access to turtle grounds in jurisdictional waters with limited success. Without it, British authorities in Central America simply urged West Indian subjects to avoid arrest and seizure of their catches and to obey national regulations of the turtle fishery until they brokered a treaty with the Nicaraguan government. In its wake, the turtle trade faltered and remained in a precarious state to the detriment of Caymanian turtlemen and their families.

**Conclusion**

Twelve long years of protracted negotiations coupled with consistent demands by Caymanian turtle hunters and others involved in the trade led to the British and Nicaraguan governments signing a treaty on May 16, 1916 in Guatemala. It specifically regulated the turtle fishery between Nicaragua and Caymanian vessels. The treaty required captains to register vessels and obtain permits at the custom house before proceeding to catch and crawl sea turtles. Nicaraguan authorities required payment of a fishing and crawling permit at $2.50 gold each as well as duty of 50 cents per turtle. If neither party extended or renegotiated this treaty, it expired in 1936. Despite this formal agreement, American bankers doubted that the treaty would resolve the turtle dispute. Irving Lindberg warned British authorities to advise Caymanians to obey the regulation and expect full enforcement of the law. “In the future, however, it is the intention of the Custom Service to proceed vigorously against all who do not comply with the laws, and a vessel engaged in contraband or considered as such on account of non-registration in accordance to the foregoing treaty will be seized and crew punished.” With the United States occupation of Nicaragua underway since 1912, American financial agents insisted on developing an efficient revenue system to collect debt payments for foreign creditors. They were unwilling to lose revenue to Caymanian turtlemen who refused to pay license fees or duties on hunted Nicaraguan turtles. As was the case in the past, Caymanians failed to heed his warning and disputes over the Nicaraguan turtle fishery continued well into the twentieth century.

An examination of the first node of the turtle commodity chain reveals two important processes difficult to see elsewhere. First, turtle fishery disputes were central in shaping the maritime territorial boundaries for modernizing states. Nicaraguan officials prioritized a desire to profit from the potential revenue source seemingly usurped and enjoyed by a neighboring empire. To regulate the turtle fishery meant to reclaim lost profits and to assert authority over a contested maritime space. Second, culinary specialties like turtle soup became synonymous with British cuisine, though few remembered its Nicaraguan or better yet, transnational origins. And thus, turtle soup is an unusual example of the ongoing entanglements between Latin America and the world.

2 For scholarly discussions on transnational history, see Mae
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5 Miskitos Cays is an archipelago to include over seventy small banks, bars, and cays. Caymanian turtlemen called the entire area Miskitos but they also identified one specific sandy isle as Mosquito Cay.

6 Declaration of John George Merrin, April 4, 1904, United Kingdom National Archive (thereafter UKNA), FO 56/67, Folios 225-226.

7 Declarations of Fendley Parsons, Samuel M. Ebanks, James Z. Farrell, Samuel Jonathan Ebanks, Simeon Ebanks, Anthony McField Conolly, and Thomas Thompson, April 4, 1904, UKNA, FO 56/67 Folios 230-244.

8 Declaration of Joseph T. Martel, April 4, 1904, UKNA, FO 56/67, Folios 228-229.

9 J.A Lopez and S. Espinoza, Sub-Treasurer and Collector of Customs Sentence, April 6, 1904, UKNA, Folios 492-496.

10 Commissioner of the Cayman Islands to the Colonial Secretary, April 12, 1904, UKNA, FO 56/67 Folio 227.


12 Capt. Herbert Lyon to Governor of Jamaica, Despatch No. 196, April 27, 1904, UKNA, FO 56/67, Folio 280.


16 Minister Adolfo Altamirano to Minister Edward Thornton, June 27, 1904, UKNA, FO 56/67, Folios 520-523.


18 Clerk Vestry Cayman Islands, Letter to Colonial Secretary Office, May 7, 1883, UKNA, FO 56/68, Folios 184-185.

19 Alfred Lyttelton (Secretary of State for the Colonies) to Sir J.A Swettenham (Governor of Jamaica), December 1, 1905, Cayman Islands National Archive (thereafter CINA), Confidential Papers Relating to Nicaraguan Turtle Fishery Volume II.

20 Treaty for the Regulation of the Turtle Fishing Industry in the Territorial Waters of Nicaragua as Regards Fishing Vessels Belonging to the Cayman Islands, May 16, 1916, Guatemala, CINA, Confidential Papers Relating to Nicaraguan Turtle Fishery Volume II.

21 Irving Lindberg to A.C Robinson, July 8, 1917, CINA, Confidential Papers Relating to Nicaraguan Turtle Fishery Volume II.
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Toward the end of the post-Independence Mexican Empire, which collapsed in 1823, officials in the province (later state) of Guanajuato thought it important to accommodate the local reading public. The first regional libraries, or gabinetes públicos de lectura—public reading salons—were to “banish ignorance and error, and generate light onto the citizens, instructing them in knowledge which should prevail,” wrote Manuel de Cortázar, a member of a leading provincial family. By the end of the decade, the first public schools were established in the Department of Guanajuato, located in northwestern Mexico, the region from which sprouted the war of Independence. The subject of “ignorance” and all that it represented to literate Mexicans recurred throughout public discourses on literacy and education in the following years. It was a counterweight to the fear of “savagery” among the masses, including the poor, indigenous, and mixed-race populations. A massacre of hundreds of white Spaniards in Guanajuato, the provincial capital, in 1810, was well-remembered, as was the Terror in France long after the Revolution. Education and mass literacy were seen by Mexican elites as means to civilize and bring orderliness to a culturally and economically fragmented society.

The idea of “progress” in the Western world means, according to one interpretation, that “mankind has advanced in the past—from some aboriginal condition of primitiveness, barbarism, or even nullity—is now advancing, and will continue to advance through the future.” Its conceptual connection to learning took shape in Europe after the Middle Ages, although there have been differing interpretations regarding the origins of mass education. One earlier study argued that it was “produced by the social construction of the main institutions of the rationalized, universalistic worldview that developed in the modern period—the citizen-based nation and state, the new religious outlook, and the economic system rooted in individual action,” while the idea of mass literacy gradually took form in the wake of the Enlightenment. Nascent primary school systems developed with varying degrees of success in states as disparate Prussia, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal by the middle of the eighteenth century.

Earlier studies indicate that the rise of mass education was not particularly tied to industrialization or urbanization. Scotland, for example established widespread literacy and schooling by the 1830s, with a mixture of private schools and those established by clergy, and had outpaced England in that endeavor. The French Revolution inspired more continental debates on the role of primary education, leading to increased adoption of school systems. By the time of Mexican independence in 1821, acceleration of mass education efforts in the transatlantic Western world, including in the U.S., were in effect for several decades.

The idea of mass education and literacy was prevalent in discourse among early Mexican state-builders (1823-1852) who envisioned social progress by Western standards of development. However, economic and political instability, social realities, and epidemics greatly restricted those efforts. The ideal of greater access to education and an expanded literate population, concurrently happening in Europe and the U.S., fell far short of what Mexican educators intended for their struggling nation-state during the first thirty years of independence. This essay focuses on the idea of Western progress through education as it was perceived by literate classes of Mexico during this period. In addition, it will hopefully provide points of reference in the world history classroom, especially regarding Latin America, on issues of state formation and liberal ideologies beyond warfare and military affairs, as is often the case.

Harvey J. Graff’s seminal work, The Literacy Myth, first published in 1979, sparked a debate on whether literacy in reading or writing, or both, leads to measurable “progress” in the modern industrial, technological, or economic sense. The social science narrative that high levels of literacy lead to such progress, Graff, argued, was not supported by documentation. “Literacy, then, as a measure of modernity, on either the individual or societal level, becomes a symbol—and just as its benefits are located in areas of abstraction and symbolism, so are its functions,” he wrote. Although he modified the argument more recently, recognizing “limits of the analysis and the need for more direct temporal and geographic comparisons,” Graff’s work remains influential. Other scholars have recorded the relative acceleration of literacy rates in Western Europe and in the United States after the first decades of the nineteenth century, markedly among non-elites. Scandinavian states, starting with Sweden, contained relatively high rates of literacy prior to 1800, and illiteracy rates in England went from around 40 percent to close to 0 by the end of the nineteenth century, with a female literate population outnumbering that of males in some rural counties. As in Mexico, there were discrepancies in urban and rural populations. At German unification, literacy rates of between about sixty-seven percent in West Prussia and nearly ninety-nine percent in Berlin were recorded. David Vincent has cited the growth of “counting” and new bureaucracies that required literate workers.

With formation of the first Mexican federal republic in 1824, informed statesmen and hombres de bien—“good men” of the professions—in the national capital Mexico City had access to a growing body of newspapers and magazines that were distributed to major urban centers. In 1827, El Amigo del Pueblo, a weekly newspaper that was “literary, scientific, of politics, and commerce,” quoted the Scottish economist J.R. McCollach, for example. Literacy skills in reading, writing, and arithmetic, combined with lessons in religion and “morals” prevented “crass ignorance” among the poor, and save them from their own vices. Workers would recognize the value of their own wages, making them “agents of their better condition.” A few years later, the official organ Diario del Gobierno de la República Mexicana reprinted an article that called for, as it stated, a centralized system of education like that established earlier by French revolutionaries. Scattered local attempts at public education produced national, provincial, and local governments that were administered by a “hierarchy of intelligence” and left out qualified and otherwise intelligent individuals. This system threatened the existence of republican governments: “Ignorance puts liberty in danger.” Such commentaries became more prevalent in the public sphere as the influence of Western
liberalism developed in opposition to growing calls for a return to monarchy in Mexico. The polarization eventually led to civil war.

Secular learning in Mexico was codified when the first federal republic was formed in 1824. The new Constitution called for “one or more establishments” organized in each state, where “natural, political, and moral sciences, noble arts, and the languages, without prejudice to the power which the Legislatures have to regulate public education.”14 Educational standards and guidelines were adopted in the Federal District (which includes Mexico City) and establishment of a Directory of Public Instruction was decreed by Vice President Valentín Gómez Farías. The state of Guanajuato incorporated public education into its constitution of 1826. Schools of “first letters,” as primary education was called were to be organized in “all the pueblos of the state” for purposes of creating “religious citizens, lovers of the nation, useful to the state.”15 Schools were to be established for boys and girls, the common practice in Mexico, and taught by same-gender teachers, with women by being paid at lower scales than men by constitutional stipulation.

Ravages of the War of Independence left the mining and agriculture sectors in ruins, and sparse public funding often went toward expenditures for local militias (and a national army). An emerging city of importance at the time was León, Guanajuato, part of the breadbasket region of Mexico known as the Bajío, and an important grain and corn-producing region for the provincial mining economy. As a frontier community that grew into an urban center with a relatively large literate population, it was the site of aggressive attempts to establish schools, both in the city itself, in outlying pueblos, and on rancho and hacienda agricultural landholdings. Problems faced by schools in the region included resistance by parents because of the need to put their children to work, including among indigenous peoples.16 Despite their literacy skills, the challenges involved, and sometimes nonexistent pay, prospective teachers clamored for employment, finding themselves in a “deplorable situation,” as one teacher stated in his letter of application for a position.17 As the national political situation continued to destabilize, local education efforts in León continued with limited degrees of success. Of seventeen schools for boys and five schools for girls that existed in the region between 1830 and 1840, only one remained by the end of that time frame—the school for boys in the city of León. Still, as the municipal seat, the city was among the most literate in Mexico, with a census recording a total reading population of twenty-seven percent in a population nearing 49,000 people, a figure that includes children and adults,18 although the figure is still low in comparison to regions of Western European nations, the German states, Scandinavia, and the United States.19

In Mexico City, proponents championed the British-based Lancasterian system, which became the “official” means of public education in Mexico by public decree in 1840. The method was named after John Lancaster, an English educator who modified what was called “mutual teaching.” The method attracted a popular following among educators in Great Britain, France and northern Europe, and the United States. The concept involved allowing older or more advanced students to instruct younger primary students, thereby reducing the time teaching literacy skills by half, compared to other methods available at the time. Meanwhile, the number of daily, weekly and monthly periodicals produced in the national capital greatly increased by 1840. One magazine, the illustrated and apolitical El Museo Mexicano, featured random snippets of Mexican regional life, and also poetry. It reached 1,209 subscribers nationwide, including fifty-nine in Guanajuato, the provincial capital and five in León, reflecting limited but growing reading publics in larger cities and towns, hungry for entertaining printed matter.20

In 1835, a new government replaced the first federal republic in Mexico City. The more authoritarian Central Republic, which restricted voting rights to propertied men and abolished the Constitution, came about largely through the efforts of General Antonio López de Santa Anna. The “pronouncement” became a staple of the violent politics of Mexico, as military officers such as Santa Anna issued their printed public grievances, and led their own loyal soldiers and allied military officers against national governments. The Central Republic itself was toppled in 1846 when Mexico lost nearly half of its national territory to the United States through warfare. Amid continued political instability, state officials in the state of Guanajuato were concerned about the extent of primary schooling in the municipalities, including León. A circular sent by the jeftatura (head office) of León requested all the town courts of justice to report on the number of schools “of both sexes” within their jurisdictions, if they were of more than five hundred people. Schools were also asked to submit figures for school attendance over the past two years. The ayuntamiento (municipal council) lacked basic information on the numbers of students attending schools, or whether individual schools were publicly or privately funded. The town justice of San Francisco del Rincón reported only one school for boys, but regular daily attendance comprised thirty pupils, with all related expenses paid by the state. In other towns, employment turnaround for teachers was still common, and requests for unfulfilled back pay continued to be problematic. In 1855, however, Governor Manuel Doblad released the report for one school in the city of León for a good job of “student advancement.”21

Problems in primary education were not limited to León and its towns, and were not always related to finances. The population of the state capital Guanajuato was hit with four smallpox or cholera epidemics (or both) from 1830 through 1851. Already stretched city officials needed to raise funds for large-scale inoculation programs during the epidemic years.22 At a school for girls, officials assigned by the León ayuntamiento, along with an associated parish priest, paid a surprise inspection to a girls’ school, asking the teacher if there was “anything to discuss.” She replied that “some little girls were missing school, so others are falling behind in their subjects,” and that twenty-seven of 125 students were out sick with smallpox.23 In another case, a complaint received by state commissioners of public instruction led to the inspection of a boys’ school in Valle de Santiago, in the southern region of Guanajuato. The state inspector arrived with the members of the town “school commission” early in the morning on a Saturday, a day of instruction. However, the school was closed because the teacher, Don José María González Rosales, was out sick. When the inspector reached his home, González appeared waving his hands wildly in the air, saying there was a “problem with his nerves.”
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After agreeing to meet that Monday at the school, the inspector then found that the children were present but not the teacher, who left the keys to his brother. The teacher was eventually forced to resign.24

After the civil War of the Reform, followed by the French military occupation and the capture and execution of Emperor Maximilian von Hapsburg (1857-1860, 1862-1867), educational efforts were renewed with vigor by the victorious liberal government under President Benito Juárez. Still, years later under the authoritarian presidency of Porfirio Díaz, the high national level of reading-illiteracy in late nineteenth-century Mexico (some eighty-four percent of adults by 1895) contrasted with that of France, where illiteracy approached zero percent. In Costa Rica, more than forty percent of the population could read by 1900, a figure roughly equal to the total literate population of Mexico, including children, recorded that same year.25 Despite the best of intentions, promotion of Western-style mass education did not lead to a thoroughly lettered populace in Mexico, as envisioned by its early nineteenth-century proponents.

1 Manuel de Cortázar to the Alcalde Constitucional (Constitutional Mayor) of León, Aug. 22, 1823, Archivo Histórico de la Municipalidad de León (Guanajuato), hereafter AHML), Jefatura Política, Educación Pública, Bibliotecas (hereafter JP-EDP-BIB), Box 1, File 1. The Historical Archive of the Municipality of León (Guanajuato), Political Leadership: Public Education, as the archive and collection translates into English, is where much of the primary research for this paper was conducted the summers of 2015 and 2016.


9 Harvey J. Graff, “The Literacy Myth at Thirty,” Journal of Social History (Spring 2010), 636.

10 Vincent, The Rise of Mass Literacy, 8, 12.


12 El Amigo del Pueblo, Vol. 1, No. 12, 1827, 27-28


14 Harvey J. Graff noted, for example, the “indifference, rather than activism,” in state support for primary schools in France before the 1830s. Harvey J. Graff, The Legacies of Literacy: Continuities and Contradictions in Western Culture and Society (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), 268.


16 This was true of parents of Barrio de Guadalupe in the town of San Francisco del Rincón, which had been a semi-autonomous Indian república during the colonial era. See José de Jesús Trindad, Agustín Guillén, Víctor Pérez, and José María Felipe to the Alcalde Constitucional (Constitutional Mayor), San Francisco del Rincón, May 5, 1831. AHML, JP-EDP-COM, Box 1, File 4.

17 José Antonio Hinojosa to the León municipal council (ayuntamiento), ca. December, 1836, AHML, JP-EDP-COM, Box 2, File 32.

18 Archivo General del Gobierno del Estado de Guanajuato (state archive), Secretaría: Censo y Estadística, Box 227, File 18.

19 “More than 90 percent of white Union soldiers and 80 percent of Confederate soldiers were literate, and most of them wrote frequent letters to their families and friends.” See James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 11-12.


21 Manuel Dobladó to the Ayuntamiento of León, Oct. 31, 1855. AHML, JP-EDP-COM, Box 1, File 27. Earlier documentation for the post-war years has been largely obliterated, possibly by the incoming liberal government.


23 Schoolteacher (Preceptora) to the State of Guanajuato. Archivo General del Estado de Guanajuato (Hereafter AGEG), Box 241, 1851.

24 “The Inspector of Schools reporting to the State what was found in the school at Valle de Santiago, including the resignation letter of the teacher.” AGEG, Box 241, 1851.


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Time, Institutions, and the Subaltern in Latin American Economic History
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In the third volume of his Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci characterized Latin America as having “a considerable number of Indians who, albeit passively, exercise an influence on the state: It would be useful to have information on the social status of these Indians, on their economic importance, on their role in land ownership and industrial production.” Although his further comments betray a lack of first-hand knowledge of the region, his initial focus on the indigenous communities points to the role of the subaltern in the region’s economic and political history. Broadly defined, subaltern communities—indigenous, mestizo, Afro-descended, slave, or ex-slave—lack access to the political and economic power of the state; they are excluded from established institutions and have no “voice” in a country’s cultural and political life.1

Inspired by Gramsci, Subaltern Studies emerged during the final decades of the twentieth century, initially, among cultural theorists and historians who specialized in India. Practitioners posed questions on the role of the subaltern in state formation, the relationship between the state and the underclasses, and how the liberal bourgeois elites view the subaltern. In the United States, the short-lived collective, the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group (1992-2000), expanded our awareness of the role of the rural and urban underclasses in the region’s history. Despite the collective’s short life, the studies that emerged provide a vocabulary and point of view that revise traditional histories of the region and challenge conventional notions of culture and politics.2

In parallel, but unrelated studies, institutional economists posed questions about the observed failure of the Latin American countries to close the gap between their economies and those of Europe and the United States. According to these economists, institutions create the economy’s legal, judicial, regulatory, cultural, and social environment. They determine an economy’s capacity to achieve the necessary growth for prosperity. Because they resist change, institutions have a substantial and long-term impact on economic growth. The institutional perspective takes from history a view to the region’s colonial past, but with a focus on land tenure, property rights, education, and economic opportunity. Institutional economists concluded that formal and informal Spanish colonial institutions have persisted through history to determine the trajectory of the Latin American economies. Thus, according to these economists, during the first century after independence, the deep structure of Latin America’s benighted colonial heritage bequeathed the region with unchanging institutions and a stable elite that worked against the national governments’ attempts at economic development.3

Because the institutional economists focus on the role of the elites in political and economic development, their studies appear not to take notice of the role of the subaltern in the economic lives of nations. Indeed, as historian Glen Keuecker points out, the subaltern has “disappeared” from the neoliberal paradigm. However, as John Williams notes in his discussion of pluralism in the English school of international relations, openness to the subaltern reveals a “richer institutional world” and highlights the “normative significance” of institutions and their interactions.4

This paper proposes a fresh look at subaltern institutions to assess their role in Latin America’s economic history and persistent inequality, recognizing the interaction of pre-colonial institutions with the new realities wrought by the Spanish conquest and the rise of Liberalism in the nineteenth century. This historiographical review, therefore, re-imagines the Latin American subaltern communities as providing their own institutions to the region’s economic development, for good or for ill, rather than serving as passive or “disappeared” participants. The impacts of these institutions have yet to be assessed. This initial exploration provides the groundwork for further study and a deeper understanding of Latin American economic history.

Pre-Colombian cultures were as complex, varied, and flawed as any other, with a long history of empires, markets, trade relations, technologies, warfare, and class and ethnic divisions. Their institutions provided the indigenous peoples with tools to respond to the new European diseases, animals, plants, technologies, and governance structures. After conquest, this complex world also contributed its own products and processes to the trans-Atlantic markets. Spaniards were quick to adopt and adapt native institutions when it served their interests.5

Neither indigenous nor Spanish institutions survived the trauma of contact, conquest, and the colonial regime unchanged. The ongoing balancing and rebalancing between change and persistence more likely influenced Latin American economic history than static Spanish colonial institutions. The history of the indigenous response to the conquest reveals both the continuity and resilience of the indigenous institutions. Moreover, the institutions that some economists identify as colonial may have resulted from changes or adaptations of pre-colonial institutions.
Marina Zuloaga Rada, for example, describes the persistence of the *guaranga*, a little-known Incan institution that served as the intermediary between the rulers and the ruled. The existence of the *guaranga* well after the conquest also suggests that Spanish rulers were willing to use pre-existing governing institutions to negotiate with the indigenous populations. The strategic role that *guaranga caciques* retained in the new imperial system of power allowed them to erode it from the inside by redirecting it in a way less damaging to their interests.6

Colin MacLachlan provides a long view and a context to the economic history of Mexico. He begins not with the Spanish conquest in the early sixteenth century, but with earlier sources: the Aztec Federation (“Indo-Mexico”), the late Roman Empire, and the Spanish 800-year long Reconquista. The story is not one of cultures destined inevitably for failure, but of complex civilizations whose clash in the sixteenth century resulted in the creation of new mestizo civilizations and institutions with elements of persistence and innovation.7

Recent studies of subaltern groups reveal persistent alternative institutions as the native communities engaged with the colonial regimes, emerging republics, or modern-day governments. These revisionist studies describe a strong self-awareness and capacity among subaltern groups to resist or modify changes imposed from “above.” They reveal the ability of the indigenous, mestizo, and Afro-descended peoples to assert their points of view, defend their interests, and preserve, in the case of the indigenous communities, pre-Colombian institutions. They are reshaping the image of the subaltern communities from passive members of colonial or modern rule to active participants. As Barry Lyons puts it, the subaltern communities participated in the making of history, as they negotiated “the terms of their subordination.” Brooke Larson, citing Jeremy Adelman, adds that “too much emphasis on the deep structures and discourses of colonialism leaves out of the picture the power of people, and especially subaltern groups, to alter the course of nation making.”8

However, this is not meant to replace one romantic gloss with another; rather, it suggests that the continuity and change in subaltern institutions may also be part of the explanation for Latin America’s economic performance. That said, subaltern institutions do more than simply impose the necessary “constraints” on individuals for the purposes of maximizing wealth. They provide the context for identity and community. They establish the “social world” and give meaning to interactions among social actors. They enable the subaltern to interact and negotiate with structures of power and, thereby, affect national policies.9

Eric Van Young recovers the voices of the subaltern during the wars of independence. Neither economic grievances nor class relations motivated members of the indigenous communities to participate in the rebellion. Rather, the indigenous participants were more concerned with defending their communities and their identities from the modernizing forces of liberalism. Karen Caplan tells a similar story in her comparative study of “local liberalisms” in the Yucatán and Oaxaca. The indigenous communities were adept at defending their own interests, sometimes in the courts or with the threat of violence; and they sought to balance their traditional colonial protections of self-government with the many legal and institutional changes introduced by the liberal elites. Despite this common institutional legacy, these two regions experienced vastly different outcomes. The difference was a result, in part, of the emerging liberal elites’ ability, or inability, to engage with indigenous leaders in ways that ensured the communities’ survival and cooperation.10

The contentious relationship between the governing elites and the subaltern communities serves as an additional institutional predictor for the pace of post-colonial modernization efforts. During the nineteenth century, the liberal modernization efforts led to tensions between the emerging “civilization” of the urban national present and the “barbarism” of the rural colonial past. As the liberal elites moved to fill the power vacuum left by the retreat of the Spanish Monarchy, the subaltern indigenous, black freedmen, and mestizo communities were left without their traditional legal and institutional protections. Ruggiero Romano imagines that, even as the system of forced labor weakened, it left a “seigniorial spirit,” that resulted not in a true (feudal) nobility but in an “aristocracy” of “betters” among elites, in opposition to the efforts of the rising mixed race and indigenous peasantry.11 This struggle, between elite values of modernity and popular values of tradition, played out not only in the economic and political spheres, but, also in cultural expressions, such as music, dance, and entertainment.12

*Resistance and Communal Lands*

Subaltern communities had at their disposal pre-colonial and colonial institutions to respond to the liberal assault. One constant is the recourse to resistance: passive, violent, or legal. For Williams, resistance meets the criteria for an institution. Resistance to the “dominant discourse” is a “durable and evolved social practice” that conditions self-understanding and regulates behavior. Resistance establishes the terms of negotiation with authorities. Uday Chandra narrowly defines resistance in terms of understanding and enduring the conditions of subordination and acting “with sufficient intention and purpose to negotiate power relations from below.” Luis Reygadas summarizes this point by stressing “the resilient capacity for resistance” of indigenous societies “in the face of the long-term trauma of the conquest.”13

Violence was a useful modality of resistance. The violent events of indigenous resistance or collaboration during the European conquest are well known, but, indigenous communities continued to resist even as the colonial state strengthened its hold.14 The eighteenth century witnessed an increasing number of uprisings in the Andes. On at least two occasions in 1742 along the eastern slopes of the Andes and in 1780-82 under Tupac Amaru II—violence threatened full scale ethnic war. The stalemates that occurred confirmed the strength of subaltern resistance. The defeat of the Tupac Amaru rebellion in 1782, however, was at a cost of 100,000 lives and a traumatized population of Indians and non-Indians.15

Communal landholding, an institution inherited from the pre-colonial and colonial periods, served as an important marker of identity and provided an economic basis for survival of the indigenous economy. Much of subaltern resistance during the nineteenth century was focused on preserving communal landholdings and traditional values, both of which provided the context for minimal levels of social relations and social
The efforts of liberal governments to take apart indigenous communal landholdings led to violent resistance with various levels of success. In Bolivia, between 1869 and 1871, despite the violent opposition of the Aymara communities to a botched land-privatization scheme, the country’s legislators continued to believe that the Indians would be better served under the protection of a large landholding hacendado. During the 1880s, violent protests forced the conservative Bolivian governments to suspend land tax collections and sales of communal land, and to recognize documented colonial communal landholdings. In the Yucatán, Mexico, as authorities moved to privatize ejido lands, villagers banded together and resisted the surveying and distribution of the properties.16

However, not all communities resisted privatization of common lands. In some cases, indigenous communities cooperated or sought to moderate the privatization efforts. In Nicaragua, the members of the indigenous community of Diríomo largely responded to the efforts to privatize their communal lands by active participation in the process. The study of this process by Elizabeth Dore illustrates the diversity of responses to elite domination and highlights the advantages and pitfalls of cooperation. The results of land privatization were mixed. The identity of the community members changed from Indian to ladino. Women acquired greater autonomy, but lost the protections afforded them by their fathers or husbands. Poor families became poorer. Indians lost common lands for cultivation and pasture. Coffee fincas occupied areas where community members traditionally hunted and gathered firewood. Emílio Kouri describes a similar response to privatization. In Papantla, Mexico, indigenous resistance resulted in a partial privatization when the state legislator revived the condeñazgo, a system of co-ownership in which the participants owned stocks or shares in the land. This was not a solution for all the issues in the division of land and only a small minority participated in the program. Nevertheless, the process reveals how indigenous communities could affect or at least slow the process of land division.17

Market Participation and Reciprocity

The indigenous peoples’ response included participation and negotiation in a reciprocal relationship between elites and subalterns. As indigenous communities entered the transatlantic market economy, they adapted the Spanish colonial institutions, making changes to meet their needs. Robert Haskett describes how ruling native elites in Cuernavaca were able to maintain certain pre-Hispanic traditions within the colonial institutional power structure, and, through the cabildo, generate income by renting out community-owned land. Studies by Robert Patch and Jeremy Baskes reveal how the Indians of Central America and Oaxaca cooperated with the system of forced consumption and production known as the repartimiento de mercancías. Revising earlier studies, Baskes notes that the repartimiento was a way to overcome certain market imperfections and facilitate the extension of credit. He also demonstrates that Indians were actively engaged in the market. Their market behavior was indeed rational and largely voluntary. The repartimiento expanded and deepened markets because it provided the necessary credit and financing. Although Patch stresses the coercive nature of the repartimiento, he recognizes the larger implication of integrating the Indian peasant into the colonial (and world) economy. In any case, other than such passive resistance as foot-dragging or pretending not to understand an order, the repartimiento apparently never inspired a major rebellion.18

Indigenous, ladino, and mestizo workers manipulated and set the terms of their participation in the economy. This certainly does not imply that work, the labor requirements or other imperial constraints were not onerous, but indigenous peoples remained engaged and retained their agency. In Peru, studies by Karen Graubart and Alcira Dueñas reveal how indigenous and mestizo scholars engaged the Spanish intellectual and literary world. Their efforts at gaining admission to institutions of education and religious establishments changed colonial society.19

Ann Zulawski’s study of colonial Bolivia serves as a corrective to the tendency to create an overly romantic image of resistance and reminds us that indigenous men and women indeed suffered under a system of class and ethnicity-based constraints and labor requirements. Jane Mangan’s urban history of Potosí describes how the marketplace served as the venue where indigenous and colonial institutions adapted to the ongoing dialogue among the members of society. Indigenous refiners dominated the silver refinery process until the late 1570s, when the mercury-based amalgamation process was introduced. Traders also traded unminted silver and bought and sold subsistence goods in the marketplace. Women participated in the market economy, as producers and purveyors of food and drink. Women also dominated the informal credit and lending mechanisms. Mangan’s review of the notorious labor draft known as the mita (a pre-colonial institution) also shows how indigenous workers managed and responded to the demand for labor in the nearby silver mines, by, among other strategies, hiding, moving away, or stealing. In the end, subaltern people created their own economic and social spaces in the informal economy by dodging taxes and regulations. Thus, the history of coercive and extractive institutions includes resistance.20

Inequality, Globalization, and Institutions

Given this dialogue between elites and subalterns, the pre-colonial and colonial institutions changed as the various parts of society negotiated the demands of modernization. For example, Barry Lyons’s account of an Ecuadorian hacienda revises earlier notions of hacienda life. During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, landlord and peasant established the outlines of their relationship with rituals of reciprocity, gift-giving, and mutual aid. At festivals and religious celebrations, such customs recognized prestige and authority, reduced tensions, and established responsibilities. These practices were part of the settlement, negotiated over time, to address a potentially conflictive relationship. They were imposed by the farm workers as much as by the landowner.21

The indigenous institutions of resistance, communal
landholding, and market participation played out and were negotiated in a context of persistent inequality. This reality of economic and ethnicity-based structural inequality remains, perhaps, the most stable institution in Latin American economic history. With independence, the indigenous communities embraced the emerging new nations at a time when “few people thought to include them as citizens.” This inequality is described in any number of studies chastising Latin America for being the “most unequal” region in the world. However, inequality also operates in an international, or transnational institutional context that connects the subaltern communities to the larger world, as exporters of bullion, as consumers of European goods, as subjects of European government, and as providers of slave or low-cost labor. In this globalizing process of the last half-millennium, the indigenous and other subaltern communities resisted and asserted their own identities; they articulated their needs and demanded recognition as citizens. Their success or failure at achieving their goals was as much a function of historical contingency as recognition as citizens. This inequality is described in any number of studies chastising Latin America for being the “most unequal” region in the world. However, inequality also operates in an international, or transnational institutional context that connects the subaltern communities to the larger world, as exporters of bullion, as consumers of European goods, as subjects of European government, and as providers of slave or low-cost labor. In this globalizing process of the last half-millennium, the indigenous and other subaltern communities resisted and asserted their own identities; they articulated their needs and demanded recognition as citizens. Their success or failure at achieving their goals was as much a function of historical contingency as institutional persistence; but, it cannot be said that the indigenous subaltern communities remained outside that process—or that they had no impact on the region’s economic history. Indeed, the economic impacts of subaltern institutions have yet to be fully assessed.


9 Williams, *Ethics, Diversity, and World Politics*, 132.


In Advanced Placement World History, document analysis is one of the skills we emphasize most. In my classes we work on it every day. As teachers we want our students to be able to interpret the meaning of primary documents but also to probe beneath the surface. We want them to analyze the author’s purpose in producing the document and question why its creator produced a particular document in a particular way. The AP exam requires that students demonstrate an ability to analyze documents this way and the Document Based Question (DBQ) requires that they do so several times within a single essay.

I offer the following DBQ, which compares the goals of two Latin American nationalist presidents who played critical roles in their nations’ histories. Following the DBQ I have provided background notes to help teachers teach the content behind the documents and to help think about the kinds of questions that can be raised with students.

This DBQ can be utilized in the AP World History class to teach Key Concepts 6.2.II.D, 6.2.VB, 6.3.IB by emphasizing the legacy of the Mexican Revolution on Mexican history, the growth of governments who sought to reshape the government’s role in economic life, and movements which challenged neo-colonialism in Latin America. Nationalist movements figure prominently in all of these trends. Nationalist political leaders often spoke out against foreign interference in their domestic affairs, and were frequently willing to utilize the state more aggressively in economic affairs than were most governments at the time.

I frequently use DBQs as a teaching device. I teach students how to write strong essays by utilizing the documents provided to answer a question. I also use them to teach historical content. Lessons driven by DBQs can easily be student-centered, as students can be divided into groups to work on specific documents or on specific essay skills. For example, one group (or set of groups) can be assigned to work only on the Cádennes documents. That group can be assigned to describe the Cádennes agenda, contextualize it by discussing the extent to which it was an outgrowth of the Mexican Revolution or by placing it in the context of the global economic crisis of the 1930s which forced states around the world to intervene in their domestic economies in a variety of ways. The other groups can be assigned to review the Perón documents. They can be asked to describe Perón’s agenda, and discuss the extent to which it reflected the pressures of the Cold War, concerns about a growing labor movement that demanded a better standard of living, and resentment of foreign pressures. After that, groups can be assigned to meet with each other to develop a larger comparative analysis of the goals of Cádennes and Perón. The product of their work should be a thesis that addresses the prompt.

Students will require some background knowledge in order to be able to tackle these documents effectively and utilize them as learning tools. The teacher can provide this in a number of ways. The teacher might choose to open the class with a mini-lesson on twentieth century Latin American nationalist movements. Alternatively, the teacher might provide a reading assignment, either for homework the previous night or in class, which covers the Key Concepts and will help the students understand Mexican and Argentine nationalist agendas during this time period.

In my class time is tight. I do not have the luxury of spending some days on content and others on skill development. Therefore, I do both at the same time. The DBQ is a useful tool because it offers the student the ability to learn historical content by analyzing primary sources. At the conclusion of the lesson the student should be able to discuss debates about the role of the state in economic life, patterns of resistance to neo-colonialism, and the appeal of nationalism in Latin America from the 1930s through the 1950s.

**Question: Analyze the extent to which the goals of Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and Argentine President Juan Perón (1946-1955) were similar.**

**Document 1**
Source: Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas, outlining his views on the future of Mexican society. Excerpt from his campaign platform of 1934.

“The main action of the new phase of the Revolution is Mexico’s march toward socialism, a movement which separates itself equally from the anachronistic norms of classical liberalism and from those of communism as it has been practiced under the Russian Soviet experiment. It distances itself from individualistic liberalism because the latter is incapable of creating a world without the exploitation of man by man, or without the non-stop surrender of the sources of natural wealth and the means of production to the selfishness of individuals. It separates itself from state communism, equally, because it is not in the nature of our people to adopt a system that deprives them of the enjoyment of the fruits of their efforts, nor do the people want to simply substitute a state-boss for their individual boss."

**Document 2**
Source: Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas, diary entry of March 9, 1938.

“Mexico today has a great opportunity to free itself from the political and economic pressures exercised by the oil industries which have exploited for their advantage one of the greatest sources of our wealth, oil …

“Many administrations of the revolutionary government [Cárdenas is referring to those governments that ruled Mexico after the Mexican Revolution of 1911-1919] have tried to intervene in mineral concessions conceded to foreign companies, but the circumstances have never been right because of international pressures and internal problems. But now that the conditions are different, that the country is not torn by armed struggles and that we are on the doorstep of a new world war, and that England and the United States frequently speak in favor of democracy and respect for national sovereignty, it is time to see if the governments comply by letting Mexico make use of its
sovereign rights.”

Document 3
Source: Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas, May 1940, just before his term expired.

“In government only one political force can stand out: the president of the Republic, who should be the only representative of the democratic sentiments of the people.”

Document 4
Source: Juan Perón, Secretary of Labor and Welfare (1943-1946) and future President of Argentina, speaking to the Argentine Chamber of Commerce, a leading business organization. August 25, 1944.

“I believe that the social problem will resolve itself in only one way: through working consciously to find a perfect system of regulation between the working, middle, and capitalist classes, bringing about a perfect harmonization of all social forces, in which the national wealth will not be damaged. We are proposing by all means the creation of social welfare, without which fortune is a mirage which can disappear at any moment. Wealth without social stability can be powerful yet dangerous because it will always be fragile, and that is the danger we are seeing and trying to avoid by all means at the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare.

“The working masses that have not been organized present a panorama of dangers because the most dangerous masses, without doubt, are those that are not organized. Modern experience demonstrates that the better organized working masses are, without doubt, those who can be easily managed … And I call on all of you to reflect and think hard about who the Argentine working masses are, and what their future might be if at a growing rate they find themselves in the hands of the communists, and if they can’t even live like Argentines …”

Document 5
Source: (Translation) “A Dream Come True. Social Assistance Foundation, María Eva Duarte de Perón.” Eva Perón collected large sums of money to redistribute to the poor via her charitable foundation.

Document 6
Source: Images of “Barrio Perón,” (Translation: “Perón neighborhood”), 1949, originally built by the Ministry of Public Works for soldiers and labor union members.

Document 7
Source: Eva Perón speaking to an October. 17, 1951 rally of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), one of the main trade union federations. She was there to receive an award from the CGT and the nomination for Vice President. It was the 6th anniversary of the pro-Perón marches and strikes that freed Juan Perón from prison and led to his election to the presidency one year later. The CGT had nominated Eva Perón for Vice President. She would decline a few days later for health reasons.

“I had to come here to give thanks to the CGT for the homage they pay me in giving me a decoration that in my eyes is the most beloved remembrance of the Argentinian workers. I had to come to thank you for having dedicated this glorious day of the workers and the CGT to this humble woman. And I had to come to tell you that it is necessary, as the general says, to keep the guards on the alert at all the posts of our struggle. The danger has not passed. Every Argentinian worker must keep his eyes open and not fall asleep, for the enemies work in the shade of treason and sometimes are hidden behind a smile or an extended hand. And I had to come to thank all of you, my beloved descamisados (“shirtless ones”) from all corners of the fatherland for being willing to risk your lives for Perón. I was certain that you knew—as did I—how to serve as Perón’s entrenchment. The enemies of the people, of Perón and the Fatherland, have also long known that Perón and Eva Perón are ready to die for this people. Now they also know that the people are ready to die for Perón.”
In 1934 Lázaro Cárdenas launched his presidential campaign as the candidate of the Revolutionary National Party (PNR). This marked the beginning of a stable political party system in 20th century Mexico. Although successors to the PNR, most notably the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), were known for their corruption, the success of Cárdenas’ party marked the end of an epoch some Mexican historians have described as a period of “individualism,” characterized by often violent competitions between such famous leaders as Venustiano Carranza, Álvaro Obregón, and Plutarco Elías Calles. Cárdenas had established his reputation as a military leader during the revolutionary period of 1911-1919. He was one of a handful of generals who entered politics believing that although fellow revolutionary leaders had presided over the Mexican governments of the 1920s, the revolutionary project had stalled and its goals had not been met. In particular Cárdenas was concerned about the failure to implement Article 27 of the revolutionary Constitution of 1917, which guaranteed land redistribution to the peasants, and Article 123, which guaranteed minimum wages and labor union rights. As Governor of the state of Michoacán (1928-1932) Cárdenas used his authority to establish labor unions for farm workers. This was an early indicator of his vision of a labor movement that would be closely tied to the government and in which the latter would often play a leading role. This document is an excerpt from the main campaign statement of the PNR in 1934. It reflects Cárdenas’ thinking on socialism and capitalism. Students should analyze the point of view of the author by placing the document in global and historical context. In 1934 Franklin Delano Roosevelt was in the second year of his presidential administration in the United States. His “Good Neighbor” policies made him more popular in Latin America than his predecessors. Furthermore, his New Deal proposals involved a significant expansion in the state’s role in social welfare policies, which many progressive and populist Latin American leaders found appealing. 1934 was also five years after the stock market crash of 1929, which initiated a global economic depression. This period of economic collapse challenged popular confidence in the United States and Great Britain. He alluded to that when he cited fear of “international pressures” to explain why his predecessors had never been as bold as he was. However, he explained that the impending European conflict would make the United States less likely to retaliate against Mexico. In fact, the question of how to react to Mexico’s oil nationalization ran the significant risk of conflict with the United States and Great Britain. The president would not announce his plans until several days after failing to convince the oil companies to obey the Mexican courts and only his closest confidants were aware of his intentions before the announcement. Students might examine the terminology he used at the end of the quotation. He suggested that the Mexican people do not want to simply replace their boss (“individual patrón”) for a state boss (“Estado-patrón”). But he did not indicate what type of boss they would want. Students could be encouraged to question why he did not spell this out. Did his critique consist more of a rejection of existing models than an articulation of a new one? Was he simply reluctant to specify a particular vision of Mexico’s economic future for fear of alienating some of the voters on whom he would depend? To fully understand this document students will need to be taught, either in class or through a homework reading, about Mexico’s 1938 nationalization of the oil industry. That act has come to define the Cárdenas presidency. Prior to 1938 the majority of oil drilling facilities were owned or leased by U.S. or British oil companies. After a series of oil workers’ strikes, the Mexican Supreme Court ordered the oil companies to pay their employees $26 million in back pay. The companies’ refusal to obey the ruling led President Cárdenas to intervene by seizing the oil assets. The oil industry’s defiance of Mexico’s courts undoubtedly offended the president’s sense of national sovereignty. However, students should be encouraged to examine deeper causes. First, oil was Mexico’s greatest source of wealth. As long as foreign corporations dominated the oil industry, Mexico would receive little benefit from its most precious asset. Nationalization would allow the president the opportunity to carry out revolutionary goals such as financing infrastructure to benefit peasant cooperatives and providing high quality schools and health care for the poor. Cárdenas indicated that nationalizing Mexico’s oil was an act designed to fulfill his country’s revolutionary agenda. Subsequent diary entries revealed his preoccupation with the fear that the revolution’s aims could be left unfulfilled. In that context he wrote of his contempt for developments in the USSR, including the executions of historic leaders of the Russian Revolution and what he considered the betrayal of the Russian revolutionary project by the rulers in Moscow. The president would not announce his plans until several days after failing to convince the oil companies to obey the Mexican courts and only his closest confidants were aware of his intentions before the announcement. Students might recognize that Cárdenas was carefully managing the timing of his announcement because oil nationalization ran the significant risk of conflict with the United States and Great Britain. He alluded to that when he cited fear of “international pressures” to explain why his predecessors had never been as bold as he was. However, he explained that the coming world war opened an opportunity for him. He gambled, correctly, that the impending European conflict would make the United States less likely to retaliate against Mexico. In fact, the question of how to react to Mexico’s oil nationalization led to a dispute within the Roosevelt administration. While Secretary of State Cordell Hull favored strong actions to pressure Cárdenas to reverse course, Treasury Secretary Robert Morgenthau emphasized the need to maintain close US ties to all of Latin America to prevent German penetration into the region. Ultimately President Roosevelt sided with Morgenthau,
insisting only that US oil companies be fairly compensated for their confiscated assets, not that the assets be returned to the oil companies. That stance bolstered the U.S. President’s image in Latin America as an advocate for social justice and strengthened the Pan-American alliance against the Axis powers. Students should note that Cádiz was contemplating that complex global picture when he wrote the second paragraph of this document. They can also contextualize the document by noting the timing: March 1938. That month Nazi Germany conquered Austria. Cádiz watched as the great powers allowed the sovereignty of a weaker country to collapse before the avarice of a more powerful neighbor. Could the coming of the world war have led the Mexican president to bolster his government’s economic power and solidify his own standing at home at the same time? Perhaps he was trying to strengthen the Mexican state and his nation’s sovereignty out of fear of foreign incursion. Teachers who wish to emphasize the global context of this document may also note the tensions between the U.S. and British governments over how to react to the nationalization of Mexican oil. While the United States prioritized the maintenance of friendly relations with its southern neighbor on the eve of a world war, Great Britain was more concerned with defense of the property rights of British oil companies. London refused to yield from the position that oil nationalization violated the rights of British nationals and had to be reversed. The differences between these two allies may have reflected a jockeying for power and influence in the Americas. As a result of Roosevelt’s stance U.S. relations with Mexico were strengthened while British influence eroded.

Document 3

In May 1940, with his presidential term about to expire, Cádiz offered a theory of government that seemed to be in conflict with what he expressed during his 1934 presidential campaign. Instead of being skeptical about the power of political leaders to solve social problems, after six years in office he came to believe in the central role of the presidency in fulfilling the goals of the Mexican Revolution. Students may ask why the president’s views changed over time. Perhaps his observations about his own role while in office, intervening on behalf of unions, and acting decisively against the oil industry in 1938, bolstered his own views of the power of the presidency. Mexican historian Armando Córdova roots this statement in Cádiz’s “mass politics” -- a conception that social progress required both the active participation of the lower classes and the leadership of state officials. Students should also be able to utilize this document to compare the Mexican president’s governing philosophy with that of Argentina’s Juan Perón.11

Document 4

Like Mexican President Cádiz, future Argentine President Juan Perón advocated a strong role for the state to mediate labor-management conflicts. 1930-1943 was a period of substantial strike activity. Although strikes peaked in 1936, they highlighted the risks of social unrest and even the specter of communism. The three sectors that experienced the greatest levels of strike activity were manufacturing, agriculture, and transport. This indicates that the strikes occurred in both the cities and the countryside and affected key parts of the economy. Strikes in the manufacturing sector would have shut down enterprises that were key to Argentina’s growth as an industrial power. Agriculture still provided the nation’s main exports: wheat and beef. And transport strikes must have had ripple effects, interrupting the shipments of both finished products and raw materials throughout the economy. In 1943 six general strikes broke out. A general strike involves unions and their members in all sectors. In short, in a general strike all or most workers stop working and the entire economy draws to a halt. Such strikes tend to create fears of social revolution and the fact that six of them occurred in 1943 is evidence that labor-management conflicts were in urgent need of resolution. Students should note both the speaker’s position at the time, and his audience. The “June Revolution” of 1943 had brought to power a conservative military junta which was aligned with the Catholic Church and large landholders who depended upon agricultural exports to Great Britain. In 1944 Colonel Juan Domingo Perón, a member of the original junta, was the Secretary of Labor and Welfare, an office he used to bolster his political career and influence. As Labor Secretary he successfully promoted pro-labor legislation, winning the confidence of many union members. Under the theory of “justicialismo”—a state guided by principles of social justice—he forced labor contracts on employers that the unions themselves probably could not have won. At the same time he curbed union autonomy. Union officers loyal to Perón were often rewarded with government offices. However, Perón used his authority to supervise union elections and approve labor contracts in order to isolate non-Peronist union officers. During this period the formerly anarchist General Labor Federation (CGT) became reliably Peronist. The Communist and Socialist labor leaders, once significant players in the Argentine labor movement, were sidelined. In this speech Perón was speaking to a group of business leaders, an audience that was generally hostile to his pro-labor agenda. In both paragraphs Perón appealed to their self-interest. He warned that “fortune” without “social welfare” was a “mirage,” implying that unbridled wealth accumulation can lead to social revolt. In the second paragraph he warned of the communist threat. Students should analyze the speaker’s point of view by interrogating his motives. In hindsight we know that Perón ran for president two years later. Was he hoping to pacify some of his opponents in the business world by convincing them that his policies served their long-term interests? Was he being honest with his audience? Did he really fear labor unrest? Students should be encouraged to ask whether Perón was genuinely trying to head off social conflict or whether he was exaggerating the risk of conflict in order to justify his accumulation of power.12

Document 5

Document 5 is a propaganda poster for the Eva Perón Foundation. Popularly known as “Evita” (“Little Eva”), Eva became Argentina’s First Lady when her husband was elected President in 1946. She was an unusually public political partner to her husband. Both the military officers corps and the landed aristocrats resented her prominence because of her gender and her lower-class upbringing. Eva, however, described herself as “the bridge of love” between President Juan Perón and the working poor. Her Foundation collected donations, sometimes through extortion, from wealthy figures who wanted political
influence and from laborers who agreed to have regular donations deducted from their payroll. Accusations of financial impropriety abounded as Eva lavishly displayed her wealth and fashion. Nonetheless, the Foundation distributed various products to lower class families and earned substantial popular support for Perón’s regime. Students should be encouraged to inquire about the purpose of the poster and the choice of both words and imagery. The title is “A Dream Come True”. (Literally: “A Dream Realized”). Teachers might ask students to consider why the word “dream” was chosen. Students might also focus on the image of the eager and excited child whose clothing indicates that he had been deprived in the past. Finally, students should consider the purpose of the wording at the bottom which identifies the source of the poster. Did the creators use such a large typeface for Eva’s name in order to encourage donations to the foundation or to promote the political careers of the first couple?13

Document 6
After his election to the presidency in 1946 Juan Perón announced his commitment to the nation’s laboring poor to guarantee them a “vida digna,” or a dignified life. Central to this agenda was a series of government plans to boost working class consumption. The Peronist government instituted price controls to limit inflation, generous union contracts to boost income, construction of vacation parks and resorts for the lower classes, and housing projects such as those pictured in document 6. The results were impressive. From 1946 to 1950 salaries increased 62% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Students should be encouraged to recognize connections between the photographs of “Barrio Perón” and the propaganda poster in Document 5. In both cases, the documents illustrated the beneficence of the government while highlighting the name “Perón”. Students may ask why political leaders insist on imprinting their own names on government efforts. This is commonplace in the United States as well. Even garbage cans on New York City streets often bear the names of local City Council representatives. To examine the point of view of photographs students should ask why the photographs were taken and the extent to which they might have been staged. The first photograph showed a very clean street and a series of houses one might find in suburban Los Angeles. Students should discuss what kind of promises to Argentina’s poor were implicit in a photograph like this? In the second photograph we see a mother watering her lawn and a young girl, presumably her daughter, sitting on the front steps. What kinds of assumptions about domestic life did this photograph promote? On the one hand the regime suggested that working families could enjoy sufficient free time to attend to their front lawns. Students could also discuss the gendered assumptions behind the type of ideal Argentine family pictured in the photograph. The woman was tending to the maintenance of the householder. In that sense this imagery was similar to pictures of the ideal American family one might have seen in magazines in the 1950s.14

Document 7
This speech, upon which the famous Andrew Lloyd Webber/Tim Rice song “Don’t Cry for Me Argentina” was based, was a dramatic moment in Juan Perón’s 1951 reelection campaign. The scene was the October 17, 1951 “cabildo abierto”—open forum—which the CGT organized to nominate Juan Perón for President and Eva Perón for Vice President. The rally featured neon images of the leading couple with the letters “CGT” shining below their names. This indicated the centrality of labor unions to the President’s image as a man of the people. In reality, by 1951 the Peronist Party controlled the CGT. The prospect of Eva’s candidacy angered the military for reasons discussed above. It is possible that concerns about the reactions of the officer corps led her to withdraw from the race only days later. However, her stated reason—ill health—may also have been the decisive factor. She would die of cancer only one year later. Students should first note her use of the word “descamisados”, or “shirtless ones.” The Peróns appropriated condescending terms from middle class parlance such as “descamisado” or “cabellecitos negros” referring to the black hair of many recent migrants from rural areas who likely had more indigenous or African ancestry. The Peróns’ use of such descriptors as terms of endearment appealed directly to lower class voters. Students should also note the ominous phrasings in her speech. Eva warned that “the enemies work in the shade of treason and sometimes are hidden behind a smile or an extended hand.” This and similar references to enemies were vague. Students might question why she didn’t indicate who the enemies were or of what their treason consisted. Was she trying to silence any possible opponents? The Perón government suppressed opposition political parties and heavily censored the press. Students might recognize that sentences such as these could have incited violence. They might also question the hyperbolic language in her claim that she and the audience were “ready to die for Perón.” Teachers may also use this document to open a discussion about leadership cults in history. The ruling couple combined its populist agenda with a campaign of self-promotion designed to elevate themselves to almost god-like status. Eva emphasized devotion to the Leader to the same extent to which she championed the cause of the poor. The Peronist Party even published a monthly magazine called “Mundo Peronista” (“Peronist World”) which used photographs and articles to promote the life and works of Juan and Eva.15

1 Kit Adam Wainer teaches Advanced Placement World History at Leon M. Goldstein High School in Brooklyn, New York. He is the author of Strive for a Five: Preparing for the AP World History Exam, Boston: Bedford, Freeman, & Worth Publishers. 2017. He would like to thank Dan LaBotz and Victoria Spicer for their comments on earlier drafts and Denise Ortiz-Wasilewski and Karina Arciniegas for assistance with translations.


7 Image: https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/736x/da/12/94/da12949fdeb073a5ba2b08c7776f513.jpg

8 Images: https://lateja2.wordpress.com/2009/05/01/1949-barrio-juan-peron-cornelio-saavedra/

9 Eva Perón’s speech to the Descamisados, October 17, 1951 https://www.marxists.org/history/argentina/peron/1951/speech.htm.

10 Arnaldo Córdova. La política de masas. See also, La Jira del General Lázaro Cárdenas. Secretaría de Prensa y Propaganda del C.E.N. del P.N.R. 1934.


15 For issues of Mundo Peronista see http://www.ruinasdigitales.com/mundo-peronista/. All of the issues are in Spanish but they contain several useful visual images.
The World History Association invites proposals for its 2018 conference. The conference provides an ideal opportunity to interact with an international community of world history scholars, teachers, and students. Proposals for panels, workshops, round tables, and individual papers are welcome on topics related to the conference themes, the Anthropocene and Material Culture, or on topics of general interest to world historians.

The conference is sponsored by the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Marquette University, and other local institutions. Tours and presentations offered by the conference will include the Milwaukee Public Museum, Pabst Mansion, Milwaukee Art Museum, and walking tours of this fascinating city.

Conference Themes

Material Culture

The Anthropocene
The World History Association invites proposals from scholars, teachers, and graduate students around the world on topics related to the conference’s themes, the Anthropocene and Material Culture, and on topics of general interest to world historians. The WHA promotes interdisciplinary conversations about scholarship and teaching, so work in anthropology, political science, literature, art, the natural sciences, and other fields is welcomed and encouraged. Proposals may take several forms:

- Organized panels of generally three panelists, one chair, and optionally, one discussant
- Organized round tables with four to six participants, which involve five-minute opening statements from participants and then conversational dialogue with the audience
- Workshops on specific teaching or research techniques or practices
- Individual papers, maximum of 15-20 minutes in length
- Meet-the-author sessions, in which the authors of recently-published books discuss their approach and methods, and engage in exchange with possible endusers

Organized panels/roundtables/workshops are given priority in the program and receive earlier notification of acceptance. If accepted, individual papers will be arranged into suitable panels by the Program Committee, but these will receive later notice of acceptance. Papers should be presented in English. A/V requests will be honored as much as possible, but A/V is always subject to failure, so handouts of essential information are always welcome.

More detailed guidelines, and the portal for submitting panels and papers may be found at: www.thewha.org. Please address any questions to info@thewha.org.

**DEADLINE: 30 NOVEMBER 2017**
Defying Ideas and Structures: Writing Global History from Latin America
Stella Krepp, University of Bern
Alexandre Moreli, Fundação Getulio Vargas

Since the rise of global history in the last two decades, Latin America’s place in it continues to be an uneasy one. While such scholarship tends to include Latin America spatially, it has seldom incorporated research from Latin America. At the same time, in Latin America, there continues to be a lack of engagement with global history that reflects research interests, funding issues, and pedagogical concerns.

This might seem counterintuitive—in Latin America, global history should have a twofold raison d’être: overcoming Eurocentrism and nation-centrism. By and large, history in Latin America is still written within the national framework, and global history could address this shortcoming. Yet Europe as cultural and academic reference point continues to looms large in Latin American academia; here, too, a global history approach could help to rectify and broaden historical narratives. Much convincing remains to be done. This implies finding good answers to why global history matters for the wider public in Latin America and outside of it.

This discussion piece is based on debates that occurred during the Global History Conference that took place in Rio de Janeiro in October 2016 which included participants from the Americas, Europe, and Africa. The Conference brought together the 2º Coloquio Internacional: Latinoamérica y la Historia Global and the 2º Latin America in Global Context Workshop in an event organized by Fundação Getulio Vargas’ School of Social Sciences, Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Universidade de São Paulo/Labmundi, University of Pittsburgh, University of Bern, and by the Red Latinoamericana de Historia Global (Latin American Network of Global History). The workshop forms part of an initiative launched in 2014 by the two authors of this piece. The goal was to delve into some of the issues which have complicated Latin America’s placement into global history and specifically to create a network and a platform to discuss history in the twenty-first century and to advance a more inclusive agenda for Latin American history. As assistant professors in Switzerland and Brazil that had been trained in Germany/United Kingdom and Brazil/France respectively, we felt decidedly at the margins of these debates, but also agreed that many failed to broach more fundamental concerns we had. In the past decade, scholars have published valuable assessments, yet they have been mainly preoccupied with historiographical and methodological questions. Our goal, by contrast, is to highlight the more practical constraints Latin American scholars face when researching and writing global history in (or from) the region.

Here, we would like to present some of the themes that have emerged during the conference on why Latin America has remained the “odd region out” and how we, as (not only) Latin Americanists, can engage more fruitfully with wider global history debates. More pertinently, we would like to offer some suggestions on why so far global history has failed to gain major traction and suggest that the rationale for this is multi-fold: the place or location from which we write, material and structural obstacles, as well as language all provide specific barriers.

Despite our interconnected world, our place in it still matters
One of the major challenges we face is to find an agenda that fits a varied and diverse community of scholars. We all come from very different academic surroundings in Europe, the United States, and Latin America, all with their own rules, and, crucially, the knowledge that underwrites it, so this is not an easy feat. In particular, there is a chasm between specialists working outside of Latin America and historians working in Latin America, belying our seemingly global academic world. The interest in global history is also driven by our own exigencies: area studies specialists have a different interest to cast themselves as global historians, than colleagues working in Latin America do, for whom national Latin American history is in many instances the default position. Even those in Latin America who are interested in global history often find debates in the United States alienating. Many PhDs are trained in Europe—for example, students generally head to France, and in other cases to Germany or Spain. Thus their reference points and basic reading on global history differs distinctly. There is a longstanding tradition of global history in continental Europe that is often loosely connected to English-speaking historiography. Where and how we receive our training, legitimacy and funding from matters profoundly. In sum, despite our interconnected world, our place in it still matters.

History, in Latin America, is by and large still written within a national framework. This is in many ways a by-product of funding and institutional structures. And yet, it is clear that we cannot relate national history without a reference to the regional or global. History does not end at national borders: people, ideas, products, knowledge, and technology move beyond and through it. From the Latin American counterinsurgency, inspired by French experiences in Algeria and U.S. training, over international terror networks such as Operation Condor, to the transnational political guerrillas, these are profoundly entangled histories.

Of course, there have been scholars working on global history in Latin America without necessarily identifying their research as such, yet they remain few and far between. Even though there is a growing awareness of these developments, entrenched institutional structures in Latin America have imped any opening towards new spatial categories. Another major reason has also been the ongoing struggle for national visions. As Latin American societies are still grappling with the ramifications of military rule and human rights violations, there is an ongoing fight for historical narratives, which makes the writing of history in many cases also a political project. Be it in Brazil, where federal legislators evoke the military coup of 1964 as a historical moment to be emulated or in Argentina, where in recent months the historical consensus over the 1976-1983 dictatorship has been challenged under Argentina’s current center-right president. National history remains at the forefront, and global historians need to acknowledge that fact. Simply preaching the virtues of global history is not sufficient, but we need to invest time and effort in how we can bring in national historiographies and scholars and what we can offer in return.

In addition to institutional resistance, a lack of funding, training and the division between national history and “the
As Jeremy Adelman had posited in a recent article in *Aeon,* we have seen a backlash to “globalism.” While historians seem to inhabit an ever increasing globalized academic world, we have failed to reflect the social reality of many people who increasingly perceive globalization and anything “global” as a threat. This is not aided by the fact that the history of globalization and global history are often conflated, painfully underscoring a lack of methodological or theoretical accuracy. As a result, global history has at times come under attack as defending globalization as a process. More so, given that we form part of this global community, historians have been charged as being implicated in this project.

“[G]lobal history is another Anglospheric invention to integrate the Other into a cosmopolitan narrative on our terms, in our tongues,” Adelman provocatively stated. With this, he highlights the problematic aspect of language: that “Globish” is dominated by English and Anglo-American values. In Latin America, few command the sort of academic English that is required and expected. Even in continental Europe, this unilateral direction of knowledge flows has been criticized. While most European scholars publish in or at least read English—not out of the goodness of their hearts but because it is expected of them—our colleagues in the Anglo-American world often do not reciprocate. This profound asymmetry has provoked resistance in diverse Latin American and European academic environments, where scholars feel threatened that their work is downgraded.

Even when working on transnational or inter-American themes there is significant institutional resistance within Latin American universities. This is even more pertinent when it comes to global history, which is often being described as a fad or a strategy to gain attention or funding, or, and more seriously, considered that it is an imperial project: by and for Anglo-American scholars.

There is no denying that global history, whether we like it or not, has grown out from imperial and colonial history and thus perpetuates Euro-centric perspectives. To this day, the study of empire forms a great part of it and it is mainly located in the universities of the Global North. In the United Kingdom, it is an indisputable fact that many global history chairs came to life when colonial history chairs were renamed. In the United States, it is often a poorly disguised expansion of the Western Civilization syllabus. In France, even the post-colonialist scholarship following Edward Said’s work remains self-centered to a large extent, not to mention the series of initiatives to study European history and particularly European integration, which continues to attract attention and funding. Regarding Spain, Christian de Vito, notes that much progress has been made concerning former imperial history, but national approaches and the history of the Civil War still dominate the research agenda for the twentieth century. The exception to this might be Germany, where historians are only too happy to escape national history and in particular the legacy of Nazi rule in Germany.

To a large extent, thus, global or world history is still self-referential: British scholars are primarily interested in their former empire and so are U.S. historians. “We’re overwhelmingly interested in ourselves” as Clossey and Guyatt conclude in a review essay. Romain Bertrand claims the same for the great part of his French colleagues: “when we follow the works and the conferences abroad, we realize that the others just absolutely do not care whether France is aware of its racism or not. ‘[…] The challenge is to show that Europe has been nothing but one additional province in the world.’” These kinds of emphases place the United States and Europe right at the center, when the original objective of global history was an eminently political project that would provide a counter-narrative to master
narratives. So instead of a globalization of history, as A.G. Hopkins posited in 2002, the opposite has manifested; it has led to more uniformity and less diversity.11

Linked to the above is the perception that global history had been hijacked by certain area studies, which consequently imposed their own historical and political agenda, thus creating frameworks, spatial segmentation, periodizations, and focal points that complicate the incorporation of Latin American history. One such example is that global history firmly situates the transition from colonial to post-colonial rule in the decade of the 1950s and 60s, yet does not take into consideration that Latin America’s de-colonization process took place at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Another that could be mentioned discusses slavery in the South Atlantic, many times presuming colonies on the nineteenth century. Another that could be mentioned discusses America’s de-colonization process took place at the beginning of the 1950s and 60s, yet does not take into consideration that Latin the transition from colonial to post-colonial rule in the decade of history. One such example is that global history firmly situates slavery in the South Atlantic, many times presuming colonies on both sides of the ocean were connected more than integrated.12

In sum, given the prevalence of English as a language and the imposition of Anglo-American academic values as a conditio sine qua non, it is not entirely surprising that Latin Americans and Latin Americanists are reluctant to participate in a project that disadvantages them from the outset. That resistance is manifest in many remarks on the supposed innovation brought by global history. For Chloé Maurel, for instance, “it is necessary to be vigilant regarding the possible ideological motivations present in the works of certain American global historians who, by shortcuts and hasty generalizations, conscious or not, are tempted to present a teleological history of the world, shaped according to certain socio-economic interests of their country.”13 The Brazilian historian Amado Cervo delivers an even more damning statement in stating that “the Anglo-Saxon tradition has almost no dialogue with international scholarship. It has already flooded the world with a harmful and unhealthy unilateral contribution.” He adds, “theories are unfounded in their knowledge base and inadequate to express the multiplicity of cultures, values and interests of all parts of the international society. If Global History goes down that road, it will receive the same critiques from scholarship. The risk exists: it has arisen in the United States[…]”14

It thus makes little sense to plow ahead and write a global history for a U.S. American and European audience. Rather, we should aim to write a global history that not only includes Latin America as a region but, crucially, engages with Latin American scholars and research, creating a common platform in the age of easy communication and circulation of knowledge. This is not just a question of respect, but speaks to the ethics of our profession: that we take both Latin American colleagues and our historic agents seriously.

The West vs. 'the Rest'? One might consider the last sentence hyperbole, but during discussions in Rio a consensus emerged that Latin American research is not taken as seriously as research on other parts of the world. There appears to be a clear hierarchy of “serious vs. soft” history, the former generally applied to U.S. and European history, and the latter to extra-European history or “the rest,” which is often relegated to the margins. Possibly, this is a result of a problematic development: Latin American sources are increasingly employed to lend international flavor to a research project; to tick the boxes, in a manner of speaking. This is particularly true for PhD students in the United States who are under immense pressure to internationalize in order to increase their chances on the job market. This underlying rationale is worrying, because many PhDs lack the language skills and the willingness to deeply and seriously engage with Latin American debates or historiography in Spanish or Portuguese.

A similar development can be observed in international history and particularly in the study of international organizations, where a certain global history “light” has emerged, seemingly ignoring that these are interconnected communities and elites that share lifestyles and values. As the recent political backlash has proven, this is the exception and not the rule, and does not reflect the social reality of many.15

Lastly, challenges to writing global history are also structural: the job market, academic culture, and hiring practices. This is particularly tricky for early career scholars who are forced to market themselves. Global history projects take a long time, which early career researchers do not have, as the next funding, job application or tenure committee is just around the corner. Fundamentally, it is a risky endeavor, as the time-consuming nature of it means that we often publish less. Then there is the question of travel funding. Scholars need much more funding to travel, more time off, and this is often hard to reconcile with administrative and teaching responsibilities. In an ever precarious and high-pressure academic market, this is clearly a disadvantage. As long as we operate within these systems and we face specific constraints, it raises the question of whether global history projects are feasible for early career scholars. However, if we fail to find an answer to this dilemma, then global history will remain the prerogative of the select few: an elite project for well-paid full professors with an army of research assistants and the necessary time on their hands.

Conclusion: Back to Roots We would also like to conclude with a few suggestions. In the era of Trump, Brexit and resurgent nationalism, it is ever more important that we reach out to provide counter-narratives that highlight the profoundly entangled histories of our societies and cultures. It is not without irony that the right-wing ethno-nationalist movements currently resurging on both sides of the North Atlantic are radically anti-globalization and yet profoundly transnational and global in their outreach. However, just because we academics live in a bubble of our interconnectedness, this is not equally true for everyone, so we need to do this without losing sight of equally important disconnections. Our place in the world matters profoundly, and with it, the cultural, material, and institutional constraints that come with it.

Language is the key. In the future, we should strive to work at least bilingually and actively seek space for more diversity. If one wants to engage with Latin American scholars, then Spanish must be a viable option, not to mention Portuguese, spoken by almost half of the Latin American population. Some journals have already taken that onboard and publish bilingual issues.

While borders seem to be hardening, and travel becoming more difficult, there are technological advances that can aid in connecting people with the necessary resources. Recent efforts to digitalize sources to make them more widely available as well as open access publications particularly benefit
Latin American scholars, for who access to costly journals and extensive travel funds are rare. Likewise, collaborations and the sharing of material offer opportunities that merit closer examination, as do joint projects where U.S. and European funds are shared with Latin American universities.

Despite the obstacles, we agreed that good research does not exclusively rely on funding, but on a range of interlinked factors, most importantly innovative ideas and good supervision. We can strive harder to make sure that not only that our students have the support but also to make available networks of which we are part.

When it comes to research, participants agreed that our goal should not be to write big history, but to show the global in everyday experiences, revealing forgotten connections. In sum, to go back to our roots: to write from within the region and with Latin American sources and to localize or provincialize global questions.

When it comes to research, participants agreed that our goal should not be to write big history, but to show the global in everyday experiences, revealing forgotten connections. In sum, to go back to our roots: to write from within the region and with Latin American sources and to localize or provincialize global questions.

1 The conference program can be accessed at: http://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/noticias/arquivos-relacionados/ghc_programa.pdf.


4 As Rafael Marquez and João Paulo Pimenta have indicated, we could mention the works from Cyril Lionel Robert James and Eric Williams from the first half of the twentieth century, for instance, or the world-system approach concerned with a long term analysis regarding development in the region. Rafael Marquez and João Paulo Pimenta, “Tradições de história global na América Latina e no Caribe,” História da Historiografia n. 17 (April 2015), 30-49. For an exhaustive review, see the special issue “Global and Transnational Approaches” of Estudios Históricos vol. 30, n. 60 (Jan-Apr 2017), http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/ree/issue/view/3114.


6 Yet, as Christopher Bayly rightly cautioned, we should not exaggerate historiographical shifts and the importance of terminology, in particular because they have distinct meanings in different cultural settings. Interview with Christopher Bayly, “I am not Going to Call Myself a Global Historian,” Itinerario Vol.31 Issue 1 (March 2007), 7-14.

7 Jeremy Adelman, “What is Global History Now?”


When presented with a choice, explained Fernand Braudel in a 1984 interview, “we decide only once.” 80 Fifty years earlier, at eleven o’clock at night, Braudel had received an unexpected invitation by pneumatic mail, a subterranean propulsion system designed for transmitting urgent messages. Indeed, time was of essence. George Dumas, head of the French-Brazilian Alliance and charged with staffing the fledgling University of São Paulo (USP), was down a member. The Sorbonne professor who was to teach the History of Civilization had died unexpectedly. Would Braudel take his place? 3

He would. He had, after all, spent a decade as a schoolteacher in Algiers. “The idea of going to Brazil seduced me,” he explained many years later. “I wanted to be a foreigner again.” 4 Braudel would begin his transatlantic voyage on the Marseille by shipping out across the Atlantic in February 1935. It was to be a profound and enduring experience: “those were the best years of my life,” he said. 1

This paper will examine the influence of Braudel’s “Brazilian” years on his life’s work and on that of Brazilian scholars in the decades to come. How did this unexpected adventure help shape his seminal The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II? Why was it a first reading of this text a “true liberation” in the 1950s for Evaldo Cabral de Mello, eminent historian of Dutch Brazil? Finally, how did Braudel’s work affect the Brazilian imagination of seventeenth century Recife under Dutch rule—what does this imply for recent, Atlanticized accounts of the colony? This paper will not delve into the details of either Braudel or Cabral de Mello’s prolific output. What I hope to offer here instead is a story of encounter, exchange, and global transformation—a narrative arc that bends far beyond Brazilian borders, and, perhaps for the longue durée.

What was the nature, history, and purpose of an interwar Franco-Brazilian cultural exchange? The concept of a “Latin” America had, after all, crystallized in the previous century, but why France—over Portugal, Italy, or, to the north, the United States? For one, the South American wars of independence resulted in a drive to national identity—distinct from Portugal and Spain. Too, creole elites who had rejected Iberian domination now affirmed their Latin identity over “Yankee imperialism.” 9 At the time, some Brazilians believed “they could only participate in the grand march of civilization by imitating the lifestyle and thought of Europeans, especially the French.” 10

Indeed, a French connection had been established in the previous century with the 1883 creation of the French Alliance. 11 This, however, was a commercial strategy on the part of the French: after all, Pierre Foncin, first secretary-general of the Alliance, noted that “all French speaking [countries] are natural clients of French products.” 12 One indicator of the program’s success is that from 1910-1915, Brazil imported an annual 2,858,000 francs worth of books. 13 Through World War I, so-called “Weeks of Latin America” were held in Lyon (1916), Paris (1917), and Bordeaux (1918), trumpeting the slogan “Republces of America, children of the French Revolution.” 14 Thus despite a relatively small population—among immigrants, behind Italians, Portuguese, Spanish, and Germans—the French, due to a long-term concerted effort, left a deep cultural impression.

The 1920s proved tumultuous in the major cities of Brazil. Tenentes (junior army officers) led rebellions against social injustice in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The result was political suppression in São Paulo, the industrial engine of the nation. 15 Culture, then, offered another avenue to national influence. This dialogue began as early as 1925, when the editor of the Estado de São Paulo, a circular with 110 thousand subscribers, bemoaned what he termed a “marked national deficiency” that included a dearth of universities capable of providing superior learning and developing elite “mental direction” for the nation. 16 Who would lead the way, if not the driven paulistanos? São Paulo already had a school of medicine and law. Soon, a university with a school of philosophy, sciences, and letters, was on the horizon—a vision that could only be realized, it was held, under French direction.

In 1929, as a young Fernand Braudel was completing the first drafts of his dissertation, Lucien Febvre would write that South America was a privileged place of study. 17 By 1934, USP—the University of São Paulo—was launched, as was a new urgency to recruit French professors to train Brazilian scholars. 18 It was at the end of this year that Braudel received his summons. For the next three years, he taught a survey course there on “the history of civilization.” 19 The experience would prove far more eventful than he ever imagined.

Braudel “the Brazilian”

“Tomorrow, on the 12th, at 5pm, Professor … Braudel, who has just come from France, having been contracted by the faculty of philosophy, sciences and letters, will give his inaugural [talk on the] history of civilization. Prof. Braudel’s classes will run Thursday, Fridays, and Saturdays, at 5pm in the amphitheater in the medical school building.” 20 So ran the April 11 advertisement in the Correio Paulistano under the column “About Schools” and titled “Inaugural Class of the History of Civilization.”

Braudel has said that in Brazil that he “became intelligent.” 21 In a later interview he backtracked—to a point. “That’s not actually the right term,” he said when asked about the famous comment. “Perhaps I became less common—or less banal.” 22 He explained to the interviewer: “In Brazil, I had to separate myself what I already knew from what I had experienced or lived, in order to communicate with the students. The students made me think another way.” 23 His classes at USP infused him with intellectual vigor. “I was forced to begin anew my intellectual life, teaching the history of civilization, the ancient worlds, the middle ages, and the modern world. In truth, the students in front of me forced me to rethink and re-explain. I’d go to class without notes—I’d listen and respond.” 24

On 22 September 1935, the Correio de São Paulo ran an announcement on the conferences held at the Law School. Talks would include “Latin, the Universal Language;” Professor Francesco Piccolo was to discuss “A Reformer of the 15th Century: Savonarola.” And on Thursday the 2nd of October, Fernand Braudel was to commence a series of three talks held on that day and subsequent Thursdays. They were:
The Mediterranean

However, he dedicated himself to study the philosophy of history. Had Braudel previewed “the Birth of Europe” with his students—hence the need, perhaps, for an additional week to clarify his thoughts? “It was very difficult to explain to Brazilian students what could be the History of Europe,” he said years later. “It’s not that they didn’t grant the importance of Europe, but they didn’t know her.”

So even as he taught courses in Greek and Roman history, as well as narrower subjects such as the unification of Germany, or the modern construct of Italy, Braudel explained that in Brazil he “became a completely different man … I don’t believe, for example, that I would have written a book on the Mediterranean much different from any other [on the topic] had I not lived in Brazil. The new history which I defended in [in my dissertation] I conceived, constructed, and dreamed of in Brazil … This is because that sort of history interested my students.”

Evaldo Cabral de Mello and the “vast panorama” of Dutch Brazil

Braudel’s students at USP were a mixed group—sons of up-and-coming farmers, and of the urban elite. In the beginning, however, more women—barred from law and medicine—enrolled in his courses than men. The governor’s representative would drop by on occasion. At times, the social tension was palpable. But the students were united by a scholar and educator who asked questions and listened; he also took them out of the classroom to study for instance, cartography, and paleography.

Braudel’s Brazilian students included, of course, those he never met, but who were moved to new imaginings of history as a result of his work. Evaldo Cabral de Mello’s first reading, in Spanish, of The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II proved to be a game-changer. By 1955, the Brazilian exchange student on study abroad in Spain and England had already switched his academic focus several times. Now, however, he dedicated himself to study the philosophy of history. The Mediterranean, for him, was “a true liberation.”

Evaldo Cabral de Mello would first pursue a long diplomatic career in the United States, and Europe; by his own admission, this helped round out and deepen his studies. His 1970s posting in France, for instance, afforded him the opportunity to attend the weekly seminar of Georgy Duby in the College of France and a few classes given by Emmanuel Ladurie. De Mello would recall that those were his years of historical maturation, for he also spent much time - most of his holidays, in fact - in the Portuguese archives. Of particular interest was the history of his home state of Pernambuco, which had been under Dutch domination from 1630-1654. His wonder with the seventeenth century did not abate with the publication of a Braudel’s revised, two-volume, Portuguese language edition of The Mediterranean a decade later. “I still recall the impression of enchanted truth in reading The Mediterranean in 1966 or 1967,” he said later. This edition produced for him a “revelation,” with regards to historiographical thinking. As a result, he would come to render seventeenth century Brazilian northeast in a new dimension—neither empirical, nor doctrinaire and Marxist, and with none of the reductionism, he claimed, of sociology.

So how had Brazilian historians construed Brazil’s past? Upon independence from Portugal, nineteenth century Brazilian historians were keen, of course, to construct a national history. This would include the twenty-four years of Dutch rule in the second wealthiest sugar producing captaincy of Pernambuco. Thus “state-sponsored Brazilian historians [studied, transcribed, and translated] relevant Dutch archival collections.” The experience of a short-lived Nieuw Holland, as it was also known, left a deep, physical impression on the region. This is particularly true of the capital city of Recife, where forts and bridges, constructed under Netherlandish supervision, stand as reminders of Dutch West India Company ambition.

Interest in this project—the deep history of the northeast, folded into a national narrative—declined at the turn of the twentieth century, as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro eclipsed the rest of the nation with their economic power. In the early 1930s, Johan Maurits von Nassau-Siegen, the one and only Dutch governor-general of Brazil, was all but written out of the history books during a decade of heightened nationalism. Few scholars risked mention, for instance, of the tercentenary of Maurits’ 1638 arrival in Recife.

Years later, Evaldo Cabral de Mello’s Olinda Restaurada (Restored Olinda) offered another departure from historical tradition. Published in 1975, the work reveals the social, political, military, economic aspects of Recife, capital of Pernambuco, during and after the time of the Dutch. Here, he aimed for a “total history.” Citing Braudel, he considered Pernambuco in the context of the “long 16th century” and the Brazilian antebellum period of the early 17th century. That is, Cabral de Mello placed Pernambuco in the wider perspective of the European contraction—the stagnation of sugar prices, the pressure of market competition, the progressive subordination of the Portuguese economy to that of England and the rise of conflict between the mazombos (American-born of European descent) and the commercial crown. In a marked departure from previous histories of the colony, he set the narrative in the context of the Eighty Years’ War—and —with a nod to Braudel, in the “vast panorama” of the 16th-19th centuries. One reviewer noted that this book had “created a regional history, which, paradoxically, was also global in scope.”

In the last few years, the failed colony of Dutch Brazil has been “Atlanticized” by scholars beyond Brazilian borders.
Special Section: The World from Latin America

But the experience of Braudel in Brazil and what resulted gives pause, perhaps, for new reflection. Clearly, the reach of *The Mediterranean* continues to cross maritime boundaries.

*A True Liberation*

“Brazil was a fountain of youth for those who came from Europe,” said Braudel of his time there in the 1930s with the French-Brazilian Alliance.37 Isn’t it always true that such encounters—in and out of the conference and the classroom—are what invigorate our own learning, as we reflect on new dimensions of research and understanding? Learning is a dialogue, and the polyglot has a marked advantage. Consider this: In his classes at the University of São Paulo, Fernand Braudel would speak in French, Spanish, and finally “if things really weren’t going well,” in Portuguese. 38

Braudel’s Brazilian relationships endured. His eulogy for former student and renowned USP professor Euripides Simões de Paula revealed the depth of his experience: recalling their time together in the mid-30s, Braudel wrote that Euripides “possessed the heart of a child, and I say that one is a historian, a real historian, when one [keeps this quality], open to surprise, to being able to be surprised by life and times past.”39

The unexpected invitation carries promise. In 1934, Braudel’s decision carried him worlds away. Travel, as we know, includes exhilaration and discomfort, excitement and stretches of tedium. Of course, we roam across time and space every day in our own work. But the journey is all the more interesting when great companions—“real” historians, like Braudel, speed us on our way. The camaraderie and communication—between teacher, student, and colleagues—isn’t this exchange, then, the truest liberation of all?

1 The author thanks J.T. Way for comments and encouragement on this paper, first developed for Princeton’s “Transformation of Global History” conference (2015). She also very much appreciates Jared Poley’s support and suggestion to develop this work further. Finally, she is most grateful for discussion and comments from engaged and engaging members at Princeton, as well as at this year’s World History Association conference.


8 Luís Corrêa Lima, *Fernand Braudel e o Brasil*, 52.

9 Ibid.


11 Ibid.


14 Ibid., 58.


18 Luís Corrêa Lima, *Fernand Braudel e o Brasil*, 104.

19 Ibid.


21 Ibid., 101.


25 Luís Corrêa Lima, *Fernand Braudel e o Brasil*, 100.

26 Ibid., 107.

27 Ibid., 100.
Finding Footprints of the Operation Condor: Cooperation Between Brazil and Uruguay in Communist Matters Before the Seventies

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In the last few decades, the study of Civilian-Military Dictatorships in Latin America have had a new boost with the increased access to documents regarding what is known as Operation Condor, which reached its peak in the seventies. The Operation consisted of coordinated actions by the governments of the Southern Cone, leading to the arrest, torture and assassination of political refugees exiled in the neighboring countries, supported by the North American government. It is also considered to be one of the most significant and traumatic legacies of Latin American history and “the widest and most articulate display of state terrorism in world history.”

Cold War historiography has, in recent years, shifted away from narratives of North American-dominated foreign policy towards a transnational approach. This allows us to envision a broader scenario that encompasses the history of the twentieth century. A close, transnational analysis of Operation Condor reveals shared practices of repression in the Southern Cone, related to the communist ideology, without being necessarily restricted to a period, a concept, or even the result of the pressure exerted by a hegemonic power. Thus Operation Condor should not be seen as an isolated event, but as the final stage of a long process of cooperation between the governments of South America in the repression and arrest of, and exchange of information on individuals considered to be political enemies of the State.

Our objective is to present a short summary of the exchange of information between the governments of Brazil and Uruguay in the fight against communist activities from the 1920s, a period prior to the start of the Cold War and the cycle of Civilian-Military Dictatorships. This unusual dialogue allows us to understand the stance taken by Latin American governments, which alternated between self-determination and adherence to North-American foreign policies when faced with hemispheric political challenges. Such an approach encourages a broader, more global perspective to the challenges of the twentieth century—and one that recasts Latin American agency in Operation Condor.

_The Russian Revolution: a Spur to Transnational Activism_

Latin America has never been isolated from the world political scenario. With the Russian Revolution in 1917, the threat to the liberal world, represented by the organization of the working classes in trade unions and associations, gained a new dimension. The internationalization of capital would be followed by the internationalization of labor. In Brazil, communism was considered a sociopolitical doctrine that was undesirable to the liberal state. Border controls by police authorities had to be changed so that it could include the suppression of such ideology. To that end, it would be necessary to strengthen international cooperation in the area of policing, by signing treaties that would allow the continuous updating of the structure for the repression of the new threat. According to the researcher Daniela Spenser, this transnational activism caused great concern to the intelligence agencies in the international scenario, leading them to keep the communists under tight “control” by means of preventive intelligence methods.

The first adaptation to this situation can be seen in the formalization of the International South American Police Treaty in 1920, signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay, which established the exchange of information on subversive activities and the submission of information on the practice of “acts aimed at a change in the social order.” In Brazil, these treaties were usually intermediated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called Itamaraty. Itamaraty played a key role in the Brazilian repressive structure, and one of its main roles was to convey and collect information that could represent an ideological threat to the _status quo_ of the Brazilian political elite. The diplomats, who were mostly descendants of the imperial aristocracy, had, since 1918, produced reports originating mainly from Europe, which stressed the dangers of the Russian Revolution and the consequent “attempt to destroy the Roman world by barbarians.”

_Uruguay—the Center of Communist Activities_

However, this exchange of information does not mean that the governments of the Southern Cone enjoyed unisonous discourse with regards to communist activities. Although it
was equally interested in suppressing communist activities, the Uruguayan government had a more tolerant attitude towards such politics. It was the only country in South America that established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (1926) and also the first country to host the first great meeting of communists in South America.11

The apparent freedom with which the communists lived and moved in Uruguay does not mean that the local police authorities were not strict. On the contrary, the communist movement in the country was controlled by the police authorities, who routinely arrested sympathizers and filed arrest records on them. Nevertheless, the Uruguayan government was also constantly questioned by its neighbors from the South and North as to the country’s high degree of tolerance with communist activities. At the time, the Uruguayan capital was commonly referred to in diplomatic circles as the communist “nest” or as the “little Moscow.”12 In response, the government argued that the soundness of the Uruguayan institutions and the insignificance of the local communist party rendered any threat completely harmless.13

At the same time that a climate of freedom was experienced in Uruguay, Brazil, like Argentina, witnessed a coup d’état known as the “Revolution of 1930” which brought Getúlio Vargas to power. According to Cancelli, the Revolution of 1930, besides rejecting “all the liberal ideology, considered to be obsolete, individualistic and the cause of inequalities” should “allow the disciplining of Brazilian society, who should, according to the new political model, obey the dictates of a modern and totalitarian State.” Also, according to the author, “it went from a policed society, until the 1930s, to a police State.”14

Despite the complaints of the neighboring governments, it seems quite probable that the Uruguayan territory provided a neutral space for both. The extension of the Uruguayan borders allowed the communists to enter the neighboring countries. At the same time, the formal and informal cooperation agreements entered into by Uruguay and its neighbors allowed the police authorities of other countries to act in the surveillance and control of communist activities outside of their territory. The Brazilian police kept an agent in Montevideo from 1931, who was in charge of monitoring the activities of The South American Bureau of the Communist International which was established in that capital in 1930.

Everything changed after the event in the Brazilian political history known as “the Communist Conspiracy of 1935.” The Conspiracy was an attempted uprising led by the communists in military barracks in Rio de Janeiro and in the Northeast, whose objective was to overthrow the government of Getúlio Vargas. The investigations that were conducted after the event led to the arrest of hundreds of people and also to the accusation that the main external support to the uprising had come from Uruguay.

In December 1935, the Brazilian government formally accused the Soviet legation in Montevideo of providing financial support to the leader of the Conspiracy, Luís Carlos Prestes. Although such allegations were never proven, the Uruguayan government backed Brazil and broke relations with the Soviet Union,15 a clear sign that the governments of the Southern Cone were united in the repression of communist activities.

The 1930s were also marked by a number of trans-Atlantic hemispheric cooperation agreements between the Brazilian government and international police authorities for the identification and control of “undesirable foreigners.” A list of foreign communists who took part in the Conspiracy was drawn up, for example, through cooperation between the Brazilian police and the British Intelligence Service.16 During that same period, the Brazilian government entered into an agreement with the Gestapo in exchange for information. In 1936, a number of catalogographic cards on communist activities in Brazil and in other countries were sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 1938, at the request of the Brazilian government, the FBI started providing assistance to the Brazilian police, including the control of foreigners.17

The Second World War

Generally, the historiography on this subject considers that the period that includes the Second World War is marked by greater political freedom and by the consequent reintegration of the communists in Latin American political life. This is partially due to the allies’ formal need to keep diplomatic relations with each other and also to the mobilization of the local communist parties in the war effort. This apparent truce, however, did not mean a weakening of anti-communist efforts. On the contrary, the war presented new possibilities. Take, for example, the creation of the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense of the Continent, created at the Rio Conference, in 1942, and whose headquarters were established in Montevideo. At first, the Committee was created in order to share and improve the methods for combating the advancement of totalitarian doctrines. The use of the term “totalitarian,” and not just Nazism or fascism, seems to have been a subterfuge that allowed the Committee to also study communism, which, at the time, was considered to be a totalitarian power.

The Committee became a great center for debates and discussions on the “totalitarian doctrine,” which was identified mainly with communism by some of its members. For the first time, the committee allowed the conduction of a comparative study of all the Latin American constitutions and existing laws, to combat subversion. When the Second World War was over, the committee continued to operate with the support of the governments, such as the Brazilian government who insisted that it was kept in order to take advantage of its structure to officially combat communism. Nevertheless, against the will of the governments of Brazil and Uruguay, the committee was abolished in 1948.

The consensus regarding the need to combat the “communist danger” through multilateral cooperation also helped to maintain regional stability. Keeping a body for the control of political ideologies also meant keeping control of the regime of Juan Perón. The Brazilian government feared that the Argentinian government could take advantage of the new military conflict to extend what it understood to be the “vice-kingdom of the Plata.” On the other hand, the government of Juan Perón was frequently hostile to the Uruguayan government, partially because the cities of Montevideo and Colônia do Sacramento started to receive a large number of political refugees who were against Juan Perón.18

The Cold War

The number and the speed of the national, regional, and international political events that took place between 1945 and
1948 cannot be described in this space. Basically, we share the view of the “political closure” of that period, developed by Leslie Bethel and Ian Roxborough, who divided the period into two phases: the first one covers the beginning of the post-war period and is characterized by a democratic opening, which would have allowed the active manifestation of popular movements and left-wing parties; followed by the second phase, between 1946 and 1948, marked by the suppression of democratic freedoms, symbolized by the repression of the trade union movement and the curtailment of left-wing parties. In October 1947, Brazil broke up diplomatic relations with the USSR. Uruguay kept diplomatic relations, but closed its embassy in Moscow.

The year of 1948 proved emblematic for the Continent. In April 1948, the assassination of the liberal political leader, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, in Bogota, which took place during the IX Pan-American Conference, resulted in riots. The press published the event as an act planned by communists. In that month, in Rio de Janeiro, the explosion of a Brazilian Army ammunition depot destroyed an area of approximately 1 km2 and raised suspicions of communist sabotage. In that same month, in the neighboring Uruguay, the government mobilized its troops due to rumors of an impending communist plot. At the beginning of October, Uruguayan communists who interrupted the screening of an anti-communist movie were arrested and tortured by the newly-created Police Intelligence Service. It is also important to add to these events, the entry into force of the so-called “Damned Law,” in Chile. The press and the police covered these activities extensively, an indication that communist activities were on the rise. Whether by coincidence or not, from the beginning of 1948, the governments of the Southern Cone were already collaborating to increase the exchange of repressive information. It is not known with certainty which government took the initiative, or if there was a previous agreement. But the fact is that the documentation found on this matter is significant.

Information circulated. For instance, in March 1948, the government of Chile also questioned the Brazilian government with regards to its interest in the creation of an “Official Letter on the Coordination of Pan-American Police Forces,” whose objective would be to centralize the police identification records of communists, to be shared by its member countries. This measure would be a continuation of the actions engendered by the Emergency Advisory Committee for the Political Defense of the Continent. The Brazilian government, through the Political and Social Police Division (DPS), was initially interested in the proposal, especially with regards to the sharing and standardization of police records and also because this initiative created a type of international police Department, aside from Itamaraty.

In January 1948, the Brazilian embassy in Buenos Aires informed of the interest of the Argentinian government in keeping, in the respective countries, two to three agents who specialized in the repression of communism. The Brazilian government took a long time to respond to the Argentinian proposal, leading the Brazilian ambassador to complain that Juan Perón had already questioned him on this matter on five different occasions. A few days later, at the end of February, the rulers of Argentina and Uruguay met on board of a yacht. The meeting was marked by a very tense atmosphere, and it was not possible to reach an effective bilateral agreement between the two countries. The only exception regarded the mutual understanding with respect to the advancement of communism in the continent. Several sources report that there was a special interest on both sides regarding the need for “coordinated action” of the respective police forces. When commenting on the meeting, the Chilean embassy in Montevideo informed that a very important officer of the Argentinian police would attend the meeting, “the head of the department in charge of these matters in Buenos Aires.”

The formalization of an agreement between the governments of Brazil and Argentina resonated in the rivalry between the two countries, and led to disagreements between the Brazilian police authorities. For instance, Antônio José de Lima Câmara, head of the Federal Department of Public Security supported the initiative, but Adauto Esmeraldo, who was in charge of the Political and Social Police Division (DPS) and directly responsible for the repression of communists, argued that there was no interest in formalizing the agreement, since the repression by the Argentinian government was sufficient to control communist activities. Moreover, keeping Peronist agents together with the Brazilian police would be unacceptable to the Brazilian authorities. In this same document, the DPS argued that Uruguay “should be prioritized,” because Brazilian communists travelled frequently to that country to make contact with members of the communist party, the trade union movement, and also with the Soviet embassy. The matter was, then, submitted to the Ministry of Justice, which agreed with the position to prioritize Uruguay.

Indeed, an agreement with Uruguay was already in progress. The initiative seems to have been taken at a meeting between the Brazilian Minister of Justice, Adroaldo Mesquita da Costa, and the ambassador of Uruguay, Enrique E. Bueiro, in the city of Rio de Janeiro. At this meeting, the ambassador of Uruguay requested information regarding the communist movement in Brazil and its international connections, and was particularly concerned with the situation at the border. The meeting was probably convened due to several reports issued by the Brazilian and Uruguayan authorities, at the end of 1947, regarding the increase of communist activities between the two countries. These rumors were further strengthened with the January 1948 impeachment of the communist parliament members by the Brazilian electoral court. There was great pressure by the Brazilian government to prevent political figures, such as Prestes and Portinari, from settling in Uruguayan territory.

Although we don’t have the exact details for the reasons to convene the meeting, there are several references in the researched diplomatic documentation. Among the documents researched at the Uruguayan embassy in Rio de Janeiro, there are references to two deliveries made to the Uruguayan Minister of the Interior, containing information and records on the communist issue. The absence of these details can be explained by the fact that the circulation of such information was confidential, even to the diplomatic channels. This became evident when the ambassador of Uruguay in Rio de Janeiro was reprimanded by its foreign office because an embassy employee had mistakenly sent the documentation through the normal channels. In response, the ambassador of Uruguay apologized, by saying: “Perhaps I am the...
person who most regrets this mistake.”

Upon returning from the meeting, Mesquita da Costa requested that the person in charge of the Ministry’s National Security Department, Hermógenes Brenha Ribeiro Filho, went personally to the embassy to talk about the situation of the communist movement in Brazil. In Hermógenes’ second visit to the embassy, his trip to Montevideo was arranged, so that he could meet with the Uruguayan police authorities and discuss the basis for the agreement on the exchange of information and police officers. However, prior to that, Hermógenes went to Rio Grande do Sul to meet with the Rio Grande do Sul’s police and get information on the communist movement at the border.13

The visit to Uruguay took place between February 2 and 4, 1948. Upon arriving in Montevideo, Hermógenes was personally received at the airport by Victor A. Bottias, the Director of Investigations, and by José Pedro Dodera, from the Intelligence Service. The Brazilian envoy would spend the next two days attending a number of meetings, the main one being held with the Minister of the Interior, Alberto Zubiria, and the Head of the Uruguayan Police, Alberto M. Fajardo. Subsequently, in a report, Hermógenes stated that he was impressed with the weakness of the Communist Party of Uruguay, and with the lack of interest of the Uruguayan people in communism and their love of freedom. According to the Brazilian envoy, this was actually the problem, since the communists took advantage of the lack of interest of the Uruguayan people to use the country as a base for the activities in the Southern Cone.14 The Chilean ambassador in Uruguay was of a similar opinion, and understood that the Uruguayan government was not aware of the communist problem, since it intended to combat it “ambiguously” by means of a “confusing and empty phraseology.”15

Besides the visits to the Uruguayan authorities, Hermógenes also went to the Brazilian embassy to introduce himself to the ambassador, José Roberto de Macedo Soares, when the embassy’s view on communism in Uruguay was expressed. What is important about this meeting is that it was held together with the Brazilian military attaché, Ernesto Geisel, who was an Army major at the time and the person who would become the future president of the Republic (1974–1979) at the height of Operation Condor. Something similar happened in Chile, with the young army officer, Augusto Pinochet, who, at the time, was in charge of a confinement camp for the members of the Chilean Communist Party, regulated by the law for the Defense of Democracy.

After this trip, the proposed agreement was approved by the Presidency of the Republic, which, in turn, requested Itamaraty to issue an opinion on the matter. At first, the diplomat from the Political Division (DPO) stated that a new agreement would not be necessary, since Uruguay was a signatory of the South American Police Agreement, of 1920. Uruguay was the only country that hadn’t ratified the Agreement, and, therefore, all it had to do was to ratify it.16 His superiors, however, disagreed, and argued that a simple administrative agreement would be faster and more efficient, since the “Brazilian communists were already in Uruguay.” Moreover, his superiors considered that “Uruguay seems to show goodwill towards Brazil, with regards to the repression of communism.”17 In March, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted the draft agreement.18

The Ministry of Justice agreed with the proposal in general, and just suggested an amendment to an item regarding the sharing of all the police records of the Brazilian government, since it considered that it was not advisable to share the content of certain records.19 In October of that same year, the Brazilian Congress approved an extradition agreement between the two countries, a clear indication that the agreement was much more than a simple administrative agreement.

Although it is not possible to state with certainty that the proposed police agreement for the exchange of information between the two countries was actually implemented, several references were found in the archives of Brazil and Uruguay which demonstrate clearly that there was a joint and progressive effort to control the supposed communist agents. A significant part of the operation of this repressive cooperation structure, which is mentioned here, can be seen during the 1950s and 1960s. The advent of the Cuban Revolution, a new threat and, undoubtedly, the most dangerous enemy to be faced, would lead the authorities to strengthen their cooperation agreements. In any case, it is important to look back at the scenario of 1948 and the sense of a search for a common view in the face of the communist ideology.

Conclusion

The brief documentation that is included in this essay allows us to make a number of considerations which, even if preliminarily, can lead us to fertile ground for future research: First, in line with the proposal of the thematic dossier, we consider that the empirical evidence analyzed here introduces interesting possibilities for reflection and interpretation on the history of the Cold War—in this case, a global story offered from a regional point of view. It is not a matter of denying the influence and the leadership of the United States in the region during the post-war period, but of uncovering the high level of independence that the regional elites had before the great powers with regards to the development of their anti-communist agenda. Even though the State Department controlled the circulation of people, agents and ideas, the documentation presented here allows us to transcend the much vaunted domination of the United States in the history of Latin American international relations.

Second, the deeply rooted anti-communist rhetoric is treated here as a force that connected and unified the political, diplomatic, police, and military elites around a common enemy from the 1920s. With the advent of the Russian Revolution, this anti-communist rhetoric was not, in fact, a product of North American rhetoric; it was a shared liberal discourse which unified local and regional Latin American elites and foreigners against a common enemy. This reflects broader historical processes that should be contextualized and further explored.

Third, the regional dynamics seen in the Southern Cone during those years reveals players, circumstances, and scenarios that traditionally go unnoticed in academic literature. When we invert the perspective of the analysis, supporting our argument by prioritizing Latin American sources, we can have a glimpse of the existence of a cold war at a regional level and not only with new players, but also of a different intensity. In the Uruguayan case, this is clear: the major concern at the beginning of the Cold War was not the distant Stalin, but the nearby Perón. However, this does not mean that Uruguay was neutral with regards to the
Cold War. In line with the regional actions, the same ruler who was considered to be ambiguous or even naive in relation to the communist issue, created the “Brigade,” the Intelligence Service whose objective was to closely monitor the activities of the party, its members and its regional and international networks.40

Fourth, although they have a different level of intensity, the anti-communist discourse and practices of both countries are based on the same principles and ideas, and they bring to light an element that is very important to explain the next phase of the history of the Cold War in Latin America, which includes the Civilian-Military Dictatorships. After the period in question, it can be seen that the powerful Brazil starts gradually taking the anticommunist leadership, which would be a decisive factor, not only with regards to Uruguayan internal affairs, but also to the Southern Cone, which is demonstrated by the work of Tanya Harmer on the coup against Salvador Allende in 1973.41 It regards something that is relevant, which would transcend the natural hegemonic tendency that existed at the time with the little Uruguayan neighbor.

Fifth, this view from the Southern Cone questions the classical timeline of the Cold War in Latin America that begins with the Cuban revolution. Inter-regional police agreements and exchange of information that took place from the 1920s forces us to expand and review this timeline.

Finally, terms such as “Cold War and Third World” and the “Cold War and Global South” limit Latin America in world history to perpetuate a central/peripheral view. Besides the need to re-discuss the timeline, it is also necessary to bridge borders and to see beyond both Eurocentric and narrow national characteristics. This will enable the development of a historiography that includes the circulation of ideas and political practices in a more dynamic way than the one that is currently produced.

The expression “Civilian–Military Dictatorship” is used here because the authors believe that the concept of “Military Dictatorships” leaves out the role of civilian society in the effective support of authoritarian regimes, which is the case of Brazil (1964-1985) and Uruguay (1973-1985).


4 One long-held view is that the Cold War reached South America with the Cuban Revolution. This then reduces events such as the fall of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 to traces of a North-American governmental anti-nationalist policy or, perhaps, of big stick diplomacy.

5 Anarchism was also characterized as undesirable at this time.


7 Daniela Spenser, ‘Unidad a toda costa’: la Tercera Internacional en México durante la presidencia de Lázaro Cárdenas, México (CIESAS, 2007), 11.

8 With regards to Uruguay, a recent study reports that the first attempt to formalize the cooperation between the police forces of Uruguay and Argentina started in the middle of the 19th century. Please see: Nicolás Duffau, “Propuestas orientales, concreciones rioplatenses. Redes delictivas, extradicion criminal y colaboracion policial en el Río de La Plata (1854-1865),” Revista Historia y Juicicia 8 (April 2017), 138-165.


11 At the May 1929 Congress of the Latin American Trade Union Confederation (CSLA).


Nova Fronteira, 1985), 16.


18 Archivo General de la Nación-Argentina (AGN-A), Departamento de Archivo Intermedio (DAI), Ministerio del Interior, Fondo Secretos, Confidenciales y Reservados (MISCR), Caja No. 118, Expediente 76, Caja No. 126, Expediente 585, Caja No. 130, Expediente 466.


20 In South America, besides Brazil, the governments of Chile, Colombia and Venezuela also broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1947.


22 “Ley Maldita” banned the Communist Party of Chile and excluded over 25,000 people from the electoral lists. See Carlos Hunees, *La guerra fría chilena: Gabriel González Videla y la Ley Maldita* (Santiago de Chile, Debate, 2009).


25 AHRME-BR. Cyro Freitas Valle to Raul Fernandes, telegram No. 73, Buenos Aires, February 27, 1948.


35 AGH-MRE, Chile, Embajada de Chile en Uruguay, Embajador Sergio Montt a Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Confidencial No. 89/15, Montevideo, 19 de abril de 1948, “Medidas precautorias del gobierno ante temor asonada comunista.”

36 AHRME-BR (Historical Archives of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Braz Florentino Garcia de Souza to the head of the Political Division, confidential memorandum. Rio de Janeiro, March 04, 1948.

37 AHRME-BR. confidential memorandum No. 33, Political Division. Rio de Janeiro, April 01, 1948.


40 In this respect, it can be deduced that the excessive repression of the Uruguayan police during the screening of the movie “The Iron Curtain” is not necessarily related to the danger posed by local communists, but an indication to the regional players of its commitment to combating communism.

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